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CAMBRIDGE  SOUTH  ASIAN  STUDIES 

THE  SWATANTRA  PARTY 

AND 
INDIAN  CONSERVATISM 


CAMBRIDGE  SOUTH  ASIAN  STUDIES 

These  monographs  are  published  by  the  Syndics  of  Cambridge 
University  Press  in  association  with  the  Cambridge  University 
Centre  for  South  Asian  Studies.  The  following  books  have 
been  published  in  this  series : 

Gopal,  S.,  British  Policy  in  India,  1858-190$ 

Palmer,  J.  A.  B.,  The  Mutiny  Outbreak  at  Meerut  in  1857 

Obeyesekere,  G.,  Land  Tenure  in  Village  Ceylon 

Das  Gupta,  A.,  Malabar  in  Asian  Trade,  17 40-1800 


w^mi^amtmm 


THE  SWATANTRA  PARTY 

AND 
INDIAN  CONSERVATISM 


BY 

HOWARD  L.  ERDMAN 

Assistant  Professor  of  Government 
Dartmouth  College,  U.S.A. 


CAMBRIDGE 

AT  THE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1967 


Published  by  the  Syndics  of  the  Cambridge  University  Press 

Bentley  House,  200  Euston  Road,  London,  N.W.i 
American  Branch:  32  East  57th  Street,  New  York,  N.Y.  10022 


Library  of  Congress  Catalogue  Card  Number:  67-27128 


Printed  in  Great  Britain 

at  the  University  Printing  House,  Cambridge 

(Brooke  Crutchley,  University  Printer) 


^H^H^^BH^^^^H 


TO  MY  PARENTS 


I 


T^^^^nv^^^^MK^^^^H^^^^^M^^^^^Ha^^^^^^H^^H 


CONTENTS 

Preface  PaSe  Lx 

i    Comments  on  Conservatism  i 

2  Indian  Right- Wing  Politics:  Social  and  Doctrinal  10 
Aspects 

3  Indian  Right- Wing  Politics :  Political  Parties  46 

4  The  Birth  of  a  Party  65 

5  The  Swatantra  *  Inner  Circle'  82 

6  The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope  109 

7  The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power  147 

8  Swatantra  Doctrine  188 

9  Electoral  Adjustments  2I2 

10  Swatantra:  Achievements,  Problems,  and  Prospects  245 

Appendices 

1    A  Note  on  the  1967  Elections  261 

11  Tables  2<s9 

Notes  278 

Bibliography  34° 

Index  353 


l^^^i^^Hl^wi 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  about  the  background,  emergence,  and  growth  of  one 
Indian  political  party  which  came  into  existence  in  mid-1959  and 
which,  at  the  time  of  writing,  had  by  no  means  reached  the  stage 
where  an  epitaph  was  in  order.  Counsels  of  prudence  might, 
therefore,  have  dictated  a  postponement  in  the  writing  and  publi- 
cation of  this  volume,  until  more  data  were  available  and  the  dust 
had  settled  somewhat.  Still,  some  students  of  politics  rush  in 
where  historians  fear  to  tread;  but  there  seems  considerable 
justification  for  such  apparent  rashness.  For  one  thing,  nothing  of 
any  consequence  has  been  written  about  the  Swatantra  Party,  one 
of  the  major  political  forces  in  India  from  1959  to  1966,  at  least; 
and  for  another— and  more  important— very  little  has  been  written 
on  the  general  subject  of  conservative  politics  in  India.  By  pro- 
viding considerable  background  material  and  by  emphasizing 
factors  more  enduring  than  who  happens  to  be  second  vice- 
president  at  a  particular  time,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  give 
this  book  more  'staying  power'  than  it  might  seem  to  have  at  first 
glance.  Readers,  and  time,  will  tell. 

This  being  said,  it  is  still  true  that  since  this  book  was  first 
drafted,  a  distressingly  large  number  of  Swatantra  luminaries 
have  died  or  left  the  party,  requiring  some  substantial  revisions  of 
the  text.  At  some  points— as  in  the  creation  of  the  new  states  of  the 
Punjab  and  Haryana— insufficient  material  could  be  mustered, 
and  the  text  was  allowed  to  stand,  despite  new  developments. 
Only  benevolent  intervention  from  on  high  could  assure  that  the 
final  text,  as  it  last  left  the  typewriter,  would  in  most  substantial 
respects  be  up-to-date  at  the  time  of  publication.  The  reader's 
indulgence  is  begged  if  he  has  to  keep  current  Times  of  India 
cuttings  inside  the  cover  of  the  book. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  may  only  be  an  embarrassment  to 
those  whose  help  is  appreciated  to  have  their  names  mentioned 
here.  Still,  I  should  like  to  express  my  deepest  gratitude  to 
Professors  Lloyd  and  Susanne  Rudolph  (now  of  the  University  of 
Chicago)  and  to  Dr  Harrington  Moore,  Jr.,  who  painstakingly  and 
affectionately— but  with  often  distressingly  honest  criticism- 
directed  the  Harvard  University  dissertation  upon  which  this  book 

ix 


Preface 

is  based;  and  these  same  people  have  been  involved  subsequently 
in  its  wholesale  revision.  Thanks  are  due  also  to  Professor  Myron 
Weiner,  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology,  who  read  the 
manuscript  in  toto  and  who  rendered  valuable  criticism  as  well  as 
encouragement  and  who  generously  made  available  some  pertinent 
manuscript  material  of  his  own;  and  to  my  Dartmouth  colleagues, 
Professors  Henry  Ehrmann,  Kalman  Silvert,  and  Vincent  Star- 
zinger,  who  have  given  valuable  aid  and  encouragement  at  various 
important  junctures.  Debts  of  gratitude  are  also  due  to  Harvard 
University  and  the  Fulbright  Foundation  for  jointly  sponsoring  a 
year  of  research  in  India  in  1962-3;  to  Professor  R.  Bhaskaran  of 
the  University  of  Madras,  who  was  of  much  help  during  that  year; 
to  the  Comparative  Studies  Center,  Dartmouth  College,  for  sup- 
port of  research  time  in  1964-5  and  for  supplementing  a  grant 
from  the  American  Institute  of  Indian  Studies,  to  make  possible  a 
second  trip  to  India  in  1966-7,  when  much  up-dating  was  under- 
taken. 

In  India,  too,  splendid  co-operation  was  forthcoming  from 
officials  and  members  of  the  Swatantra  Party,  too  numerous  to 
mention  to  the  last  man  here.  I  would  be  remiss  in  my  duty, 
however,  if  I  did  not  thank  Mr  M.  R.  Masani,  General-Secretary 
of  the  Swatantra  Party,  for  authorizing  the  opening  of  certain  party 
files  for  my  benefit;  his  able  executive  assistant,  Mr  S.  V.  Raju, 
for  steering  me  through  those  files  and  for  providing  much  valuable 
information  both  while  I  was  in  the  United  States  and  in  India; 
Mr  A.  P.  Jain  of  the  Swatantra  parliamentary  office,  for  similar 
assistance;  Mr  Noorul  Arfin,  personal  assistant  to  the  Raja  of 
Ramgarh,  for  keeping  a  steady  stream  of  information  about  Bihar 
and  Orissa  affairs  flowing  to  me;  and  Major  Thakur  Raghubir 
Singh  of  Bissau,  not  only  for  similar  help  but  also  for  his  kindness 
in  allowing  me  to  use  his  Jaipur  home  as  research  headquarters  and 
residence  for  six  hectic  weeks.  I  know  that  much  that  I  have  already 
written  on  Swatantra  has  not  met  with  the  approval  of  many  party 
members  who  were  generous  with  their  time  and  help,  and  this 
book  will  doubtless  be  cause  for  further  distress.  I  only  hope,  at 
least,  that  I  have  not  abused  their  confidence  in  any  way. 

Thanks  are  also  due  to  the  editors  of  Asian  Survey,  Pacific 
Affairs,  and  the  Journal  of  Developing  Areas  for  allowing  me  to 
reproduce  material  from  my  articles  which  appeared  earlier  in  their 
publications;  and  to  the  Hutchinson  Publishing  Group,  Ltd.,  for 


Preface 

allowing  me   to   reproduce   the   tables   from  Professor  W.  H. 
Morris- Jones'  Government  and  Politics  of  India. 

Finally,  as  research  assistant-critic-typist-indexer,  my  wife 
Joan,  and  my  young  daughter  Karen,  deserve  affectionate  mention. 
The  former,  in  addition  to  her  work,  has  submitted  twice  to 
travelling  almost  ceaselessly  throughout  India,  while  at  the  same 
time  being  something  of  a  book- writer's  widow.  The  latter  in- 
variably brought  good  humour  into  sundry  oppressively  serious 
offices,  to  good  advantage.  And  this  book  is  dedicated  to  my 
parents,  whose  many  sacrifices  made  my  education  possible. 

Baroda,  India  H.  L.  E. 

December  1966 


xx 


ABBREVIATIONS  USED  IN  THE  TEXT 

AIAF  All-India  Agriculturalists'  Federation 

AICC  All-India  Congress  Committee 

COC  Central  Organizing  Committee  (of  the  Swatantra  Party) 

CPI  Communist  Party  of  India 

CSP  Congress  Socialist  Party 

DK  Dravida  Kazagham 

DMK  Dravida  Munnetra  Kazagham 

FFE  Forum  of  Free  Enterprise 

FICCI  Federation  of  Indian  Chambers  of  Commerce  and 
Industry 

INDC  Indian  National  Democratic  Congress 

IPLP  Independent  Progressive  Legislature  Party 

KLP  Krishikar  Lok  Paksh 

MLA  Member  of  (state)  legislative  assembly 

MP  Member  of  Parliament 

PEPSU  Patiala  and  Eastern  Punjab  States  Union 

PSP  Praja  Socialist  Party 

RRP  Ram  Rajya  Parishad 

RSS  Rashtriya  Swayamsevak  Sangh 

UP  Uttar  Pradesh 


xn 


CHAPTER    I 

COMMENTS  ON  CONSERVATISM 

The  formation  of  the  Swatantra  Party  in  1959  represented  an  effort 
on  the  part  of  some  of  India's  most  distinguished  public  figures 
to  build  a  '  non-leftist '  opposition  to  the  ruling  Congress  Party. 
This  book  is  intended,  first  and  foremost,  to  describe  in  detail  the 
background,  genesis,  and  subsequent  development  of  Swatantra. 
It  is,  to  use  some  current  terminology,  a  study  of 'interest  aggrega- 
tion' in  India.1  In  addition,  however,  this  study  will  also  define 
what  type  of  non-leftist  party  Swatantra  has  or  is  likely  to  become. 
To  be  more  specific,  the  relationship  of  Swatantra  to  Indian 
conservatism  is  used  as  the  principal  focal  point.  Other  approaches 
could  easily  have  been  taken,  but  this  one  seemed  the  most  fruitful, 
given  the  present  state  of  the  literature  on  Indian  politics.2 

conservatism:  common  usage  and 
common  problems 

The  term  conservatism  is,  however,  sufficiently  ambiguous  that 
some  mention  must  be  made  of  its  usage  here.  To  be  sure,  con- 
servatism (as  etymology  suggests)  denotes  a  response  to  a  challenge, 
a  response  which  seeks  to  preserve,  conserve,  sustain,  etc.  It  is 
evident,  too,  that  the  frame  of  reference  must  be  that  which 
actually  exists — otherwise  the  idea  of  conserving  would  not  be 
relevant.  Thus,  Huntington,  emphasizing  the  doctrinal  aspect, 
defines  conservatism  as  'the  ideological  justification  of  established 
social  and  political  institutions '  in  response  to  '  a  clear  and  present 
danger  to  the  institutions'.3  Granting  that  defenders  of  established 
institutions  generally  do  advance  some  ideological  justification,  we 
shall  not  insist  upon  this  here;  nor  shall  we  employ  a  distinction 
between  traditionalism  (non-ideological)  and  conservatism  (ideo- 
logical) as  is  sometimes  done.4 

These  minor  points  do  not,  however,  get  to  the  heart  of  the 
difficulty  in  using  the  term  conservatism.  Huntington's  definition 
is  intended  to  cover  any  group  which  defends  any  established 
institutions,  no  matter  how  divergent  these  groups  or  institutions 
may  be.  This  is  akin  to  Michels'  'technically  political'  usage  of 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

conservatism,  which  'means  a  tendency  to  maintain  the  status  quo 
regardless  of  what  that  may  be'.  In  this  sense,  the  word  is  'devoid 
of  philosophical  content,  and  one  may  logically  designate  as  con- 
servative the  most  disparate  parties  and  factions'.5  As  Friedrich 
puts  it,  'conservatism  shows  very  diverse  forms  in  different 
countries  at  different  times,  for  it  is  by  definition  concerned  with 
maintaining  the  existing  order. .  .Hence  the  programmatic  view- 
point, the  ideal  objectives  of  conservatives  are  variable  in  the 
extreme'.6  Oakeshott  insists  that  conservatism  is  not  'connected 
with  any  particular  beliefs  about  the  universe,  about  the  world  in 
general  or  about  human  conduct  in  general',  and  he  adds  further 
that  'what  is  esteemed  is  the  present;  and  it  is  esteemed  not  on 
account  of  its  connections  with  a  remote  antiquity  [pace  Burke], 
nor  because  it  is  recognised  to  be  more  admirable  than  any  possible 
alternative,  but  on  account  of  its  familiarity...'7  One  logical 
corollary  of  such  views,  with  Michels,  is  that  'a  party  conservative 
in  this  sense  may  in  the  past  have  been  revolutionary  and  without 
any  change  of  theoretical  position. .  .may  have  become  technically 
conservative  on  the  successful  completion  of  the  revolution'.8 

Needless  to  say,  the  implications  of  such  an  approach  have 
troubled  many  writers;  and  even  some  of  those  just  cited  have 
provided  alternative  approaches  which  restrict  the  meaning  of 
conservatism  somewhat.  Mannheim  would  limit  its  use  to  the 
ideological  response  of  one  class  (the  aristocracy)  at  one  point  in 
time.9  Others  are  less  restrictive  and  less  precise  but  also  strive  for 
limitation.  Michels  talks  of  a  second  approach  to  conservatism  in 
which  it  has  a  'philosophical  use  and  meaning'  and  'in  which  case 
it  implies  a  particular  Weltanschauung';  10  Oakeshott  insists  that 
'to  be  conservative  is  to  be  disposed  to  think  and  behave  in  certain 
manners;  it  is  to  prefer  certain  kinds  of  conduct  and  certain  condi- 
tions of  human  existence  to  others;  it  is  to  be  disposed  to  make 
certain  kinds  of  choices '  ;n  and  Viereck  cites  distinctive  attitudes 
toward  'human  nature,  history,  tradition,  and  the  tempo  of 
change'.12  In  general,  a  conservative  is  seen  to  prefer  stability  and 
prefers  change  which  is  gradual  and  which  maintains  continuity; 
he  will  himself  decline  to  be  an  important  innovator  and  will  place 
the  burden  of  proof  on  those  who  favour  change;  he  will  be 
sceptical  of  the  power  of  reasoning  even  among  a  given  society's 
best  talents  and  he  will  be  sceptical  of  the  reliability  of  the  'masses ', 
unless  properly  led;  and  he  will,  to  use  Viereck's  words,  engage  in 


Comments  on  Conservatism 

'  spiritual  arithmetic ',  calculating  the  moral  price  paid  for  material 
progress.13  This  narrows  the  scope  of  conservatism,  along  the 
lines  of  current  usage,  but  it  does  not  establish  a  precise  definition  in 
terms  of  which  this  study  can  be  easily  and  unambiguously  located. 

Whatever  the  ultimate  merits  of  alternative  approaches  may  be, 
it  will  have  to  suffice  for  present  purposes  to  indicate  the  approach 
taken  here.  First,  conservatism  is  primarily  (if  not  exclusively, 
with  Mannheim)  associated  with  the  aristocratic  defence  of  the 
feudal-agrarian  ancien  regime.  Secondly,  conservatism  has  also 
come  to  refer  to  middle-class  resistance  to  more  radical,  lower- 
class  demands.  This,  for  example,  follows  Friedrich's  view  that 
conservatism  'is  primarily  compounded  of  the  groups  and  interests 
who  happen  to  be  "in  possession",  the  "haves". . .  \14  This  does 
not  mean  that  all  individuals  at  a  given  social  level  and  at  a  given 
point  in  time  resort  to  the  same  actions  or  doctrinal  formulations ; 
nor  does  it  mean  that  only  those  '  in  possession '  are  relevant  to  a 
study  of  conservatism.  It  means  only  that  historically  the  two 
principal  manifestations  of  conservatism  have  been  associated  in 
gross  terms  and  in  terms  of  leadership  with  the  aristocracy  on  the 
one  hand  and  propertied  middle-class  interests  on  the  other. 

Put  somewhat  differently,  we  shall  follow  the  lines  suggested  by 
Silvert,  who  said  that  it  may  safely  be  assumed  that  'groups  which 
have  would  like  to  keep  what  they  have'  but  that  before  we  can 
translate  this  into  meaningful  terms,  we  need  to  know  'what  they 
think  they  will  permit  themselves  to  do  toward  that  end. . .,  how 
much  real  power  they  have  relative  to  other  social  groups . . . ,  and 
the  actual  state  of  the  competitive  situation  in  which  they  find 
themselves  \15  Moore's  seminal  work  and  the  best  of  the  Marxist 
literature  certainly  proceed  along  these  lines;16  and  only  through 
an  examination  of  such  issues  can  the  nature  (e.g.  the  intensity, 
cohesion,  substance,  effectiveness,  latent  potential)  of  a  given 
conservative  response  be  fully  intelligible.  Thus,  the  present 
study  will  locate  certain  key  groups  'in  possession'  and  it  will 
examine  in  some  historical  detail  the  process  of  challenge  and 
response  as  it  has  affected  these  groups  and  the  manner  in  which 
they  interact. 

This  having  been  said,  there  are  still  certain  problems.  What  if 
divergent  traditions  exist  within  the  same  country,  and  what  if 
different  social  and  political  institutions  exist  side-by-side,  on  a 
territorially  segmented  basis?  What  if  an  aristocracy  is  not  fully 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

supplanted  by  a  middle-class  group  and  a  more  radical  movement 
arises  to  challenge  both?  Are  the  defenders  of  diverse  traditions 
within  the  same  political  unit  equally  conservative,  or  can  we  differ- 
entiate among  them?  Are  all  opponents  of  radical  regimes  on  the 
same  footing,  or  can  we  differentiate  among  them? 

Many  of  the  sources  already  cited  reflect  this  problem.  Hunting- 
ton states  that  the  French  middle  classes  'had  to  face  in  two 
directions'  and ' expounded  liberal  ideas  against  the  aristocrats  and 
conservative  ideas  against  the  masses5.17  Similarly,  Friedrich  states 
that  the  liberals,  after  challenging  the  ancien  regime,  found  that 
'the  more  radical  socialist  elements'  were  becoming  'the  effective 
opposition';  and  at  that  point,  the  liberal  movement  'begins  to 
adopt  a  defensive  attitude,  and  insofar  as  it  does,  it  becomes 
conservative'.18  These  writers  surely  do  not  mean  that  the  views  of 
the  aristocratic  and  middle-class  interests  were  identical,  yet  at 
least  in  some  situations  both  groups  are  termed  conservative. 
Viereck  takes  a  perhaps  more  helpful  line  by  stating  only  that 
conservatives  and  liberals  may  join  hands  for  certain  purposes, 
while  they  'will  continue  to  differ  about  human  nature,  history, 
tradition,  and  the  tempo  of  change'.19  Certainly  if  both  aristo- 
cratic and  middle-class  interests  exist  side-by-side,  sometimes  in 
opposition  to  one  another  and  sometimes  associated  in  resisting 
radical  demands,  we  must  maintain  some  distinction  between 
them.  And  even  if  one  privileged  class  seemingly  abandons  its 
claims  against  another,  in  pursuit  of  a  common  effort  against 
radical  demands,  we  must  surely  emphasize  the  element  of  latent 
conflict,  which,  under  changed  circumstances,  could  become 
manifest.  Such  an  approach  is  indispensable,  if  we  are  to  make 
sense  out  of  the  Indian  case. 

Another  area  of  ambiguity  concerns  the  possibility  of  divergent 
approaches  by  the  same  individual  or  group  to  change  in  social, 
economic,  and  political  spheres.  What,  for  example,  if  an  aristocrat 
mechanizes  previously  traditionally  farmed  estates  or  establishes 
modern  industrial  enterprises,  while  still  insisting  on  the  divine 
right  of  aristocrats  to  dominate  society?  Is  such  an  aristocrat  con- 
servative or  not?  One  could  attempt  to  define  some  'average'  or 
general  tendency,  embracing  all  public  views,  but  this  would 
obscure  much  that  is  important.  Alternatively,  one  could  emphasize 
a  single  factor,  as,  for  example,  the  overall  power  relationships 
among  major   social  groups.    Such   an   approach  seems   more 


Comments  on  Conservatism 

satisfactory  than  the  previous  one,  but  it  has  deficiencies  of  its  own, 
viz.  it  might  fail  to  point  up  adequately  the  differences  between 
technologically  progressive  traditional  elites  and  those  who  were 
not,  and  between  those  who  were  'Tory  democrats'  and  those 
who  were  not.  An  approach  which  did  not  specify  such  dis- 
tinctions would  be  of  limited  value;  and  it  would  seem  more  useful 
to  indicate  views  on  social,  economic,  and  political  matters, 
indicating  both  departures  from  and  adherence  to  tradition  in 
each  area,  with  due  attention  to  the  impact  on  the  overall  pattern 
of  power  relationships. 

Implicit  in  many  of  the  preceding  remarks  is  one  final  problem 
which  must  be  noted  here  in  preliminary  fashion:  the  use  of  con- 
servative and  often  allied  terms  such  as  reactionary  and  rightist. 
Huntington,  for  example,  states  that  'in  France ...  aristocratic 
thought,  once  conservative,  rapidly  became  reactionary  and 
eventually  became  radical'.20  Viereck,  referring  to  differences 
between  Burke  and  Maistre,  argues  that  'the  former  is  evolu- 
tionary; the  latter  counter-revolutionary.  Both  favor  traditions 
against  the  innovations  of  1789,  but  their  traditions  differ. .  .The 
latter... is  often  called  not  "conservative"  but  "reactionary".' 
Agreeing  substantially  with  Huntington  in  this  respect,  Viereck 
adds  that  the  reactionary 

sometimes  seems  just  as  radical  against  the  existing  present  as  the  radical 
Jacobin  or  the  Marxist,  only  in  the  opposite  direction.  The  Burkean,  in 
contrast,  does  come  to  terms  with  the  reality  of  inevitable  change.  But 
he  does  so  without  the  liberal's  optimism  and  faith  in  progress. .  .But 
that  distinction  (between  conservative  and  reactionary)  must  not  be 
over-simplified  or  over-applied .  Many  conservatives  do  not  fully  lend 
themselves  to  neat  pigeon-holing  in  either  category  but  overlap. .  .21 

Finally,  Michels  notes  that  his  'philosophical  conservative'  often 
'tends  to  desert  his  ideology  if  changes  are  brought  about  despite 
him,  and  to  take  on  a  new  attitude  favouring  change  (change  in  a 
backward  direction,  i.e.  reaction) . . .  \22  Even  a  cursory  reading  of 
Rogger  and  Weber's  The  European  Right  will  indicate  the  con- 
siderable difficulties  in  defining  the  'radical  right'  and  in  relating 
it  to  conservatism  and  reaction.23  We  may  ask,  for  example,  if  a 
reactionary  in  Huntington's  sense  is  not  ipso  facto  radical  as  well, 
as  Michels  suggests?  If  so,  how  does  a  reactionary  differ  from 
a  right  radical?  How  does  one  decide  when  a  conservative  is 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

transformed  into  a  reactionary  or  a  right  radical?  These  are  not 
easily  answered  questions. 

Acknowledging  these  difficulties,  we  shall  still  employ  these 
various  terms  in  the  study  of  Swatantra.  The  term  rightist  or 
right  wing  will  be  used  broadly  to  cover  all  people,  parties,  and 
doctrines  categorized  more  specifically  as  conservative,  reactionary, 
and  right  radical.  The  term  reactionary  will  refer  to  efforts  to  re- 
establish some  system  which  actually  or  substantially  existed  at 
one  time  but  which  has  been  (largely)  displaced.  The  term  right 
radical  will  denote  efforts  which  tend  strongly  to  be  authoritarian, 
chauvinistic,  and  militant,  which  seek  to  establish  mass-mobiliza- 
tion regimes  through  the  use  of  religio-cultural  symbols,  charisma, 
and  the  like,  and  which  tend  strongly  toward  fascism.  The  term 
conservative  will  refer  to  efforts  to  sustain  some  more  or  less  stable, 
ordered  system  which  in  fact  exists  at  a  given  historical  moment 
(or  which  very  recently  existed),  by  contrast  with  both  reactionary 
and  right  radical  efforts  which  will  be  critical  of  such  a  system. 
Whatever  the  abstract  merits  or  universal  applicability  of  such  a 
classification  may  be,  it  works  tolerably  in  the  Indian  case.  More 
important  is  the  fact  that  we  are,  in  any  event,  more  interested  in 
analysing  certain  major  political  developments  in  India  than  we 
are  in  quibbling  over  the  words  used  to  refer  to  them. 

conservatism:  the  Indian  case 

The  Indian  case  presents  us  with  much  that  is  familiar,  but  it 
presents  some  important,  distinctive  features  as  well.  There  is  no 
difficulty,  for  example,  in  locating  an  indigenous  aristocracy  (the 
so-called  native  princes — maharajas,  rajas,  nawabs,  etc. — and 
landed  nobles— jagirdars,  taluqdars,  zamindars,  etc.)  whose  response 
to  challenges  will  satisfy  the  search  for  aristocratic  conservatism. 
However,  the  absence  of  stable,  indigenous,  macro-political  institu- 
tions and  the  absence  of  broad  class  identifications  and  cohesion 
have  meant  that  there  was  no  national  focal  point  for  aristocratic 
conservatism.  The  latter  was  at  best  regional;  and  often  it  formed 
around  antagonistic  individual  rulers.  The  absence  of  a  cohesive 
body  of  *  lords  temporal'  is  paralleled  on  the  religious  side,  where 
we  find  no  cohesive  body  of 'lords  spiritual'— the  latter  meaning 
that  Hinduism  has  no  organized  'church'— to  serve  as  a  focal 
point  for  religious  conservatism.  All  of  this  is  part  of  the  more 


Comments  on  Conservatism 

general  problem  of  social  fragmentation  in  India,  to  which  count- 
less writers  have  referred.24 

Moreover,  in  about  half  of  India,  princely  polities  were  swept 
aside  by  the  British,  and  different  institutions  and  values  and  new 
social  classes  came  to  the  fore,  ultimately  to  lead  to  parliamentarism. 
In  the  rest  of  the  country,  princely  polities  were  nominally  re- 
tained, but  became  atrophied.  Are  the  defenders  of  princely  India 
and  of  British  Indian  institutions  both  conservative  and  on  a  par, 
or  is  the  princely  tradition  more  authentically  Indian  and  its 
defenders  more  authentically  conservative?  Are  the  surviving 
aristocrats  to  be  called  conservative,  if  they  defended  their 
patrimonies  which  were  at  least  nominally  retained;  or  are  they  to 
be  called  reactionary,  because  the  social  order  which  they  repre- 
sented had  been  largely  displaced,  de  facto,  if  not  de  jure}  In  this 
study,  aristocratic  conservatism  will  be  accorded  higher  'status' 
than  that  relating  to  British  India,  and  the  defenders  of  the 
princely  regimes  will  be  called  conservative,  unless  they  argue  for  a 
more  or  less  complete  restoration  of  such  regimes  along  pre- 
British  lines. 

There  is  yet  another  complication.  The  historic  weakness  of 
India's  macro-political  institutions,  the  instability  of  the  princely 
polities  and  the  fate  which  befell  them,  and  the  pro-British  stand 
ultimately  taken  by  most  leading  aristocrats  combined  to  lead 
many  Indians  to  hold  that  the  'real'  India  had  nothing  whatever 
to  do  with  the  princely  states.  For  them,  the  real  India  was  to  be 
found  in  the  three  pillars  of  the  'self-regulating'  Indian  society— 
the  joint  family,  caste,  and  village — which  enabled  India  to  with- 
stand instability  in  the  broader  polity  and  which,  rather  than  the 
much-vaunted  Indian  Civil  Service,  deserve  to  be  called  the  '  steel 
frame '  of  India.  At  this  level,  conservatism  exists  without  monarchs 
and  landed  nobles,  without  the  pomp  and  flourish  of  the  courts  of 
the  ancien  regimes.  It  was,  in  fact,  usually  unconcerned  with  and 
often  opposed  to  conservatism  at  'higher'  levels.  Furthermore, 
the  caste  system,  often  portrayed  as  totally  inflexible,  contained 
within  itself  a  profoundly  conservative  mechanism  of  change  (now 
generally  termed  '  sanskritization '),  which  helped  to  avoid  frontal 
attacks  on  the  system  and  hence  diminished  the  need  to  articulate 
defences  of  it.25 

The  village  order  ultimately  came  to  have  its  Burkes  and 
Maistres,  as  disintegration  set  in,  in  the  wake  of  British  rule  and  as 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

a  result  of  the  entering  wedge  of  industrialism.  The  defence  of  the 
old  order  (itself  considerably  idealized  by  many)  often  revealed  a 
fusion  of  conservatism  with  local  variants  of  Utopian  socialist  and 
Luddite  postures.  This  renders  hazardous  a  characterization  of  this 
response  as  conservatism  plain  and  simple,  but  its  ample  con- 
servative component  must  be  set  forth  in  any  study  of  Indian 
conservatism. 

India's  urban,  and  to  a  much  lesser  extent  rural  propertied 
middle  classes  looked  in  two  directions;  and  this  was  particularly 
but  not  exclusively  true  of  those  in  British  India.  Many  landed 
peasants  were  at  least  happy  to  contemplate  the  demise  of  the 
aristocracy;  but  in  terms  of  major  social  transformations,  this  is 
not  in  any  sense  decisive,  as  the  village-based,  agrarian  order 
remains  to  be  dealt  with.26  More  important  is  the  view  of  the  urban 
industrial-professional  classes,  which  was  critical  of  both  aristo- 
cratic conservatism  and  villagism.  However,  the  rise  of  more  radical 
movements  helped  to  blunt  this  challenge,  which  was  not,  in  any 
event,  of  massive  strength  to  begin  with. 

Finally,  the  British  presence  affected  the  outlook  of  diverse 
classes,  as  well  as  the  pattern  of  inter-class  relationships.  Many  of 
the  forces  of  change  were  often  traced  to  the  British,  and  con- 
servative responses  were  often  merged  with  more  broadly  anti- 
imperalist  positions.  Needless  to  say,  many  non-conservatives 
were  associated  with  the  latter.27  Groups  which  favoured  the  types 
of  changes  brought  about  (consciously  or  unconsciously)  by  the 
British  ran  the  risk  of  being  labelled  as  anti-national,  which  also 
helped  to  blunt  anti-traditional  efforts.  To  put  the  matter  differ- 
ently, we  may  ask:  in  what  .ways  was  the  dialogue5  between  east 
and  west  also  a  dialogue  between  conservatism  and  liberalism, 
and  in  what  ways  did  conservatism  (and  class  and  doctrinal  matters 
more  generally)  take  on  new  dimensions,  because  of  the  colonial 
setting?  The  picture  which  emerges  is  quite  complex,  indeed,  but 
one  central  feature  is  certainly  this:  as  the  nationalist  movement 
progressed  in  the  twentieth  century,  a  wedge  was  driven  between 
the  aristocracy  (increasingly  alined  with  the  British)  and  the 
urban  industrial  and  professional  elements  (increasingly  alined 
with  the  Congress),  forestalling,  if  not  precluding  a  fascist-type 
alliance  between  them  in  the  face  of  more  radical  demands.  The 
present  state  of  the  relationship  between  these  two  broad  classes 
must  be  examined  in  any  study  of  Indian  conservatism. 


Comments  on  Conservatism 

In  India,  then,  we  shall  find  aristocratic  conservatives;  village- 
oriented  groups  which  rejected  both  the  aristocratic  order  and 
British  institutions  and  values;  village-oriented  groups  which 
accepted  parliamentarism  but  which  wanted  the  new  political 
institutions  to  be  used  in  defence  of  village  India;  and  others  who, 
in  varying  ways  and  degrees,  were  more  fully  committed  to  trans- 
form India  socially,  economically,  and  politically  along  western 
lines.  For  a  long  time  these  groups  functioned  in  a  colonial  setting 
which  further  complicated  already  complex  interrelationships.  This 
study  is  intended  to  lay  bare  some  basic  perspectives  and  some  of 
these  complex  interrelationships,  many  of  which  exist  in  micro- 
cosm in  the  background,  genesis,  and  subsequent  development  of 
the  Swatantra  Party.  Conservatism  will  receive  the  bulk  of  the 
attention;  but  the  analysis  of  Swatantra  will  be  set  against  the 
backdrop  of  rightist  politics  more  generally. 


CHAPTER   2 

DIMENSIONS  OF  INDIAN 

RIGHT-WING  POLITICS:  SOCIAL  AND 

DOCTRINAL  ASPECTS 

It  has  been  part  of  the  conventional  wisdom  about  Indian  politics 
that  right-wing  political  activity  has  been  extremely  ineffectual. 
Certainly,  few  writers,  apart  from  Marxists,  have  argued  to  the 
contrary.  Thus,  two  leading  students  of  Indian  affairs  have  com- 
mented on  reactionary  activity  in  the  following  fashion:  'It  is  one 
of  the  paradoxes  of  Indian  politics  that  India's  ancien  regime,  surely 
one  of  the  oldest  and  most  deeply  rooted  in  the  world,  produced 
no  reaction. . .  Only  a  few  minor  local  parties  today  stand  for  a  full 
return  to  the  rule  of  Brahmins  and  kshatryas  according  to  the  pre- 
cepts of  dharma  or  traditional  duty,  and  they  are  ineffectual.'1  In  a 
more  general  vein,  another  scholar  has  argued:  'Nehru  once  ob- 
served. .  ."Who  says  that  opposition  forces  are  weak  in  India? 
The  opposition  we  have  to  fight  is  obscurantism  and  inertia  of  the 
people."  The  Prime  Minister  had  in  mind  mass  lethargy  and 
ignorance:   but  the  record  of  bbth  the  religious  and  secular 
Rightist  parties  is  a  sad  commentary  on  this  maxim.'2  The  last 
remark  misses  Nehru's  basic  point  that  the  resistance  of  those 
attached  to  the  ancien  regime  is  passive,  not  active;  but  the  judg- 
ment about  the  weakness  of  rightist  parties  is  none  the  less  evident 
here.3  The  situation  was  such  that  one  writer  could  announce,  after 
the  first  two  general  elections  in  India  (i951-2  and  i957)j  'tne 
almost  complete  eclipse  of  our  so-called  rightist  parties'.4  No  one 
denied  that  there  existed  privileged  classes  with  a  vested  interest 
in  maintaining  the  ancien  regime,  but  they  seemed  quiescent ;  and  the 
passivity  and  inarticulateness  of  these  groups  were  paralleled, 
ostensibly,  in  the  case  of  the  modern  elites  in  land  and  industry. 
The  weakness  of  conservatism  more  specifically  was  noted  before 
independence  by  a  maharaja  who  commented  that  'it  must  seem 
strange  in  a  country  whose  ways  of  life  are  so  dominated  by  cus- 
tom and  tradition  as  India,  there  should  be  no  political  party 
which  calls  itself  conservative '.  Events  seem  to  have  falsified  this 
same  man's  prediction  that  with  growing  emancipation  from 

10 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

British  tutelage  'a  strong  party  of  experienced  and  responsible 
politicians  will  emerge,  which  will  call  itself  the  Conservative 
Party . . .  '.5  The  £  almost  complete  eclipse '  of  rightist  parties,  con- 
servative or  otherwise,  seemed  to  be  an  obvious,  yet  puzzling 
feature  of  Indian  political  life. 

Were  these  judgments  sound?  If  so,  why?  If  not,  why  were  so 
many  capable  observers  misled?  What  were  the  problems  and 
prospects  of  a  strong,  explicitly  rightist — and  more  specifically, 
conservative — force  in  India?  These  in  brief  are  the  important  but 
unanswered  questions  which  account  for  the  focus  selected  for  this 
study  and  for  which  some  answers  will  be  sought  through  an 
examination  of  India's  Swatantra  Party. 


social  bases:  challenge  and  response 

On  15  August  1947  India  gained  her  independence  from  British 
rule.  There  was  no  doubt  that  the  mantle  of  power  would  fall  to 
the  Indian  National  Congress,  but  at  the  time  this  alone  must  have 
seemed  clear.  Fundamental  problems  which  had  plagued  India 
through  her  long  centuries  would  have  to  be  confronted  anew,  and 
there  was  no  assurance  that  the  Congress  or  any  other  political 
force  in  the  country  would  be  adequate  to  the  challenge.  Could  a 
united  country  be  created  out  of  the  diverse  religions,  linguistic 
and  caste  groups,  and  out  of  the  former  British  provinces  and  the 
congeries  of  princely  states?  Could  the  weight  of  centuries  of  tradi- 
tion be  overcome  sufficiently  to  allow  India  to  develop  the  dynam- 
ism required  for  desperately  needed  progress  on  many  fronts? 
These  were  but  two  of  the  critical  questions  for  which  no  confident 
answers  could  be  provided. 

From  the  standpoint  of  India's  conservative  elements,  as  for  all 
others,  the  future  was  clouded.  Over  the  years  of  British  rule, 
traditional  India  had  confronted  numerous  challenges.  Many 
princely  polities  had  been  annexed,  and  those  remaining  had 
atrophied  considerably.  Conscious  efforts  at  social,  legal,  educa- 
tional, and  other  reforms,  as  well  as  changes  flowing  from  the 
advent  of  rail-roads,  modern  communications,  new  forms  of 
industry,  and  the  like,  seemed  to  many  to  strike  at  the  roots  of 
Indian  society.  Over  wide  areas,  erosion,  if  not  sudden  destruction, 
seemed  to  threaten  indigenous  institutions  and  values,  and  at 
least  from  the  time  of  Ram  Mohun  Roy  in  the  early  nineteenth 

11 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

century,  there  were  always  articulate  Indians  who  also  advocated 
changes,  some  modest,  some  drastic,  in  traditional  India.  It  re- 
mained to  be  seen  what  the  'new  India'  held  in  store. 

Uppermost  in  the  minds  of  many  conservative  Indians  in  1947 
was  the  knowledge  that  Jawaharlal  Nehru  would  probably 
dominate  the  political  scene,  and  this  generated  considerable 
anxiety.  From  the  late  1920s  onward,  Nehru  had  explicitly  identi- 
fied himself  with  the  more  radical  elements  in  the  country  and  had 
inveighed  against  the  princely  order,  the  landed  aristocracy,  the 
capitalist  class,  the  defenders  of  socio-religious  orthodoxy,  the 
general  stagnation  of  rural  India,  and  the  like.6  Shortly  before 
independence,  Gandhi  warned  the  princes  that  'Pandit  Jawaharlal 
Nehru  will  have  no  patience  with  you',7  but  the  princes  were  by 
no  means  alone  in  their  need  to  be  apprehensive.  A  government 
acting  responsively  to  Nehru  could  have  provided  a  formidable 
threat  to  a  number  of  important  privileged  social  groups. 

Nehru  did,  of  course,  tower  over  the  Indian  political  scene 
after  independence,  until  his  death  in  1964,  and  in  varying  degrees 
each  of  the  groups  against  whom  he  had  inveighed  did  confront 
challenges  during  his  tenure  as  Prime  Minister.  The  princes  had 
their  states  'integrated'  into  the  Indian  Union,  and  thus  they  lost 
their  residual  political  power,  their  status  suffered,  and  their 
economic  position  deteriorated  badly,  where  it  did  not  completely 
collapse.  The  same  was  true  of  the  great  landed  aristocrats,  both  in 
the  former  princely  states  and  in  former  British  India,  who  were 
eliminated  as  'intermediaries'  between  the  peasant  and  the  state. 
The  middle  peasantry  came  ultimately  to  confront  pressure  for 
heavier  taxation,  ceilings  on  land  holdings,  a  vague  threat  of 
collectivized  agriculture,  and  a  variety  of  efforts  designed  to  im- 
prove the  general  position  of  the  lowest  strata  of  the  rural  popula- 
tion, in  whose  continued  exploitation  the  higher  caste  Hindus  had 
a  deep  and  abiding  vested  interest.  The  business  communities  were 
confronted  by  a  wide  range  of  restrictive  legislation,  including 
prohibitions  on  entry  into  certain  fields  which  were  reserved  for 
state-sponsored  enterprises;  limitations  on  expansion  in  other 
areas;  quotas  and  excises,  particularly  in  the  textile  field,  intended 
to  make  hand-woven  cloth  more  competitive;  attacks  on  the 
'managing  agency'  system  which  had  structured  Indian  enterprise 
since  the  nineteenth  century;  heavy  corporate  and  personal  taxa- 
tion; and  occasional  intimations  of  nationalization  or  at  least  rather 


12 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

drastic  circumscription  of  the  private  sector.  Legislation  intended 
to  reform  Hindu  family  relations,  inheritance,  and  other  aspects  of 
traditional  private  law  challenged  the  orthodox  of  whatever  status 
or  occupation.8 

Each  of  these  moves  produced  adverse  responses,  but  for  the 
most  part  these  responses  were  isolated  efforts  which  did  not 
develop  into  a  cohesive  force.  Some  princes  refused,  at  the  outset, 
to  accede  to  the  Government  of  India  and  made  what  amounted  to 
declarations  of  independence;  one  or  two  resorted  to  military  re- 
sistance; and  in  1 95 1  some  former  rulers  and  landed  aristocrats 
attempted  to  form  a  'Rulers'  Union',  to  agitate  against  the  integra- 
tion of  the  native  states  and  the  decline  of  the  aristocracy  more 
generally.  The  landed  aristocracy,  often  in  consort  with  former 
princes,  took  their  fight  against  land  reforms  to  the  courts,  where 
in  some  cases  they  were  temporarily  successful;  and  in  some 
isolated  instances  they  resorted  to  banditry  as  a  form  of  protest 
against  the  effects  of  government  policy.  Non-aristocratic  landed 
groups  worked  through  many  channels,  including  caste  associa- 
tions and  such  groups  as  the  All-India  Agriculturalists'  Federation 
(1958);  while  at  the  village  level  the  attempted  rise  of  depressed 
groups  was  countered  in  a  variety  of  ways,  including  attrition  in 
prolonged  court  battles,  boycotts  of  village  councils  on  which  they 
sat  and  schools  which  they  attended,  refusal  to  respect  elections 
which  they  might  have  won  and  taxes  which  their  representatives 
might  have  been  instrumental  in  levying,  and  a  whole  spectrum  of 
more  or  less  coercive  measures,  including  the  burning  of  homes 
and  crops,  the  destruction  of  cattle,  physical  assault,  and  so  on.  On 
the  national  level,  the  late  President  of  the  Republic,  Rajendra 
Prasad,  steadfastly  opposed  certain  provisions  of  the  social  reform 
legislation  and  threatened  to  withhold  his  assent,  or  to  resign 
from  office,  unless  modifications  were  forthcoming.  The  business 
communities,  having  tried  to  anticipate  and  to  undercut  Congress 
planning  efforts  by  advancing  a  development  plan  of  their  own  in 
1944,  betrayed  a  crisis  of  confidence  in  the  regime  immediately  after 
independence,  and  periodically  thereafter  they  displayed  anxiety 
over  Congress  policies,  especially  whenever  there  seemed  to  be  a 
move  toward  'Soviet'  style  planning.  The  frequent  complaints  of 
various  individuals  and  business  groups,  and  the  creation  of  a 
small  but  vocal  organization  called  the  Forum  of  Free  Enterprise 
(1956)   testify   to   business   opposition   to   diverse   government 

13 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

measures.  These  will  suggest  the  range  of  responses  to  Congress 
policies  during  the  years  1947-59.9  Efforts  along  party  lines  will  be 
discussed  below. 

Many  of  these  challenges  were,  thus,  acutely  felt  and  many  of 
the  responses  thereto  were  certainly  conservative;  yet  there  was  no 
coherent,  explicitly  conservative  response  at  the  party  level  during 
the  first  decade  after  independence.  There  are  many  reasons  for 
this,  but  the  brief  catalogue  of  challenge  and  response  during  the 
Nehru  era  suggests  one  important  factor:  the  diversity  of  the 
social  forces  involved.  In  addition  to  major  inter-group  cleavages, 
however,  there  were  also  intra-group  cleavages,  based  in  large  part 
on  the  historic  social  fragmentation  of  Hindu  society;  and  these 
also  worked  against  the  formation  of  a  cohesive  opposition  force. 

A  brief  glance  at  the  historical  record  will  show  that  even  within 
a  given  group,  viz.  the  aristocracy,  landed  peasantry,  business 
communities,  etc.,  unity  was  at  best  a  remote  possibility.  With 
respect  to  the  princely  order,  for  example,  it  is  clear  that  at  almost 
every  critical  juncture  in  its  history,  it  was  beset  by  internal  cleav- 
ages which  seriously  impaired  its  collective  position.  The  story  is 
told  that  sometime  before  the  rebellion  of  1857  a  leading  Indian 
ruler  looked  at  a  standard  British  map  of  the  sub-continent,  with 
*  British  India'  coloured  red,  princely  India  yellow,  and  com- 
mented, *  one  day  it  will  all  be  red  \10  Yet  this  sentiment  was  either 
not  widely  shared  or  else  it  did  not  matter,  because  at  no  time  did 
the  native  rulers  act  on  the  maxim  that  it  would  be  better  to  hang 
together  than  to  hang  separately.  The  disunity  of  the  princes  in 
1857 — notwithstanding  certain  ultra-nationalist  fantasies  about 
projected  'United  States  of  India5  and  kindred  visions — is 
obvious.  While  some  rulers  were  engaged  in  a  life-and-death 
struggle  (to  be  counted  among  the  major  manifestations  of  con- 
servatism in  India)  with  the  British  raj,  other  rulers  stood  apart  or 
actively  assisted  in  the  suppression  of  the  revolt.  Subsequently,  in 
the  constitutional  deliberations  of  the  1920s  and  1930s,  the  princes 
once  again  found  it  impossible  to  present  anything  resembling  a 
united  front.  Pre-eminent  rulers  held  aloof  from  the  Chamber  of 
Princes  and  looked  upon  its  activities  with  scorn;  lesser  princes 
who  were  excluded  from  the  Chamber  resented  their  demotion  and 
demanded  equality,  which  the  more  prestigious  rulers  were  un- 
willing to  concede.  Even  as  'doomsday'  approached,  disunity  was 
prevalent.11 

14 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

Prior  to  independence,  the  great  landed  nobles  of  British  India 
were  virtually  compelled  to  be  better  united,  because  they  had  to 
function  within  a  somewhat  more  copen5  and  more  reformist 
environment.  Over  the  years,  the  zamindars  had  organized  them- 
selves, at  least  locally,  to  petition  the  raj  and  eventually  to  elect 
representatives  to  the  legislative  councils,  in  which  they  had 
reserved  seats.  They  amply  demonstrated  their  conservatism  by 
proclaiming  and  defending  their  elite  status  and  by  steadfastly 
opposing  almost  every  significant  piece  of  land  reform  legislation 
introduced  by  the  British  to  ameliorate  the  conditions  of  the  actual 
tillers  of  the  soil.  Throughout  the  years  of  the  British  raj,  however, 
differences  between  big  and  small  zamindars  were  evident;  each 
group,  as  in  the  case  of  the  princes,  was  beset  by  religious  and  caste 
animosities;  and,  for  example,  the  first  'All-India  Landholders' 
Conference',  dominated  by  the  great  zamindars,  was  not  con- 
vened until  1938,  which  was  rather  late  in  the  game  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  self-interest  of  the  landed  aristocracy.  Furthermore, 
the  political  division  of  India  into  British  and  princely  areas  in- 
hibited the  development  of  associations  which  would  bring  to- 
gether the  zamindars  and  their  closest  counterparts  in  the  princely 
states,  the  jagirdars.12 

The  state  of  Rajasthan  provides  a  good  case  study  of  the  multiple 
cleavages  which  beset  the  aristocratic  classes  even  on  a  regional 
level,  in  the  post-independence  era.  The  great  Rajput  princes  were 
not  particularly  solicitous  of  or  fully  trusted  by,  the  lesser  ones. 
The  non-Rajput  rulers,  like  the  Jat  family  of  Bharatpur,  were 
often  treated  with  scorn  by  the  Rajputs,  great  and  small  alike.  The 
Rajput  jagirdars  themselves,  reasonably  well  united  for  a  short 
time  in  the  early  years  after  independence,  came  ultimately  to  be 
split  along  economic  lines,  between  big  and  little  jagirdars.  An 
interesting  footnote  to  this  is  provided  by  the  manifestly  pre- 
posterous assertion  of  some  jagirdars  that  they  would  have  treated 
the  people  better,  had  it  not  been  for  the  presence  of  the  princes 
who  ruled  the  area.13 

Thus,  while  sharing  many  interests  and  aspirations  vis-a-vis 
more  democratic  tendencies,  the  aristocratic  classes  never  formed  a 
cohesive  opposition  force,  either  on  the  national  or  the  state  level, 
either  under  the  British  or  after  1947.  Both  the  aristocrats  and  the 
defenders  of  religious  orthodoxy  might  be  eminently  conservative 
but  their  activities  were  inevitably  fragmented.14  To  appreciate  the 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

significance  of  this  one  need  only  ask  how  different  India's  political 
development  might  well  have  been  had,  say,  the  Rajputs  been  the 
dominant  aristocratic  group  throughout  India,  or  had  the  Chit- 
pavan  Brahmins  been  similarly  dispersed  as  a  religious  elite  group. 
Indian  conservatism,  if  not  India  as  a  would-be  modern,  con- 
stitutional, democratic  polity,  has  certainly  suffered  because  this 
was  not  the  case. 

Many  intra-group  conflicts  are  evident  as  well  among  the  landed 
peasant  groups  and  the  business  communities.  In  some  areas  the 
Rajput-Jat  split  is  evident  at  this  level,  as  well  as  within  the 
aristocracy,  the  Kshatrya-Patidar  conflict  in  much  of  Gujarat  is 
well  known,  and  the  Kamma-Reddy  conflict  in  Andhra  has  been 
well  documented.15  Historically  organized  along  family  and  com- 
munity (i.e.  Parsi,  Marwari,  Chettiar,  Bohra,  etc.)  lines,  Indian 
business  has  only  partially  progressed  toward  the  creation  of  a 
broad,  more  or  less  national  business  class.  The  Parsis,  who  were 
Zoroastrians  by  religion  and  many  of  whom  were  highly  Anglicized, 
were,  for  example,  poles  apart  from  the  Hindu  and  Jain  Marwari 
community,  itself  quite  orthodox  religiously;  and  while  this  might 
be  the  most  extreme  case,  it  is  not  the  only  one.  Certain  business 
organizations  and  individual  firms  were  intercommunity  ones,  but 
others,  like  the  Marwari  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Calcutta,  were 
largely  or  even  exclusively  confined  to  one  community.  Certain 
'peak'  organizations  such  as  the  Federation  of  Indian  Chambers  of 
Commerce  and  Industry  (FICCI)  have  helped  to  bring  these  to- 
gether, as,  significantly,  have  certain  challenges  to  the  position  of 
business  in  general,  viz.  the  threat  of  Congress  planning  which  led 
to  the  formulation  of  the  *  Bombay  Plan'  and  the  attack  at  a  later 
date  on  the  managing  agency  system  of  business  organization.  All  of 
this  notwithstanding,  it  will  be  quite  a  long  time  before  compar- 
ably placed  businessmen  from  different  communities  can  be 
spoken  of  as  one  reasonably  cohesive  business  class,  even  for 
relatively  limited  purposes  and  even  after  due  allowance  is  made 
for  different  sectors  of  industry  and  for  large-  versus  small-scale 
enterprises.  This  is  a  specific  aspect  of  Weber's  more  general  view 
that  social  cleavages  in  India  virtually  precluded  the  emergence  oj 
an  urban  'brotherhood'  comparable  to  those  which  arose  in  many 
western  cities  during  the  medieval  period  and  which,  in  his  view, 
in  part  accounted  for  the  success  of  the  urban  challenge  to  feuda- 
lism in  the  west.16 

16 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

This  analysis  could  easily  be  elaborated,  but  to  no  important 
present  purpose.  It  is  sufficient  to  note  that  even  within  a  given 
social  stratum,  even  on  a  regional  level,  unity  in  responding  to 
challenges  did  not  exist  and  the  likelihood  of  achieving  it  was 
remote. 

Compounding  this  difficulty  was  the  diversity  of  interest  among 
major  groups,  including  the  important  split  between  the  aristo- 
cratic and  middle-class  interests.  Co-operative  effort  by  such  groups 
would  have  been  difficult  to  achieve,  certainly  in  the  absence  of  a 
formidable  threat  from  the  left  and  quite  probably  even  in  the  face 
of  one.  This  dimension  of  the  problem  is  most  profitably  investi- 
gated from  the  standpoint  of  the  social  bases  and  policies  of  the 
nationalist  movement,  which,  as  everyone  knows,  was  socially 
heterogeneous.  What  was  the  nature  of  the  Congress  coalition? 
How  was  it  held  together?  What  directions  did  its  policies  take?  In 
suggesting  answers  to  these  questions,  it  will  be  possible  not  only 
to  define  better  certain  inter-group  conflicts  but  also  to  suggest 
certain  implications  for  the  development  of  a  cohesive,  conserva- 
tive opposition  party  in  India. 

The  Congress,  at  least  after  the  advent  of  Gandhi,  had  its 
centre  of  gravity  among  the  middle  peasant  groups,  with  ample 
support  from  India's  frustrated  industrialists  and  much  leadership 
from  the  urban  intelligentsia.  It  is  clear  that  there  were  many 
differences  in  the  goals  of  these  diverse  components  of  the  Con- 
gress coalition,  yet  they  were  held  together.  The  latter  fact  is 
partly  explained,  of  course,  by  common  opposition  to  alien  rule, 
which  served  as  the  broadest  possible  rallying  point  not  only  for 
these  groups  but  for  others  as  well.  But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to 
underestimate  the  role  of  leadership  and  of  ideology  here.  It  was 
one  of  Gandhi's  critical  contributions  that  he  emphasized  the 
notion  of '  trusteeship '  and  class  harmony,  tapping,  in  this  respect 
and  others,  certain  very  traditional  currents  of  thought  in  India, 
while  providing  no  direct  threat  whatever  to  industrial  interests.17 
Without  Gandhi  or  someone  like  him,  and  without  Gandhism  or 
something  akin  to  it,  it  would  have  been  much  more  difficult  to 
keep  these  disparate  elements  together,  even  with  the  anti- 
imperialist  rallying  point.  Apprehension  over  the  rise  of  socialist 
elements  also  played  a  part,  which  dovetailed  neatly  with  Gandhi's 
contribution,  as  will  be  discussed  subsequently. 

Limited  though  the  aspirations  of  the  middle  classes  in  the 

2  17  ESP 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Congress  were,  particularly  with  respect  to  the  most  depressed 
elements  in  Indian  society,  they  proved  sufficient  to  alienate  the 
upper  strata  in  many  areas.  Broadly  speaking,  the  conflict  between 
the  middle  class  and  the  aristocracy  was  the  most  pronounced.  The 
latter  not  only  remained  aloof  from  the  nationalist  movement  but 
often  actively  opposed  it;  and  particularly  from  the  1930s  onward 
the  aristocrats  viewed  the  Congress  with  increasing  hostility  and 
alarm,  turning  more  to  the  British  to  defend  their  interests.  It  is 
clear  that  the  British  played  a  key  role  in  Indian  political  develop- 
ment here,  in  the  sense  that  the  anti-colonial  struggle  drove  a 
wedge  between  the  indigenous  aristocracy  and  the  industrial- 
commercial  classes,  precluding  the  emergence,  at  least  in  the  short 
run,  of  a  fascist-style  alliance  between  them.  It  is  significant,  too, 
that  while  there  was  a  growing  concern  over  the  rise  of  socialist 
elements,  the  threat  from  the  left  was  not  so  acutely  felt  that  the  gap 
between  these  classes  was  bridged.  Suggestive  of  the  problem 
here — and  it  has  proved  to  be  an  enduring  one — is  the  fact  that 
the  aristocracy  was  inclined  to  look  upon  the  Congress  as  a  whole 
with  a  good  deal  of  anxiety,  while  large  groups  of  non-aristocratic 
conservative  Congressmen  were  themselves  becoming  increasingly 
worried  about  the  upsurge  of  socialism,  both  inside  the  party  and 
out.18 

Congress  alienation  of  the  aristocracy— as  in  what  is  now 
Rajasthan,  where  the  States'  Peoples'  Conference  drew  upon  a 
wide  array  of  non-aristocratic  groups — v/as  the  most  visible  social 
split,  but  others  deserve  attention.  In  the  same  state  of  Rajasthan, 
after  independence,  the  lower  caste  Jats  moved  increasingly  into 
positions  of  strength  in  the  Congress  (which  built  upon  the  States' 
Peoples'  Conference),  and  this  led  to  the  decline  and  disaffection  of 
some  formerly  prominent  Brahmin  leaders  and  other  higher  status 
groups.  To  cite  a  different  but  also  important  case,  the  Madras 
Congress  was  originally  dominated  by  Brahmins,  but  in  the  face 
of  strong  anti-Brahmin  movements  in  that  state,  the  social  basis  of 
the  party  was  broadened  and  newer  sources  of  strength  and  leader- 
ship emerged.  At  present,  Brahmins  are  conspicuous  by  their 
absence  from  high  positions  in  the  Madras  Congress,  and  even 
some  of  the  middle-caste,  anti-Brahmin  groups  have  been  alienated 
as  a  result  of  an  even  further  broadening  of  the  social  base  of  the 
party.  In  these  and  other  cases,  however,  the  ascendant  elements 
were  middle  and  lower  middle  caste  groups  for  the  most  part,  and 

18 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

their  solicitude  for  those  who  remain  below  them  is  certainly 
suspect.19  The  hard  core  of  the  gradually  democratizing  Congress 
coalition  was,  in  sum,  non-aristocratic,  middle  class  and  moderately 
reformist,  generally  not  desiring  complete  liquidation  of  superior 
classes  and  generally  not  desiring  radical  efforts  to  enhance  the 
position  of  the  lowest  classes,  particularly  the  untouchables.  Thus, 
Rajagopalachari  ('Rajaji',  founder-leader  of  Swatantra),  as 
premier  of  Madras  from  1937  to  1939,  used  available  legislation  to 
control  anti-princely  state  activity  within  the  province ;  he  sponsored 
land  reform  legislation  which  was  designed  to  give  greater  security 
of  tenure  and  somewhat  greater  income  to  tenants,  but  which  left 
the  existing  landlords  firmly  in  control;  he  insisted  on  substituting 
a  permissive  bill,  based  on  the  principle  of 'local  option',  to  permit 
temple  entry  by  untouchables,  in  place  of  a  bill  which  would  have 
made  it  mandatory.20  During  his  second  term  as  political  head  of 
Madras,  in  the  early  1950s,  Rajaji,  under  the  threat  of  communist 
gains  in  the  state,  carried  forward  some  of  this  land  legislation,  in 
particular;  but  otherwise  he  remained  generally  moderate  in  his 
policies.  Rajaji's  non-Brahmin  challengers  and  successors  were 
more  reform-minded  than  he,  but  even  they  fell  short  of  radical 
programmes.  Numerous  other  examples  could  be  cited,  but  these 
will  suffice  in  the  present  connection. 

The  relative  moderation  of  the  broad  Congress  coalition,  even 
under  Nehru's  leadership,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  for  one 
reason  or  another  none  of  the  elements  whom  he  had  belaboured 
were  driven  completely  to  the  wall.  The  princes  and  landlords 
suffered  serious  setbacks,  to  be  sure,  but  there  were,  in  each  case, 
some  not  inconsiderable  consolations.  On  the  probably  sound 
assumption  that  'the  capacity  for  mischief  and  trouble  on  the  part 
of  the  rulers  if  the  settlement  had  not  been  reached  on  a  negotiated 
basis  was  far  greater  than  could  be  imagined  at  this  stage',  Sardar 
Patel  insisted  that  in  approaching  the  native  rulers  'a  spirit  of 
give  and  take'  prevail.  He  further  'expressed  the  hope  that  the 
Indian  States  would  bear  in  mind  that  the  alternative  to  co-opera- 
tion in  the  general  interest  was  anarchy  and  chaos  which  would 
overwhelm  great  and  small  in  common  ruin...'.21  As  a  con- 
sequence, the  princes  received  a  wide  array  of  quid  pro  quos  in 
return  for  their  accession  to  the  Indian  Union.  Foremost  among 
these  was  the  annual,  tax-free,  'privy  purse',  but  in  addition  the 
princes  were  granted  the  right  to  retain  all  personal  property  and 

19  2-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

wealth,  Succession  according  to  law  and  custom  \  exemption 
from  customs  and  certain  other  duties,  continued  'gun  salutes'  on 
certain  occasions,  privileged  positions  at  certain  state  functions, 
special  licence  plates,  permission  to  fly  their  old  flags,  among  other 
perquisites,  all  of  which  were  constitutionally  guaranteed  and  non- 
justiciable. Furthermore,  some  of  the  pre-eminent  rulers  were 
named  as  Rajpramukhs,  ambassadors,  special  advisers  on  govern- 
ment commissions,  and  the  like,  thus  easing  the  impact  of  inte- 
gration somewhat  further  in  some  important  cases.22  Patel  justified 
these  arrangements  in  the  following  terms : 

The  minimum  which  we  could  offer  to  them  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  parting 
with  their  ruling  powers  was  to  guarantee  to  them  privy  purses  and 
certain  privileges  on  a  reasonable  and  defined  basis. .  .Need  we  cavil  at 
the  small— I  purposely  use  the  word  small— price  we  have  paid  for  the 
bloodless  revolution  which  has  affected  the  destinies  of  millions  of  our 
people.23 

Given  the  fact  that  many  princes  were  phenomenally  wealthy  'in 
the  modern  as  well  as  in  the  feudal  sense5,24  through  investment  in 
industry,  integration  was  not  the  catastrophe  it  might  have  been, 
even  though  in  almost  every  case  a  cut-back  in  the  level  of  living 
was  necessary.25  And  it  is  by  no  means  insignificant  for  this  study 
that  Patel  has  been  charged  with  expediting  the  integration  of  the 
states  on  this  basis,  in  order  to  forestall  more  radical  solutions  to 
the  problem.26 

In  the  case  of  the  landed  aristocrats,  comparable  considerations 
apply.  Prior  to  the  introduction  of  abolition  legislation  it  was 
observed  that  the  intermediaries,  'for  fear  of  the  impending 
abolition. .  .are  directing  their  attention  increasingly  to  non- 
agricultural  secondaries  \27  In  almost  every  case,  abolition  legisla- 
tion provided  for  compensation,  and  even  Nehru  argued  that 
simple  expropriation,  'though  equitably  perhaps  justifiable,  may 
lead  to  many  cases  of  hardship'  and,  by  implication,  social  dis- 
content, and  was  to  be  avoided  for  this  reason.28  In  some  cases, 
rehabilitation  grants  were  also  provided  and  many  acts  permitted 
landlords  to  evict  tenants  in  order  to  acquire  land  for  personal 
cultivation.29  Particularly  in  the  case  of  the  wealthier  zamindars  and 
jagirdars  who  had  industrial  investments,  abolition  legislation  did 
not  mean  disaster,  although  as  in  the  case  of  the  princes  cut-backs 
were  well-nigh  inevitable.  It  is  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  in 

20 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

Rajasthan,  for  example,  the  legislation  'might  as  well  have  been 
drafted  by  the  Jagirdars'  Association',30  but  one  can  scarcely 
consider  the  broad  approach  to  have  been  a  particularly  radical 
one  either. 

The  position  of  the  peasantry  remained  quite  secure  throughout 
this  period.  Taxation  was  generally  less  heavy  and  tenure  more 
secure  under  the  Congress  than  under  the  British  and  the  landed 
intermediaries.  Moreover,  many  government  programmes — 
organization  of  co-operatives,  extension  of  rural  credit,  improved 
transport,  electrification,  irrigation,  and  the  like — were  advanta- 
geous to  these  rural  classes,  although  many  fell  far  short  of  govern- 
ment expectations  at  least.  Land  ceiling  legislation  applied  to  very 
few,  and  those  who  were  likely  to  be  affected  had  ample  time  to 
divest  themselves  of '  surplus '  lands  to  relatives  and  friends,  thus 
escaping  inclusion  under  the  laws  in  many  cases.  In  some  instances 
the  ceilings  were  made  applicable  only  to  future  holdings,  allow- 
ing the  existing  rural  elite  to  escape  completely.  The  famed 
'Nagpur  Resolution'  (1959)  on  'joint  co-operative  farming'  was 
considered  to  mean  'collectivization'  by  very  few,  and  Nehru 
insisted  that  no  coercion  would  ever  be  used  to  bring  it  about. 
Thus,  government  economic  policies  did  not  provide  a  clear  and 
present  danger  to  the  landed  peasantry;  and  the  diverse  measures 
intended  to  improve  the  position  of  the  untouchables  and  to 
democratize  the  village  generally  were  heavily  'filtered'  by 
dominant,  upper  castes,  leaving  in  many  instances  only  a  relatively 
inoffensive  residue.  In  some  cases,  projected  reforms  simply 
remained  totally  unimplemented.31 

Business  communities  were  also  quite  secure,  even  though  there 
were  loud  complaints  about  the  pattern  of  taxation  and  the  range 
of  government  controls.  Nationalization  remained  very  much  a 
'red  herring',  as  the  Federation  of  British  Industries  noted  in  a 
report  on  investment  opportunities  in  India;  and  many  state- 
sponsored  industries  meshed  well  with  private  industry,  assuring 
the  latter  of  many  necessary  materials,  power,  and  the  like,  at  no 
private  risk.  In  the  area  of  economic  infra-structure  the  govern- 
ment aided  private  enterprise  considerably.  Furthermore,  even 
where  theoretically  excluded  from  certain  sectors,  private  indus- 
trialists often  found  the  government  quite  flexible;  and  where  the 
government  proved  to  be  rigid,  many  industrialists  successfully 
resorted  to  diversification,  as  they  responded  to  standard  capitalist 

21 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

impulses.  Moreover,  under  the  government  system  of  licensing 
and  issuing  permits,  some  industrialists  were  established  in  privi- 
leged positions,  although  others  might  have  been  disaffected  as  a 
result.  All  in  all,  this  was  obviously  not  the  best  of  all  imaginable 
worlds  from  the  standpoint  of  private  enterprise,  but  it  was  not 
inordinately  oppressive.32 

The  willingness  of  the  Congress  to  be  conciliatory  in  order  to 
stabilize  a  shaky  government  testifies  further  to  its  generally 
moderate  approach.  In  Rajasthan  after  1952  and  in  Orissa  after 
1957s  aristocratic  elements  were  brought  into  the  ministry,  in  the 
former  case  by  outright  absorption  of  opposition  members  into 
the  Congress,  in  the  latter  through  a  coalition  with  a  princely  led 
party.  Comparable  accommodating  tendencies  have  been  widely 
evident  in  the  realm  of  policy  as  well. 

The  failure  of  the  Congress  to  mount  a  potent,  radical  challenge 
thus  helps  to  account  for  the  absence  of  a  potent,  coherent  opposi- 
tion to  the  ruling  party,  even  though,  as  noted,  there  is  no 
assurance  that  in  the  face  of  such  a  challenge  the  situation  would 
be  substantially  different.  However,  Congress  restraint  by  itself  is 
insufficient  to  account  for  the  condition  of  the  opposition:  the 
hegemony  of  the  Congress  also  plays  a  major  role.33 

Briefly  put,  not  only  was  the  Congress  relatively  moderate  in  its 
policies,  but  where  it  did  seriously  offend  certain  segments  of  the 
population — and  it  surely  did  so — there  was  little  prospect  that 
anti-Congress  activity  would  be  worth  the  effort.  Had  there  been  a 
long-established  opposition  party  to  which  the  disaffected  could 
repair,  the  situation  would  doubtless  have  been  different.  But 
under  the  prevailing  circumstances,  opposition  was  difficult  and 
might  only  elicit  more  drastic  treatment  from  the  ruling  party. 
Congress  restraint  and  Congress  hegemony  are,  however,  linked : 
had  Congress  been  radical  to  the  point  of  complete  dispossession  of 
the  aristocracy,  for  example,  its  hegemony  might  not  have  been  much 
of  a  deterrent  to  desperate  men.  As  it  was,  it  was  the  fact  that  many 
adversely  affected  groups  had  still  more  that  they  could  lose  which 
accounts  for  much  of  the  significance  of  Congress  hegemony. 

The  princes,  for  example,  were  dependent  on  the  Congress  for 
the  continuation  of  the  annual  privy  purse,  which,  although  con- 
stitutionally guaranteed,  could  be  reduced  or  eliminated  because 
of  the  ease  with  which  the  constitution  is  amended  (given  Con- 
gress' overwhelming  legislative  majority).  An  early  effort  (195 1) 


22 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

by  the  Maharajas  of  Jodhpur  and  Baroda,  in  consort  with  some 
landed  aristocrats,  to  form  a  'Rulers'  Union'  and  'to  work  up  an 
agitation  amongst  the  rulers  as  well  as  the  jagirdars  and  zamindars 
against  the  merger  of  the  States '  had  little  chance  to  gain  momen- 
tum, because  for  this  and  other  reasons  the  government  deprived 
the  Maharaja  of  Baroda  of  his  title  and  his  purse.34  Periodically,  as 
princes  display  an  inclination  to  enter  more  widely  into  anti- 
Congress  politics,  they  are  reminded  by  representatives  of  the 
ruling  party  that  the  privy  purse  is  not  sacrosanct.35  The  fact  that 
so  few  princes  have  chosen  to  right  the  Congress  is  thus  '  a  posthu- 
mous tribute  to  Sardar  Patel's  shrewdness  in... making  them 
economically  dependent  on  their  foes . . . ',  and  one  prince  put  it 
quite  succinctly :  '  The  rulers  are  letting  themselves  be  hanged  by 
these  financial  strings. .  .We  ought  to  stand  on  our  dignity  like 
men  and  tell  the  Congress  "take  away  your  bribes.  Let  us  fight 
you  at  the  polling  booths  like  Indians."  '36  Exactly  the  same  con- 
siderations apply  to  the  jagirdars  and  zamindars  who  receive  pay- 
ments in  instalments  and  mostly  in  long-term  bonds,  thus  tying 
them  to  the  regime  as  well.37 

In  so  far  as  other  groups  were  disaffected,  their  situation  was  not 
in  principle  different,  although  perhaps  the  Congress  could  not 
have  moved  quite  so  easily  against  them  as  it  could  against  the 
aristocrats.  Businessmen  would  have  to  deal  with  the  Congress  raj, 
and  risky  ventures  into  political  opposition  could  lead  to  reprisals : 
threats  of  nationalization,  loss  of  permits  and  licences  already 
granted,  denial  of  those  applied  for,  and  so  on,  were  among  the 
available  weapons  with  which  the  Congress  could  not  only  induce 
the  captains  of  industry  to  remain  docile  but  also  to  help  fill  the 
Congress  coffers,  as  they  had  done  in  the  past.  In  short,  as  the 
party  in  power,  with  little  indication  that  in  the  short  run  it  would 
lose  power,  the  Congress  could  convince  potential  opposition  forces 
of  the  futility,  if  not  the  danger,  of  taking  up  the  cudgels  against  it. 
It  should  occasion  little  surprise  that  many  disgruntled  elements 
chose  to  sit  quietly  on  the  sidelines  or  else  to  bore  from  within  the 
Congress  itself,  rather  than  to  go  into  the  political  wilderness. 
Couple  this  with  the  social  obstacles  to  the  mobilization  of  these 
elements,  and  the  creation  of  a  cohesive  opposition  was  rendered 
even  more  difficult.38  Add  to  all  of  this  such  critical,  if  somewhat 
more  pedestrian  problems  as  finance,  and  you  have  some  very 
formidable  barriers  to  the  creation  of  such  an  opposition.  Finally, 

23 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

given  the  hegemony  of  the  Congress  and  Nehru's  personal  commit- 
ment to  socialist  doctrine,  it  is  easy  to  understand  why  explicitly 
conservative  positions  had  not  been  advanced,  even  by  those  who 
had  the  inclination  to  do  so.  Much  conservative  sentiment,  both 
inside  and  outside  of  the  Congress,  remained  unarticulated, 
introducing  an  important  element  of  latency  into  Indian  politics 
as  regards  the  conservative  interests  in  the  country. 

It  should  also  be  clear  that  in  any  reasonably  open  political 
context  the  hegemony  of  one  party  cannot  be  expected  to  last 
forever,  and  it  is  important,  therefore,  to  recognize  suppressed  or 
latent  elements  which  may  become  more  influential  as  the  domina- 
tion by  one  party  (or  one  individual)  recedes.  In  the  Indian  case, 
after  the  first  two  general  elections  it  should  have  been  abundantly 
clear  that  there  were  such  latent  or  suppressed  elements,  and  that 
at  least  some  of  these  were  in  a  position  to  influence  politics  in  a 
conservative  direction.  To  indicate  what  the  precise  direction(s) 
might  be,  some  estimate,  however  sketchy,  of  the  doctrinal 
commitments  of  these  groups  must  be  set  forth. 


DOCTRINAL   STRANDS 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  India's  native  aristocracy  was  in 
large  measure  a  self-consciously  proud,  if  not  arrogant  group, 
which  explicitly  referred  to  and  defended  its  extraordinarily 
privileged  position  in  Indian  society.  The  princes'  self-esteem  is 
abundantly  evident  from  the  assertion  that  the  Chamber  of  Princes 
(1921)  'was  instituted. .  .as  the  result  of  the  desire  of  the  rulers  of 
the  Indian  States. .  .to  come  together  and  to  deliberate  on  matters 
relating  to  the  Empire,  and  the  States  as  a  whole'.39  Similarly,  a 
spokesman  for  the  zamindars  argued  that  'the  landlord  class,  to 
which  I  have  the  honour  to  belong,  have  the  largest  and  most 
important  interests  at  stake  in  British  India,  and  they  should  be 
adequately  preserved  and  safeguarded'.40  Throughout  the  con- 
stitutional deliberations  of  the  1920s  and  I930S3  thev  insisted  that 
'  we  cannot  allow  the  rights  and  privileges  of  our  class  to  be  ignored 
or  encroached  upon';  that  they  must  always  be  given  constitutional 
protection  'commensurate  with  our  interests';  and  that  they  must 
'preserve  the  inherited  rights  of  their  class,  and  secure  legitimate 
guarantees  in  the  new  scheme  of  things . . .  '.41 

In  confronting  the  British,  the  aristocrats  quite  understandably 

24 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

emphasized  their  'ungrudging  support  and  sincere  assistance'  and 
reminded  the  raj  of  their  record  of  'unalloyed  loyalty  to  the 
Crown'.42  The  landlords  frankly  conceded  that  'if  we  are  to  exist 
as  a  class ',  then  '  it  is  our  duty  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  the 
[British]  Government'.43  Many  a  British  official  frankly  admitted 
the  Crown's  debts  to  the  aristocracy  and  regarded  the  final  disposi- 
tion of  the  native  states  in  particular  as  illegal,  immoral  and  a 
despicable  sell-out.44 

While  this  style  of  argument  commended  itself  widely  to  the 
British,  it  was  not  designed  to  appeal  to  the  articulate,  non-aristo- 
cratic elements  in  Indian  public  life,  notably  those  who  comprised 
the  Congress.  For  the  latter,  a  host  of  additional  arguments  was 
set  forth,  many  of  which  suggested  an  awareness  of  the  need  to 
swim  with  the  tide  to  some  extent.  One  defender  of  the  native 
rulers  thus  insisted  that  'the  natural  instinct  of  mankind'  is  self- 
preservation,  'and  no  one  should  grudge  it  to  the  great  Princely 
order';  and  another  insisted  that  'we  wish  to  preserve  the  indi- 
vidual and  historical  identity  of  our  States  which  our  forefathers 
carved  out  for  themselves  and  handed  down  to  us'.45  But  even 
this  was  too  baldly  put  to  stand  alone,  and  other  buttressing  argu- 
ments were  advanced.  One  ruler  stressed  '  the  traditions  of  king- 
ship and ...  the  instincts  and  responsibilities  of  hereditary  rule 
ingrained  in  our  being',  while  others  referred  to  the  princes  as 
'custodians  of  ancient  dynastic  traditions'  which  'they  have  the 
greatest  duty  of  preserving . . .  \46  The  zamindars,  although 
formally  deprived  of  their  autonomy,  echoed  the  same  sentiments 
by  emphasizing  that  theirs  was  a  class  which  could  '  claim  lineage 
from  ancient  houses,  who  have  held  lands  for  ages  past ...  in 
recognition  of  military  services ...  or  for  some  other  potent 
reason'.47 

Such  self-interested  and  fully  conservative  arguments  could 
hardly  suffice  by  themselves  and  the  rulers  were  by  no  means 
oblivious  of  this  fact.  In  addition  to  a  variant  of 'divine  right'  and 
'  tradition '  from  the  aristocrats'  own  standpoint,  there  were  other 
reasons  for  their  preservation:  the  people,  it  was  asserted,  'look 
upon  their  Rulers  as  a  precious  legacy  of  India's  glorious  past'  and 
it  became  '  an  essential  element  of  patriotism  that  nothing  should 
be  done  to  damage  the  Indian  States,  though  attack  on  individual 
rulers  may  sometimes  be  justified'.48  While  admitting  that  they 
were  conservative  'to  a  certain  extent  by  tradition  and  instinct', 

25 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

the  aristocrats  were  insistent  that  they  were  'conservators. .  .of  a 
great  tradition,  of  an  ancient  civilization  and  of  a  proud  culture ' 
which  was  superior  to  the  'dynamic,  machine-made  civilization 
of  the  West'  which  was  to  some  extent  being  imported  into  India 
by  the  British  and  westernized  Indians.49  The  emphasis  on  the 
role  of  the  princely  states  in  the  indigenous  tradition  and  on 
Indian  culture  as  superior  to  that  of  the  west  held  out  some  hope 
for  a  more  favourable  response  from  the  more  conservative,  non- 
aristocratic  Congressmen,  many  of  whom  were  sympathetic  to  the 
latter  argument,  at  least. 

Also  indicative  of  their  determination  to  exploit  prevailing 
problems  and  sentiments,  the  aristocrats  claimed  that  they  were 
above  the  communalism  of  the  newer  class  of  politicians,50  that 
they  treated  the  people  in  their  states  as  'children'  rather  than  as 
'subjects',  that  by  contrast  with  the  complex,  bureaucratic  cold- 
ness of  British  India,  'there  is  much  to  relieve  the  monotony  of 
life '  for  states '  peoples,  that  there  was  widely '  a  real  feudal  identity 
between  chief  and  people',  and  that  'the  demand  for  self-govern- 
ment [of  the  princely  states]  has  had  no  greater  argument  for  its 
support  than  the  general  success  of  the  rule  of  the  princes  and  the 
happiness  of  the  people  living  under  their  care'.51  The  rulers  of  the 
smaller  states  took  special  pains  to  point  out  that  in  their  domains 
all  official  business,  and  the  dispensing  of  justice  in  particular, 
got  done  'without  endless  formalities  and  dilatory  proceedings' 
because,  unlike  the  British  raj  and  the  great  native  rulers,  the 
smaller  prince  'is  accessible  to  all  and  ready  to  redress  grievances 
and  to  bestow  the  blessings  of  personal  rule';  'The  special  charac- 
teristic of  the  small  State  is  the  personal  and  direct  relation  of  the 
Ruler  with  his  people,  and  no  one  acquainted  with  them  will  deny 
the  esteem  in  which  a  ruler  is  held  by  his  people  and  the  veneration 
that  the  people  have  for  his  decision  and  judgments.'52  Here  we 
find  an  effort  to  relate  princely  rule  to  popular  well-being  and 
we  find  a  critique  of  western  political  institutions.  The  latter,  at 
least,  did  not  fall  on  entirely  deaf  ears  among  non-aristocratic 
groups. 

Given  such  feelings,  it  is  little  wonder  that  most  articulate 
aristocrats  balked  at  any  strong  suggestion  of  the  advent  of 
parliamentary,  democratic  government  on  an  all-India  basis, 
especially  under  the  auspices  of  the  Congress.  As  one  British  sup- 
porter of  the  princes  put  it, '  democracy,  as  known  in  British  India, 

26 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

they  do  not  find  alluring'  in  part  because  it  represented  rule  by 
the  lower  classes, '  an  inversion  of  the  traditions  of  three  thousand 
years'.53  Another  referred  to  the  Congress  as  'subversive  elements 
and  bile  producers'54  which  justified  the  conclusion  that  'in  such 
conditions,  one  can  hardly  expect  the  Indian  Princes  to  sit  in  their 
Durbars  with  folded  hands,  while  the  lawyers,  school-masters, 
money-lenders  and  industrialists  decide  the  fate  of  India  '.55 

The  aristocrats  themselves  were  no  less  vitriolic  than  the  British 
who  stood  by  them.  One  leading  zamindar  referred  to  the  Congress 
as  a  c  new  class '  of '  demi-gods  and  career  politicians '  who  exploit 
the  ignorant  masses  '  for  strengthening  their  own  class  rule ' ;  and 
he  insisted  that  the  Congress  'is  an  upstart  body  and  has  not  built 
up  the  traditions  of  authority  and  command  through  time  with  a 
corresponding  attitude  of  obedience  among  the  masses'.56  Many 
reiterated  their  'prolonged  hostility  to  Congress  ideas',  scorned 
'the  talk  of  democracies  and  all  such  things ',  rejected  the  prospects 
of  a  Congress  regime  as  one  'run  by  tradesmen  who  were  not 
born  to  rule'.57  The  intensity  of  feeling  which  possessed  some  is 
nowhere  better  seen  than  in  the  assertion  that  'when  a  eunuch  is 
able  to  serve  a  woman,  then  this  government  will  be  able  to  rule 
with  authority,  and  not  before'.58 

In  light  of  such  sentiments,  it  is  also  not  surprising  that  many 
rulers,  before  the  integration  of  the  states,  were  quite  outspoken  in 
their  insistence  that  'we  and  our  people  will  never  submit  to  being 
governed  by  British  India,  over  many  parts  of  which  our  States 
in  former  times  held  sway',  and  most  emphatic  was  the  statement 
that '  we  fought  and  sacrificed  our  blood  to  win  power  and  we  mean 
to  hold  it.  If  Congress  wants  to  rob  us,  if  the  British  should  let  us 
down,  we  will  fight'.59  In  the  event,  these  brave  words  were  not 
matched  by  brave  deeds,  but  two  points  remain  clear.  First,  these 
words  represent  the  authentic  voice  of  aristocratic  conservatism, 
defending  the  rule  of  kshatryas  according  to  tradition  and  the  pre- 
cepts of  dharma,  although  efforts  were  made  to  go  beyond  such 
defences,  in  order  to  appeal  to  non-aristocratic  conservatives.  It  is 
abundantly  clear,  however,  that  the  aristocracy  did  not  look  with 
favour  upon  the  middle  classes  (whether  westernized  or  not),  let 
alone  the  'masses'.  Secondly,  and  related  to  this,  is  the  fact  that 
there  is  much  smoldering  resentment  against  the  Congress  regime, 
which  the  ruling  party  has  by  no  means  been  able  to  obliterate. 
The  aristocrat  who  said,  in  1963,  'I  do  not  believe  in  democracy, 

27 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

but  in  autocracy — benevolent,  of  course  ',  can  for  the  moment  stand 
as  a  reminder  that  the  old  princely  order  still  has  its  defenders.60 
Not  all  of  the  aristocrats  were  vehement  about  the  Congress,  at 
least  in  public.  Before  independence,  many  were  disposed  to  assure 
the  nationalist  leadership  that  they  were  not  reactionaries  who 
wanted  to  effect  a  total  princely  restoration  or  steadfast  conserva- 
tives who  refused  to  alter  their  own  polities  or  to  associate  with  the 
leadership  of  British  India.  These  insisted  only  that  they  were 
Burkean  conservatives  who  acknowledged  the  need  for  change  but 
felt  that  it  must  be  gradual.61  This  difference  in  emphasis  was  in 
fact  underscored  by  the  British,  who  recognized  a  representative 
of  the  'conservative'  princes,  as  opposed  to  the  Burkeans,  at  the 
Round  Table  Conferences.  In  more  recent  years,  the  Maharaja 
of  Bikaner,  one  of  the  politically  active  ex-rulers,  has  claimed  to  be 
a  socialist  and  has  insisted  that  no  successful  political  party ' can  be 
established  if  it  is  based  entirely  on  the  leadership  of  former 
rulers. . .  '.62  To  this  writer's  knowledge,  only  the  late,  somewhat 
aberrant,  Maharaja  of  Bastar  has  openly  suggested,  in  recent  years, 
the  restoration  of  the  Chamber  of  Princes  or  a  comparable  forum 
for  former  rulers.63  Most,  in  the  realm  of  external  behaviour  at 
least,  have  made  their  peace  with  the  new  order,  if  only  as  a 
matter  of  necessity  and  if  only  temporarily. 

Still,  resentment  is  quite  widespread  and  has  affected  far  more 
people  than  the  aristocrats  themselves.  Events  in  almost  every 
former  state,  but  especially  the  larger  ones,  underscore  one  state- 
ment made  about  Mewar  (Udaipur) : ' . .  .nine  tenths  of  the  retainers 
have  been  turned  away. .  .Visitors  were  few,  even  the  Jagirdars 
only  putting  in  a  perfunctory  appearance;  many  of  them  had 
commuted  with  a  cash  payment  the  duty  of  attending  upon  their 
Ruler,  which  had  once  seemed  a  privilege.'64  This  parallels  in  most 
essentials  the  observation  made  over  a  century  earlier,  when 
the  annexation  of  states  by  the  British  was  generating  considerable 
uneasiness,  to  culminate  in  the  rebellion  of  1857: ' . .  .when  a  great 
state  falls,  its  nobility  and  its  supporters  must  to  some  extent 
suffer  with  it:  a  dominant  sect  and  party. .  .cannot  return  to  the 
ordinary  level  of  society  and  the  common  occupations  of  life, 
without  feeling  some  discontent  and  some  enmity. . .  '.65  Those 
who  would  understand  current  Indian  politics  would  do  well  to 
appreciate  the  contemporary  relevance  of  this  judgment.  It  would 
be  a  mistake  to  assume  that  India's  aristocracy  is  fully  reconciled 

28 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

to  the  new  dispensation,  and  the  sentiments  discussed  above  still 
animate  many.  And  as  will  be  seen  subsequently,  the  residual 
appeal  of  India's  aristocrats  is  still  great.  They  must,  therefore,  be 
considered  potentially  powerful  actors  in  a  conservative  direction. 

In  some  ways,  the  upper  castes  at  the  village  level  advanced 
positions  comparable  to  those  of  the  aristocrats.66  As  one  scholar 
has  observed,  the  decline  of  the  Brahmins  and  kshatryas  'is  not  a 
happy  thought'  for  these  classes,  and ' the  prospect  of. . .  degenera- 
tion' which  would  bring  the  sudras  and  untouchables  into  greater 
prominence  was  'an  appalling  prospect'.67  Numerous  village 
studies  fully  document  this  point,  and  in  so  far  as  the  untouchable 
is  to  have  any  place  at  all,  it  will  be  through  'knowing  his  place' 
and  hoping  for  the  best.68  Upper  castes  complain  that  lower  castes 
'are  now  swollen  headed.  They  do  not  want  to  serve  us,  and  we 
cannot  depend  on  them.' 69  Efforts  by  some  government  servants 
to  work  directly  with  the  lower  castes  at  the  village  level  have 
generated  '  coldness  and  even  hostility  from  groups  on  the  higher 
levels  of  the  social  hierarchy'  who  ask  themselves  'whether  the 
government  was  out  to  destroy  the  social  system  of  the  Hindus  '.70 
One  effort  by  prominent  private  citizens  and  government  officials 
to  gain  temple  entry  for  untouchables  elicited  the  response:  'The 
government  is  mixing  the  maize  with  the  millet.  We  are  helpless.' 
But  not  all  felt  helpless :  upon  turning  the  group  back  a  local  notable 
is  reported  to  have  said,  'you  can  tell  Mr  Nehru  from  me  to  go  to 
hell.  The  whole  town  will  back  us.' 71  A  wide  range  of  coercive 
techniques  has  been  employed  by  higher  castes  to  keep  the  lower 
orders '  in  their  place ',  and  this  in  its  own  way  is  an  important  mani- 
festation of  conservatism,  albeit  of  a  less  politically  organized  sort. 

Even  middle-caste  Hindus  who  might  be  vehemently  opposed  to 
Brahminical  or  aristocratic  pre-eminence  come  down  heavily  on  the 
lowest  classes.  Thus,  the  anti-Brahmin  Justice  party  had  this  to 
say  about  temple  entry  for  certain  harijan  groups : 

For  many  centuries  these  people  most  of  whom  until  recently  were 
Animists,  were  content  to  worship  at  their  own  shrines,  and  to  try  to 
force  themselves  into  Hindu  temples  is  not... to  make  themselves 
popular.  Nor  can  we  think  that  any  grave  wrong  is  done  by  their  con- 
tinued exclusion. .  .They  would  be  better  occupied  in  improving  their 
own  conditions  than  in  violent  attempts  to  assert  rights  which  no  one 
heard  of  till  a  few  years  ago.72 

29 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Suggesting  that  some  in  government  service  share  such  sentiments 
is  the  pathetic  statement  from  an  official  publication  on  the  condi- 
tion of  harijans : 

Alcoholic  liquor  and  other  intoxicating  drugs  and  drinks  are,  indeed,  the 
Public  Enemy  Number  One  of  the  backward  classes.  Indulgence  in 
these  eats  into  their  meagre  resources  and  deprives  them  and  their 
families  of  their  essential  requirements.  It  saps  their  vitality  and  under- 
mines their  physique  and  minds . . .  much  is  being  done  to  educate  the 
harijans  to  reform  their  extravagant  habits  and  customs.73 

So,  too,  many  middle  peasants  and  substantial  tenants  have  been 
quite  willing  to  see  the  end  of  large-scale  landlordism,  without 
being  in  any  way  solicitous  of  those  who  are  subordinated  to  them; 
and  they  frequently  condemn  efforts  to  give  land  to  the  landless  as 
contrary  to  dharma  or  else  as  unproductive,  i.e.  land  is  given  to 
people  who  are  held  to  be  incompetent  to  cultivate  it  properly.  In 
these  and  other  ways,  caste  Hindus  demonstrate  their  sense  of 
superiority  either  explicitly  or  implicitly  to  the  depressed  castes; 
and  they  demonstrate  as  well  their  refusal  to  confront  the  funda- 
mental problems  of  rural  India.  Still,  it  is  important  to  note  that 
non-conservative  vocabulary  is  often  used  (i.e.  efficient  cultivation) 
to  deny  the  claims  of  depressed  groups.  Furthermore,  it  is  also 
important  to  note  that  the  exponents  of  these  views  are  not  neces- 
sarily sympathetic  to  aristocratic  or  Brahmin  world- views :  many 
anti-kshatrya  and  anti-Brahmin  groups  have  challenged  the  position 
of  these  superior  classes,  while  steadfastly  denying  the  claims  of 
those  who  remain  below  them.74 

More  difficult  to  come  to  grips  with  than  such  straightforward 
manifestations  of  conservatism  is  a  doctrine  whose  practical  con- 
sequences are  profoundly  conservative,  even  though  its  exponents 
profess  to  want  certain  major  changes  in  Indian  life.  This  doctrine 
has  as  its  core  an  image  of  an  idealized  village  community,  some- 
times alleged  to  have  existed  in  ancient  India.  It  has  as  its  principal 
roots  (i)  the  view  that  village  India  is  the  real  India;  (2)  the  reac- 
tion against  imperialist  arrogance  and  against  the  corrosive  effects 
of  British  rule  on  traditional,  village  India,  pitting  the  real  India 
against  the  west;  and  (3)  linked  to  this,  the  virtually  universal 
reaction  to  the  dislocations  of  the  early  stages  of  industrialization, 
including  Indian  variants  on  Luddite  and  Utopian  socialist  themes.75 
The  association  of  Gandhi's  name,  rightly  or  wrongly,  with  this 

30 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

strand  of  thought  accounts  in  large  measure  for  its  potent  emotional 
appeal. 

Different  exponents  of  this  doctrine  naturally  give  it  different 
twists  and  embellishments,  but  some  major  perspectives  are 
almost  universally  shared.  Of  central  importance  is  the  view  that 
the  Indian  village  is,  or  was  at  one  time,  almost  an  idyllic,  self- 
reliant,  harmonious,  spiritual  little  republic.  The  caste  system,  one 
of  the  most  uniformly  condemned  aspects  of  Indian  life,  was, 
according  to  this  view,  originally  a  plausible  approach  to  the  re- 
quirement of  a  division  of  social  function  and  did  not  contain  the 
rigidities  commonly  associated  with  it  in  recent  times.  Nor  did  it 
relegate  a  significant  segment  of  the  population  to  the  position  of 
untouchables.  The  *  good  life '  was  approximated  under  this  system, 
and  even  if  the  presently  existing  villages  fall  far  short  of  this 
picture,  it  is  only  within  the  village  context,  somehow  purified, 
that  the  'good  life'  can  now  be  attained  by  Indians. 

The  anti-western  and  anti-industrial  themes  are  related  to  this 
one  and  are  also  almost  uniformly  articulated.  The  introduction 
of  machine-made  goods,  both  foreign  and  domestic;  the  intro- 
duction of  western  legal  procedures,  western  education,  western 
political  processes,  and  the  like,  is  widely  portrayed  as  the  cause 
of  the  present  distress.  There  is  a  general  rejection  of  individualism, 
in  favour  of  social  co-operation  and  concern  for  larger  social 
groupings,  Specifically,  there  is  a  rejection  of  the  competition 
associated  with  laissez  faire  economics,  of  the  win-or-lose  struggle 
associated  with  western  legal  processes,  and  of  its  alleged  parallel 
in  western,  'adversary'  style  party  politics.  The  individual  is  to 
subordinate  his  passions  and  needs  to  those  of  the  extended  family, 
the  caste,  and  the  village  as  a  whole;  and  an  important  corollary  of 
this  basic  view  is  the  requirement  that  the  rich,  the  wise  and  the 
well-born  must  use  their  advantages  for  the  common  good — the 
so-called  doctrine  of  trusteeship.  Because  co-operation  and 
harmony  are  major  desiderata,  conflict  and  coercion  in  any  form 
are  not  permissible;  and  here  the  notions  of £  class  war'  and  even  of 
legislation  through  majority  rule  are  to  be  rejected.  In  so  far  as 
privileged  classes  use  coercive  techniques  which  are  to  be  elimin- 
ated, education  in  the  doctrine  of  trusteeship  must  provide  the 
corrective.  It  is  generally  argued  that  the  ideal  can  be  approximated 
only  in  smaller  communities  unsullied  by  significant  concern  for 
material  things;  hence,  urbanization  and  industrialization  along 

3i 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

western  lines  must  be  resisted.  Indian  spirituality  must  be  main- 
tained in  the  face  of  western  materialism.76 

The  contention  that  such  perspectives  have  conservative  impli- 
cations (in  addition  to  certain  explicitly  conservative  views)  is 
based  on  the  following  considerations.  First  of  all,  for  many 
exponents  of  these  ideas,  the  principal  dangers  to  the  idealized 
village  system  lie  not  in  the  village  itself,  e.g.  in  the  caste  hierarchy, 
in  the  gross  inequalities  which  prevail  locally,  or  in  the  degradation 
of  the  untouchables,  but  in  the  forces  outside  the  village  which  are 
undermining  it,  e.g.  industrialization,  party  politics,  and  the  rest. 
Hence,  in  many  cases  there  is  relatively  little  attention  devoted  to 
the  actual  distribution  of  power  in  the  Indian  village  and  to  the 
manner  in  which  those  who  have  power  use  it.  Secondly,  when  the 
rural  power  pattern  is  realistically  examined  and  changes  are 
deemed  necessary,  the  latter  are  to  be  achieved  through  education 
in  trusteeship,  as  already  noted.77  Other  conceivable  techniques 
are  incompatible  with  the  demand  for  harmony  and  co-operation 
and  non-violence.  Thirdly,  the  pattern  of  constraints  within  the 
joint  family  and  caste  are  often  totally  neglected  (as  are  the  con- 
straints within  the  village  as  a  whole),  and  these  social  groupings  are 
looked  upon  as  instruments  of  social  welfare  and/or  of  moral 
discipline.78  Fourthly,  while  there  is  some  attention  given  to  the 
desperate  plight  of  the  lowest  classes,  there  is  less  than  passionate 
concern  for  their  unhappy  material  condition  because  a  concern 
for  material  affairs  tends  to  erode  concern  for  spiritual  matters. 
Thus  Rajaji  has  supported  Gandhi  in  the  view  that  'civilization 
consists  not  in  the  multiplication  of  wants  but  in  the  deliberate 
and  voluntary  restriction  of  wants ',  and  he  also  supported  the  view 
that  'high  thinking  is  inconsistent  with  a  complicated  material 
life,  based  on  high  speed  imposed  on  us  by  mammon  worship'.79 
Hence,  the  cynic  could  conclude,  India's  poorest  people  are  really 
better  off,  or  at  least  they  have  a  head  start  in  the  race  for  the 
good  life! 

From  some  vantage  points,  it  is  really  immaterial  whether  one 
calls  the  exponents  of  such  views  conservatives,  reactionaries, 
'messiahs  of  backwardness',  Utopian  socialists,  'spiritualized 
Luddites',  or  something  else  more  or  less  flattering.80  In  some 
respects,  it  also  matters  little  whether  one  assumes  that  they 
genuinely  desire  the  changes  which  they  profess  to  want  or  whether 
one  insists  that  they  are  frauds.  The  important  point  is  that  policies 

32 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

consistent  with  the  model  of  the  idealized  village  would  serve  as 
almost  a  total  bar  to  any  major  transformation  of  the  Indian  village. 
In  other  words,  the  doctrine  supports  the  status  quo  in  fact,  if  not 
in  theory.  Particularly  for  the  lowest  strata  of  the  population  there 
is  little  hope  for  significant  improvement,  materially  or  otherwise. 
It  is  abundantly  clear  from  the  historical  and  current  state  of  the 
Indian  village  that  there  is  no  salvation  for  the  lowest  strata  within 
that  framework,  in  all  probability  even  with  the  advent  of  com- 
petitive politics  and  the  impingement  of  external  forces,  but 
certainly  not  without  them.  And  the  entire  history  of  mankind 
should  be  proof  that  privileged  classes  do  not  become  trustees  to 
any  significant  degree  without  substantial  pressure  from  below  or 
from  competing  elites  who  speak  for  the  lower  classes.  If,  as 
commonly  argued,  the  capacity  of  the  lowest  classes  to  act  success- 
fully on  their  own  behalf  requires  a  secure  economic  base,  then 
the  defence  of  a  rural  economy  and  the  scorn  for  material  concerns 
is  especially  supportive  of  the  status  quo.  Under  existing  and  fore- 
seeable Indian  conditions  (tremendous  overpopulation  relative  to 
available  arable  land,  etc.),  the  village  itself  simply  cannot  provide 
the  economic  underpinnings  needed  to  sustain  a  movement  for  the 
betterment  of  the  lowest  classes.81  Even  efforts  from  supra-village 
quarters  to  improve  the  conditions  of  the  *  poorest  he'  often 
founder  as  a  result  of  the  vulnerability  of  the  lowest  classes  to 
coercion  in  one  form  or  another  on  the  part  of  the  village  elite.82 

If  the  commitment  to  co-operation,  trusteeship,  and  the  like 
precludes  any  major  changes  in  the  village  in  the  interests  of  lower 
class  advance,  the  anti-urban,  anti-industrial  commitments  clearly 
run  counter  to  the  interests  of  the  urban  industrial  class.  It  is  easy 
to  see,  therefore,  why  the  exponents  of  the  idealized  village  did  not 
endear  themselves  to  untouchable  leaders,  such  as  Ambedkar,  or  to 
India's  captains  of  industry.  But  it  is  also  easy  to  understand  why 
the  former  were  much  more  concerned  than  the  latter.  To  the  un- 
touchable, a  defence  of  the  village  was  a  defence  of  his  prison.  To 
the  industrialist,  a  defence  of  the  village  was  more  a  nuisance  than 
a  threat,  although,  as  we  shall  see,  it  has  given  the  captains  of 
industry  cause  for  some  serious  complaints. 

Also  important  is  the  fact  that  in  its  defence  of  the  traditions 
(real  or  imagined)  of  the  east  against  the  incursions  of  the  west,  this 
strand  of  thought  overlaps  with  some  parts  of  the  aristocratic 
argument  sketched  above — although  it  is  evident  that  the  village 

3  33  esp 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

model  is  essentially  unencumbered  by  any  concern  for  aristocratic 
institutions  and  values.  Similarly  important  is  the  fact  that  this 
doctrine  to  some  extent  fuses  anti-imperialism  and  anti-reformism, 
generating  some  of  the  analytical  difficulties  already  noted.  The 
fact  that  this  doctrine  does  defend  India  against  the  west  and  that 
it  can  be  sanctified  by  the  invocation  of  Gandhi's  name  makes  it  an 
almost  uniquely  attractive  refuge  for   all  manner   of  knaves, 
scoundrels,  reactionaries,  etc.,  as  well  as  genuine  conservatives,  in 
addition  to  those  who  earnestly  desire  substantial  changes  along 
'Gandhian'  lines.  This  is  particularly  important  because  of  the 
difficulty  of  articulating  explicitly  conservative  positions  in  India, 
especially  in  the  Nehru  era.  Even  in  the  hands  of  those  who 
genuinely  want  change,  this  doctrine  is  conservative  in  its  practical 
consequences;  and,  of  course,  it  is  quite  explicitly  conservative  in 
some  respects.  Those  who  use  it  as  a  more  respectable  facade  for  a 
commitment  to  the  status  quo  only  re-enforce  its  conservative 
impact.  In  examining  the  nature,  problems,  and  prospects  of 
Indian  conservatism,  we  must  give  much  weight  to  the  fact  that 
this    doctrine,    which    represents    'disguised'    conservatism,    is 
available  and  persuasive  to  many  Indians;  and  it  will  be  considered 
in  further  detail  as  it  is  advanced  by  one  of  its  more  articulate 
exponents,  Rajaji. 

Many  of  those  who  were  adversely  affected  by  and/or  deeply 
resented  the  penetration  of  western  ideas,  whether  via  the  British 
or  via  westernized  Indians,  did  not  in  response  take  refuge  in 
heavy-handed  Hindu  orthodoxy  or  in  the  de  facto  conservatism  of 
the  defenders  of  the  idealized  village.  By  contrast  with  these 
strands  of  thought,  others  espoused  views  which  are  more  properly 
called  right  radical  rather  than  conservative  or  reactionary  and 
chose  to  emphasize  a  renascent,  revitalized  Hinduism  as  the  basis 
for  their  commitment. 

If  one  pieces  together  the  assorted  evidence,  a  strongly  suggestive 
ideal-type  may  be  sketched.  The  social  bases  for  militant  Hinduism 
are  diverse,  but  prominent  at  one  time  or  another  have  been  various 
dislocated  or  dispossessed  segments  of  the  population:  refugees 
from  Pakistan,  former  princely  state  retainers,  and  many  lower 
middle-class  elements,  such  as  lesser  Rajput  landholders,  smaller 
businessmen  and  shopkeepers,  traders,  and  the  like.83  Much  of  the 
leadership  and  intellectual  inspiration  for  this  component  of  the 

34 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

Indian  right  has  come  from  Maharashtra  and  from  a  singularly 
prominent  community,  the  Chitpavan  Brahmins  of  the  Poona  area, 
a  militant  and  very  'political'  caste  associated  with  the  Maratha 
confederacy.  In  the  background  stand  many  of  the  great  figures 
of  the  Hindu  renaissance — Dayanand  Saraswati,  Vivekananda, 
Aurobindo,  Tilak,  Lajpat  Rai,  Bepin  Chandra  Pal,  V.  D.  Savarkar, 
among  many  others. 

As  in  the  preceding  case,  no  simple  characterization  will  apply 
uniformly  to  all  of  these  leading  figures  and  component  groups, 
but  in  the  present  context,  the  individual  variants  are  less  import- 
ant than  the  general  thrust.  And  this  thrust  is  clear  enough.  What 
is  wanted  is  a  unified,  disciplined,  militant  and  militarized  Hindu 
community,  bound  together  as  far  as  possible  in  a  full-fledged 
gemeinschaft  by  ties  of  blood,  culture,  language,  religion,  and  the 
like,  and  capable  of  taking  a  leading  place  among  the  nations  of  the 
world  as  a  consequence.  In  most  formal  statements,  traditional 
caste  distinctions  are  laid  aside  and  even  the  untouchables  are  to 
be  admitted  to  the  fold  of  respectable  Hindus,  if  only  to  keep  alien 
religions  (Islam,  Buddhism,  Christianity)  from  making  inroads 
into  Hinduism  (thus  'denationalizing'  Hindustan's  people),  and  to 
prevent  the  exploitation  of  caste  differences  to  the  detriment  of 
national  solidarity  and  strength.  India's  historic  political  fragmen- 
tation and  the  instability  of  her  macro-political  institutions  are 
seen  as  sources  of  great  weakness.  Therefore,  instead  of  defending 
the  congeries  of  princely  states  and  instead  of  defending  the 
idealized  village  (with  supra-village  institutions  having  minimal 
functions),  the  preferred  polity  is  a  highly  centralized  and  if  neces- 
sary a  highly  authoritarian  state.  The  determination  that  India  must 
not  only  become  immune  to  internal  discord  and  disintegrative 
forces,  but  must  also  be  able  to  prevent  further  foreign  conquests, 
leads  in  turn  to  an  emphasis  on  military  strength  and  its  inevitable 
concomitant,  modern  industry — in  sharp  contrast  with  the 
emphasis  of  the '  Gandhians '  on  the  village  economy  and  asceticism. 
Tilak's  insistence  that  'one  common  religion  becomes  a  great 
means  to  create  mutual  affinity  and  sympathy  among  people'  and 
Savarkar's  slogan, '  Hinduize  all  politics  and  militarize  Hindudom ', 
satisfactorily  suggest  the  preoccupations  of  the  militant  Hindus.84 

It  is  essential  to  stress  that  the  militant  Hindu  ideal  represents  a 
considerable  departure  from  traditional  Indian  norms  and  institu- 
tions, while  conceding  at  the  same  time  that  many  followers  of 

35  3-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Tilak  et  al.  were  steadfastly  orthodox  and  while  conceding  that 
the  effort  to  'return  to  the  Vedas'  represents  an  effort  to  relate  this 
ideal  to  an  earlier  Indian  tradition.  The  anti-traditional  dimensions 
become  somewhat  clearer  when  we  realize  that  many  orthodox 
Hindus  'joined  the  Sanatan  Dharma  Sabha,  which  had  been 
created  in  1885  as  a  defence  of  orthodox  Hinduism  against  the 
criticisms  of  the  Arya  Samaj ',  one  of  the  early  vehicles  for  a 
renascent,   purified  Hinduism.85  That  this   ideal  has   strongly 
communal  and  proto-fascist  tendencies  is  undeniable;  that  it  makes 
no  concessions  either  to  secularism  or  to  a  solid  sense  of  diversity 
and  pluralism  is  also  undeniable.  But  that  at  least  on  paper  it 
represents  a  departure  of  no  small  proportions  from  the  other 
streams  of  thought  must  also  be  conceded.  While  there  is  far  from 
complete  congruence  between  social  group  and  doctrinal  position 
there  is  sufficient  overlap  in  some  regions  so  that  ideological  and 
social  splits  are  mutually  re-enforcing,  to  the  detriment  of  a  broad, 
rightist  coalition.  In  addition,  because  militant  Hinduism  is  based 
on  specifically  Hindu  appeals,  and  because  the  desired  linguistic 
unity  is  to  be  achieved  through  the  use  of  Hindi  as  a  national 
language,  non-Hindu  and  non-Hindi-speaking  rightists  will  be 
largely  alienated,  rendering  even  more  difficult  the  creation  of  a 
cohesive  rightist  force.  The  discussion  of  the  Jan  Sangh  and  of 
right-wing  unity  efforts,  below,  will  elaborate  all  of  these  major 
points,  as  will  the  discussion  of  K.  M.  Munshi,  of  the  Swatantra 
'inner  circle'. 

In  light  of  the  diverse  inquiries  into  the  origins  of  capitalism  in 
the  west,  it  is  particularly  important  to  try  to  delineate  the  doc- 
trinal position  of  the  Indian  bourgeoisie.  To  what  extent  did  this 
class  in  India  play  a  role  comparable  to  its  counterparts  in  the  west? 
To  what  extent,  in  short,  has  it  been  anti-traditional  and  liberal? 
To  what  extent  was  the  colonial  setting  responsible  for  departures 
from  the  pattern  of  one  or  another  western  nation?  To  what  extent 
was  anti-traditionalism  suppressed,  for  example,  in  the  interests  of 
anti-imperialism,  and  to  what  extent  was  it  suppressed  as  well  in 
the  interests  of  anti-socialism?  To  what  extent  can  the  contempo- 
rary Indian  bourgeoisie  be  spoken  of  as  a  conservative  or  rightist 
force?  Only  sketchy  answers  to  these  questions  are  possible  here, 
but  even  these  will  provide  important  materials  for  an  understand- 
ing of  contemporary  Indian  conservatism. 

36 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

To  put  the  matter  in  a  nutshell,  the  Indian  urban  classes,  both  in 
ancient  and  more  recent  times,  have  fought  against  the  constraints 
imposed  by  traditional  Hindu  institutions  and  by  the  political 
chaos  which  characterized  the  princely  polities;  but  at  no  time  has 
this  fight  resulted  in  a  more  or  less  complete,  sustained  victory  for 
the  urban  classes.  In  recent  times,  when  the  urban  classes  took  on 
more  of  an  industrial  and  professional  (rather  than  commercial) 
quality,  there  was  still  no  broad-based  commitment  to  a  doctrine 
which  was  directed  principally  and  explicitly  against  indigenous 
traditionaHsm. 

Some  historical  points  are  pertinent  here.  It  is  well  known,  for 
example,  that  India's  urban  classes,  in  ancient  times,  gave  con- 
siderable support  to  anti-Brahminical,  protestant  religions,  notably 
Buddhism  and  Jainism,  in  an  effort  to  escape  the  inferior  position 
to  which  they  were  assigned  by  Brahminical  teachings.  Yet  this 
did  not  result  in  a  permanent  breakthrough:  Buddhism,  though  it 
left  its  imprint  on  subsequent  religious  development  in  India, 
has  all  but  disappeared  from  the  land  of  its  birth;  and  Jainism, 
which  survives,  has  only  a  tiny,  if  important  following,  which  for 
the  most  part  considers  itself  a  reformed  sect  of  Hinduism.86  India's 
business  communities  were  mostly  re-embedded  in  the  Hindu 
social  order,  in  an  inferior  position,  upon  the  Hindu  'restoration'. 

A  second  major  historical  example  concerns  the  distress  of  urban 
commercial  groups  under  Akbar  and  other  Mogul  emperors.  At 
some  junctures,  the  Mogul  imperial  service  itself  undertook  some 
manufacturing  and  commerce,  and  Akbar  and  some  of  his  Mogul 
successors  claimed  and  often  availed  themselves  of  the  right  to 
inherit  the  property  of  all  subjects,  including  that  of  wealthy  busi- 
nessmen, who  were  tempting  prey.  These  and  other  circumstances 
were  obviously  unsatisfactory  from  the  standpoint  of  a  stable, 
flourishing  private  commerce  and  manufacture;  but  about  the 
best  that  could  be  done  by  the  Marwaris,  for  example,  was  to  repair 
to  the  relatively  barren  wastes  of  Rajasthan,  in  order  to  escape 
Mogul  depredations.  There  was  no  breakthrough  here  either.87 

Weber,  in  his  studies  of  Indian  religion  and  society  and  of  urban 
development  in  the  west,  has,  of  course,  stressed  the  absence  of 
equivalents  of  the  protestant  ethic,  in  attempting  to  explain  the 
weakness  of  India's  urban  classes  in  traditional  society.  This 
interpretation  has,  however,  been  widely  and  in  some  cases 
persuasively  disputed.  But  Weber  has  also  emphasized  the  social 

37 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

fragmentation  of  the  Indian  population,  in  explaining  why  India's 
burghers  did  not  establish  urban  brotherhoods  comparable  to 
those  which  led  the  fight  against  feudalism  in  the  west.  The  latter 
argument  certainly  deserves  close  attention,  in  view  of  the  enduring 
social  barriers  to  the  creation  of  a  business  class  in  India,  by  con- 
trast with  the  collection  of  communities  and  castes.88 

Also  important  is  the  fact  that  many  leading  business  groups 
supported  the  British  in  the  rebellion  of  1857.  This  indicates  that 
the  Pax  Britannica,  whatever  its  limitations,  represented  an  advance 
over  the  political  chaos,  the  depredations,  the  confiscatory  policies, 
the  customs  and  transit  duties,  and  the  like,  which  adversely 
affected  Indian  business  prior  to  the  stabilization  of  British  rule. 
Implicit  here  is  a  rejection  of  the  imperial-princely  political  order 
of  pre-British  days,  but  it  says  little  specifically  about  the  broader 
questions  of  liberalism  associated  with  the  rise  of  urban  classes  in 
the  west.  That  Indian  business  later  turned  against  the  British 
because  the  latter  seemed  to  impose  great  constraints  on  the 
former  (but  in  the  interests  of  British  business,  more  than  of 
traditional  India),  is  also  important  in  another  connection  to  be 
discussed  shortly.  For  the  moment,  however,  it  is  sufficient  to  note 
that  Indian  business  has  historically  shown  certain  anti-traditional 
tendencies  but  that  these  were  never  translated  into  a  self-sustaining 
movement  which  overcame  the  constraints  of  traditional  India. 

In  a  detailed  study,  the  preceding  remarks  would  have  to  be 
qualified  in  a  number  of  important  respects.  Certainly  many 
Indian  business  elements  managed  to  accumulate  great  fortunes, 
even  in  the  darker  days  of  political  instability  and  chaos,  or  of 
autocratic  abuse.  Also,  there  were  important  variations  in  the 
pattern  of  inter-class  relationships,  depending  on  time  and  region. 
Lamb  has  argued,  for  example,  that  during  certain  eras,  Indian 
businessmen  seem  to  have  been  held  in  high  esteem  and  seemed 
also  to  thrive;  and  Harrison,  among  others,  has  noted  that  in 
Gujarat,  where  businessmen  are  largely  local,  they  have  generally 
been  held  in  higher  esteem  than  in  other  areas,  where  leading 
businessmen  were  outsiders  to  the  region.89  (This  in  itself  suggests 
some  of  the  obstacles  to  the  creation  of  a  national  business  class.) 
So,  too,  the  tiny  Parsi  community  proved  to  be  extremely  adaptive, 
and  many  of  their  number  Anglicized  widely  and  rapidly.  In  and 
around  Bombay,  they  served  as  an  important  nucleus  of  social 
mobility,  outside  of  the  Hindu  social  structure. 

38 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

What  has  been  lacking  in  recent  times  is  a  direct  assault  on 
traditional  society.  Even  the  Parsis  were  in  no  position  to  do  much 
on  this  score,  because  they  were  so  few  in  number  (100,000),  very 
much  localized,  and  of  alien  origin.  In  fact,  the  rapid  westerniza- 
tion of  many  Parsis  and  their  close  association  with  the  British 
exposed  them  to  some  sharp  criticism  from  more  traditional  and 
militant  Hindu  groups,  although  relations  were,  generally,  good. 
There  was  certainly  some  anxiety  among  Parsis,  lest  a  Hindu 
renaissance  deprive  them  of  their  strong  position  in  commerce  and 
industry,  while  with  the  gradual  democratization  of  politics,  their 
fortunes  in  this  area  declined.90 

By  contrast  with  the  westernizing  Parsis,  the  Marwaris,  even  in 
Calcutta,  remained  '  an  orthodox  community . . .  hardly  touched  by 
the  social  and  intellectual  reform  movements  launched  by  Bengali 
intellectuals5,91  although  they  did  apparently  support  the  British 
during  the  1857  rebellion.  If  they  were  not  in  the  forefront  of  re- 
form movements,  the  Marwaris  have  more  recently  been  in  the 
forefront  of  anti-parochial  political  movements,  as  the  most  nearly 
national  business  community.92  So  also  the  Marwaris  supported 
the  States'  Peoples'  movement  in  what  is  now  Rajasthan,  and  their 
southern  counterparts  (the  Chettiars  et  al.)  supported  the  Justice 
Party,  indicating  that  there  was  resentment  against  the  Rajput 
aristocracy  on  the  one  hand  and  against  the  Brahmin  elite  on  the 
other.93  But  such  opposition  to  an  elite  caste  was  not  generalized 
into  a  broadly  liberal  movement  against  the  rigidities  of  the  Hindu 
social  structure.  Even  so,  sharp  conflicts  between  Brahmin  and 
aristocratic  elements  on  the  one  hand  and  business  interests  on 
the  other  are  discernible,  as  one  would  imagine  from  the  kshatrya 
condemnation  of  the  Congress,  e.g.  as  run  by  tradesmen  who  were 
not  born  to  rule. 

During  the  twentieth  century,  business  attacks  were  directed 
primarily  against  the  British,  not  against  traditional  India.  Empha- 
sizing the  privileged  position  of  British  interests  and  lack  of  support 
for  Indian  interests,  Indian  business  leadership,  within  the  con- 
text of  the  Pax  Britannica,  demanded  much  state  assistance. 
Feeling  increasingly  frustrated  by  the  British,  they  turned  in- 
creasingly to  the  Congress  as  a  vehicle  for  their  demands.  Because 
the  aristocratic  elements  were  alined  with  the  British  in  delaying 
independence,  the  business  interests  criticized  the  aristocrats, 
often  very  sharply,  but  primarily  on  narrow,  political  grounds.94 

39 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

This  is  another  aspect  of  the  business-aristocratic  split,  and  in  this 
limited  sense  can  business  support  for  the  Congress  be  viewed  as 
something  of  a  surrogate  for  a  stand  against  the  old  order.  The  need 
to  maintain  Congress  cohesion  seems  to  have  precluded  any 
broad-based  attack  on  traditional  India,  and,  in  any  event,  it  is  far 
from  clear  that  any  but  the  Parsis,  as  a  group,  were  particularly 
willing  or  anxious  to  see  a  massive  erosion  of  traditional  India. 
We  can  only  speculate  about  this  point,  but  it  seems  plausible  that 
to  have  been  anti-traditional  might  have  been  interpreted  as  being 
anti-Indian  in  the  colonial  situation,  thus  weakening  business 
attacks  against  the  ancien  regime. 

The  attitudes  of  Indian  business  require  further  clarification, 
because  of  some  rather  superficial  judgments  made  about  business' 
apparently  weak  commitment  to  an  industrial,  free  enterprise 
ideology.   Some  interpret  business  support  for  Gandhi  as  an 
endorsement  of  his  economic  preferences,  while  others  stress  a 
'socialist'  strain  in  Indian  business  thinking,  which  is  sometimes 
related  to  the  principle  of  trusteeship.95  But  either  way,  business- 
men would  seem  ill-suited  to  perform  a  broadly  liberalizing  role. 
It  is  probably  true  that  Gandhi's  involvement  in  such  matters  as 
a  ban  on  cow-slaughter  appealed  to  the  more  orthodox  Hindu  and 
Jain  businessmen;  and  it  is  perhaps  true  that  Gandhi's  'saintly' 
qualities  struck  a  responsive  chord.  Both  may  help  to  explain 
business  support  for  the  Gandhian  Congress,  but  this  is  far  from 
proof  that  Gandhi's  economic  views  were  being  endorsed.  In  fact, 
there  is  ample  evidence  to  the  contrary,  including  some  from  those 
very  people  who  were  most  generous  in  their  financial  support  for 
Gandhi's  activities.  For  example,  G.  D.  Birla,  a  leading  Marwari 
businessman  and  a  principal  contributor  to  Congress  coffers, 
observed  that  Gandhi  'believed  in  small-scale  industries'  while  he 
(Birla)  'believed  in  the  industrialization  of  the  country  through 
large-scale  industries '.  Many  businessmen,  among  others,  objected 
to  aspects  of  Gandhi's  constructive  programme  for  rural  uplift 
and  to  the  requirement  that  Congressmen  must  spin  some  cloth 
by  hand,  wear  homespun,  and  so  on,  which  Gandhi  emphasized. 
Moreover,  in  the  post-independence  period  many  businessmen 
(particularly  in  textiles)  vehemently  object  to  efforts  to  sustain  the 
cottage  textile  industry  through  restrictions  on  machine  output, 
excise  levies,  and  the  like.  This  is  the  point  of  most  direct  contact 
between  Gandhian  and  urban-industrial  values,  and  on  the  basis 


40 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

of  the  evidence  available,  it  is  not  possible  to  conclude  that  business 
groups  have  embraced  Gandhism,  although  they  may  feel  obliged 
to  pay  lip  service  to  it  because  of  the  appeal  of  Gandhian  thought.96 
In  terms  of  technology,  then,  Indian  business  is  not  particularly 
antiquarian  in  outlook,  however  conservative  some  may  be  religi- 
ously and  socially.  The  idealized  village  model  finds  little  favour 
among  businessmen,  at  least  in  its  critical  economic  aspects. 

Whatever  value  one  may  want  to  attach  to  religious  and  saintly 
matters  in  explaining  business  support  for  Gandhi,  it  is  obvious 
that  there  were  other  reasons;  and  these  relate,  in  part,  to  the 
alleged  socialist  tendencies  of  Indian  business.  For  one  thing, 
given  the  generally  bad  image  of  Indian  businessmen,  Gandhi's 
emphasis  on  trusteeship  could  only  be  advantageous,  because  it 
helped  to  deflect  certain  kinds  of  criticism  of  the  business  elite. 
Nehru,  for  example,  was  quite  abusive  in  the  1930s  and  was  on 
record  as  saying  that '  our  captains  of  industry  are  quite  amazingly 
backward  in  their  ideas;  they  are  not  even  up-to-date  capitalists. . . ', 
which  ties  in,  of  course,  with  some  of  the  Weberian  arguments 
about  Indian  business.  In  addition,  many  anti-industrial  peasant 
leaders,  such  as  N.  G.  Ranga  (now  the  Swatantra  President), 
were  attacking  Gandhi  for  being  so  solicitous  of  the  interests  of 
Indian  businessmen.97  In  this  light,  Weiner's  conclusion  that  the 
radical  elements  in  the  1930s  'did  not  alarm  the  business  com- 
munity5 simply  will  not  bear  scrutiny;  and  once  again  we  have  the 
unimpeachable  testimony  of  businessmen  themselves.  At  the 
Round  Table  Conferences,  Birla  warned  the  British  that  Gandhi, 
'  who  has  proved  himself  in  many  respects  a  greater  Conservative 
than  many  of  you',  might  not  be  able  to  check  the  rise  of  radical- 
ism; and  he  urged  Britain  to  yield  to  moderate  demands  before  it 
was  too  late.  In  a  letter  to  Sir  Samuel  Hoare,  Birla  was  even  more 
explicit,  in  arguing  that  Gandhi '  alone  is  responsible  for  keeping  the 
left  wing  in  India  in  check5.98  Indian  businessmen  perhaps  did 
not  visualize  the  hammer-and-sickle  flying  over  parliament  house, 
but  they  certainly  were  apprehensive  about  the  socialist  tendencies 
in  the  Congress — in  many  cases  even  before  the  formation  of  the 
Congress  Socialist  Party  (CSP)  in  1934.  The  crisis  of  confidence, 
including  a  massive  'strike  of  capital5,  immediately  after  inde- 
pendence reflected  the  same  apprehension.99 

Other  suggested  indices  of  businessmen5 s  socialist  tendencies 
must  also  be  viewed  with  caution.  The  much-heralded  '  Bombay 

4i 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Plan'  did  set  forth  a  programme  for  Indian  development  in  which 
the  government  was  assigned  a  place.  But  it  is  clear,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  it  was  partly  inspired  by  a  desire  to  outflank  incipient 
planning  efforts  of  the  Congress  itself,  and,  on  the  other,  that  it 
involved,  from  the  standpoint  of  private  enterprise,  little  more 
than  maximum  state  assistance  with  minimum  state  control.100 
Similarly,  the  fact  that  the  business  communities  have  not  rejected 
the  underlying  principles  of  the  five-year  plans  is  due  partly  to  the 
benefits  which  accrue  to  private  enterprise  as  a  result  of  govern- 
ment planning  and  partly  to  the  difficulties  involved  in  running 
counter  to  the  prevailing  socialist  rhetoric.  Under  the  circum- 
stances it  is  little  wonder  that  private  enterprise  argues  more  over 
the  details  of  the  plans  rather  than  the  whole  concept  of  planning, 
and  it  is  little  wonder  that  even  the  most  steadfastly  free  enterprise 
group— the  Forum  of  Free  Enterprise  (FFE)— explicitly  renounces 
unbridled  laissez  faire  and  admits  that  at  present  the  government 
must  play  a  role  in  economic  development.101  But  all  of  this  is  very 
far  from  proving  that  Indian  businessmen  have  'sold  out5  or  are 
excessively  timid.  A  careful  reading  of  the  statements  of  business 
chambers,  of  individual  firms  and  of  individual  industrialists  will 
indicate  that  the  sum  total  of  specific  grievances  constitutes  a  quite 
strong  attack  on  the  existing  approach  of  the  government  and  a 
request  to  revert,  in  effect,  to  the  principles  of  the  Bombay  Plan. 

In  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds,  business  would  certainly  like 
to  have  maximum  state  support  with  minimum  state  controls. 
Under  Nehru,  at  least,  this  was  not  feasible,  and  the  positions 
taken  by  Indian  businessmen  reflect  the  need  to  come  to  terms 
with  the  'socialist  pattern'  as  advanced  by  Nehru.  In  this  connec- 
tion, Weiner's  conclusion  about  Indian  private  enterprise  is  worth 
noting:  'Most  probably  it  could  survive  without  it  [representative 
government],  and  may  take  no  steps  to  save  it;  but  on  the  other 
hand,  Indian  business  is  not  likely— in  the  foreseeable  future— to 
take  steps  to  destroy  the  institutions  of  representative  government. 
That  is  of  no  small  importance.'102  This  is  admittedly  a  consolation, 
and  it  is  of  importance.  But  we  must  also  ask  other  questions.  To 
what  extent  will  Indian  business  press  for  economic  moderniza- 
tion, as,  for  example,  in  the  opposition  to  subsidized  cottage 
industries?  The  limited  evidence  suggests  that  this  fight  will,  in 
some  sectors,  be  carried  on  with  vigour,  even  though  it  runs 
counter  to  much  Gandhian  rhetoric.103  To  what  extent  will  busi- 

42 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

ness  subordinate  its  own  interests  to  broader  social  purposes, 
assuming  that  what  is  good  for  Indian  private  enterprise  is  not 
ipso  facto  good  for  India?  Here  the  record  is  mixed,  and  much 
business  behaviour  described  by  Brecher,  for  example,  leads  to  un- 
favourable conclusions.104  To  what  extent  would  business  aline  with 
rural  interests  to  suppress  organized  labour?  There  is  limited 
evidence  to  suggest  that  business  would  go  a  long  way  in  this 
direction.105  To  what  extent  would  business  aline  with  reactionary 
and/or  conservative  interests  within  the  framework  of  parliamentary 
institutions ,  if  the  Indian  left  showed  signs  of  increasing  strength? 
This  is  one  of  the  central  issues  of  the  Swatantra  coalition,  and  we 
shall  see  here  that  the  record  is  mixed  but  that  there  is  perhaps  more 
grist  for  the  pessimist's  mill  than  for  the  optimist's.  These  are  also 
critical  questions  to  ask  about  Indian  business,  and  Weiner's 
conclusion  about  business  and  parliamentary  democracy  says  little 
if  anything  about  them.  In  approaching  these  and  related  questions, 
the  historic  alliance,  in  the  Congress,  between  business  and  the 
peasantry  is  important,  as  is  the  gap  which  was  created  by  the 
colonial  setting  between  business  and  the  aristocracy.  To  the  extent 
that  business  fails  to  challenge  the  old  order,  to  the  extent  that  its 
fears  of  socialism  drive  it  into  alliances  with  the  aristocracy  or 
landed  interests,  to  this  extent  business  might  be  considered  as  a 
component  of  the  conservative  camp.  The  record  thus  far  suggests 
a  Janus-like  stance  between  traditional  India  and  socialist  ele- 
ments but  one  in  which  business  has  been  unable  or  unwilling  (or 
perhaps  has  found  it  unnecessary)  to  mount  a  potent  attack  on  the 
former  and  thus  play  a  broadly  liberalizing  role  in  Indian  society. 
In  part,  this  is  due  to  the  slowness  with  which  business  is  over- 
coming the  community  and  caste  barriers  to  effective  class  action. 
All  of  this,  too,  'is  of  no  small  importance'. 

If  we  take  an  essentially  western  view  of  what  is  modern  or 
developed,  it  is  clear  from  the  foregoing  that  the  social  groups 
and/or  doctrinal  strands  just  discussed  have  different  potentialities 
for  development,  and  it  is  well  to  spell  these  out,  however  briefly. 
At  the  same  time  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  within  each 
group  or  doctrinal  strand  there  are  important  variations,  which 
make  neat  categorization  difficult. 

Of  the  doctrinal  strands,  the  full-blown  idealized  village  model 
seems  clearly  to  admit  the  least  progress,  however  much  change  its 

43 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

adherents  may  desire.  It  is  quite  explicitly  anti-industrial,  although 
some  modest,  local  industries  may  be  countenanced.  In  the  political 
realm,  it  holds  out  little  hope  for  a  substantial  alteration  in  the  rural 
power  structure  and  it  is  quite  explicitly  opposed  to  heavy  reliance 
on  national  political  institutions,  working  counter  to  the  develop- 
ment of  a  modern  nation-state.  In  the  social  realm,  too,  it  holds  out 
little  hope  for  substantial  alteration  in  relationships  among  broad 
social  groups,  and  many  of  its  proponents  explicitly  announce 
that  little  change  is  needed. 

In  some  of  these  respects,  the  aristocratic  strand  of  thought  is 
more  compatible  with  modernization.  The  feeling  of  social 
superiority  certainly  remains  and  there  are  some  barriers  to 
effective  participation  in  contemporary  party  politics.  But  many 
aristocrats  are  fully  committed  to  and  involved  in  modern  industry, 
even  though  few  will  be  found  in  the  lead  of  pro-industrial  spokes- 
men. Somewhat  fewer,  it  would  appear,  are  committed  to  be- 
coming Tory  democrats.  But  if— and  this  is  a  big  '  if  '—more 
leading  aristocrats  were  to  broaden  their  perspectives  beyond 
residual  bitterness  against  the  Congress  and  were  to  participate 
more  in  the  industrial  economy  and  the  modern  polity,  a  rather 
sanguine  assessment  of  their  potential  role  in  Indian  life  would  be 
possible.  A  combination  of  Tory  democracy  and  a  commitment  to 
industrialization  would  go  a  long  way  to  making  the  aristocrats 
agents  of  important  changes,  or,  if  not  that,  at  least  capable  of 
adjusting  to  and  accepting  certain  important  changes,  well  beyond 
those  tolerable  to  the  Gandhians.  At  least  in  the  realm  of  technology 
and  in  the  development  of  a  modern  nation-state,  the  aristocrats 
could  play  a  useful  role,  if  they  can  be  reconciled  to  and  be 
persuaded  to  participate  more  widely  in  the  modern  economy  and 
polity. 

The  strand  of  militant  Hinduism  is,  as  described  here,  explicitly 
committed  to  economic  modernization,  to  social  change,  and  to  the 
creation  of  a  modern  nation-state.  Its  emphasis  on  Hinduism  and 
on  religio-cultural  matters  may  disturb  those  who  feel  that  pragma- 
tism, secularism,  and  national  citizenship  are  essential  aspects  of 
modernization;  and  communal  tensions  are  a  serious  danger 
inherent  in  this  approach.  Yet  an  industrialized  nation-state  with 
altered  class  lines  is  called  for,  even  if  it  is  not  secular  and  con- 
stitutional-democratic; and,  unlike  the  Gandhians,  the  militant 
Hindus  are  willing  to  countenance  almost  any  means  to  achieve 

44 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Social  and  Doctrinal 

their  ends.  There  are,  of  course,  differences  among  the  militant 
Hindus,  as  between  those  whose  principal  concern  is  with  the 
religio-cultural  realm  and  those  who  are  mainly  concerned  about 
an  industrialized,  centralized  state;  but  in  most  major  respects 
this  strand  of  thought  is  not  antithetical  to  and  could  well  facilitate 
modernization  in  many  areas  of  Indian  life.  In  the  discussion  of 
right-wing  parties  which  follows,  further  evidence  about  moderni- 
zation in  connection  with  these  different  strands  of  thought  will  be 
presented. 


45 


Ill 


CHAPTER   3 

DIMENSIONS  OF  INDIAN  RIGHT-WING 
POLITICS:  POLITICAL  PARTIES 

The  diverse  groups  and  doctrinal  positions  which  have  just  been 
discussed  were  not  effectively  mobilized  into  a  cohesive  force 
during  the  years  1947-59.  Many  important  groups  and  individuals 
simply  remained  on  the  political  sidelines,  whether  through  resigna- 
tion, fear  of  reprisals,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  the  aristocrats,  through  an 
inability  to  transcend  the  ethos  of  the  ancien  regime,  with  its  heredi- 
tary basis  for  political  power.1  Many  leading  individuals  contested 
as  independents  rather  than  through  an  organized  political  group, 
and  this  again  was  particularly  true  of  the  aristocracy  and  other 
local  notables  who  could  capitalize  on  residual,  traditional  loyalties 
and  on  the  *  organizational '  aspects  of  the  extended  family  and 
caste.  Some,  indeed,  took  great  pride  in  the  fact  that  they  did  not 
have  to  participate  in  organized  party  politics  to  ensure  success. 
This  is  evident  from  the  assertion  of  a  former  dewan  (Prime 
Minister)  of  the  Rajput  state  of  Bikaner:  'We  came  in  without 
any  programme,  without  any  party,  and  defeated  these  Congress- 
men', and  from  Bailey's  report  that  'one  ex-raja  told  me  "I 
promised  them  nothing.  I  had  no  arguments.  I  just  asked  them  to 
vote  for  me.  I  suppose  there  were  a  few  party  workers,  but  I  had 
nothing  to  do  with  them.'"2  Local  and  state-wide  parties,  often 
extensions  of  caste  groups  and/or  ad  hoc  groups  established  for 
such  purposes  as  fighting  land  reform  legislation,  represented 
another  channel  of  political  activity,  further  along  the  path  toward 
more  organized  party  politics.3  Finally,  more  ambitious  political 
groups,  with  all-India  pretensions  if  not  all-India  impact,  served 
as  vehicles  for  one  or  more  of  these  elements,  but  of  all  Indian 
parties,  only  the  Congress  was  truly  national  in  scope.  In  many 
areas,  a  number  of  rightist  candidates  contested  against  one  another, 
further  weakening  the  impact  of  already  fragmented  forces.  The 
supposed  compulsions  of  the  single-member,  plurality-vote  con- 
stituency did  little  to  generate  a  discernible  trend  toward  a  two- 
party  system,  even  on  the  state  level.4  Given  the  overwhelming 
supremacy  of  the  Congress  in  the  days  before  independence  and 

46 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Political  Parties 

given  the  fact  that  it  was  virtually  the  only  broadly  based,  well- 
organized  political  force  in  pre-independence  India,  it  is  no 
wonder  that  a  comparable  opposition  political  force  did  not 
emerge  full-blown  with  the  advent  of  the  general  elections.  And, 
as  we  have  seen,  there  were  very  substantial  obstacles  to  the  emer- 
gence of  such  a  force,  on  the  right,  which  was  in  part  unmobilized 
and  very  much  fragmented.  As  long  as  these  conditions  remained, 
the  emergence  of  an  effective  right-wing  opposition  was  precluded. 
None  the  less,  if  the  support  given  to  all  of  the  disparate  rightist 
forces — independents,  local  parties,  and  all-India  parties— be  con- 
sidered in  the  aggregate,  it  was  by  no  means  as  negligible  as  most 
students  of  Indian  affairs  have  suggested. 

A  few  preliminary  observations  will  set  the  stage  for  an  under- 
standing of  the  parties  to  be  considered  here :  the  Hindu  Mahasabha, 
the  Jan  Sangh,  the  Ram  Rajya  Parishad  (RRP),  the  Ganatantra 
Parishad,  and  the  Janata  Party.  First,  only  the  Ganatantra  Parishad 
had  had  even  a  share  of  power  prior  to  1959,  and  this  occurred 
during  a  several-month-long  coalition  with  the  Congress  in  Orissa. 
Hence,  it  is  not  possible  to  judge  these  parties  in  terms  of  actual 
performance  in  office,  even  at  the  state  level.5  Secondly,  the 
Ganatantra  Parishad  and  the  Janata  Party  were  wholly  local  in 
inspiration,  leadership,  and  orientation;  and  while  the  others  had 
all- India  pretensions,  they  were  largely  confined  to  the  great 
Hindi-speaking  heartland  of  north  central  India.  Collectively, 
then,  they  were  for  all  practical  purposes  confined  to  India  north 
of  the  Vindhyas.  Thirdly,  only  the  Hindu  Mahasabha  had  been 
established  prior  to  independence  but  was  still  poorly  organized; 
and  only  the  Jan  Sangh,  via  the  para-military,  'cultural5  group, 
the  Rashtriya  Swayamsevak  Sangh  (RSS,  which  was  also  formed 
prior  to  independence),  showed  signs  of  a  more  modern,  disci- 
plined organization.  Generally  speaking,  party  structures  were 
rudimentary  and  were  based  heavily  on  residual  support  for 
traditional  leaders.6  Thus,  in  speaking  of  these  parties  as  our 
examples  of  the  rightist  opposition,  it  is  important  to  remember 
that  they  were  generally  of  recent  origin,  poorly  organized,  and 
geographically  circumscribed,  both  individually  and  collectively. 

The  Janata  Party,  on  which  the  least  information  is  available, 
was  organized  in  1950  by  Raja  Kamakhya  Narain  Singh  of 
Ramgarh,  a  fiery  and  fiercely  proud  Rajput  zamindar-busmessman,7 

47 


1  m 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

in  order  'to  demonstrate  that  the  sponsor  [K.  B.  Sahay]  of  the 
zamindari  abolition  measure  [in  Bihar]  has  no  support  in  his  own 
district'.8  In  fact,  as  one  report  observed,  Ramgarh's  feud  with 
Sahay  'has  gone  to  the  point  of  political  fanaticism'.9  Growing  out 
of  efforts  to  invalidate  abolition  legislation  in  the  courts,  Janata  had 
its  principal  stronghold  in  the  Hazaribagh  plateau  region  of  Bihar, 
with  its  heavily  tribal  population.  An  energetic  organizer,  the  Raja 
has  not  only  been  supported  by  those  who  fell  within  the  former 
Ramgarh  raj,  but  he  has  extended  Janata's  influence  beyond  these 
boundaries,  into  adjacent,  still  largely  tribal  areas.  Having  given 
away  personal  forest  rights  and  much  land  of  unknown  quality  to 
the  bhoodan  (land-gift)  movement  of  Vinoba  Bhave,  he  is  earnestly 
trying  to  develop  the  image  of  a  Tory  democrat,  but  with  a 
marked  fuhrer-prinzip  embodied  therein.  At  the  same  time,  his 
ample  modern  business  interests  have  freed  him  of  any  great 
dependence  on  the  land  for  his  continued  personal  comfort  and 
they  also  suggest  that  he  is  personally  forward-looking  in  the 
economic  sphere.  The  key  elements  in  his  party's  formal  pro- 
gramme have  been  '  land  to  the  tiller ',  reduced  land  revenues,  and 
a  redrawing  of  state  boundaries  to  restore  to  Bihar  certain  areas 
now  in  West  Bengal.  Suggestive  of  the  Raja's  political  style,  the 
Janata  members  of  the  legislative  assembly  (MLAs)  resigned  en 
bloc  over  the  boundary  issue  and  threatened  satyagraha.  Less  often 
emphasized— although  suggested  by  the  Raja's  own  bhoodan  con- 
tributions and  his  fight  against  zamindari  abolition— is  the  fact 
that  land  reform  is  to  come  about  through  voluntary  abandon- 
ment of  holdings,  i.e.  never.  Finally,  it  is  important  to  note  that 
some  of  the  zamindars  who  joined  with  the  Raja  in  fighting 
abolition  legislation  in  the  courts  declined  to  join  him  in  his  sub- 
sequent political  activity.10 

A  good  deal  more  has  been  said  about  the  Ganatantra  Parishad, 
even  if  most  of  it  has  been  based  on  '  logical '  extrapolations  from 
the  fact  that  it  was  founded  by  former  rulers  in  highland  Orissa. 
Thus,  the  most  careful  student  of  the  Ganatantra  Parishad  to  date 
has  rightly  observed:  'The  Ganatantra  Parishad  seldom  gets  a 
good  press.  It  is  "reactionary"  or  "dominated  by  feudal  interests 
and  medieval  traditions"  or  it  is  a  party  of  "disgruntled  prince- 
lings". Its  rank  and  file  are  supposed  to  be  illiterate  tribals,  hood- 
winked by  the  Rajas,  and  incapable  of  realizing  that  they  are  in 
the  twentieth  century . . .  m  However,  while  acknowledging  the 

48 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Political  Parties 

party's  aristocratic  origins  and  the  debt  which  it  owes  to  these 
origins  for  its  considerable  success,  and  while  acknowledging  as 
well  that  it  contains  some  '  spectacularly  atavistic  rulers  \  this  same 
observer  rejects  the  stereotype  of  the  Parishad.  In  this  view  he  has 
received  support  from  seemingly  improbable  sources — the  former 
socialist  leader,  Asok  Mehta,  and  from  an  official  election  analysis 
by  a  prominent  Congressman,  Sadiq  Ali.12 

The  Ganatantra  Parishad  took  shape  shortly  prior  to  the  195 1-2 
elections  under  the  leadership  of  the  Maharajas  of  Kalahandi  and 
Patna.  While  drawing  on  other  royal  families  as  well,  the  party's 
leadership  came  to  include  some  middle-class  professionals  who  had 
no  connection  whatever  with  the  aristocracy.  Despite  efforts  to 
broaden  its  base  of  support  by  organizing  modestly  in  the  coastal 
regions  of  Orissa,  the  party  has  had  its  greatest  success  in  the 
heavily  tribal,  former  princely  areas  of  highland  Orissa  and  in 
small  adjacent  districts  of  Bihar,  which  contain  Oriya-speaking 
peoples. 

There  are  many  signs  that  the  Ganatantra  Parishad  is  not 
motivated  by  a  desire  to  restore  the  good  old  days  of  princely  rule, 
although  as  expected  the  leaders  defend  their  privy  purses  and 
other  perquisites  whenever  they  come  under  attack.  In  addition 
to  the  emergence  of  some  middle-class,  professional  leadership,13 
one  could  point  to  the  fact  that  both  Kalahandi  and  Patna  'had 
introduced  administrations  of  the  modern  variety  in  their  respective 
states '  and  had  established  the  rudiments  of  legislative  assemblies.14 
As  an  adopted  heir,  Patna  in  particular  seemed  to  take  his  ruling 
responsibilities  quite  seriously  indeed.15  While  they  speak  of  the 
weakness  of  a  non-personal  administration,  which  strikes  our  ears 
as  decidedly  'feudal',  the  leaders  of  the  Parishad  are  correct  to 
the  extent  that  the  administrative  framework  of  the  Government 
of  Orissa  has  not  been  effectively  established  in  the  highland 
regions,  leaving  something  of  a  vacuum. 

Beyond  this,  the  Parishad  has  spent  much  of  its  parliamentary 
time  speaking  well  for  the  people  of  highland  Orissa,  demanding 
resettlement  assistance  for  those  displaced  by  the  waters  behind 
the  Hirakud  Dam,  demanding  an  end  to  the  government's  kendu 
leaf  monopoly,  and  demanding,  in  general,  greater  government 
efforts  to  develop  the  Orissa  highlands,  among  the  most  backward 
parts  of  India.  In  addition,  the  party  has  placed  a  good  deal  of 
emphasis  on  the  Oriya-speaking  peoples  in  present-day  Bihar, 

4  49  esp 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

whose  territories  the  party  wants  attached  to  Orissa  state,  and  on 
'  Orissa  for  the  Oriyas  \ 

Still  further,  the  Parishad's  programme  has  included  a  defence 
of  large-scale  and  even  nationalized  industries,  and  recommended 
nationalization  of  those  'which  have  been  established  mostly  at 
the  cost  of  the  government  and  yet  are  in  private  hands';  it  has 
recommended  nationalization  of  industries  'in  which  competition 
between  the  State  and  individual  enterprises  will  not  be  conducive 
to  public  benefit';  and  it  recommended  nationalization  of  mines 
'which  shall  be  worked  in  the  future'.16  The  party  has  also  advo- 
cated the  substitution  of  a  progressive  agricultural  income  tax  for 
existing  land  revenues,  a  ceiling  on  agricultural  incomes,  a  national 
minimum  wage,  some  protection  for  cottage  industries,  and  co- 
management  and  profit-sharing  by  management  and  labour  in  the 
industrial  sector.17  The  leadership  of  the  Parishad  subscribes  to 
the  view  that  it  would  be  futile  to  organize  political  parties  solely 
on  the  basis  of  former  aristocrats  and  for  a  restoration  of  their 
historic  position,  and  they  insist  that  theirs  is  a  Burkean  conserva- 
tive, centrist  party,  as  suggested  by  its  slogan,  'neither  right,  nor 
left,  but  a  middle  path'. 

It  is  for  these  reasons  that  Morris- Jones  could  quite  safely  refer  to 
the  Parishad  as  'a  party  of  mixed  princely  and  popular  character', 
and  it  helps  to  explain  why  Sadiq  Ali  could  call  it  'a  respectable 
party  with  all  appearances  of  a  respectable  programme  and  with 
some  leaders  who  command  some  respect'.18  It  is  for  the  same 
reasons  that  Bailey  has  such  a  high  assessment  of  the  party  and  that 
Mehta  could  say  that  'the  most  interesting  party  combining  tradi- 
tional loyalties  with  resilient  outlook  is  the  Ganatantra  Parishad'.19 
In  light  of  the  available  evidence  and  these  estimates,  it  simply  will 
not  do  to  label  the  party  'feudal'  or  'reactionary'  and  let  it  go  at 
that.  The  Parishad  seems  clearly  to  have  been  the  best  example  of 
Tory  democracy  which  has  arisen  in  India,  and  in  light  of  the 
approach  of  some  aristocrats  this  is  no  mean  accomplishment."" 


20 


The  Hindu  Mahasabha,  Jan  Sangh,  and  RRP,  in  their  com- 
munal aspect  and  in  their  concern  for  cultural  matters  such  as 
religion,  language  and  education,  are  best  understood  in  terms  of 
'the  history  of  the  Hindu  reaction  to  the  Western  impact'.21 
However,  the  broad  similarities  in  this  respect  are  not  as  important, 
for  the  present  analysis,  as  the  differences  among  them.  Generally 


50 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Political  Parties 

speaking,  the  RRP  is  far  and  away  the  most  steadfastly  conservative, 
if  not  reactionary,  in  terms  of  the  orthodox,  hierarchical,  village- 
based  model  sketched  above,  while  the  Mahasabha  and  the  Sangh 
represent  the  more  militant,  reformist  Hindu  elements.  All  three 
parties  stress  the  ' despiritualization '  or  'denationalization'  of 
Indians  (more  specifically  of  Hindus)  through  contact  with  the 
Muslim  and  European  conquerors  and  westernized  Indians,  but 
the  Mahasabha  and  the  Sangh  also  emphasize  the  need  to  over- 
come the  rigidities  and  the  less  attractive  excrescences  of  recent 
Hinduism,  as  the  RRP  does  not.  The  Mahasabha  and  RRP,  as 
receding  forces  in  Indian  political  life,  will  receive  little  attention 
here,  while  the  more  viable  Jan  Sangh  will  be  examined  in  some 
detail. 

The  Mahasabha  grew  out  of  the  formation  of  the  first  Hindu 
sabha  in  1907,  founded  to  counter  the  demands  of  the  Muslim 
League,  and  throughout  its  existence  the  party  has  kept  up  its 
attacks  on  the  League  and  its  demand  for  Pakistan,  on  Pakistan 
itself  after  1947,  and  on  any  Indians,  including  Gandhi  and 
Nehru,  who  seemed  excessively  '  soft  on  Muslims  \  Among  those 
most  vehemently  castigated  was  veteran  Congressman  Rajaji,  whose 
early  recommendation  that  the  Congress  accept  in  principle  the 
demand  for  Pakistan  elicited  some  venomous  attacks.22 

Specifically  restricted  to  Hindus,  the  Mahasabha  has  not  only 
condemned  allegedly  pro-Muslim  or  pro-Pakistan  positions,  but 
it  has  also  condemned  the  failure  to  support  energetically  the 
Hindu  cause  through  education,  support  for  religious  institutions 
and  efforts  at  reconversion  of  one-time  Hindus,  including  former 
untouchables.  Beyond  this,  the  Mahasabha,  in  its  official  pro- 
gramme, has  followed  the  major  contours  of  militant  Hinduism,  as 
already  outlined.  Doubtless,  not  all  Mahasabhites  adhered  to  the 
reformist  positions  set  forth  by  Savarkar  and  other  leaders,  but  on 
the  level  of  formal  doctrinal  pronouncements  the  commitment  is 
clear  enough.  In  the  post-independence  period,  the  Mahasabha 
suffered  because  Gandhi's  assassins  had  been  associated  with  it 
and  with  the  RSS  and  because  of  Nehru's  vehement  condemna- 
tion of  communal  parties.  On  the  whole,  its  electoral  impact  has 
been  almost  negligible,  it  lost  ground  from  195 1-2  to  1957,  anc^ 
many  of  its  former  adherents  have  repaired  to  the  banner  of  the 
Jan  Sangh.  Where  it  has  had  some  modest  success,  it  drew  on 
refugees  from  Pakistan  and  on  urbanites  in  the  interior  areas  of 

51  4-2 


/ 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

India,  particularly  in  former  princely  states,  where  the  impact  of 
the  west  and  of  various  post- 1947  reforms  has  been  relatively  light 
but  by  no  means  absent.23 

By  contrast  with  the  more  militant,  chauvinistic  and  formally 
reformist  posture  of  the  Mahasabha,  the  RRP,  founded  in  1948 
by  one  Swami  Karapatri,  is  certainly  the  most  orthodox  of  all  the 
rightist  parties  which  have  achieved  any  renown.  The  party 
manifesto  waxes  eloquent  about  the  halcyon  days  of  Lord  Rama, 
about  a  largely  rural  economy  based  on  the  traditional  jajmani 
system  and  on  barter,  about  traditional  systems  of  medicine  such 
as  ayurveda,  about  prohibition  of  alcoholic  drink  and  of  cow 
slaughter,  and  about  comparable  items,  most  of  which  are  drawn 
from  the  catalogue  of  the  'messiahs  of  backwardness  \  About  as 
progressive  a  position  as  one  can  find  in  this  handbook  for  Indian 
reactionaries  and  obscurantists  is  the  recommendation  that  high 
positions  in  sanitation  departments  be  given  to  untouchables, 
because  this  is  in  keeping  with  their  traditional  calling  as  sweepers 
and  scavengers ! 

The  RRP  did  manage  to  gain  some  support  in  India's  most 
backward  areas,  such  as  Rajasthan  and  Madhya  Pradesh,  where  it 
capitalized  on  the  residual  appeal  of  some  local  notables,  mainly 
aristocrats,  who  accepted  the  party  label.  Virtually  the  only  small 
consolation  is  the  fact  that  many  RRP  standard-bearers  did  not 
believe  in  the  absurdities  of  its  programme  (just  as  many  Maha- 
sabhites  did  not  believe  in  reformism).  This  does  not  do  much  to 
rescue  the  RRP  from  its  obscurantism,  but  it  does  remind  us  that 
the  RRP— and  the  other  parties— cannot  be  judged  entirely  at 
face  value.  It  is  not  represented  solely  by  those  who  wish  to  march 
backward  to  the  days  before  the  Muslim  and  British  conquests 
and  the  industrial  and  scientific  revolutions.24 

Far  more  important  in  terms  of  its  electoral  record  and  organiza- 
tion is  the  Jan  Sangh,  founded  in  195 1  by  Shyama  Prasad  Mooker- 
jee,  a  former  leader  of  the  Mahasabha,  and  by  members  of  the 
RSS,  which  'had  been  informally  connected  with  the  Mahasabha 
for  some  time5. 25Mookerjee,  the  prime  mover  in  creating  this 
new  party,  was  a  somewhat  chastened  militant  Hindu — no  '  wild- 
eyed  fanatic'  as  one  writer  has  put  it.  He  insisted  on  open  mem- 
bership for  the  party,  by  contrast  with  the  Mahasabha,  and 
he  seemed  personally  to  have  been  'a  constitutionalist  and  a 
parliamentarian  \26 

52 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Political  Parties 

It  is  important  to  stress,  moreover,  that  Mookerjee,  prior  to  the 
formation  of  the  Sangh  was  urged  to,  and  did,  join  the  Congress 
Cabinet  in  order  to  strengthen  the  right  wing  of  the  party,  sym- 
bolized by  Sardar  Patel.  Only  after  holding  a  Cabinet  post  for 
some  time  did  he  resign  in  protest  over  the  government's  policy 
toward  Pakistan  and  join  with  some  RSS  associates  to  form  the 
Sangh. 

It  is  also  important  to  stress  that  Mookerjee  was  adamant  in 
insisting  that  the  new  party  have  open  membership,  i.e.  that 
Muslims  be  admitted.  This  represents  a  step  forward  in  the 
direction  of  secularism  and  national  citizenship  and  in  this  sense  it 
represents  an  important  advance  over  the  explicit  communalism  of 
the  Hindu  Mahasabha.  But  neither  this,  nor  the  occasional  non- 
Hindu  candidates  put  up,  nor  the  prohibition  against  holding 
office  simultaneously  in  the  Sangh  and  the  RSS  has  been  able  to 
remove  the  stigma  of  communalism  from  the  Sangh.  Ties  with  the 
RSS  are  very  close;  the  Sangh's  English-language  weekly,  The 
Organiser,  regularly  abuses  Muslims  for  their  allegedly  anti- 
national  proclivities;  and  Tinker,  a  reasonably  sympathetic 
observer,  summarily  disposes  of  the  Sangh's  Muslims  as  *  Uncle 
Toms  \27  For  these  and  other  reasons,  one  is  justified  in  considering 
the  Sangh  a  militant  Hindu  party. 

The  Sangh,  like  the  Mahasabha,  places  great  emphasis  on 
national  unity  and  strength,  opposing  all  disintegrative  tendencies 
at  home  and  insisting  on  military,  and  hence  industrial  strength  in 
the  international  community.  Support  for  Hinduism  as  a  cohesive 
force,  support  for  Hindi  as  a  common  language  for  all  Indians, 
and  kindred  measures  bulk  large  in  the  Sangh  programme.  Thus, 
the  secessionist  agitation  of  the  Dravida  Munnetra  Kazagham 
(DMK)  in  Madras  and  the  demand  for  a  separate  Punjabi-speaking 
state  by  the  Akali  Sikhs  (the  Punjabi  suba  demand)  are  anathema, 
as  are  disturbances  in  the  tribal  regions  of  the  Indo-Burman 
frontier.  Illustrative  of  the  party's  perspectives  is  the  assertion  that 

India  is  one  and  an  indivisible  whole . . .  This  conviction  is  a  cardinal 
principle  of  the  Jana  Sangh. .  .The  federal  character  of  the  constitution 
is  exotic  and  does  not  symbolize  unified  nationhood.  There  should  be 
a  unitary  centre  with. .  .decentralization. .  .The  Jana  Sangh  stands  for 
modernizing  and  augmenting  the  defence  potential  of  the  country. 
'Militarize  the  Nation'  and  'Modernize  the  Military'  should  be  our 
motto.28 

53 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Similarly,  it  was  considered  deplorable  that  '  after  14  years  of 
freedom  our  boys  and  girls  continue  to  be  fashioned  into  Macau- 
lay's  mould'  rather  than  in  a  way  consonant  with  the  genius  of 
India  herself.29  Obviously  a  united,  militarized  nation,  animated 
by  specifically  Indian  symbols,  is  the  central  concern. 

Economic  issues  have  generally  been  understated  in  the  Jan 
Sangh  programme,  but  over  the  years  there  has  been  increasing 
attention  to  this  subject,  in  part  reflecting  the  party's  desire  to 
present  a  well-rounded  alternative  to  the  ruling  party.  On  the 
whole,  the  party's  approach  has  been  an  eclectic  one:  it  has  re- 
commended a  mixture  of  large-,  medium-  and  small-scale  enter- 
prises, and  a  mixture  of  public  and  private  enterprise,  with  the 
public  sector  controlling  the  'commanding  heights'  of  the 
economy.  By  contrast  with  the  so-called  Gandhians,  however,  the 
Sangh  in  1962  declared  itself  in  favour  of  'a  time  limit  within 
which  the  [khadi]  industry  will  be  required  to  become  self- 
sufficient',  because  'in  spite  of  heavy  subventions  it  has  not  yet 
become  economic'.30  Quite  naturally  there  is  an  emphasis  on  self- 
sufficiency,  on '  made  in  India ',  and  on  the  Indianization  of  foreign- 
dominated  firms. 

The  party's  position  on  private  property,  especially  on  large- 
scale  corporate  holdings,  remains  somewhat  ambiguous.  It  pro- 
fesses to  favour  a  mixed  economy  in  which  key  industries  will  be 
nationalized,  a  view  which  might  be  inspired  by  a  number  of 
factors.  It  might  reflect  a  genuine  commitment  to  the  principle 
or  the  practicality  of  state-owned  key  industries.  This  would  seem 
plausible  in  terms  of  the  desire  for  national  unity,  because  it  would 
permit  a  greater  disciplining  of  the  national  economy.  It  might 
reflect  the  impact  of  socialist  rhetoric,  which  is  well-nigh  ines- 
capable in  India,  to  which  the  lip-service  (at  least)  which  almost 
every  party  pays  to  'socialism'  attests.  Or  it  might  reflect  the  pre- 
dominantly lower  middle-class  base  of  support  for  the  party, 
which  would  be  more  solicitous  of  smaller  property  holders  as 
opposed  to  the  corporate  giants.31  The  last  view  gains  credence 
from  the  Sangh's  stand  on  some  agricultural  questions,  particularly 
its  willingness  to  attack  large  landholders  while  defending  the  more 
modest  cultivators.  While  the  issue  is  by  no  means  clear,  and  while 
Sangh  leaders  are  by  no  means  committed  to  one  single  position 
here,  it  would  appear  that  on  balance  large-scale  property  in 
industry  and  land  receives  no  principled  endorsement  and  that 

54 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Political  Parties 

the  Sangh  would  not  be  averse  to  attacking  it.  In  short,  there  is  at 
least  a  strand  of  petit  bourgeois  'national-socialism'  evident  here. 

Finally,  the  Jan  Sangh,  like  the  Mahasabha,  is  constantly  pre- 
occupied with  foreign  policy,  particularly  relations  with  Pakistan.32 
However,  in  recent  years  the  Peoples'  Republic  of  China  has  bulked 
larger  in  Sangh  thinking.  The  ultimate  reunification  of  the  sub- 
continent is  a  professed  goal,  as  it  is  for  the  Mahasabha,  but  here, 
too,  there  is  a  difference  in  emphasis  which  deserves  note :  for  the 
Sangh,  the  goal  is  'Akhand  Bharat\  while  for  the  Mahasabha  it  is 
'Akhand  Hindustan'.  The  Sangh's  views  on  relations  with  China 
indicate  that  the  party  cannot  be  accused  of  timidity:  '  Jana  Sangh 
is  confident  that  our  armed  forces  are  quite  competent  to  turn  the 
Chinese  out.  The  Government  apprehension  of  a  world  war,  if 
there  happens  to  be  an  armed  conflict  in  Ladakh,  is  nothing  but  an 
aberration  of  a  weak  mind.'33  The  Chinese  invasion  also  propelled 
the  Sangh  into  a  leading  position  among  those  who  favour  the 
development  of  an  Indian  nuclear  arsenal.  On  a  more  modest  level, 
the  goal  of  absorption  of  all  French  and  Portuguese  enclaves  in 
India  was  always  a  major  tenet  of  the  party,  which  also  concerns 
itself  widely  with  all  Indians  overseas,  especially  those  in  Africa, 
Ceylon  and  Burma. 

To  sum  up,  the  Jan  Sangh  is  the  principal  political  vehicle  for 
the  militant  Hindu  or  right  radical  element  in  Indian  politics. 
Many  of  its  leaders  are,  indeed,  no '  wild-eyed  fanatics '  and  hope  to 
temper  the  overall  belligerence  of  the  party.  However,  its  emphasis 
on  a  centralized,  militarized  and  now  nuclear  state,  its  rather 
aggressive  foreign  policy  statements,  and  its  close  ties  with  the 
RSS,  for  the  moment  preclude  a  shedding  of  the  *  pro  to-fascist ' 
brush  with  which  the  party  has  generally  been  tarred.  With 
respect  to  the  development  of  a  cohesive,  right-wing  opposition, 
the  emphasis  on  discipline  and  militancy  has  alienated  many  of 
the  aristocratic  elements,  who  appreciate  neither  quality,  and 
its  communal  tendencies  have  alienated  more.  In  general,  the 
Sangh's  *  Hindu-Hindi'  emphasis  severely  impairs  its  aggregative 
capacity.34 

In  the  195 1-2  and  1957  elections,  the  overall  performance  of 
these  five  parties  was  decidedly  poor,  especially  in  voting  for  the 
Lok  Sabha,  the  lower  house  of  the  Indian  national  Parliament.35 
This  was  not  substantially  offset  by  improvement  in  the  position  of 

55 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

the  Jan  Sangh,  by  the  strong  showing  of  the  Ganatantra  Parishad 
in  Orissa,  and  by  the  combined  rightist  groups  in  Rajasthan, 
primarily  RRP  and  independents.  If  all  of  the  diverse  rightist 
elements  be  considered  together,  they  amassed  upwards  of  25  per 
cent  of  the  popular  vote  for  and  seats  in  the  Lok  Sabha — by  no 
means  a  sign  of  eclipse.  It  was  abundantly  clear,  however,  that  to 
do  battle  with  the  Congress,  more  co-ordinated  action  was  an 
absolute  niinimum.  An  awareness  of  this  obvious  fact  impelled 
some  leaders  to  seek  greater  unity,  at  all  levels. 

At  the  parliamentary  level  the  most  notable  effort  was  under- 
taken by  Mookerjee  shortly  after  the  elections  of  195 1-2.  In  order 
to  co-ordinate  the  work  of  the  'democratic5  opposition  and  to 
build  toward  the  fifty-man  group  required  for  official  recognition 
as  the  opposition  party,  Mookerjee  approached  virtually  every 
non-communist,  non-socialist,  and  non-Muslim  opposition 
group  in  the  Lok  Sabha,  in  order  to  establish  a  legislative  'front'. 
The  result  was  the  formation  of  the  strictly  parliamentary '  National 
Democratic  Party',  which  included  members  of  the  Sangh, 
Mahasabha,  RRP,  Ganatantra  Parishad,  Akali  Dal  (a  party  com- 
prised primarily  of  conservative  Sikhs,  confined  to  the  Punjab), 
Commonweal  and  Tamilnad  Toilers'  parties  (both  lower  middle 
caste  Madras  parties),  and  some  independents.36 

Mookerjee's  death  in  1953  removed  the  leader  of  this  unity 
effort  and  the  group  collapsed  within  one  year,  but  to  put  the 
burden  of  the  collapse  entirely  on  the  death  of  Mookerjee  is 
quite  unwarranted.  Internal  strains  became  evident  very  quickly, 
as  Dr  A.  Krishnaswamy,  'one  of  Tamilnad's  wealthy  Mudaliars' 
(a  principal  trading-financial  caste)  resigned  from  the  group  because 
of  the  emphasis  on  Hindi  as  the  national  language,  favoured  by  the 
Sangh-Mahasabha  axis.37  Similarly  the  alinement  of  the  Akalis 
with  this  group  was  a  very  shaky  marriage  of  convenience,  because 
the  demand  for  a  separate  Punjabi-speaking  state  was  totally 
unacceptable  to  the  Sangh-Mahasabha  forces,  and  this  was  the 
issue  for  the  Akalis.  Without  underestimating  the  creative  role  of 
leadership  in  such  a  context,  it  is  evident  that  there  were  very 
substantial  cleavages  which  even  a  man  of  Mookerjee's  admitted 
abilities  could  have  overcome  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty. 

Differences  separating  the  Sangh,  Mahasabha  and  RRP  also 
existed,  and  these  are  well  illustrated  by  the  extra-parliamentary 
merger  talks.  The  latter  did  not  include  any  south  Indian  elements, 

56 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Political  Parties 

who  by  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  would  have  rallied  to  the 
standard  of  a  group  dominated  by  pro-Hindi  forces.  Nor  did  they 
include  the  Akali  Dal,  for  reasons  already  given.  The  talks  did, 
however,  include  the  Sangh,  Mahasabha  and  RRP,  and,  at 
one  stage,  the  Ganatantra  Parishad,  which,  according  to  one 
source,  had  the  'full  sympathies'  of  the  Sangh  in  Orissa.38  What 
became  clear  is  that  each  wanted  merger  essentially  on  its  own 
terms. 

Difficulties  in  Kashmir  provided  a  strong  impulse  for  these 
parties  to  co-operate,  and  it  was  in  this  context  that  the  merger 
talks  were  undertaken.  N.  C.  Chatter jee,  speaking  for  the  Maha- 
sabha, further  insisted  that  in  his  party  at  least  there  was  rank-and- 
file  sentiment  for  merger.  But  Swami  Karapatri  (RRP)  under- 
scored his  party's  determination  to  sustain  the  village  order  by 
refusing  to  yield  significantly  on  matters  of  religion  and  social 
policy,  in  the  face  of  the  right  radical,  reformist  demands  of  the 
Mahasabha  and,  more  importantly,  of  the  Sangh.  Also,  Savarkar 
and  other  Mahasabhites  underscored  their  party's  firm  com- 
munal commitment  by  rejecting  the  Sangh's  insistence  on  admis- 
sion of  Muslims  and  other  non-Hindus.  Chatterjee,  who  favoured 
a  united  'Hindu'  party  devoid  of  Muslims,  seemed  genuinely 
willing  to  contemplate  the  demise  of  the  Mahasabha,  but  other 
Mahasabha  leaders,  such  as  Deshpande,  wanted  only  a  'united 
front'  and  electoral  alliances,  not  an  outright  merger. 

Further  complicating  the  process  was  the  persistent  aggressive- 
ness of  the  Jan  Sangh,  even  after  Mookerjee's  death  when  Chatter- 
jee insisted  on  sustaining  the  talks.  The  Sangh,  considering  itself 
a  young,  dynamic  party,  termed  the  Mahasabha  a  'communal 
body '  and  censured  it  because  it '  welcomed  princes,  zamindars  and 
vested  interests  in  its  midst'.39  The  latter  charge  was  energetically 
denied  by  Deshpande  and  others,  but  this  is  not  the  important 
point.  What  is  crucial  is  the  Sangh's  effort  to  project  itself  as  a 
non-communal  party  of  the  common  man  and  to  disclaim  any 
connection  with  leading  aristocratic  or  capitalist  elements.  The 
Sangh  charge,  in  short,  suggests  something  about  the  social 
composition  and  'style'  of  the  party,  to  which  we  referred  above. 
In  any  event,  amidst  repeated  charges  by  the  Sangh  that  the 
Mahasabha  was  reactionary  and  dead  politically,  and  demands  that 
merger  be  on  Sangh  terms  in  all  important  respects  and  with  full 
acceptance  of  Sangh  discipline,  the  negotiations  broke  down — 

57 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

even  though  to  the  end,  Chatterjee  seemed  anxious  to  find  some 
common  ground  with  the  Sangh.40 

It  is  Weiner's  contention  that  there  was  very  little  genuine 
feeling  that  unity  was  desirable,  apart  from  leaders  such  as 
Mookerjee  and  Chatterjee.  There  were,  of  course,  some  pro- 
grammatic differences  and  the  dispute  over  membership  provi- 
sions, but  Weiner  chooses  to  understate  these  in  favour  of  a  social- 
psychological  explanation  for  failure  of  the  talks:  that  because 
Indian  social  structure  has  traditionally  been  based  on  small, 
compact  groups,  many  Indians  who  are  loosened  from  their 
traditional  moorings  turn  toward  small,  compact  political  groups 
as  a  substitute.  This,  he  suggests,  helps  to  explain  the  reluctance 
of  much  of  the  membership  of  the  several  parties  to  submerge  its 
identity  in  a  broad,  more  disciplined  party,  as  would  have  been 
the  case  in  a  Sangh-dominated  'Hindu'  party. 

However  insightful  this  hypothesis  may  seem,  it  must  be 
approached  with  caution.  First  of  all,  it  is  too  much  'inward- 
looking'  in  the  sense  that  it  disregards  the  environmental  factors 
which  play  a  part  in  party  realinements.  The  Congress,  after  all, 
was  a  national  party  comprised  of  highly  disparate  groups  which 
were  willing  to  submerge  their  local  identities  at  least  partially.  A 
consideration  of  the  factors  which  enabled  the  Congress  to 
overcome  parochialism  would  be  pertinent  for  an  understanding 
of  the  right-wing  unity  efforts  and  would  force  us  to  look  beyond 
the  '  inner  psyches '  of  the  individual  parties. 

Moreover,  there  would  seem  to  be  a  simpler  explanation  for  the 
failure  of  merger  talks  even  if  we  do  not  look  beyond  the  discussants 
themselves.  There  are,  after  all,  many  local  politicians  with 
essentially  local  ambitions  and  constituencies  who  simply  could 
not  survive  in  a  larger  arena.  Such  people  would  for  reasons  of 
prestige  and  individual  self-interest,  if  not  for  personal  power, 
oppose  amalgamation  of  smaller  groups  into  one  large  one.  They 
could  hope  to  dominate  the  former,  not  the  latter.  It  is  important 
to  have  some  feeling  for  these  different  explanations  for  the  failure 
of  right-wing  unity  efforts,  because  they  have  a  bearing  on  the 
Swatantra  Party.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  obvious  fact  is  for  the  present 
the  important  one:  even  though  a  serious  effort  toward  unity  was 
made,  the  right  wing  remained  highly  fragmented,  even  in  the  face 
of  electoral  reverses  and  a  seemingly  unpromising  future.41 

Thus,  although  negotiations  continued  until  1956,  no  mergers 

58 


Indian  Right-Wing:  Political  Parties 

and  no  significant  'united  front5  activity  came  to  pass,  even  among 
the  Sangh,  Mahasabha  and  RRP.  By  and  large,  the  Ganatantra 
Parishad  remained  aloof,  as  did  the  Janata  Party,  the  Akali  Dal, 
and  other  local  groups,  particularly  south  Indian  conservative 
interests.  Leaders  of  many  of  these  groups  did,  however,  profess 
to  desire  the  creation  of  a  significant,  all- India  opposition  party, 
if  the  proper  leadership,  programme  and  financing  could  be 
secured.42 

Paralleling  the  efforts — and  reflecting  the  difficulties — at  the 
national  level  were  efforts  and  difficulties  at  the  state  level.  In 
Rajasthan,  which  will  suffice  for  an  example  here,  the  RRP,  Jan 
Sangh  and  some  independents  constituted  themselves  as  a  united 
front  in  the  assembly,  only  to  fall  apart  after  a  short  time.  The 
proximate  cause  seems  to  have  been  the  *  Pant  Award ',  a  judgment 
on  smaller  jagirdari  holdings  which  was  deemed  to  affect  adversely 
the  Bhoomias,  or  lesser  Rajputs,  for  whom  the  Sangh  claimed  to 
speak,  and  for  whom  the  big  jagirdars,  primarily  independents 
and  RRP-men,  displayed  little  concern.  Still,  they  zoere  united  for  a 
time  and  they  doubtless  would  have  held  together  somewhat  better 
had  the  leader  of  the  front,  the  Maharaja  of  Jodhpur,  not  died 
shortly  after  the  elections  of  195 1-2.  As  in  the  case  of  Mookerjee, 
one  should  not  expect  miracles  from  a  leader,  but  leadership 
remains  one  of  the  critical  problems  in  all  merger  and  united  front 
activity.43 

On  a  more  modest  scale,  there  were  also  successes  and  failures, 
as  the  right-wing  parties  groped  toward  a  more  coherent  effort 
against  the  Congress.  There  were,  for  example,  many  local  'non- 
aggression5  pacts,  through  which  parties  agreed  to  defer  to  one 
another  on  a  reciprocal  basis,  to  avoid  multi-cornered  fights  which 
would  include  more  than  one  rightist  candidate.  But  quite  common 
also  were  some  very  fierce  battles  among  the  rightist  parties,  which 
only  serve  to  underscore  the  point  that  much  remained  to  be  done 
if  the  Congress  were  to  be  challenged  effectively.44 

To  speak  of  challenging  the  Congress  is,  however,  misleading  to 
the  extent  that  the  ruling  party  itself  contained  many  elements  in- 
distinguishable from  those  just  discussed.  For  a  long  time,  for 
example,  dual  membership  in  the  Congress  and  the  Mahasabha 
was  permitted,  and  when  this  was  no  longer  possible,  many 
Mahasabhites-cum-Congressmen  remained  with  the  Congress. 
We  have  seen  that,  for  a  time,  Mookerjee  was  in  a  Congress 

59 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

ministry,  where  it  was  hoped  he  would  strengthen  the  right-wing 
elements.  More  importantly,  throughout  the  history  of  the  Con- 
gress, defections  have  occurred  primarily  on  the  left  flank,  suggest- 
ing the  weight  of  a  well-entrenched  right  wing  in  the  nationalist 
movement.  Both  prior  to  and  after  independence  the  impact  of  the 
right  wing  on  personnel  and  policy  decisions  has  been  evident,  and 
this  point  has  been  sufficiently  well  documented  in  many  standard 
sources.  Brecher  is  particularly  effective  on  this  point,  and  there 
is  a  useful  case  study  of  the  Hindu  Code  bills  which  bears  on  the 
same  issue.  Here  it  will  suffice  to  cite  Tinker's  account  of  one 
battle  between  secularist  reformers  and  some  right-wing  elements 
in  the  Congress : 

Nehru,  Krishna  Menon,  and  other  spokesmen  of  the  'secular'  school 
of  politics  have  so  frequently  argued  that  the  Hindu  communal  parties 
have  failed  to  gain  a  footing,  that  the  argument  has  been  widely  accepted. 
Yet,  over  the  central  features  of  Nehru's  secular  programme,  the  Hindu 
Code  Bill,  the  communalists  have  to  a  large  extent  had  their  own  way. 
The  Hindu  Code  Bill  was  first  introduced  by  Nehru  in  1950  as  a  com- 
prehensive measure  to  reform  the  whole  structure  of  Hindu  marriage, 
divorce,  inheritance  rights  and  adoption  custom.  The  bill  met  with 
widespread  opposition,  in  and  out  of  Parliament.  In  October  195 1, 
President  Prasad  threatened  to  use  his  power  of  veto,  unless  the  measure 
was  withdrawn.  The  bill  was  delayed,  and  its  provisions  whittled  away. 
At  last  in  1955,  a  major  part  of  the  code  was  placed  on  the  statute  books 
as  the  Hindu  Marriages  Law.  The  ranks  of  the  Congress  parliamentary 
party  contained  few  prepared  to  support  the  measure,  and  many  who 
spoke  against  it:  but  when  the  vote  was  taken,  the  party  whip  was 
obeyed.  As  a  demonstration  of  the  secular  spirit,  all  this  was  not  very 
impressive.45 

Comparable  cases  could  be  cited  from  the  areas  of  economic  policy, 
land  reform,  harijan  'uplift',  and  the  like,  to  indicate  the  impact  of 
the  right-wing  elements  who  are  often  obscured  behind  the  socialist 
facade  of  the  Congress.  It  is  quite  remarkable  that  after  so  com- 
menting on  the  Hindu  Code  Bill,  Tinker  could  go  on  to  argue  that 
the  right  wing  was  weak  in  India,  supporting  his  argument  by 
reference  to  non- Congress  opposition  parties.46  The  'sad'  per- 
formance of  right-wing  parties  to  which  he  referred,  and  the 
'almost  total  eclipse  of  our  so-called  rightist  parties'  to  which 
another  writer  pointed,  become  less  surprising  if  one  appreciates 
the  very  substantial  strength  of  certain  right-wing  groups  in  the 

60 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Political  Parties 

Congress  itself,  coupled  with  the  other  factors  examined  above. 
The  extremes  of  militant  Hinduism,  of  aristocratic  conservatism, 
and  of  reaction  were  doubtless  not  particularly  potent,  but  non- 
aristocratic  conservatism,  including  the  *  disguised'  conservatism 
of  the  idealized  village,  certainly  was  strong.  Put  in  admittedly 
exaggerated  form,  we  may  ask  those  who  emphasize  the  weakness 
of  the  Indian  right,  {how  many  conservative  parties  does  India 
need?'  The  contemporary  Congress  is  quite  enough  to  satisfy  a 
good  many  conservatives,  and  some  of  those  whom  it  did  not 
satisfy  still  remained  in  the  party,  paying  lip  service  to  socialism 
and  boring  from  within,  because  of  Nehru's  commitment  to 
socialist  positions  and  because  of  the  apparent  futility  of  righting 
him  openly. 

None  the  less,  there  was  no  opposition  party  which  seemed 
likely  to  fulfil  the  function  of  an  open,  explicitly  conservative 
force,  to  speak  for  those  who  were  offended  and  who  could  not  be 
content  with  silence  or  with  boring  from  within.  The  Jan  Sangh 
impressed  some  observers  as  moving  in  this  direction,  i.e.  of 
'responsible  conservatism',  but  on  balance  it  had  a  less  sanguine 
image  which  seemed  to  preclude  effective  aggregation  of  some  key 
elements,  notably  conservatives  (as  opposed  to  right  radicals),  and 
the  non-Hindu,  non-Hindi  speaking  groups.47  It  is  clear  also  that 
urban  business  interests  were  poorly  represented  by  the  available 
opposition  parties,  and  even  the  Jan  Sangh,  with  its  right  radical 
style,  gave  many  big  businessmen  a  few  anxious  moments. 

Although  the  right  side  of  the  political  spectrum  was  by  no 
means  unpopulated,  and  although  the  record  of  the  years  1947-59 
could  scarcely  be  encouraging  to  any  new  entrant  into  the  political 
fray,  the  Swatantra  Party  entered  the  arena  in  mid-1959,  as  the 
self-appointed  non-leftist  alternative  to  the  Congress.  Its  arrival 
might  have  been  expected  only  to  fragment  further  the  opposition 
forces.  As  Humayun  Kabir  put  the  matter,  Swatantra  was  'at  a 
disadvantage  because  of  its  late  appearance.  As  the  latest  comer  in 
the  field,  it  has  to  establish  its  claim  against  all  existing  parties.'48 
Admitting  this,  it  was  still  by  no  means  foreordained  that  Swatan- 
tra would  only  further  complicate  matters.  Both  the  context  and 
the  nature  of  Swatantra  itself  held  some  promise. 

With  respect  to  the  context,  it  might  have  been  tempting  to 
assert  that  India's  social  diversity,  various  legacies  of  the  colonial 
situation,  and  the  rise  of  the  Congress  would  combine  to  prevent 

61 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

a  more  *  rational'  alinement  of  political  forces  in  India.  This  argu- 
ment has  considerable  merit  and  it  has  been  freely  employed  in  the 
preceding  pages.  But  it  must  also  be  recognized  that  many  power- 
ful and  effective  political  groupings,  among  which  one  must  count 
the  Congress  itself,  have  been  comprised  of  very  heterogeneous 
materials;  and  it  must  also  be  acknowledged  that  basic  realinements 
of  political  forces  have  occurred  in  many  countries  where  they 
might  have  seemed  improbable.  If  Gandhi  could  create  a  Congress 
in  which  widely  disparate  elements  existed  cheek-by-jowl  for  the 
purpose  of  ousting  the  British,  could  not  another  leader  also  build  a 
broad  coalition,  given  a  certain  objective  situation  and  percep- 
tions about  it?  Could  not  a  serious  famine  in  the  present  context 
precipitate  a  political  emergency  and  new  political  alinements? 
Could  not  an  international  crisis  do  much  to  restructure  political 
life  in  India?  Could  not  a  strong,  frontal  attack  on  a  wide  range  of 
long-standing  customs  and  beliefs  and  institutions  work  in  the 
same  direction?  To  ask  these  questions  is  not  to  answer  them,  but 
neither  does  a  catalogue  of  historic  political  fragmentation  by  itself 
preclude  future  political  cohesion. 

With  respect  to  the  Swatantra  Party  itself,  as  a  potential  vehicle 
for  a  more  formidable  conservative  effort,  there  were  some  grounds 
for  modest  optimism.  It  came  into  being  as  a  result  of  a  series  of 
policies  of  the  Congress,  culminating  in  the  'Nagpur  Resolution' 
on  *  joint  co-operative  farming',  and  the  party  self-consciously  set 
out  to  exploit  the  alleged  menace  of  collectivization  of  agriculture, 
while  at  the  same  time  relating  this  specific  issue  to  a  broader 
pattern  of '  statism'  which  it  felt  prevailed.  It  had  a  number  of  very 
distinguished  leaders,  including  some  from  the  south  of  India, 
where  the  major  right-wing  parties  received  negligible  support. 
Its  leaders,  moreover,  included  some  veteran  Congressmen  of 
great  stature,  who  were  thus  more  likely  to  appeal  to  right-wing 
Congressmen  than  were  the  other  opposition  parties.  Furthermore, 
Swatantra  was  not,  on  the  surface  at  least,  committed  either  to 
militant  Hinduism  or  to  reaction,  which  gave  it  a  more  'respect- 
able' image  in  these  respects  than  the  Jan  Sangh  and  the  RRP. 
Most  important,  perhaps,  was  Swatantra's  explicit  determination 
to  set  forth  a  minimum  programme  on  the  basis  of  which  it  would 
hope  to  create  a  cohesive,  non-communist  alternative  to  the  Con- 
gress. These  and  other  factors  seemed  to  augur  well  for  Swatantra, 
although  everyone  knew  that  its  task  would  not  be  easy. 

62 


Indian  Right  Wing:  Political  Parties 

The  stage  may  be  set  for  the  following  analysis  by  indicating 
briefly,  by  way  of  anticipation,  some  general  but  basic  points.  In 
the  elections  of  1962,  the  Swatantra  Party  established  itself  as  a 
significant,  if  highly  controversial  political  force.  Founded  only  in 
mid- 1 959,  it  must  be  credited  with  a  strong  showing  by  con- 
temporary Indian  standards  for  the  performance  of  opposition 
parties.  Polling  about  8  per  cent  of  the  popular  vote,  it  secured  the 
third  largest  contingent  in  the  Lok  Sabha  and  the  second  largest 
total  of  state  assembly  seats.  It  secured  the  position  of  principal 
opposition  party  in  the  states  of  Bihar,  Gujarat,  Rajasthan,  and 
Orissa;  and  after  the  split  in  the  Communist  Party  of  India  (CPI) 
in  1965,  it  became  the  principal  opposition  in  the  Lok  Sabha  as 
well. 

From  the  outset,  the  nature  and  role  of  the  party  have  been 
hotly  disputed  subjects.  It  has  been  described  as  a  party  of 
'  conservative  rich  peasants  in  the  South,  a  few  finance  capitalists 
in  the  West,  some  Bihar  and  U.P.  feudal  atavisms,  and  communalist 
chiefs  in  the  North'.49  It  was  condemned  by  the  CPI  as  one  of  the 
'forces  of  dark,  right  reaction'50  and  by  Nehru  as  belonging  to  'the 
middle  ages  of  lords,  castles  and  zamindars'  and  as  becoming 
'more  and  more  Fascist  in  outlook'.51  One  American  scholar 
labelled  it  'a  communal  conservative  party',52  while  a  British 
observer  concluded  that '  the  victory  of  this  party  could  be  an  un- 
mitigated disaster  for  India. . .  '.53 

By  contrast,  its  supporters  see  it  as  ' a  progressive  liberal  party'54 
which  will  'slow  down  the  Congress  steamroller'  by  providing  a 
non-communist,  non-socialist,  secular  and  constitutionalist 
alternative  to  the  ruling  party.55  The  reaction  of  the  Indian  press 
was,  at  the  outset,  guardedly  optimistic  along  these  lines,56  while 
the  American  magazine  Life  almost  surpassed  Swatantra  Party 
literature  itself  when  it  contended  that  '  the  Swatantra  program 
could  really  get  that  huge  country  moving  in  a  direction  favorable 
to  free  institutions.  The  free  world  can  wish  this  little  party  a 
big  future.'57 

It  is  tempting  to  conclude  that  these  divergent  estimates  derive 
from  different  perspectives  on  key  Indian  problems,  as  polarized 
by  the  heat  of  political  battle.  This  is  to  some  extent  true.  In 
addition,  however,  the  cleavage  in  critical  opinion  reflects  the  fact 
that  Swatantra  is  in  some  fundamental  ways  an  enigma,  one  im- 
portant aspect  of  which  is  the  diversity  of  social  forces  within 

63 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Swatantra  and  the  balance  of  power  among  them.  By  probing  in 
detail  the  nature  of  this  enigma  and  this  special  aspect  of  it,  we 
shall  not  only  understand  this  intrinsically  important  political 
party,  but  through  it  we  shall  also  gain  insights  into  the  problems 
and  prospects  of  political  conservatism  (and  of  the  right  more 
generally)  in  India. 


64 


CHAPTER   4 

THE  BIRTH  OF  A  PARTY 

The  formal  decision  to  establish  the  Swatantra  Party  was  made 
public  in  Madras  on  4  June  1959.  Only  in  the  narrowest  sense, 
however,  does  this  tell  us  anything  about  its  birth.  The  date  of 
conception  is  uncertain,  although  the  period  of  gestation  is  known 
to  have  been  long.  Paternity  is  difficult  to  specify.  And  the  new 
party  was  on  the  verge  of  entering  the  political  world  earlier,  in 
Bangalore,  if  not  elsewhere.  The  date,  4  June  1959,  is  significant 
primarily  because  it  post-dates  the  Nagpur  Resolution,  and  Madras 
is  important  primarily  because  it  suggests  a  south  Indian  origin. 

Commenting  on  the  birth  of  Swatantra,  one  writer  has  argued 
that  'in  one  sense  this  was  not  the  emergence  of  a  new  political 
force,  but  only  the  regrouping  of  the  conservative  elements  in 
Indian  society  which  were  making  themselves  felt  in  the  working  of 
other  parties  earlier5.1  Although  there  is  more  than  a  grain  of 
truth  in  this  contention,  it  is  necessary  to  go  beyond  it,  for  the 
following  reasons:  as  it  stands,  the  statement  is  both  incomplete 
and  inadequate  because  it  fails  to  indicate  that  some  previously 
latent  elements  were  mobilized  and  because  it  fails  to  specify 
precisely  what  forces  were  regrouped  and  on  what  basis.  Swatantra 
to  be  sure  represented  a  confluence  of  many  diverse  social  forces 
and  personalities,  animated  at  the  doctrinal  level  by  one  general  and 
one  specific  problem  ('  statism '  and  the  Nagpur  Resolution  respec- 
tively), and  dominated  by  one  towering  figure,  Rajaji.  But  as  the 
preceding  analysis  has  suggested,  it  is  essential  to  understand  the 
nature  of  the  forces  involved  and  the  basis  on  which  they  came 
together,  including  the  impact  of  the  objective  situation  and  sub- 
jective perceptions  of  it,  the  nature  and  role  of  leadership,  the 
doctrinal  stance,  relations  with  other  parties,  and  so  on,  if  we  are 
to  understand  properly  the  nature  and  significance  of  Swatantra. 

Of  the  more  formally  organized  social  forces  which  helped  to 
generate  the  Swatantra  Party,  two  stand  out,  although  neither 
stands  in  the  front  rank  of  organized  interest  groups  in  India:  the 
Forum  of  Free  Enterprise  (FFE)  and  the  All-India  Agriculturalists' 
Federation  (AIAF),  founded  in  1956  and  1958,  respectively. 
Concerning  them,  three  general  points  are  in  order.  First,  each 

5  65  ESP 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

took  a  decisive  stand  against  government  controls,  taxation,  and 
general  economic  policy,  in  the  area  of  industry  and  agriculture 
respectively.   Secondly,  Swatantra  leaders  are  quite  willing  to 
acknowledge  their  debts  to  both,  as  Rajaji  did  at  one  juncture:  'I 
shall  be  failing  in  my  duty  if  I  do  not  say  how  grateful  we  are  to  the 
Agricultural  Federation  of  India  for  the  inspiration  they  gave  us 
for  the  formation  of  this  Party  and  to  the  Forum  of  Free  Enter- 
prise that  helped  us  so  greatly  in  the  preliminary  work.' 2  Thirdly, 
because  it  grossly  underestimates  the  original  and  enduring  con- 
tribution of  the  FFE,  Rajaji's  statement  reflects  the  determination 
of  the  leadership  to  identify  the  party  with  the  agricultural  rather 
than  the  industrial  sector.  For  the  moment,  however,  it  is  import- 
ant simply  to  stress  the  party's  debt  to  the  most  aggressively  'free 
enterprise'  segments  of  the  business  and  agricultural  communities. 
The  FFE  was  founded  by  a  group  of  businessmen  in  Bombay, 
notably  the  late  A.  D.  Shroff  of  Tatas  and  Murarji  Vaidya  of  the 
Indian  Rayon  Corporation  and  the  All-India  Manufacturers' 
Association.  They  were  brought  together  in  this  venture  by  a 
prominent  one-time  Tata  official,  M.  R.  Masani,  a  veteran  anti- 
communist  (and  more  recently  anti-socialist)  ideologian  and  severe 
critic  of  the  Nehru  government.3  Ultimately  expanding  to  include 
centres  in  many  cities  in  addition  to  its  home  office  in  Bombay,  the 
Forum,  by  and  large,  was  scrupulously  careful  not  to  carry  on  a 
vendetta  against  Nehru  or  the  Congress,  and  it  never  identified  it- 
self with  any  political  party,  for  obvious  reasons.4  Thus,  the  Forum 
explicitly  claimed  that  it  was  'a  non-political  and  non-partisan 
organization'  which  would  'disseminate  authoritative  information 
to  educate  public  opinion ...  [and]  bring  to  public  notice  the 
achievements  of  Free  Enterprise  in  this  country  and  the  manner 
in  which  it  can  make  its  contribution  to  the  economic  development 
of  India  in  order  to  raise  the  standard  of  living'.5  It  contended  that 
'today  the  case  for  Free  Enterprise  is  going  by  default',  and  to  the 
end  of  'educating  the  educated'  about  the  relationship  which  it 
felt  existed  between  free  enterprise  and  economic  development  and 
politics,  it  organized  meetings  of  various  types  and  distributed 
literature,  the  latter  often  of  a  second-hand  sort.6 

In  addition  to  arguing  that  the  organization  was  non-partisan, 
the  FFE  also  took  pains  to  insist  that  it  did  not  stand  for  laissez 
faire.  According  to  one  leader,  'we  consider  that  "Laissez 
Faire"  or  Nineteenth  Century  Capitalism  has  no  place  in  con- 


66 


The  Birth  of  a  Party 

temporary  Indian  life'  and  that  these  systems  'are  as  dead  as  the 
dodo  and  can  make  no  contribution  to  the  industrial,  social  and 
economic  advancement  we  seek'.7  None  the  less,  the  leaders  and 
spokesmen  of  the  FFE  did  seek  to  expand  the  sphere  in  which 
private  enterprise  would  be  secure  and  they  also  sought  to  artic- 
ulate in  reasonably  coherent  fashion  the  accumulated  grievances  of 
the  business  communities.  In  particular,  they  hammered  at  the 
theme  that  a  largely  free  enterprise  economy  was  necessary  both  for 
rapid  economic  growth  and  for  the  maintenance  of  political 
democracy.  They  warned,  sometimes  guardedly,  sometimes  vigor- 
ously and  stridently,  that  wide  government  controls,  heavy  taxation, 
and  a  large  public  sector  not  only  destroyed  economic  initiative 
but  led  ultimately  down  the  familiar  road  of  Friedrich  Hayek.8 

Thus,  the  Forum— its  non-partisan  protestations  notwith- 
standing—necessarily took  on  an  anti-Congress  image,  because  if 
there  was  a  danger  of  statism  in  India,  it  could  have  emanated  only 
from  the  Congress  or  some  segment  of  it.  Moreover,  some  of  those 
who  were  associated  with  the  activities  of  the  Forum  either 
adverted  to  or  explicitly  discussed  the  need  for  the  formation  of  a 
new,  anti-statist  opposition  party,  although  on  every  occasion  the 
FFE  entered  a  familiar  disclaimer,  viz.  that  the  views  expressed 
were  not  necessarily  those  of  the  FFE. 

One  of  the  foremost  of  those  who  stressed  the  need  for  a  new 
party  was  Masani,  whose  advocacy  well  ante-dated  the  Nagpur 
Resolution.  At  one  stage  he  referred  to  the '  dangerous  polarization ' 
of  Indian  political  life,  between  the  Congress,  not  yet  viewed  as  a 
menace,  and  the  CPI.9  He  deplored  the  fact  that  'consistent  ideo- 
logical opposition  to  communism  has  hitherto  been  negligible'.10 
Moreover,  he  questioned  the  judgment  of  Rajaji,  one  of  India's 
most  determined  anti-communists,  that  as  of  the  mid-1950s  the 
CPI  was  losing  ground.  By  contrast,  Masani  insisted  that  there  was 
a  threat  of  paralysis  of  the  will  in  confronting  communism  and  he 
argued  that  'only  purposeful  democratic  leadership  that  arouses 
the  country  to  the  internal  and  external  dangers  with  which  it  is 
faced  can  immunize  India  from  this  threat'.11  At  this  juncture, 
Masani  pointed  to  the  anti-communist  role  of  the  Indian  Com- 
mittee for  Cultural  Freedom  (1951),  with  which  he  was  closely 
associated,  and  to  the  Democratic  Research  Service  in  Bombay, 
which  was  c  somewhat  more  polemical '  in  its  anti-communism  and 
with  which  Masani  has  also  been  involved.12 


67 


5-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Through  such  channels  Masani  attempted  to  build  up  anti- 
communist  sentiment  in  the  country,  and  at  least  as  early  as  his 
election  campaign  of  1957,  he  stressed  the  need  to  forge  a  non- 
communist  alternative  to  the  Congress.  As  was  suggested  in  his 
book  on  the  communists  in  India,  Masani  at  this  time  defended 
the  declared  need  for  an  opposition  of  this  type  not  because  the 
Congress  itself  was  being  communized  but  because  people  who 
objected  to  the  Congress  had  nowhere  else  to  go,  in  his  view,  but 
to  the  CPI.  According  to  Ramgarh,  sometime  Janata  Party  leader 
and  Swatantra  stalwart,  Masani  had  broached  the  idea  of  a  more 
coherent,  non-communist  opposition  to  him  at  an  *  all-parties ' 
conference  shortly  after  the  1957  elections,  in  which  Masani  was 
returned  to  the  Lok  Sabha  from  a  district  adjacent  to  Ramgarh's 
own  stronghold.13  In  the  early  months  of  1959,  however,  the 
tempo  of  Masani' s  efforts  increased  and,  concomitantly,  he  insisted 
that  the  Nehru  government  itself  was  heading  toward  communism. 
Thus,  Masani  termed  the  Nagpur  Resolution  an '  insidious  attempt 
to  bring  in  Collective  Farming  of  the  Communist  pattern  by  the 
back  door',  a  view  which  was  echoed  throughout  India  by  those 
who  now  lead  the  Swatantra  Party.14  As  a  consequence,  he  came  to 
insist  more  forcibly  that  a '  middle  of  the  road'  party  be  founded.15 
In  the  early  1950s  Masani  had  praised  Rajaji,  'to  whom,  above  all, 
credit  goes  for  having  protected  southern  India  from  Communist 
rule  after  the  last  [195 1-2]  General  Elections',  and  it  was  perhaps 
only  natural  that  Masani  look  again  to  this  most  respected  of 
Indian  elder  statesmen  for  leadership  of  an  anti-communist 
movement.16 

Among  those  who  responded  favourably  to  the  efforts  of  the 
FFE  and  of  Masani  was  Rajaji.  But  pressure  from  Masani  in  1957 
and  1958  found  Rajaji  unrelenting  on  the  question  of  his  own 
personal  involvement  in  an  anti-Congress  movement.  Vaidya,  a 
founder-leader  of  the  FFE,  went  to  Madras  in  1958,  met  Rajaji, 
and  was  asked  what  the  Forum  proposed  to  do  when  and  if  it 
succeeded  in  'educating  the  educated'  to  the  menace  of  statism 
and  to  the  virtues  of  free  enterprise.  Vaidya  insisted  that  he  and  his 
colleagues  were  writing  as  businessmen  and  economists  and  that 
authentic  political  leaders  would  have  to  come  forth  to  challenge 
statism  politically  and  to  channel  the  efforts  of  the  Forum's 
supporters  in  that  direction.  Here,  as  in  his  dealings  with  Masani 
and  others,  Rajaji  insisted  that  he  was  too  old  (over  eighty),  too 


68 


The  Birth  of  a  Party 

long  a  Congressman,  and  too  close  to  Nehru  personally  to  consider 
a  re-entry  into  politics  on  an  active,  organized  basis.17 

Against  this  backdrop,  the  Nagpur  Resolution  came  as  some- 
thing of  a  god-send  to  spokesmen  for  and  supporters  of  the  FFE 
who  were  anxious  to  develop  an  anti-Congress,  anti-communist 
party.  Having  been  labelled  as  apostles  of  'reactionary5  laissez 
faire  capitalism  (a  charge  which  was  vehemently  denied),  the 
leaders  of  the  FFE  could  exploit  the  more  ominous  implications 
of  'joint  co-operative  farming',  and  could  identify  themselves 
with  free  enterprise  in  agriculture,  thus  linking  themselves  with 
men  of  property  in  the  countryside. 

In  the  early  months  of  1959  the  Forum  sponsored  many  meet- 
ings in  which  the  Nagpur  Resolution  was  the  main  topic.  Other 
groups  were  doing  the  same  on  a  reasonably  wide  scale,  and  Rajaji 
became  more  and  more  involved  with  these  in  the  south,  partic- 
ularly in  Bangalore.  Anti-Congress  efforts  were  gaining  some 
momentum,  and  on  29  May  1959,  the  FFE  sponsored  a  meeting 
in  Bangalore  with  Rajaji  in  the  chair  and  Masani  as  first  speaker, 
and  although  it  was  a  Forum-sponsored  meeting,  it  was  concerned 
almost  exclusively  with  the  Nagpur  Resolution.  Masani,  who 
termed  the  atmosphere  'electric',  launched  into  a  vehement  de- 
nunciation of  the  Congress,  after  which  Rajaji  spoke  even  more 
vehemently,  complaining  that  Masani  had  been  too  restrained. 
Rajaji,  Masani,  and  others  decided  at  Bangalore  to  form  a  new 
party,  continuing  a  process  which  had  started  long  before,  but  in 
part  because  the  Bangalore  meeting  was  Forum-sponsored,  it  was 
decided  to  postpone  the  public  announcement  about  the  new 
party  until  a  later  date.18  That  date  proved  to  be  4  June  1959,  for 
which  the  AIAF  had  scheduled  a  meeting  in  Madras  and  to  which 
most  of  the  participants  in  the  FFE-sponsored  Bangalore  meeting 
were  going.  Thus  the  birth  of  Swatantra  was  announced  at  an 
AIAF  meeting,  but  the  role  of  the  Foum  and  its  adherents  was  so 
obvious  that  'some  people  say  the  party  is,  in  fact,  the  Forum's 
political  arm'.19  Yet  it  is  important  to  note  that  there  was  much 
reluctance  to  have  Swatantra  too  closely  and  too  openly  identified 
with  the  FFE,  both  because  of  dangers  to  business  interests  and  to 
the  party.20 

The  AIAF,  founded  in  Bangalore  in  1958,  was,  from  all  available 
indications,  a  group  of  very  modest  dimensions  and  impact.  How- 
ever, it  numbered  among  its  leaders  N.  G.  Ranga,  a  veteran  peasant 

69 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

leader,  and  its  President  in  mid- 1959  was  Sardar  Bahadur  Lai 
Singh  (now  deceased),  an  agricultural  economist  and  sometime 
adviser  to  the  national  Planning  Commission— a  fact  which  did  not 
escape  attention  when  Swatantra  was  founded  at  a  meeting  spon- 
sored by  the  AIAF.21  The  group  was  very  heavily  south  Indian  in 
leadership  and  membership,  and  while  it  claims  to  be  a  'peasant' 
organization  and  while  upon  occasion  it  may  speak  convincingly  for 
cultivators  generally,  it  is  dominated  by  kulaks  and  by  other  larger 
landholders.22 

The  activities  of  the  AIAF  paralleled  in  many  respects  those  of 
the  FFE.  The  Federation  organized  meetings,  distributed  litera- 
ture, and,  in  a  few,  isolated  cases,  local  units  ostensibly  set  up 
candidates  for  public  office.23  Further  paralleling  the  FFE's  efforts, 
the  AIAF  severely  criticized  the  government's  agricultural  policy. 
The  AIAF  stood  four-square  behind  the  more  prosperous  land- 
holder, by  taking  exception  to  some  government  tenancy  legisla- 
tion, by  insisting  that  the  goal  of  individual  peasant  proprietorship 
was  not  only  Utopian  but  unnecessary,  by  adamantly  opposing 
land  ceiling  legislation,  and,  finally,  by  denouncing  'joint  co- 
operative farming'  in  Masani-like  fashion.  All  of  these  moves  were 
held  to  destroy  initiative  and  productivity  among  those  most 
capable  of  increasing  India's  agricultural  production,  i.e.  those 
presently  in  possession  of  larger  holdings  and  those  who  had 
historically  been  tillers  of  the  soil.24  At  a  number  of  junctures, 
again  primarily  in  Bangalore,  Rajaji  had  met  with  AIAF  leaders 
and  other  kindred  spirits  to  discuss  the  Nagpur  Resolution  and 
possible  counter-moves;  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  Rajaji 
personally  had  greater  sympathy  for  the  AIAF  than  he  did  for  the 
FFE.  It  was  for  this  reason,  as  well  as  for  the  more  practical  one 
already  mentioned,  that  the  announcement  of  Swatantra's  entry 
into  the  lists  was  deferred  until  the  AIAF  meeting  in  Madras. 

The  determination  of  the  founders  of  Swatantra  to  identify  the 
party  with  the  rural  sector  is  widely  evident  and  played  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  selection  of  former  kisan  sabha  leader  Ranga  as 
party  President.  Thus,  even  Masani,  through  whose  initiative,  in 
large  part,  the  FFE  took  shape  and  whose  own  identification  is 
with  modern,  urban  interests,  has  emphasized  that  'it  is  not  an 
accident  that  the  move  for  the  establishment  of  the  Swatantra 
Party  should  have  taken  place  at  a  meeting  convened ...  by  the 
All-India  Agriculturalists'  Federation  and  that  Professor  Ranga 

70 


The  Birth  of  a  Party 

should  be  nominated  as  its  leader.  This  is  as  it  should  be.  India  is, 
and  will  remain,  for  many  generations  to  come,  a  peasant  country.'25 
Without  any  intention  to  impugn  the  sincerity  of  Rajaji  and  Masani, 
it  is  none  the  less  clear  that  the  role  of  the  AIAF  has  been  em- 
phasized and  that  of  the  FFE  understated  for  practical  reasons. 
Assertions  such  as  Masani's — necessary  because  business  sponsor- 
ship would  have  been  a  liability — cannot  deflect  attention  from 
Swatantra's  debt  to  the  FFE.  Meanwhile,  the  AIAF,  because  of  its 
stand  on  a  wide  range  of  land  reforms,  has  been  accused  of  de- 
fending 'feudal  landlordism  \26  It  is  not  easy  to  estimate  accurately 
the  relative  importance  of  the  Forum  and  the  Federation  among 
business  and  agricultural  groups  respectively,  or  in  terms  of  their 
role  in  the  Swatantra  Party.  It  is  fairly  clear,  however,  that  neither 
group  stands  in  the  front  rank  of  interest  groups  in  India,  and  it  is 
beyond  dispute  that  most  of  the  leaders  of  the  two  organizations 
are  either  members  of  or  very  sympathetic  to  the  Swatantra  Party.27 
Swatantra's  roots  in  the  most  aggressively  free-enterprise  sectors 
of  the  business  community  and  of  the  rural  propertied  class  are 
thus  abundantly  evident.  But  while  it  is  important  to  point  out 
that  this  background  militates  strongly  against  an  image  of  a 
'  common  man's '  party,  it  is  equally  important  to  stress  three  other 
facts.  First,  both  the  FFE  and  AIAF  were  animated  more  by 
economic  than  by  religio-cultural  issues,  and  their  economic 
arguments  were  pitched  in  decidedly  modern  terms,  i.e.  efficiency 
and  productivity.  The  contrast  between  their  commitments  and 
those  of  the  Gandhians,  the  aristocratic  conservatives,  and  various 
cultural  groups  and  more  religiously  oriented  parties  is  obvious 
and  important.  Secondly,  the  emphasis  of  both  was  on  freedom 
from  state  controls,  not  on  freedom  from  the  constraints  of  tradi- 
tional Indian  society,  even  though  the  FFE  included  many  Parsis 
and  other  modern  businessmen  and  even  though  the  AIAF 
leaders  were  in  many  cases  opposed  to  the  great  landed  aristocrats 
of  pre-independence  days.  As  Swatantra  leaders  would  subse- 
quently make  very  explicit,  the  greatest  threat  to  freedom  lay  on 
the  left,  not  on  the  right.  Thirdly,  it  is  necessary  to  emphasize, 
because  of  later  developments,  that  at  this  juncture  in  its  history, 
Swatantra  did  not  draw  to  any  significant  extent  upon  the  great 
aristocratic  classes  of  north  India;  and,  as  we  have  already  sug- 
gested and  as  we  shall  see  further,  most  of  Swatantra's  founding 
fathers  were,  at  least  in  the  past,  hostile  to  the  aristocracy. 

7i 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

If  the  success  of  the  new  party  had  depended  on  the  potency  of 
the  Forum  and  the  Federation  alone,  it  would  doubtless  never 
have  been  formed,  or,  if  formed,  it  would  have  failed  miserably. 
As  we  have  seen,  however,  there  were  diverse  currents  of  dis- 
content which  could  be  tapped,  and  those  who  eventually  brought 
Swatantra  into  the  world  were  well  aware  of  this  fact.  And  even 
some  aristocrats  figured  into  these  calculations.  The  Raja  of 
Ramgarh  had  expressed  interest  in  a  new  national  opposition 
party  at  a  seminar  in  Bombay,  shortly  before  Swatantra  was 
founded.28  The  Maharaja  of  Kalahandi,  a  leader  of  the  Ganatantra 
Parishad,  had  approached  Rajaji,  as  Vaidya  had  done,  well  before 
the  Nagpur  session  of  the  Congress  in  1959,  to  discuss  the  possi- 
bility of  forming  a  new  party.29  Jankinandan  Singh,  uncle  of  the 
then  Maharajadhiraj  of  Darbhanga  (formerly  premier  zamindar  in 
Bihar  and  leader  of  the  Maithil  Brahmin  community)  and  a 
member  of  the  Bihar  Legislative  Council,  asked  Rajaji  in  1957  to 
rally  all  dissident  Congress  groups,  such  as  Jankinandan  Singh's 
own  Jan  Congress.30  Many  others  of  lesser  political  stature, 
including  some  (like  H.  N.  Kanoongo,  an  Orissa  lawyer)  who 
had  not  previously  been  involved  in  politics,  had  also  turned  to 
Rajaji  prior  to  1959,  as  the  man  most  likely  to  provide  the  requisite 
leadership  for  the  type  of  opposition  party  which  so  many  people 
had  contemplated.31 

In  addition  to  the  discontent  of  relatively  long  standing,  there 
was  the  storm  of  protest  elicited  by  the  Nagpur  Resolution.  A 
number  of  distinguished  individuals  and  local  groups  responded 
with  great  alarm,  conjuring  up  the  image  of  Soviet-style  collectives 
or  Chinese  communes.  Even  before  the  actual  passage  of  the 
Nagpur  Resolution,  a  khan  convention,  which  reportedly  included 
many  AIAF  leaders  and  about  one  hundred  Congress  MPs,  was 
held  in  Delhi,  to  protest  against  the  proposed  resolution.  Late  in 
January  1959  a  Punjab  kisan  convention  was  called  to  protest 
against  the  Nagpur  Resolution,  and  Ranga,  then  Secretary  of  the 
Congress  parliamentary  party,  the  late  Sardar  Udham  Singh 
Nagoke,  former  Akali  leader  and  then  a  Congress  MP,  General 
K.  M.  Cariappa,  retired  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Indian  army,  and 
the  Maharaja  of  Patiala  shared  the  platform.32  The  Gujarat 
Khedut  Sangh,  with  which  Ranga  was  associated  and  which 
brought  him  into  close  touch  with  some  prominent  local  leaders, 
was,  according  to  one  report,  the  first  organized  group  to  enter  its 

72 


The  Birth  of  a  Party 

protest  against c joint  co-operative  farming'.33  For  months,  Ranga, 
Masani,  and  others  spoke  against  the  Nagpur  proposals  in  various 
parts  of  India,  often  at  the  behest  of  prominent  local  leaders  and 
groups.34 

There  were,  in  addition,  some  veteran  Congressmen  who  joined 
with  Ranga,  Masani,  Nagoke,  et  al.,  in  what  took  on  many  qualities 
of  an  anti-Congress  crusade.  K.  M.  Munshi,  a  most  distinguished 
Bombay  Congressman  of  very  long  standing,  cmade  a  scathing 
criticism  of  the  idea  of  co-operative  farming'  in  an  address  to  the 
Delhi  Historical  Society,  and  S.  K.  D.  Paliwal,  an  almost  equally 
distinguished  Congressman  from  UP,  sought  to  work  up  a  storm  of 
local  protest.35  Nagoke  and  Paliwal  were,  moreover,  attempting  to 
organize  at  least  state-wide  groups  which  might  better  channel  the 
opposition  to  the  Nagpur  Resolution.36  Elsewhere,  there  were 
groups  of  dissident  Congressmen,  such  as  the  Indian  National 
Democratic  Congress  in  Madras  and  the  Democratic  Party  in 
Andhra,  who  had  split  themselves  off  from  the  parent  organiza- 
tion, although  not  necessarily  for  doctrinal  reasons;  and  these  were 
potential  recruits.  In  fact,  the  Democratic  Party,  some  of  whose 
leaders  had  been  with  Ranga  in  the  old  Krishikar  Lok  Paksh,  had 
asked  Rajaji  to  preside  over  its  inaugural  convention.37  In  short, 
anti-Congress  sentiment  was  widespread,  and  those  (like  Ram- 
garh)  who  had  been  in  opposition  for  a  long  time  were  joined  by 
those  for  whom  the  Nagpur  Resolution  was  the  last  straw — or  who 
at  least  felt  that  it  provided  an  opportunity  for  previously  suppres- 
sed opposition  to  come  into  the  open.  These  opposition  groups  were 
obviously  fragmented  and  most  of  the  obstacles  previously  men- 
tioned worked  to  keep  them  apart.  But  the  would-be  founders  of  a 
national  opposition  to  the  Congress  had  much  material  on  which  to 
draw,  and  Ranga  among  others  had  had  a  chance  to  'feel  out' 
potential  recruits  in  his  widespread  travels  to  publicize  the  alleged 
menace  of  the  Nagpur  proposals.  If  distinguished  leadership  were 
available,  if  there  were  a  key  issue  on  which  to  capitalize,  and  if 
there  were  at  least  a  fair  prospect  of  decent  financial  support,  there 
was  reason  to  think  that  some  of  the  barriers  to  a  cohesive  opposi- 
tion might  be  overcome. 

Those  who  had  looked  to  Rajaji  to  assume  the  leadership  of  an 
opposition  party  not  only  knew  that  he  was  one  of  the  most 
distinguished  of  all  Indian  statesmen-politicians,  but  they  were 
also  encouraged  by  many  of  his  post-retirement  pronouncements 

73 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

about  the  Indian  political  scene,  particularly  about  the  need  to 
combat  'statism'.38  Typical  of  his  assessment  of  the  political 
situation  in  the  mid-1950s  was  his  short  essay,  'Our  Democracy', 
in  which  he  argued  that 

every  change  must  necessarily  produce  dislocation,  disturbances  and 
distress. .  .the  pain  involved ...  must  be  taken  into  account  in  any 
orderly  advance.  A  Party  on  the  Right,  as  it  is  called,  gives  expression 
to  these  distresses  and  disturbances,  which  are  not  less  real  or  important 
than  the  need  for  change  and  progress.39 

He  further  insisted  that  ' since. .  .the  Congress  Party  has  swung 
to  the  left,  what  is  wanted  is  not  an  ultra  or  outer-Left  [viz.  the 
CPI  or  the  Praja  Socialist  Party,  PSP],  but  a  strong  and  articulate 
Right'.40  He  also  added  a  remark  which  is  crucial  in  terms  of 
the  argument  about  rightist  elements  in  the  Congress  itself,  viz. 
that  this  opposition  must  'operate  not  privately  and  behind  the 
closed  doors  of  the  party  meeting,  but  openly  and  periodically 
through  the  electorate'.41 

While  thus  tempting  anti-Congress  forces  of  conservative 
temper  to  seek  him  out,  Rajaji  at  the  same  time  continued  to 
enphasize  his  old  age,  long  service  in  the  Congress,  and  personal 
attachment  to  Nehru  as  the  factors  which  precluded  his  assump- 
tion of  leadership  of  these  forces.  The  Nagpur  Resolution  was, 
according  to  Rajaji  himself,  the  proverbial  last  straw.42  Having 
lived  four-score-plus  years,  with  the  end  in  sight,  he  felt  that  he 
must  make  one  last,  if  desperate  effort,  to  deflect  the  Congress 
from  the  path  which  it  was  following.  He  was,  as  one  foreign 
observer  put  it,  a  man  with  'a  deep  moral  sense. .  .prepared  to  go 
down  fighting  in  a  last  crusade'.43 

When  he  was  finally  prevailed  upon  to  come  out  of  retirement, 
Rajaji  provided  a  fillip  to  many  of  the  disparate  rightist  forces 
and  he  provided  the  much-sought  distinguished  leadership  almost 
single-handed.  Kabir  overstates  the  case  only  slightly  when  he 
argues  that '  the  only  rallying  point  of  the  Swatantra  Party  is  the 
personality  of  Rajagopalachari',  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
Rajaji  'is  the  stellar  attraction'  and  'commands  wide  attention' 
whenever  he  speaks  and  acts.44  Rajaji  is  thought  of 'as  a  member  of 
Gandhi's  generation,  the  liberators,  because  he  was  involved  in  the 
movement  from  the  very  start',  and  'as  Gandhi's  old  friend  and 
lieutenant  he  has  a  very  special  status'.45  Not  without  his  severe 

74 


The  Birth  of  a  Party 

critics,  Rajaji  has  also  been  termed  'the  most  astute  intellectual 
among  the  elite  of  Indian  nationalists  ',46  and  Nehru  wrote  of  him 
in  1940  that  his  'brilliant  intellect,  selfless  character,  and  penetrat- 
ing powers  of  analysis  have  been  a  tremendous  asset  to  our  cause'.47 
Although  Nehru  was  not  so  generous  in  later  years,  this  judgment 
will  stand  as  a  suggestion,  at  least,  of  the  sort  of  person  who  became 
the  founder-leader  of  the  Swatantra  Party.48  That  Rajaji  had  been 
approached  by  so  many  people  from  all  corners  of  India  testifies 
further  to  the  esteem  in  which  he  was  held  and  to  the  importance 
which  these  appellants  attached  to  leadership  of  great  stature,  in 
their  efforts  to  constitute  a  broad  opposition  party. 

The  Nagpur  Resolution  specifically,  and  'statism'  generally, 
provided  the  key  issues  which  had  potential  mass  appeal,  if  only 
the  peasantry  could  be  convinced  that  these  constituted  a  'clear 
and  present  danger'  to  their  interests.  It  was  argued  above  that 
one  factor  in  right-wing  disunity  was  the  relative  moderation 
of  the  Congress  Party,  and  the  resultant  feeling  that  however  bad 
things  were,  they  could  still  get  worse,  and  would  get  worse  if  the 
Congress  were  opposed.  Swatantra's  task — and  hope — was  to 
convince  the  populace  that  action  was  necessary  then,  before  it  was 
too  late.  It  is  also  very  important  to  observe,  in  this  regard,  that  if 
the  threat  of  communism  could  be  satisfactorily  communicated, 
it  was  a  potential  solvent  for  the  disparate  elements  and  doctrines 
which  had  previously  comprised  the  disorganized  Indian  right, 
and  it  could  also  hope  to  appeal  to  liberal,  middle-class  groups.  It 
could,  in  short,  serve  as  a  rallying  point  akin  to  the  anti-British 
focus  of  the  nationalist  movement,  i.e.  one  which  could  mobilize 
disparate  groups  with  different  positive  goals  but  with  a  common 
negative  goal.  This,  at  least,  was  a  potentiality  which  was  seen  to  be 
inherent  in  the  Nagpur  Resolution. 

Not  to  be  underestimated  in  all  calculations  concerning  the  birth 
of  Swatantra  was  the  presence  of  Masani  and  the  extensive,  if 
formally  unofficial  support  of  the  FFE— and  the  connection  of 
both  with  the  Tata  empire,  one  of  the  premier  industrial-financial 
complexes  in  India.  Although  no  one  expected  the  keys  to  vast 
industrial  treasuries  to  be  handed  over,  some  support  from  Tatas 
could  easily  have  been  envisaged:  Masani  had  very  close  ties,  and 
Shroff,  a  founder-leader  of  the  FFE,  had  for  a  long  time  been 
prominent  in  the  organization.  The  All-India  Manufacturers' 
Association,  for  a  time  headed  by  Vaidya  and  a  supporter  of  the 

75 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

FFE,  was  also  a  possible  source  of  financial  support,  through  its 
constituent  units. 

Combined,  these  factors— Rajaji's  leadership,  exploitable  issues, 
and  the  possibility  of  funds— provided  the  basis  for  very  cautious 
optimism,  which  one  more  traditionally  minded  Indian  tried  to 
reinforce  by  gratuitously  providing  a  very  favourable  horoscope 
for  the  new  party.49  The  prospects  were  far  from  bright— everyone 
knew  that— but  to  many,  particularly  those  getting  on  in  years,  it 
seemed  a  matter  of  *  now  or  never '  and  the  decision  to  proceed  was 
taken. 

For  the  most  part,  there  were  no  illusions  concerning  the  prob- 
lems confronting  the  new  party.  This  was  again  particularly  true 
among  the  older  men,  many  of  whom  linked  their  own  limited  days 
with  the  fate  of  India  and  who  took  up  the  challenge  more  with  an 
attitude  of  resignation  in  a  'last-gasp'  effort  than  with  confidence 
in  a  successful  outcome.  Rajaji  reflected  this,  for  while  he  was 
convinced  that  the  need  for  a  cohesive  opposition  was  clear,  he  was 
far  less  sanguine  when  it  came  to  the  prospects  of  creating  one: 

Although  there  is  today  abundant  material  for  a  powerful  opposition, 
hypnotic  fear  and  the  pressure  of  individual  interests  operate  to  pre- 
vent the  gathering  together  of  the  forces. .  .Unless  the  conservatives 
realize  their  duty,  throw  off  their  dejection,  overcome  their  fears  and 
unite  to  build  a  worthy  opposition,  parliamentary  democracy  in  India 
has  a  dismal  future.50 

Masani,  upon  whom  time  weighs  less  heavily,  echoed  the  same 
sentiments  in  less  despairing  terms : 

The  Swatantra  Party  can  succeed  in  giving  effective  opposition  to  the 
State  Capitalist  policies  of  the  present  government  and  in  providing  the 
country  with  an  alternative  government  only  if  it  can  mobilize  a  broad 
based  coalition  [of  peasantry  and  professional  men,  especially].  The 
middle  classes  of  the  cities  and  towns  must  join  hands  with  the  peasants 
in  the  villages  in  defence  of  their  rights  and  property.  If  they  do  not 
hang  together,  they  will  assuredly  hang  separately.51 

It  is  pertinent  to  point  out  not  only  that  these  observations  were 
entirely  correct,  but  also  that  Rajaji,  here  and  elsewhere,  explicitly 
referred  to  the  need  for  a  conservative  or  rightist  party,  and  that 
Masani,  here  and  elsewhere,  explicitly  referred  to  the  propertied, 
middle-class  basis  which  he  envisaged  for  the  Swatantra  Party. 
Was  such  a  party  likely  to  be  progressive  and  a  defender  of  the 

76 


The  Birth  of  a  Party 

interests  of  the  non-propertied  common  man?  That,  and  a  good 
deal  more,  remained  to  be  seen. 

There  were  doubts,  too,  concerning  the  leadership.  Rajaji,  for  all 
his  undeniable  stature  and  intellect,  was  not  a  mesmerizing  public 
figure  by  any  means,  and  Palmer's  claim  that  he  was  'the  only 
living  Indian  who  has  the  kind  of  appeal  to  the  Indian  masses — 
combining  personal  magnetism  with  a  messianic  quality— that 
Gandhi  had'52  is  unsupportable.  More  apt  is  the  view  that  he 
'always  seemed  unable  to  sense,  still  less  anticipate,  the  senti- 
ment and  mood  of  the  people . . .  [and]  was  never  able  to  capture 
the  imagination  of  the  Indian  masses  \53  Here  was  a  figure,  then, 
who  was  more  respected  than  loved,  a  man  who  would  get  a 
respectful  hearing  but  would  arouse  few  passions.  Even  with  these 
limitations,  however,  Rajaji  provided  Swatantra  with  a  figurehead, 
at  least,  who  was  undeniably  superior  to  those  whom  the  other 
rightist  parties  could  offer. 

Beyond  the  problem  of  Rajaji  personally  was  that  of  the  'found- 
ing fathers '  as  a  whole.  Among  the  founders  were  such  people  as 
Jinraj  Hegde  of  the  AIAF,  a  landowner  and  advocate  of  the 
Mysore  High  Court,  and  the  late  V.  P.  Menon,  the  venerable  and 
desperately  ailing  assistant  to  Patel  in  the  integration  of  the 
princely  states — and  these  two  men  were  nominated  as  the  'Joint 
Secretaries'  of  the  party  at  the  Madras  meeting.  All  told,  the  slate 
of  officers  nominated  did  not  inspire  abundant  confidence  or 
enthusiasm  among  many  prospective  supporters,  or,  indeed, 
among  some  of  the  founders  themselves.  Notwithstanding  the 
presence  of  some  prominent,  anti-collectivist  Gujaratis  and  a 
scattering  of  people  from  other  northern  states,  the  thirty-odd  men 
who  assembled  in  Madras  were  heavily  drawn  from  the  south  of  the 
Vindhyas,  and  certain  early,  if  tentative  decisions  reflected  this. 
The  headquarters  of  the  party  were  to  be  in  Bangalore,  and  the 
President  (Ranga),  the  Joint  Secretaries  (Menon  and  Hegde),  and 
the  Treasurer  (B.  V.  Narayana  Reddy),  were  all  from  the  south 
as,  of  course,  was  Rajaji  himself.54 

One  prominent  party  man  explicitly  charged  that  this  group 
was  too  much  'a  southern  Brahmin  clique';  and  another  referred 
to  it  as  a  group  of  'old  fogies'  who  were  'out  of  touch  with 
politics'.55  Masani  was  prevented  from  reaching  the  Madras 
meeting  for  its  opening  session  and  arrived  to  find  a  slate  of  officers 
and  a  general  atmosphere  very  far  from  his  liking.  It  was  no  sur~ 

77 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

prise,  then,  that  Masani  was  anxious  to  *  politicize'  the  leadership 
and  to  give  it  wider  geographical  scope.  It  was  also  no  surprise  that, 
within  a  short  time,  Masani  himself  became  General- Secretary, 
that  party  headquarters  were  moved  to  Bombay,  and  that  the 
'preparatory  convention'  of  the  party  was  scheduled  first  for 
Ahmedabad  and  then  moved  to  Bombay.  (This  also  suggests  the 
importance  of  the  FFE's  role  in  the  party.)  That  even  Rajaji  and 
Ranga  were  themselves  concerned  is  suggested  by  the  serious 
effort  that  was  made  to  have  Jayaprakash  Nar ayan  (who  had  attended 
the  Madras  meeting  at  Rajaji's  invitation)  assume  the  leadership 
of  the  party.56  Masani  himself  stated  publicly  that  this  effort  to 
recruit  Narayan  was  made— but  failed.57  It  remained  to  be  seen 
whether  the  'founding  fathers'  would  prove  sufficiently  attractive 
in  the  political  marketplace  to  contribute  substantially  to  the 
party's  organizational  and  electoral  efforts. 

There  was  also  considerable  anxiety  concerning  finances,  be- 
cause, with  ample  justice,  many  feared  that  big  business  would  not 
dare  to  offend  the  Congress  by  making  substantial  contributions 
to  Swatantra.  This  problem  and  the  association  of  Swatantra  with 
the  FFE  led  most  party  leaders  to  comment  on  the  financial 
prospects.  Thus,  Masani  took  pains  to  explain  his  view,  and  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  he  was  very  serious  in  making  the  following 
statement : 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the  Swatantra  Party  is  depending  on  large 
funds  from  Big  Business.  Not  only  our  opponents  but  many  of  our 
supporters  are  under  that  wrong  impression. . .  At  a  meeting  in  Banga- 
lore on  May  29,  with  Rajaji  in  the  chair  and  even  before  this  Party  was 
formed,  I  had  said  that  it  would  be  futile  for  us  to  wait  for  Big  Business 
to  make  up  its  mind  to  give  us  support. .  .The  reason  for  this  state  of 
affairs  is  not  far  to  seek.  It  lies  in  a  controlled  economy. .  .At  this  point, 
may  I  be  permitted,  without  hurting  the  susceptibilities  of  my  business 
friends,  to  say  that  the  lack  of  imagination  and  vision,  the  supine  attitude 
to  government  and  the  pathetic  desire  to  clutch  at  any  straw  that  may 
come  their  way  in  the  shape  of  soft  words  thrown  at  them  occasionally  by 
government  spokesmen,  displayed  by  certain  sections  of  Business  are 
not  qualities  that  are  calculated  to  help  them  fill  the  important  role  they 
have  in  the  country's  economic  life.58 

As  we  shall  see  below,  not  only  was  Masani  serious,  but  with 
respect  to  the  response  of  Indian  big  business,  he  was  also  entirely 
correct. 

78 


The  Birth  of  a  Party 

Little  concern  was  expressed  at  this  stage  about  the  ability  of  the 
party  to  mobilize  mass  support  on  the  basis  of  the  anti-statist 
programme  which  the  founding  fathers  envisaged,  but  the  prob- 
lems were  clear  enough.  To  communicate  this  message  as  the 
common  bond  among  the  more  conservative  opponents  of  the 
Congress  would  clearly  have  required  a  substantial  re-orientation 
of  Indian  political  thinking.  Among  other  things,  it  would  have 
required  a  subordination  of  religious,  linguistic,  and  caste  differ- 
ences, and  a  transcendance  of  many  historic  animosities,  in  the 
interests  of  a  common  stance  concerning  political  economy.  There 
were  no  illusions  concerning  the  ease  with  which  this  could  be 
accomplished.  The  opportunity  and  the  difficulty  here  were  both 
suggested  by  Masani,  who  wrote  that  'the  Nagpur  resolution  is 
both  a  challenge  and  an  opportunity.  If  properly  explained,  it 
brings  to  the  landed  peasants  in  the  villages,  who  constitute  537 
per  cent  of  our  greater  population,  and  to  the  middle  classes  in  the 
city  an  awareness  of  their  common  interests  and  their  common 
peril.'59  Furthermore,  the  successful  communication  of  this 
message  did  not  depend  on  Swatantra  alone.  It  depended  as  much, 
if  not  more,  on  the  'co-operation'  of  the  Congress,  in  the  sense 
that  a  broadening  and  deepening  of  controls,  heavier  taxation,  and 
the  like,  would  be  necessary  to  help  Swatantra  establish  the 
credibility  of  its  claims  about  statism.  Yet  the  Congress  record 
has  consistently  been  more  moderate  and  more  conciliatory  than 
would  have  seemed  necessary  for  Swatantra's  good.  Thus,  on  the 
Nagpur  Resolution  in  particular,  Nehru  was  very  insistent  that 
coercion  would  never  be  used  to  impose  'joint  co-operative 
farming',  and  Shastri  made  some  very  conciliatory  remarks  about 
the  fate  of  private  enterprise,  which  had  been  sharply  castigated 
in  a  report  of  the  All-Indian  Congress  Committee  (AICC)  Planning 
Seminar  at  Ootacamund  some  months  before.60  A  number  of 
journalists  and  political  figures  aptly  pointed  out  that  in  the  months 
after  the  creation  of  Swatantra,  the  Congress,  both  in  word  and 
deed,  sought  to  pacify  some  of  the  key  groups  to  whom  the  new 
party  had  to  pitch  its  appeal.  Finally,  as  suggested  by  the  fact  that 
the  FFE  quite  explicitly  aimed  its  appeal  at  the  educated  classes, 
Masani-style  arguments  about  political  economy  were  not  likely  to 
find  much  resonance  among  the  masses,  without  ample  help  from 
the  Congress. 

Thus,   the   prevailing   conditions   posed   some   very   critical 

79 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

problems  in  terms  of  Swatantra's  ability  to  'make  a  go  of  it',  with 
respect  to  leadership,  finances,  and  doctrine.  At  best,  very  cautious 
optimism  was  possible.  But  prospects  were  not  hopeless,  and  many 
would  in  any  event  have  persisted  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  '  now 
or  never'. 

The  weeks  between  the  Madras  meeting  and  the  'preparatory 
convention'  held  in  Bombay,  i  and  2  August,  were  hectic  ones  for 
some  of  the  leaders.61  There  was  the  by  no  means  trivial  discussion 
of  the  name  of  the  new  party  (the  selection  of  which  will  be  dis- 
cussed subsequently),  but  more  important  was  the  effort  to  line  up 
potential  recruits;  and  Ranga  himself  cited  Paliwal's  Gram  Raj 
Party  (UP),  the  Janata  Party  (Bihar),  Nagoke's  Dehati  Janata 
Party  (Punjab),  the  Democratic  Party  (Andhra),  the  Krishikar  Lok 
Paksh  (Gujarat)  and  the  Peasants  and  Workers  Party  (Bombay)  as 
existing  or  incipient  groups  which  were  possibly  vulnerable  to  a 
merger  appeal.62  Ranga  and  many  other  Swatantra  recruits  travel- 
led widely  to  agitate  against  the  Nagpur  proposals  and  to  gauge 
more  effectively  the  potential  support  for  the  party,  both  from 
existing  groups  and  from  the  unorganized. 

This  in  turn  raised  a  question  about  the  basic  structure  of  the 
new  party.  Would  it  seek  to  establish  its  own  identity  and  its  own 
programme  throughout  India,  as  Masani  favoured  (a  'unitary' 
party),  or  would  Swatantra  exist  only  at  the  level  of  the  national 
Parliament,  as  a  'holding  company',  allowing  local  parties  already 
in  existence  to  maintain  their  own  local  interests  and  their  own 
electoral  symbols,  as  Paliwal  and  others  favoured  (a  'federal' 
party)?63  The  important  and  persistently  vexing  issue  of  party 
structure  and  centre-state  relations  was  thus  broached  at  the  out- 
set. 

Finally,  there  were  pre- visions  of  other  important  developments 
which  would  play  a  major  part  in  the  life  of  the  party.  There  were 
savage  attacks  on  the  fledgling  party  by  Nehru  and  other  leading 
Congressmen  (as  well  as  by  the  CPI,  of  course),  which  put  Swatan- 
tra very  quickly  on  the  defensive  in  many  respects.  In  particular, 
the  charge  that  it  was  a  'rich  man's  party',  a  'projection'  of  the 
FFE,  and  otherwise  associated  with  'reactionary'  and  'selfish' 
vested  interests,  gave  the  party  a  negative  image  in  many  quarters, 
an  image  against  which  it  has  had  continually  to  struggle.64  In 
addition,  there  was  a  very  early  suggestion  of  a  Swatantra-Jan 

80 


The  Birth  of  a  Party 

Sangh  merger,  which  raised  the  general  question  of  the  new 
party's  relations  with  the  more  important,  existing  opposition 
groups.65  Just  having  been  born,  Swatantra  was  obliged  to  learn 
to  stand  on  its  feet  and  to  defend  itself  in  a  hostile  environment.  All 
of  the  problems  notwithstanding,  by  the  time  of  the  preparatory 
convention,  some  leaders  of  existing  parties  had  already  decided 
to  cast  their  lot  with  Swatantra  and  many  locally  influential  people 
from  all  parts  of  India  had  evinced  more  than  passing  interes  tin 
the  new  party.  A  party  had  been  born;  but  it  was  at  Bombay  that 
it  suggested  a  capacity  to  survive.66 


81 


CHAPTER  5 

THE  SWATANTRA  'INNER  CIRCLE' 

INTRODUCTION 

During  the  years  covered  by  this  study  of  Swatantra  (1959-66),  the 
'inner  circle'  of  the  party's  national  elite  has  consisted  of  Rajaji, 
Ranga,  Munshi,  and  Masani,  with  Sir  Homy  P.  Mody  as  a  much 
less  visible  and  less  active  colleague.  Around  these  men  a  variety 
of  personalities  and  purposes  have  clustered,  ebbing  and  flowing, 
and  they  would  seem  to  constitute  the '  experienced  and  responsible 
politicians'  whose  emergence  as  the  nucleus  of  a  conservative  party 
was  predicted  much  earlier.  By  any  reasonable  standards,  the 
careers  of  these  five  men  are  exceptionally  distinguished. 

Rajaji,  the  founder-leader,  was  one  of  the  towering  figures  of  the 
Nationalist  movement,  Premier  and  Chief  Minister  of  Madras, 
Home  Minister  in  the  central  government,  Governor  of  West 
Bengal,  and  the  only  Indian  Governor-General  of  India.  Ranga, 
the  President,  was  educated  at  Oxford,  has  been  an  economics 
professor,  and  was  a  stalwart  in  the  Andhra  Congress,  a  founder 
of  the  kisan  sabha  movement,  a  leader  of  many  agriculturalists' 
organizations,  and  a  frequent  delegate  to  international  conferences 
concerning  agriculture.  Munshi,  the  senior  Vice-President,  was 
also  a  veteran  Congressman  who  was  Home  Minister  of  Bombay, 
Agriculture  Minister  in  the  central  government,  Governor  of  UP, 
and  a  principal  architect  of  India's  constitution;  and  he  is  well 
known  also  for  his  distinguished  legal,  literary,  and  educational- 
cultural  work.  Masani,  the  General- Secretary,  was  educated  in 
Bombay  and  London  (London  School  of  Economics),  was  called 
to  the  bar  at  Lincoln's  Inn,  has  been  a  lawyer,  economist  and 
management  consultant.  He  was  also  a  veteran  Congressman,  a 
founder  of  the  Congress  Socialist  Party  (CSP),  Mayor  of  Bombay, 
Ambassador  to  Brazil,  and  Chairman  of  the  UN  Subcommittee  for 
Prevention  of  Discrimination  and  Protection  of  Minorities.  Mody, 
party  Treasurer,  is  one  of  India's  pre-eminent  businessmen- 
financiers,  was  a  member  of  the  Viceroy's  Council  (i93I~43)?  a 
representative  of  Indian  business  at  the  Round  Table  Conferences, 
and  Governor  of  UP.  This  truncated  list  of  the  accomplishments 

82 


The  Swatantra  ''Inner  Circle' 

of  the  inner  circle  suffices  to  show  why  the  party's  leadership  'was 
too  distinguished  or  too  popular  to  be  ignored',  and  it  does  no 
violence  to  their  stature  to  insist  that  they  were  and  are  far  more 
'distinguished'  than  'popular'.1 

Beyond  this  it  would  seem  difficult  to  generalize  about  the  inner 
circle,  save  to  say  that  they  are  all  'comparatively  older  men'  who 
are  united  in  their  opposition  to  communism  and  to  what  they 
regard  as  the  increasingly  'statist'  policies  of  the  Congress,  especi- 
ally under  Nehru.2  Certain  differences  among  them  are  obvious 
from  even  a  superficial  familiarity  with  the  men  and  their  back- 
grounds. Masani  and  Mody  are  Parsis,  the  other  three  are  Hindus. 
Of  the  three  Hindus,  two  (Rajaji  and  Munshi)  are  Brahmins,  while 
Ranga  is  a  'clean'  sudra  (a  Kamma).  Masani  and  Mody  are  very 
highly  westernized  and  very  much  oriented  toward  the  modern 
business-industrial  world,  while  the  others  are,  in  varying  ways, 
more  in  tune  with  non-industrial  India.  To  complicate  matters 
even  further,  Ranga  and  Masani  were  radical  relative  to  the  main 
thrust  of  the  Congress  in  the  1930s,  while  the  others  were,  in  vary- 
ing ways,  relatively  conservative.  The  diversity  is  so  apparent  that 
it  has  elicited  the  oft-heard,  derisive  comment  that  the  party  is  a 
'  melange '  or  a '  medley '  of  fundamentally  uncongenial  bedfellows — 
which  is  particularly  strange  when  coming  from  a  Congressman.3 
But  the  question  remains :  what  forces  are  represented  and  on  what 
basis  have  they  come  together?  Surely  there  were  disparate  ele- 
ments involved  in  the  rebellion  of  1857,  just  as  there  were  disparate 
elements  in  the  nationalist  movement,  but  it  makes  a  great  deal  of 
difference  to  specify  just  who  was  represented  and  on  what  basis. 
By  the  same  token,  we  must  ask  if  the  key  Swatantra  leaders  simply 
represent  old  interests  in  unmodified  form,  jostling  uncom- 
fortably cheek-by-jowl,  or  do  they  in  combination,  if  not  individu- 
ally, represent  a  new  direction  in  Indian  political  life?  Put  another 
way,  is  Swatantra  simply  the  Jan  Sangh  or  the  RRP  or  some  other 
force  in  disguise,  or  all  of  them  lumped  together,  or  something 
new? 

From  this  standpoint,  we  can  in  fact  say  a  good  bit  more  than 
the  assertion  that  Swatantra's  leadership  is  a  medley  of  older  men 
united  in  their  opposition  to  communism,  although  this  is  in  itself 
important.  We  can  say  that  within  the  inner  circle  there  are  repre- 
sentatives of  at  least  three  major  strands  of  thought:  the  idealized 
village,  militant  Hinduism,  and  modern  industrial  capitalism.  But 


83 


6-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

we  can  say  still  more.  Historically,  none  of  the  Swatantra  inner 
circle  has  displayed  any  appreciable  affinity  for  aristocratic  con- 
servatism, and  while  the  other  three  strands  of  thought  are  repre- 
sented, the  leadership,  collectively,  has  a  centre  of  gravity  which 
lies  outside  of  the  pale  of  the '  messiahs  of  backwardness '  and  of  the 
militant  Hindus.  The  Swatantra  inner  circle  is,  in  this  very  broad 
sense,  more  moderate  than  one  had  previously  found  in  most 
parties  of  the  right.  Whether  this  moderation,  as  we  shall  define  it 
further,  conforms  to  India's  needs,  and  whether  the  conditions  are 
at  all  favourable  to  such  an  approach,  are  different  questions  for 
which  answers  will  also  be  suggested  in  due  course. 


THE  INNER  CIRCLE  AND  THE  ARISTOCRATS 

Apart  from  the  obvious  fact  that  none  of  the  key  national  leaders 
was  himself  a  member  of  the '  feudal'  elites,  it  is  also  true  that  none 
had  any  particular  commitment  to  the  historical  position  of  these 
classes  and  the  views  they  expressed.  This  was  in  part  due  to  the 
nature  of  pre-independence  politics,  i.e.  the  association  of  the 
princes  and  the  landlords  with  the  British  and  their  combined 
resistance  to  the  aspirations  of  even  moderate  nationalists.  But  it 
flowed  also  from  an  awareness  that  it  would  be  sheer  folly  to 
retain  the  princely  states  and  unthinkable  to  retain  the  landed 
aristocracy. 

The  animosity  of  Masani  and  Ranga  toward  these  classes  flowed 
from  their  leftist  posture  in  the  1930s,  i.e.  their  affiliation  with  the 
CSP  and  the  kisan  sabha  movement,  respectively.  The  CSP,  of 
which  Masani  was  a  founder-leader  (1934),  was  not  homogeneous 
in  its  'socialist'  outlook,  and  Masani  was  a  representative  of  the 
social  democratic  or  Fabian  strand  of  thought.4  Yet  the  group  as  a 
whole  and  Masani  personally  were  extremely  hostile  to  the 
aristocratic  classes.  The  CSP  programme  of  1934  urged  'elimina- 
tion of  Princes  and  Landlords  and  all  other  classes  of  exploiters, 
without  compensation',  and  Masani,  in  1938,  deplored  the  fact 
that  in  recent  Congress  declarations  'the  people  of  the  Indian 
States,  who  form  a  fourth  of  the  nation,  are  told  to  fight  on  their 
own  and  to  expect  no  direct  aid  from  the  people  of  British  India'.5 
Even  after  he  turned  his  back  on  socialism  and  embraced  a  variant 
of 'Gandhism',  Masani,  a  highly  anglicized  Parsi  from  a  wealthy 
urban  family,  remained  hostile  to  the  basic  perspectives  of  the 

84 


The  Swatantra  ' Inner  Circle'' 

Hindu  traditionalists,  whether  aristocratic  or  non-aristocratic.6  By 
and  large,  it  is  fair  to  say  that '  no  figure  in  Indian  political  life  could 
be  more  unambiguously  modernist  than  . .  .Minoo  Masani'.7 

Ranga,  as  a  sudra  by  caste  background  and  as  one  of  India's  pre- 
eminent peasant  leaders,  was  similarly  extremely  hostile  toward 
the  aristocracy,  as  well  as  toward  the  Brahmin  priesthood,  whose 
world-view  relegated  his  caste  to  a  position  slightly  above  perdi- 
tion. In  addition — and  here  he  differed  sharply  from  Masani — he 
was  fundamentally  anti-industrial  in  outlook.  Both  then  and  now, 
Ranga  is  first  and  foremost  a  peasant  'populist',  and  his  conception 
of  what  is  good  for  an  independent  peasantry  has  been  the  pole- 
star  in  his  ideological  life.  Both  the  anti-aristocratic  and  the  anti- 
industrial  themes  are  present  in  his  assertion  that  'influenced  so 
powerfully  as  I  had  been  by  the  inspiring  Russian  achievements  and 
Leninist  destruction  of  the  monopoly  of  power  held  by  the  tradi- 
tional, feudal,  princely,  commercial  and  industrial  classes,  and  even 
the  priestly  and  intellectual  orders  of  society',  he  found  it  in- 
evitable that  he  seek  to  lead  India's  peasant  masses  against  these 
same  forces.8  Similarly,  he  frequently  spoke  at  length  of  the  need 
'to  set  right  the  present  inequalities  of  wealth  and  income,  and 
consequent  achievement  of  social  and  cultural  opportunities  as 
between  the  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  peoples,  as  between 
the  toilers  as  a  whole  and  the  capitalist-cum-feudal-cum-priestly 
orders  and  to  save  the  State  from  the  exploiting  classes...'.9 
Throughout  the  1920s  and  1930s  he  was  critical  of  Gandhi  and 
other  leading  Congressmen  for  their  seeming  tenderness  toward 
the  landlord  class,  and  he  claimed,  for  example,  that  the  'agitation 
led  by  the  Mahatma  in  Champaran  did  not  lead  up  to  any  fight 
against  the  main  causes  for  the  terrible  poverty  and  sufferings  of 
Champaran  peasants ...  It  does  strike  us  rather  significant  that 
both  he  (Gandhi)  and  Raj  en  Prasad  should  have  remained  scru- 
pulously silent  upon  the  ravages  of  the  zamindari  system. . .  '10 
Emphasizing  always  the  needs  and  'revolutionary'  aspirations  of 
the  world's  peasants,  Ranga,  displaying  'an  element  of  the  pro- 
selytizing missionary  in  his  restless  political  crusading',11  articu- 
lated a  'peasant  socialist'  theory  which  boiled  down  'in  concrete 
terms  to  a  defense  of  peasant  proprietorship  as  opposed  to  land 
nationalization'— and,  it  is  important  to  add,  to  'feudal'  land- 
lordism.12 Whatever  the  precise  quality  of  his  'socialism'  may  be, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  about  his  historical  antipathy  to  India's 

85 


f 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

aristocratic  and  priestly  classes  and  to  the  world-view  which  they 
advanced  to  justify  their  superior  positions.13 

Munshi  and  Rajaji  were  far  from  implacably  hostile  to  the 
princely  order,14  yet  both  favoured  Patel's  approach  to  the  princely 
states.  Munshi,  from  his  rather  militant,  nationalist  perspective, 
was  happy  to  call  Patel  the  'Bismarck  of  India',15  while  the  more 
restrained  Rajaji  announced  that  'history  has  taken  a  course 
which  we  cannot  alter  now. .  .we  need  a  new  form  of  government 
. . .  we  have  to  integrate  India  into  one'.16  He  added  that  while  the 
rulers  might  serve  a  useful,  if  largely  symbolic  and  ornamental 
function  as  governors  of  states,  for  example,  this  '  does  not  mean 
you  should  have  560  Princes  to  confuse  matters'.17  Finally, 
Rajaji  urged  the  princes,  many  of  whom  had  viciously  condemned 
the  Congress,  to  contribute  to  the  success  of  the  new  government, 
for  'if  the  Princes  love  the  people,  they  should  love  the  Ministers 
whom  the  people  have  elected. . .  \18 

The  same  broad  considerations  apply  as  well  to  the  great  landed 
intermediaries,  the  zamindars  and  jagirdars.  Masani  and  Ranga, 
during  the  1920s  and  beyond,  adhered  to  the  view  that  these  were 
exploiting  classes  which  had  to  be  eliminated.  Rajaji  and  Munshi 
were  again  less  hostile,  but  they,  like  so  many  non-radical 
Congressmen,  found  the  position  of  the  intermediaries  inde- 
fensible, because  of  the  extreme  misery  of  the  tiller  of  the  soil  and 
the  social  instability  which  this  could  carry  in  its  wake.  Even  so 
conservative  a  person  as  Sampurnanand  (now — 1966 — Governor 
of  Rajasthan)  could  not  confront  the  situation  in  rural  India 
with  anything  but  horror: 

The  whole  picture  is  heart-rending ...  Every  where  it  was  the  same 
monstrous  tale  of  heavy  rents,  illegal  demands,  arrears,  ejectments, 
debts  of  mahajans,  sale  of  belongings  and  trees,  semi-starvation,  and 
semi-nudity,  beatings  and  tortures  by  zamindars  and  their  employees  to 
compel  payments  of  legal  and  illegal  demands,  and  bleak  outlook  for  the 
future... The  Kisan  passes  his  life  in  an  atmosphere  of  perennial 
terrorization.19 

Rajaji  and  Munshi  both  realized  that  an  improvement  in  the 
position  of  the  tenant  was  mandatory,  for  humane  reasons  and  to 
forestall  more  radical  solutions  to  the  problem;  and  Rajaji  sup- 
ported the  famous  'Karachi  Resolution'  on  abolition  of  the 
zamindari  system.  Furthermore,  when  Premier  of  Madras  (i937"9) 

86 


The  Swatantra  6 Inner  Circle'' 

he  proposed  some  fairly  drastic  (by  prevailing  standards)  land 
reform  legislation,  even  though  it  never  approached  expropriation 
of  landlords;  and  when  he  returned  as  Chief  Minister  after  the 
first  general  elections,  he  saw  to  the  passage  of  legislation  which 
provided  greater  security  of  tenure  and  a  larger  share  of  produce 
for  tenants.20 

With  respect  to  both  the  princes  and  the  landed  aristocrats, 
Mody  was  generally  restrained.  None  the  less,  as  a  leading 
spokesman  for  Indian  business,  Mody  also  came  to  be  critical  of 
the  aristocracy,  which,  by  and  large,  served  to  retard  constitutional 
and  economic  progress  of  the  type  he  desired.21  Showing  no  par- 
ticular animus  beyond  this,  Mody  still  shared  with  Masani  the  out- 
look of  a  highly  westernized  Parsi,  fundamentally  at  odds  with  the 
traditional,  aristocratic  world- view;  and  he  would  have  to  be 
classified  as  a  non-aristocratic  moderate  in  this  context.  Whatever 
the  present  attitude  in  the  inner  circle  may  be  toward  the  princes 
and  landlords,  it  should  be  clear  that  historically  Swatantra's 
leaders  favoured  as  a  minimum  Patel's  approach  to  these  classes.22 


RAJAJI  AND   INDIAN  CONSERVATISM 

If  the  Swatantra  inner  circle  neither  individually  nor  collectively 
was  inclined  to  defend  aristocratic  conservatism,  the  same  cannot 
be  said  for  the  other  strands  of  thought  outlined  above.  In  par- 
ticular, Rajaji's  views  are  crucial  here,  not  only  because  he  is 
Swatantra's  stellar  attraction,  but  also  because  he  is  a  determined 
exponent  of  a  refined,  'high  culture'  version  of  the  idealized  village 
model.  Inasmuch  as  this  strand  of  thought  is  one  of  the  most 
appealing  in  recent  Indian  intellectual  history,  because  of  its 
association  with  'Gandhism',  its  exposition  by  Rajaji  requires  the 
closest  attention.23 

Rajaji's  general  approach  is  suggested  by  Sheean's  observation 
that  the  Swatantra  founder-leader  shows  a  'yearning  for  a  home- 
spun and  disarmed  society,  a  sort  of  Gandhian  abstraction',  but  we 
need  not  and  cannot  rest  content  with  such  an  imprecise  characteri- 
zation.24 Rajaji  himself  has  provided  ample  documentation  for 
such  a  conclusion  about  his  views,  by  endorsing  Gandhi's  belief 
that '  civilization  consists  not  in  multiplication  of  wants  but  in  the 
deliberate  and  voluntary  restriction  of  wants '.  And  similarly  he  has 
endorsed  the  contention  that  'high  thinking  is  inconsistent  with  a 

87 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

complicated  material  life,  based  on  high  speed  imposed  on  us  by 
mammon  worship'.25  This  commitment  need  not,  however,  in- 
volve a  defence  of  the  traditional,  village-based  order,  although  it  is 
quite  compatible  with  it.  To  understand  the  full  range  of  Rajaji's 
thought,  it  is  necessary  to  go  beyond  this  basic  posture. 

A  second  basic  point,  which  might  seem  at  first  glance  to  con- 
flict with  the  first,  is  reflected  in  Rajaji's  assertion  that  he,  like 
Gandhi  (in  his  view),  believes  that  'machinery  has  its  place,  it  has 
come  to  stay'.26  So  too  he  insists  that  he,  like  Gandhi,  is  'an 
enemy  of  the  machine  when  the  machine  became  the  master  and 
man  became  its  slave'.27  While  thus  trying  to  separate  himself  from 
those  who  oppose  machinery  as  such,  it  is  also  clear  that  'slavery' 
is  considered  to  be  inherent  to  some  extent  in  all  large-scale  enter- 
prise in  heavily  urban-industrial  settings.  The  latter  feeling  pulls 
Rajaji  back  toward  the  village  and  more  modest  technology. 

Equally  important  to  understand  is  Rajaji's  approach  to  the 
manner  in  which,  and  the  scale  on  which,  machinery  should  be 
introduced,  and,  more  generally,  to  the  way  in  which  economic 
change  should  be  undertaken.  Briefly,  he  insists  that  economic 
change  minimize  the  'dehumanizing'  aspects  of  modern  industry, 
that  it  minimize  dislocations  attendant  upon  its  introduction,  and 
that  it  keep  technology  as  close  to '  human  scale '  as  possible.  This  is 
clear  from  cases  which  Rajaji  himself  has  raised  to  illustrate  his 
views.  What,  he  once  asked,  if  the  only  son  of  a  village  potter 
decided  to  seek  alternative  employment  (not  necessarily  in  modern 
industry)  outside  the  village?  The  local  producer  would  no  longer 
be  there  to  meet  traditional  needs  in  the  traditional,  predictable 
manner;  the  villagers  would,  he  said,  be  unable  to  afford  machine- 
made  substitutes;  and,  as  a  consequence,  the  level  of  living  of  the 
common  man  in  the  village  would  actually  decline  as  a  result  of 
economic  change.28  Obviously,  insistence  that  all  such  dislocations 
be  minimized  implies  a  rather  strict  adherence  to  the  hereditary, 
caste-based  division  of  labour,  with  its  hierarchical  implications. 
Rajaji  thus  defends  the  ancien  regime  indirectly,  on  grounds  other 
than  strictly  traditional  ones. 

The  second  case  illustrates  equally  critical  dimensions  of 
Rajaji's  conservatism  and  shows  the  vehemence  with  which  he  can 
respond  to  the  'improper'  introduction  of  modern  technology. 
Speaking  of  the  position  of  the  handloom  weavers  during  a  par- 
ticularly acute  'time  of  troubles',  Rajaji  asserted  that  they  'have 


The  Swatantra  c Inner  Circle'' 

fought  bravely  against  foreign  mill  manufacture  and  next,  against 
Indian  mill  manufacture \  and  he  insisted  that  'we  cannot  allow 
the  capitalist  mill  industry  to  create  unemployment  on  a  mon- 
strous scale ...  No  sacrifice  is  too  heavy,  no  measures  are  too  harsh, 
if  we  find  that  by  such  measures  we  can  avert  the  disaster  that  is 
slowly  but  surely  advancing  towards  us.' 29  In  this  case,  unlike  the 
first,  the  obvious  implication  is  that  the  villager  could  more  easily 
afford  machine-made  goods,  but  that  the  economic  change  must 
be  resisted  because  of  the  involuntary  and  sudden  displacement 
of  a  certain  class  of  producers,  without  alternative  employment. 
Thus,  whether  the  producer  deserts  his  post  voluntarily  and 
causes  dislocations  in  the  village  through  non-availability  of  goods 
or  services,  or  whether  he  is  involuntarily  displaced,  causing  dis- 
locations of  a  different  type,  is  really  immaterial :  all  dislocations 
should  be  minimized.  It  is  immediately  obvious  that  only  the  most 
gradual  economic  change  is  compatible  with  such  an  approach, 
which  justifies  the  charge  that  there  are  very  formidable  elements 
or  'disguised  conservatism'  embedded  in  Rajaji's  views.  It  be- 
comes somewhat  less  hidden  when  we  note  that  Rajaji  has  explicitly 
endorsed  the  'trade-school'  function  of  caste  in  the  absence  of 
alternative  facilities  and  that  his  educational  plans  for  Madras 
included  training  in  one's  hereditary  caste  occupation,  as  an 
important  component.30 

Ranga,  from  his  perspective  as  a  peasant  populist,  shares  this 
anti-industrial  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  gradualist  bias,  as  is  clear 
from  his  condemnation  of  the  Congress,  because 
they  wish  to  draw  millions  of  our  artisans  into  the  embraces  of  the  small 
factories  tied  up  however  loosely  to  the  growing  large-scale  money 
economy  as  is  evident  by  their  plans  to  replace  the  whole  of  the  hand- 
loom  weavers. .  .by  the  introduction. .  .of  power  looms  through  the 
sugar-coated  weavers'  power  loom  co-operatives.  They  also  want  to 
replace  crores  of  small  shopkeepers  and  their  family  economy  of  trading 
by  introducing  state-controlled,  regulated  or  owned  grain  shops . .  .31 

In  this  case,  we  are  moving  toward  the  conclusion  that  no  matter 
how  gradual  or  how  close  to  'human  scale'  technological  change 
may  be,  it  is  undesirable,  and  Rajaji  is  by  no  means  unsympathetic 
to  the  idea.32  There  are  some  differences,  to  be  sure,  because  Rajaji 
adopts  a  more  philosophical  approach  to  this  issue,  by  contrast 
with  Ranga  who  is  something  of  a  fanatical  populist.  A  key  point, 
however,  is  that  such  positions  lay  the  basis  for  conflict  with  those 

89 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 
who  are  more  urban-industrial  in  orientation,  both  inside  and 
outside  the  party. 

While  Ranga  by  and  large  rests  content  with  this,  Rajaji  goes 
well  beyond  it,  and  a  further  examination  of  his  views  leads  toward 
the  heart  of  his  conservatism  and  into  an  area  where  he  and  Munshi 
join  hands.  The  key  point  is  this:  overarching  all  other  views  and 
preoccupations  is  one  which  transcends  dislocations  and  types  of 
technology  and  levels  of  living.  This  is  brought  out  in  Rajaji's 
assertion  that 

planned  economy  and  cooperative  life  in  place  of  the  competitive  and 
selfish  motive  [associated  with  laissez  faire  capitalism],  is  modern 
economy.  This  cannot  be  effectively  achieved  if  it  depends  on  mere 
authority,  however  powerful.  We  must  have  a  generally  accepted  culture 
which  works  as  a  law  from  within,  to  assist  the  law  imposed  from  with- 
out. Unless  we  have  the  help  of  culture,  mere  material  planmng  cul- 
minates in  fraud  and  corruption.33 
Embellishing  this  same  theme,  Rajaji  asserted  that 
properly  designed  and  placed  on  a  spiritual  basis,  a  regulated  economy 
need  not  be  inconsistent  with  individual  satisfaction  and  individual  zeal. 
The  restraints  and  habits  of  mind  that  are  required  to  be  developed  for 
altruistic  action  must  flow  from  faith  and  inner  conviction.34 

If  '  culture'  restrained  people,  virtually  any  type  of  technology  and 

any  level  of  living  would  seem  to  be  acceptable— even  though  this 

seems  to  contradict  the  view  that  'high  thinking  is  inconsistent 

with  complicated  material  life...'.  If  'culture'  prevailed,  due 

respect  would  be  shown  by  all  economic  actors  for  the  interests  of 

others:  the  village  potter  would  not  desert  his  job,  the  capitalist 

would  not  be  a  robber-baron  and  would  not  exploit  his  workers, 

economic  planners  would  not  pursue  policies  which  generate 

severe  dislocations,  nor,  in  a  more  general  sense,  would  'social 

engineers'  attempt  to  reconstruct  the  lives  of  the  people.  This  is 

the  'responsible  individualism'  which  Rajaji  understands  by  the 

notion  of '  trusteeship ',  and  in  this  version,  Rajaji's  doctrine  falls 

on  responsive  ears  in  India.35  But  it  is  clear  that  too  many  people, 

and  especially  the  incumbent  government,  are  not  disciplined  by 

culture  and  by  spiritual  principles.  Here,  Rajaji  is  in  complete 

agreement   with   Munshi,   who   once   wrote   of  the   'complete 

identity'  which  existed  between  the  Gandhian  leaders  and  the 

masses,  as  opposed  to  the  westernized  leadership  which  'has  not 

90 


The  Swatantra  ' Inner  Circle'' 

learnt  to  reflect  the  mind  of  the  masses.  It  does  not  know  the  idiom 
of  their  life.  It  is  too  deeply  engrossed  in  leading,  directing  and 
organizing  them  from  a  higher  pedestal.' 36  Both  Rajaji  and  Munshi 
agree  that  only  through  a  restoration  of '  culture '  and  £  spirituality ' 
can  India  progress  and  be  true  to  her  own  destiny,  and  both  place 
a  great  deal  of  emphasis  on  trusteeship  in  this  connection.37 

If  we  now  ask  how  *  culture'  and  'spirituality'  can  be  secured, 
we  get  close  to  bed-rock.  In  part,  as  we  have  already  seen,  it  de- 
pends (more  for  Rajaji  than  for  Munshi),  on  very  modest  material 
commitments  and  interests,  although  Rajaji  is  not  free  from 
apparent  contradictions  on  this  point.  But,  apart  from  this,  it 
depends  on  other  circumstances  as  well.  Defining  'culture'  as 
'essentially  the  prevailing  pattern  of  joyous  restraint  accepted  by 
the  people  ',38  Rajaji  links  it  to  the  maintenance  of  dharma,  or  moral 
duty,  which  is  f  an  organic  growth  which  it  is  our  duty  to  respect 
and  which  we  should  not  treat  as  mere  Indian  superstition  or 
eccentricity'.39  This,  in  turn,  depends  on  the  maintenance  of 
religious  values  in  a  high  culture  sense,  as  Rajaji  conceives  them,  as 
he  made  explicit  in  his  contention  that '  if  there  is  any  honesty  in 
India  today,  any  hospitality,  any  chastity,  any  philanthropy,  any 
tenderness  to  dumb  creatures,  any  aversion  to  evil,  any  love  to  do 
good,  it  is  due  to  whatever  remains  of  the  old  culture'.40  And,  to 
put  it  briefly,  he  said  that  'if  our  four-hundred  millions  strike  out 
religion  from  their  lives,  India  will  be  wiped  out'.41 

To  maintain  dharma  and c  joyous  restraint '  it  is  necessary,  accord- 
ing to  Rajaji,  to  sustain  those  institutions  which  have  inculcated 
them  over  the  centuries  in  India,  and  here  we  do  arrive  at  bed- 
rock. For  on  this  score,  Rajaji  asserts  that  the  joint  family  is  an 
'institution  which  gives  a  distinctive  feature  to  life  in  India',  and 
that  it  is  the  jati  which  is  '  the  most  important  element  in  the 
organization  of  our  society'.42  Over  the  years,  Rajaji  has  bemoaned 
the  fact  that  these  were  weakened  by  'the  cult  of  individuality' 
which  came  to  India  through  'the  impact  of  the  West'.43  Noting 
that  these  institutions  had  been  weakened  but  not  totally  under- 
mined 'by  the  impact  of  Western  individualism  and  perverted 
movements  of  social  reform',  Rajaji  has  expressed  the  hope  that 
'perhaps  we  may  yet  see  the  light  and  revise  our  opinions  and 
revive  and  strengthen  these  so-called  reactionary  virtues  of  helping 
people  around  us  and  acquiring  merit  in  the  eyes  of  the  Gods  and 
saving  the  welfare  state  a  lot  of  trouble'.44  Thus,  rather  than 

9i 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

being  viewed  as  coercive  vis-a-vis  the  individual  and  parochial 
vis-a-vis  society  as  a  whole,  the  great  pillars  of  Indian  society  (joint 
family,  jati,  and  village)  are  seen  as  beneficent  institutions  which 
serve  a  number  of  critical  social  purposes.  They  develop  the  sense 
of  ' culture',  force  attention  to  larger  social  groupings  than  does 
western  individualism,  and  they  are,  moreover,  structures  of 
'decentralized  socialism',  which  have  long  insulated  the  Indian 
(or  at  least  the  Hindu)  against  the  ravages  of  his  natural  and  man- 
made  environments.45 

It  is  here  that  the  Congress  has  committed  its  greatest  sin: 

The  loosening  of  the  religious  impulse  is  the  worst  of  the  dis-services 
rendered  by  the  Congress  to  the  nation.  We  must  organize  a  new  force 
and  movement  to  replace  the  greed  and  the  class  hatred  of  Congress 
materialism  with  a  renovated  spiritual  outlook  emphasizing  the  re- 
straints of  good  conduct  as  of  greater  importance  than  the  triumphs  of 
organized  covetousness.  Every  effort  should  be  made  to  foster  and  main- 
tain spiritual  values  and  preserve  what  is  good  in  our  national  culture 
and  tradition  and  avoid  dominance  of  a  purely  material  philosophy  of 
life  which  thinks  only  in  terms  of  the  standard  of  life  without  any 
reference  to  its  content  or  quality.46 

The  need,  then,  is  for  a  strong  party  which  will  first  check  the 
Congress  and  then  re-emphasize  the  values  and  institutions  which 
are  quintessentially  Indian.  Should  such  a  reversal  be  effected, 
viz.  from  the  government's  'atheistic'  policy  to  one  which  is 
'secular'  but  supports  all  religions  equally,47  benefits  would  be 
evident  in  all  areas  of  Indian  life.  The  quality  of  government  would 
be  enhanced,  because  religion  would  serve  as  a  '  force  counter- 
acting the  baser  pulls  of  polities';  the  'modern  economy'  would 
develop  properly;  and  even  the  'poorest  he'  in  India  would  derive 
great  benefits,  because  the  all-pervading  sense  of  spirituality  has 
meant  that  'beggars  are  honoured  in  spite  of  their  obviously  un- 
satisfactory way  of  life'  and  'the  poor  man  commands  not  only 
respect  but  a  religious  status  by  reason  of  his  poverty'.48  And  if 
this  can  be  said  of  the  beggar  and  the  pauper,  can  the  rest  of  the 
society  be  so  bad? 

Taken  together,  the  emphasis  on  restriction  of  wants,  on 
minimizing  dislocations,  on  the  need  to  sustain  'culture'  through 
the  family  and  the;<m,  and  the  like,  would  go  far  toward  maintain- 
ing the  status  quo  in  India.  In  this  sense,  Rajaji  is  fundamentally  a 
conservative,  which  he  himself  freely  admits,  without  mvokmg 


92 


The  Swatantra  c Inner  Circle' 

traditionalist  dogmas  of  the  type  found  in  RRP  pronouncements, 
and  Rajaji  draws  close  to  the  'messiahs  of  backwardness '  in  some 
respects.49  It  may  be  a  consolation  that  Rajaji  eschews  traditional 
justifications  for  supporting  many  traditional  institutions,  practices 
and  values,  but  it  is,  to  this  author,  a  small  one. 

But  even  more  than  this  remains  to  be  said,  and  some  of  the 
pertinent  points  have  already  been  touched  upon.  As  we  have  seen, 
Rajaji  favoured  the  integration  of  the  princely  states  and  limited 
action  against  the  interests  of  the  landlord  class.  During  his  term 
as  Premier  of  Madras  he  favoured  a  permissive  bill,  on  the 
principle  of  local  option,  to  permit  temple  entry  by  harijans.  He 
helped  to  pass  a  bill  to  prohibit  the  exclusion  of  harijans  from  all 
facilities  built  with  or  maintained  by  state  funds.  He  has  spoken  in 
favour  of,  although  he  would  never  dream  of  compelling,  inter- 
caste  marriage,  and  he  permitted  it  in  the  case  of  his  own  children. 
He  has  told  the  practitioners  of  traditional  forms  of  medicine  that 
'vested  interests  should  never  be  allowed  to  mar  the  progress  of 
science'.  He  reprimanded  Indian  businessmen  for  preferring  in 
some  ways  the '  placid  pool '  of  the  British  raj  to  the '  swift  river '  of 
independence  politics,  He  is,  moreover,  well  aware  that  many 
Congress  reforms  are  irrevocable  and  that  many  processes  of 
change  have  been  set  in  motion  which  can  be  moderated  but  not 
arrested.  In  particular,  he  has  come  recently  to  insist  that  it  is  too 
late  to  go  back  to  a  village  economy  and  he  has  emphasized  instead 
the  decentralization  of  more  modern  industry.  And  it  is  worth 
recalling  that  he  defended  his  call  for  a  'party  on  the  right'  by  say- 
ing that  dislocations,  etc.,  '  are  not  less  real  or  important  than  the 
need  for  change  and  progress',  which  not  only  makes  clear  his 
conservatism  but  also  indicates  that  he  considers  himself  very 
much  a  Burkean  in  this  respect.50  Some  of  these  matters  may  be 
largely  symbolic  gestures  of  little  practical  significance,  viz. 
temple  entry  through  'local  option',  but  there  are  some  people  for 
whom  even  these  symbolic  departures  from  the  status  quo  are 
anathema,  and  it  is  well  to  remember  that  Rajaji  is  not  among  them. 
On  other  points,  the  departures  from  orthodoxy  and  tradition  are 
significant  and  they  serve  to  pull  Rajaji  back  from  the  RRP  and  its 
spiritual  kinfolk. 

Furthermore,  from  his  high  culture  perspective,  Rajaji  is  fully 
confident  that  Hinduism  is  compatible  with  very  substantial 
progress.  He  insists  that  'the  fathers  of  Hindu  religious  thought 

93 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

approached  their  subject  in  a  scientific  spirit.  They  treated  religion 
as  a  whole  as  a  search  for  truth  and  not  as  a  matter  of  dogma.'51 
Vedantic   thought,   which  he  has  termed  'the  root  of  Indian 
culture',  is  'fully  consistent  with  the  awe-inspiring  and  beautiful 
universe  as  it  is  unfolded  by  science ',  while  'the  way  of  life 
preached  in  the  Gita  is  fully  consistent  with  progressive  views  of 
citizenship'.52  Thus,  provided  Hinduism  is  properly  understood, 
it  is  no  bar  to  'modernization'.  But  there  is  a  problem  here  which 
obliges  us  to  approach  Rajaji's  formulations  with  some  caution. 
In  addition  to  the  refined  Hinduism  of  the  Brahmin  intellectual 
and  of  the  high  culture,  there  is  also  the  popular  Hinduism  of  the 
masses,  which  is  more  bound  up  with  dogma,  social  orthodoxy, 
and,  especially,  the  full  panoply  of  considerations  related  to  the 
hereditary  caste  system.  To  emphasize  its  flexibility  may  liberate 
the  intellectual,  but  this  will  escape  the  common  man,  whose  con- 
nection with  Hinduism  is  scarcely  liberating.  Put  another  way,  in 
his  analysis  Rajaji  uses  the  term  dharma  in  a  rather  abstract 
fashion,  but  more  relevant  in  popular  Hinduism  is  the  more '  earthly ' 
notion  of  varnashramadharma,  or  the  moral  duty  of  a  man  in  terms 
of  his  social  status  (varna)  and  his  stage  of  life  (ashrama).  The 
former  usage  may  be  flexible,  the  latter  is  not,  and  in  this  sense, 
too,  there  is  an  element  of 'disguised  conservatism'  which  intrudes 
into  Rajaji's  approach. 

Rajaji  himself  is  by  no  means  oblivious  to  these  criticisms. 
He  quoted  Nehru's  view  that  much  that  was  deplorable  in  India 
flowed  from  the  'old  culture'  and  he  quoted  Nehru's  con- 
tention that '  I  do  not  see  how  by  means  of  that  traditional  system 
you  can  ever  get  rid  of  the  problem  of  poverty'.53  He  has  also 
admitted  that  'the  tyranny  of  the  community  may  by  some  be 
considered  worse  than  that  imposed  by  any  form  of  state  control  \54 
It  is  clear,  however,  where  Rajaji's  sympathies  lie. 

There  are  still  some  critical,  concluding  points  to  be  made  about 
Rajaji.  First,  in  his  more  recent  statements,  Rajaji  has  empha- 
sized the  need  to  increase  industrial  output,  when  applying  the 
doctrine  of  trusteeship  to  the  modern  sector.  Thus,  he  has 
backed  away  somewhat  from  a  general  emphasis  on  voluntary 
restriction  of  wants.  Secondly,  as  we  have  already  seen,  he  has 
proved  to  be  enough  of  a  realist  to  acknowledge  that  it  is  impossible 
to  go  back  to  the  village  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  prevent  the 
spread  of  modern  industry.  Thus,  he  has  come  to  stress  the  de- 

94 


The  Swatantra  'Inner  Circle' 

centralization  of  modern  industry,  favouring  smaller-scale  pro- 
jects and  favouring  the  distribution  of  all  industry,  large  or  small, 
over  as  wide  an  area  as  possible,  to  minimize  dislocations  and  to 
avoid  a  mad  rush  to  overcrowded  and  otherwise  undesirable 
urban  areas.55  Thirdly,  the  struggle  against  'statism',  Rajaji's 
present  preoccupation,  has  allowed  him  to  supplement  his  more 
traditional  formulations  with  more  liberal  ones,  because  *  statism ' 
is  worse  than  either  and  menaces  both.  Thus,  while  generally 
stressing  self-restraint  and  insisting  that  it  is  necessary  to  curb 
c  the  free  play  of  individual  ambitions 5,56  he  can  also  argue,  in 
the  present  context,  that  'the  individual  is  the  only  reality.  The 
State  is  a  non-living  entity.  The  Leviathan  has  no  soul.  If  the 
individual  is  wiped  out  we  reduce  the  nation  to  a  soul-less  exist- 
tence.' 57  This,  however,  still  allows  the  individual  and  his  soul  to 
be  defined  by  the  family  and  the/arz,  and  hence  it  is  more  important 
to  stress  his  view  that  'to  let  every  person  act  creatively  as  he 
chooses,  looks  no  doubt  reactionary  and  chaotic;  notwithstanding 
this,  it  is  the  best  means  of  making  people  work'.58  Although  his 
primary  emphasis  has  long  been  anti-individualistic  and  con- 
servative, Rajaji  here  advances  arguments  which  are  more  classical 
liberal  in  flavour.  He  has,  in  short,  supplemented  his  conservatism 
with  a  modicum  of  liberal  individualism.  Even  individualism,  it 
appears,  does  not  look  so  bad  when  juxtaposed  to  the  spectre  of 
statism  which  haunts  Rajaji.59  In  these  important  respects,  Rajaji 
has  been  groping  toward  a  more  resilient  position  which  combines 
his  older  Burkean  conservatism  with  a  more  recent  infusion  of 
liberalism.  It  is  probably  too  much  to  say  that  Rajaji  is  'an 
ingenious  and  perfect  combination'  of  traditional  and  modern 
conservatism,60  but  it  is  clear  that  he  does  not  feel  able  to  turn  his 
back  on  the  twentieth  century.  To  put  the  matter  somewhat  dif- 
ferently, if  Rajaji  were  made  dictator  of  India,  he  would  doubtless 
act  along  strongly  (non-aristocratic)  conservative  lines,  but  in  the 
present,  competitive  political  context  he  has  become  more  flexible 
in  outlook  and  less  close  to  a  full-blown  conservative  position. 

MUNSHI  AND  MILITANT  NATIONALISM 

Munshi,  while  a  close  personal  friend  and  associate  of  Rajaji  and 
while  sharing  his  determination  to  sustain  the  spirit  of  Indian 
(more  specifically  Hindu)   culture,  displays  a  markedly  more 

95 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

militant  approach  to  public  affairs.  Both  historically  and  currently, 
Munshi  has  been  acutely  sensitive  to  problems  of  national  unity  and 
cohesion,  which  have  had  a  decisive  impact  on  his  views  of  religion, 
language,  caste,  political  organization,  and  the  like. 

A  useful  starting-point,  because  it  illustrates  differences  between 
Munshi  and  Rajaji,  is  the  matter  of  partition  and  the  more  general 
problem  of  religious  and  other  minorities  in  the  subcontinent.  Here 
we  see  that  Munshi  withdrew  from  the  Congress  during  the  Second 
World  War  so  that  he  might  carry  on  the  fight  against  the  Pakistan 
demand,  which  Rajaji,  almost  alone  among  top  Congress  leaders  at 
this  stage,  wanted  to  accept  in  principle  so  that  a  wartime '  national ' 
government  could  perhaps  be  formed.  In  a  kindred  vein,  Munshi 
emphasized  his  concern  for  national  unity  and  strength  after  it 
became  clear  that  Pakistan  would  become  a  reality,  by  stating  to 
the  Constituent  Assembly: 

I  feel,  thank  God,  that  we  have  got  out  of  this  bag  at  last.  We  have  no 
sections  and  no  groups  to  go  into,  no  elaborate  procedure  as  was  en- 
visaged, no  double-majority,  no  more  provinces  with  residuary  powers, 
no  opting  out,  no  revision  after  ten  years,  and  no  longer  only  four 
categories  of  powers  for  the  Centre.  We  feel  free  to  form  a  federation  of 
our  own  choice. .  .We  have  now  a  homogeneous  country.61 

Munshi  was  determined  to  establish  a  very  strong  central  govern- 
ment in  India,  and  to  this  end  he  reminded  the  members  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly  that  India's  most '  glorious  days 5  were  those 
spent  under  'a  strong  central  authority5  and  'the  most  tragic  days 
were  when  the  central  authority ...  was  dismembered  by  the 
provinces  trying  to  resist  it'.62  Virtually  every  one  of  Munshi' s  key 
positions  is  embedded  in  these  remarks. 

Munshi  to  this  day  remains  fearful  of  religious  divisions  in 
India,  admitting  in  effect  that  he  was  premature  in  his  view  that 
India  had  become  a  homogeneous  country  upon  the  creation  of 
Pakistan.  Thus,  he  found  it  necessary  to  support  a  suggested  ban  on 
religious  parties  as  electoral  participants,  while  at  the  same  time 
arguing  that  a  complete  ban  on  all  religiously  based  groups  would 
be  unconstitutional : 

Religious  appeals  evoke  the  most  intimate  of  responses.  Such  appeals  if 
issued  by  religious  parties  would  mean  that  Hindus,  Muslims,  Christians, 
and  Sikhs  would  be  pitted  against  one  another  in  the  elections  on  the 
basis  of  their  religious  attitudes  and  interests.  A  stage  would  have  been 

96 


The  Swatantra  'Inner  Circle* 

set  for  a  religious  conflict  during  the  elections  which  would  be  trans- 
ferred into  the  arena  of  legislatures.  Ultimately,  it  would  strengthen 
disruptive  tendencies,  dividing  the  nation  into  warring  religious  interests. 
We  have  enough  danger  in  linguism  without  having  to  create  another 
equally  dangerous  front.63 

That  a  suppression  of  religious  appeals  would  leave  most  of  the 
trump  cards  in  the  hands  of  the  overwhelming  Hindu  majority  is 
one  of  the  least  of  Munshi's  worries,  because  he  has  always  been 
far  less  concerned  about  Hindu  chauvinism  and  communalism  than 
about  other  forms  of  parochialism.64  It  is  an  awareness  of  this 
which  makes  Muslims,  Sikhs,  and  other  minorities  very  suspicious 
(to  say  the  least)  of  Munshi,  as  he  has  made  clear  his  hostility  to 
them  when  they  engage  in  what  he  regards  as  anti-national 
behaviour.65 

The  contrast  between  Munshi  and  Rajaji  on  this  point  is  very 
sharp.  Concerning  the  same  proposed  ban  on  communal  parties, 
Rajaji  said  that  the  ban  would  be  'a  foolish  and  unconstitutional 
enterprise. .  .attacks  on  minorities  by  the  majority  are  not  only 
unconstitutional  but  mean ',  and  he  asserted  that '  any  grouping  for 
protecting  the  interests  threatened  or  under  oppression  is  not 
communaHsm,  but  is  an  exercise  of  the  right  of  association  and 
must  be  deemed  lawful  '.66  Once  again,  Rajaji  sees  virtues  in  family, 
caste,  religious  and  other  groupings,  while  Munshi  is  inclined  to 
see  only,  or  primarily,  their  vices  as  parochial  forces. 

In  all  areas,  according  to  Munshi,  the  Congress  is  responsible 
for  having  injected  into  the  younger  generation  'the  venom  of 
provincialism  and  communalism',  which,  in  his  view,  accounts  for 
the  fact  that  'it  is  very  difficult  to  find  an  Indian  in  India5.67  On 
language  more  specifically,  he  has  said  that  linguistic  states  were 
deplorable,  because  'this  aggressive  group  sentiment  has  tended  to 
give  undue  prominence  to  one's  regional  languages  against  the 
paramount  importance  of  a  national  medium  without  which 
national  consciousness  would  wither  away',  and  he  has  insisted 
that  education  and  all  public  business  should  be  kept  'from  lapsing 
into  regional  media'.68  Yet  to  foster  linguistic  unity,  Munshi  does 
not  favour  a  rapid  and  perhaps  forcible  imposition  of  Hindi,  as 
does  the  Jan  Sangh,  among  other  groups.  In  fact,  Munshi  was  one 
of  the  authors  of  the  fifteen-year  compromise  formula,  whereby 
English  would  be  retained  from  1950  to  1965,  until  Hindi  could  be 
satisfactorily  developed.  Even  now,  however,  Munshi  is  wary  of  the 

7  97  esp 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

imposition  of  Hindi.  To  counter  linguistic  parochialism,  Munshi 
has  favoured  a  zonal  rather  than  a  linguistic  division  of  India,  to 
which  Rajaji  has  also  subscribed,  and  he  has  favoured  retention  of 
English  both  for  official  and  educational  purposes,  with  a  major 
university  in  each  zone  to  shift  eventually  from  English  to  Hindi.69 
Be  this  as  it  may,  Munshi  has  not  only  condemned  religious  and 
linguistic  parochialism,  but  he  has  also  come  down  hard  on  such 
would-be  secessionist  groups  as  the  DMK  in  Madras,  favouring  a 
ban  on  secessionist  propaganda,  as  most  of  his  colleagues  did  not.70 
Resembling  the  militant  Hindu  position  again  is  Munshi's  con- 
cern for  unity  and  strength  among  Hindus,  for  example,  overcom- 
ing caste  parochialism.  He  was,  for  example,  quite  insistent  that 
the  constitution  specifically  allow  the  government  to  legislate  in 
the  area  of  social  reform  and  to  guarantee  temple  entry  to  un- 
touchables;71 and  from  his  earliest  days,  he  had  some  harsh  words 
for  the  socially  orthodox  and  those  who  cited  scriptural  authority 
in  defence  of  the  caste  system.  In  this  spirit,  he  abused  the 
sanatanist 

whose  notions  of  Hinduism  are  so  wonderful  that  he  will  not  and 
cannot  be  reconciled  to  the  opening  of  the  temples  to  Hanjans.  He 
believes  that  his  Hinduism  is  an  arrogant  creed  which  bases  its  existence 
on  the  superiority  of  one  caste  over  the  other.  His  faith  is  in  social  in- 
equality. He  believes  in  hereditary  social  injustice. .  .Sir,  it  is  a  very 
unfortunate  mentality,  though  I  am  very  glad  to  say  that  it  is  restricted 
to  a  very  few . . .  The  social  structure  of  Hindu  India  is  entirely  different 
from  the  spirit  of  Hinduism  and  we  do  hope  that  Hinduism  will  be 
purged  of  its  greatest  disgrace  of  which  we  really  feel  ashamed. .  .We 
would  be  untrue  to  the  Nation  and  the  whole  spirit  of  Hinduism  if  we 
allowed  such  notions  of  social  inequality  to  be  prepetuated  in  times  like 
this.72 

The  claim  that  the  'spirit  of  Hinduism'  is  entirely  different  from 
the  social  structure  of  Hindu  India  is  a  familiar  one  among  would- 
be  reformers  of  Hindu  society;  and  those  who  advance  this  view 
endeavour  to  stress  a  few  key  principles  which  all  Hindus  may 
embrace,  and  to  stress  the  flexibility  of  Hinduism,  as  Rajaji  has 

done.  w       u.  , 

In  his  effort  to  capture  the  'spirit  of  Hinduism  ,  Munshi  has 
availed  himself  of  both  traditional  and  novel  means.  When  he  was 
Minister  for  Food  and  Agriculture,  Munshi '  declared  that  respect 
for  the  cow  was  a  unifying  sentiment  for  Hindus  and  that  there 

98 


The  Swatantra  ' Inner  Circle* 

was  "no  higher  Dharma"  than  her  protection'.73  But  far  more 
important  than  such  isolated,  if  recurrent  pronouncements  of  a 
topical  sort  is  Munshi's  role  as  founder-president  of  Bharatiya 
Vidya  Bhavan,  an  organization  devoted  to  the  study  and  renais- 
sance of  Indian  (not  specifically  Hindu)  culture.74  The  element  of 
renaissance  is  well  illustrated  by  the  organization's  statement  of 
principles : 

The  ultimate  aim  of  Bharatiya  Shiksha  [education]  is  to  teach  the  younger 
generation  to  appreciate  and  live  up  to  the  permanent  values  of  Bhara- 
tiya Vidya  [knowledge]  which  flowing  from  the  supreme  act  of  creative 
life-energy  as  represented  by  Shri  Ramachandra,  Shri  Krishna,  Vyasa, 
Buddha,  and  Mahavira  have  expressed  themselves  in  modern  times  in 
the  life  of  Shri  Ramakrishna  Paramahamsa,  Swami  Dayanand  Sara- 
swati,  and  Swami  Vivekananda,  Shri  Aurobindo  and  Mahatma  Gandhi.75 

It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  the  stress  is  on  the  spirit  of  India, 
not  on  any  particular  institutional  arrangements  or  specific  customs. 
This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  the  principal  bearers  of  Hinduism 
in  modern  times  who  are  cited  are  all  associated  with  very  substan- 
tial efforts  at  reformation  and  renaissance,  not  with  maintenance  of 
the  status  quo.  But  the  statement  of  principles  leaves  no  doubt 
about  this : 

Bharatiya  Shiksha  while  equipping  the  student  with  every  kind  of 
scientific  and  technical  training  must  teach  the  student  not  to  sacrifice  an 
ancient  form  or  attitude  to  an  unreasoning  passion  for  change;  nor  to 
retain  a  form  or  attitude  which  in  the  light  of  modern  times  can  be 
replaced  by  another  form  or  attitude  which  is  a  truer  and  more  effective 
expression  of  the  spirit  of  Bharatiya  Vidya;  and  to  capture  the  spirit 
afresh  for  each  generation  to  present  it  to  the  world.76 

Suffice  to  say,  Bharatiya  Vidya  Bhavan  and  the  principles  for  which 
it  professes  to  stand  remain  as  one  of  the  principal  institutional 
channels — itself  an  innovation  in  this  field — for  the  expression  of 
the '  spirit '  of  Hinduism  and  of  India.  This,  coupled  with  Munshi's 
other  efforts,  doubtless  justifies  Harrison's  contention  that 
Munshi  is '  the  most  sophisticated  ideologian  of  Hindu  revivalism  ',77 
and  it  helps  to  account  for  his  popularity  in  Jan  Sangh  circles.78 

Tempering  Munshi's  militancy  and  centralist  proclivities  is  not 
so  much  a  Gandhian  influence  (with  which  he  has  felt  recurrently 
uncomfortable)  as  his  western-oriented  legal  training  and  his 
outlook  on  political  institutions  more  generally.  Munshi  declined 


99 


7-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

to  support  the  Gandhi-led  Congress  during  the  1920s,  because,  in 
his  words, '  Gandhi  captured  it  and  changed  its  creed  and  method ', 
to  an  emphasis  on  the  attainment  of  '  Swaraj  by  peaceful  and 
legitimate  means'  rather  than  the  earlier  'attainment  of  Dominion 
Status  by  Constitutional  means'.79  In  short,  Munshi  gives  as  his 
own  reason  for  leaving  the  Congress  at  this  early  stage  in  his 
career  the  abandonment  of  more  strictly  constitutionalist  procedures 
and  more  limited  goals.  The  same  tendency  is  suggested  by  his 
association  with  the  Swarajist  forces,  the  group  which  wanted  the 
Congress  to  enter  the  legislatures  and  function  therein  as  best  it 

could. 

Munshi  was  also  alienated  from  many  of  the  so-called  Gandhians 
in  the  realm  of  political  organization.  In  keeping  with  his  deter- 
mination to  secure  a  strong  political  system  for  India,  he  felt 
obliged  to  insist  on  the  retention  of  the  British  political  model  as 
the  base  upon  which  India  should  build,  with  modifications  drawn 
from  the  American  experience  in  particular.80  This  brought  him 
into  sharp  conflict  with  those  who  deplored  the  proposed  retention 
of  an  alien  pattern  of  government  and  who  wanted  to  revert  to 
something   more   'Indian',   specifically   more   'Gandhian'.    In 
Tinker's  view,  for  example,  there  were  two  broad  schools  of 
thought  in  the  Constituent  Assembly:  first,  'the  Liberals  and  the 
Moderates,  former  administrators  and  jurists',  who  'welcomed  the 
constitution  as  a  worthy  instrument  of  government ' ;  and,  secondly, 
'a  much  larger  element'  which ' deplored  the  whole  constitution  as 
a  betrayal  of  Gandhian  ideals  and  of  the  ancient  spirit  of  India'.81 
Sampurnanand,  a  leading  Gandhian  conservative  from  UP,  insisted 
that  'the  attempt  at  centralization  of  all  power  is  hardly  veiled. . . 
this  is  bad',  and  he  added  that  'our  constitution  is  a  miserable 
failure.  The  spirit  of  Indian  culture  has  not  breathed  on  it:  the 
Gandhism  by  which  we  swear  so  vehemently  at  home  and  abroad 
does  not  inspire  it.  It  is  just  a  piece  of  legislation  like,  say,  the 
Motor  Vehicles  Act.'82  Others  argued  that  'if  you  look  into  this 
Constitution  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  anything  Indian';  that 
what  was  wanted  was  '  the  music  of  the  Veena  or  Sitar,  but  here  we 
have  the  music  of  an  English  band';  and  that  the  constitution 
represented  'a  slavish  imitation— nay  much  more— a  slavish  sur- 
render to  the  West'.83  K.  Hanumanthaya,  a  leading  Mysore 
Congressman,  insisted  on  great  attention  to  grass-roots  institutions 
as  the  foundation  of  the  new  constitution,  and  he  was  seconded 


100 


The  Swat  antra  ''Inner  Circle' 

here  by  two  of  Munshi's  Swatantra  colleagues,  Ranga  and  Masani. 
The  latter,  seeking  to  fuse  some  of  his  earlier  socialist  sentiments 
with  Gandhism,  spoke  of  Gandhi's  conception  of  panchayat  raj, 
not  because  of  its  traditional  aspect  but  because  of  its  potential  for 
'grass  roots  democracy';  and  Ranga  insisted  upon  a  'co-operative 
commonwealth,  as  Bapu  was  good  enough  to  call  it',  based 
similarly  on  grass-roots  institutions.84 

Munshi,  as  we  have  seen,  also  talked  of  the  'spirit'  of  India  and 
of  the  need  to  sustain  it,  but  he  did  not  accept  the  view  that  this 
meant  retention  of  a  decentralized,  village-based  political  system. 
It  could  be  plausibly  argued  that  no  indigenous  political  model 
seemed  likely  to  assure  the  unity  and  strength  which  Munshi 
desired;  and  it  could  also  be  argued  that  in  Munshi's  view,  a  strong 
state  was  necessary  to  protect  the  'spirit'  of  India  against  future 
subjugation  and  erosion.  Both  are  doubtless  true,  but  it  is  also 
true  that  many  of  the  'messiahs  of  backwardness'  failed  to  respond 
to  either  point  and  made  a  fetish  out  of  the  village,  and  it  is  not  a 
matter  of  splitting  hairs  to  point  up  such  differences,  because  they 
illustrate  important,  divergent  styles  of  thinking  which  must  be 
understood  for  a  proper  appreciation  of  Indian  political  develop- 
ment and  of  Swatantra's  role  in  it.  On  this  point,  too,  Rajaji  has 
turned  his  back  on  the  village  and  has  accepted  stronger,  national 
political  institutions,  at  least  as  a  matter  of  practical  necessity. 

Munshi's  defence  of  the  strong,  highly  centralized  political 
system  would  seem  entirely  compatible  with  the  views  of  the 
militant  nationalists,  such  as  those  in  the  Jan  Sangh.  Here,  how- 
ever, there  are  also  certain  differences,  at  least  vis-a-vis  the  proto- 
typical Jan  Sanghi.  For  one  thing,  Munshi  did  not  favour  as  highly 
centralized  a  state  as  did  many  of  the  militant  nationalists,  but  re- 
commended instead  a  federal  scheme  along  zonal  lines.  In  addi- 
tion, as  we  have  already  seen,  he  rejected  the  pro-Hindi  fanaticism 
of  many  militants  by  advocating  the  compromise  language  formula. 

More  important  yet,  there  has  always  been  a  very  strong  emphasis 
on  legalism  in  his  approach  to  politics  and  a  great  respect  for  con- 
stitutional niceties,  neither  of  which  bulks  very  large  in  the  con- 
cerns of  the  RRP,  the  Mahasabha,  or  the  Sangh.  Munshi  is  aware 
of  this  legalist  strain  and  he  has  quite  emphatically  defended  it  by 
arguing  that  'the  rule  of  the  tribe  of  lawyers  is  any  day  better  than 
the  rule  of  the  tribe  of  tyrants  \85  Munshi  tempered  his  own  cen- 
tralist bias  with  an  emphasis  on  judicial  review  and  on '  due  process ', 

IOI 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

which  were  borrowed  explicitly  from  American  constitutional 
experience,  and  he  defended  this  in  part  by  citing  the  overwhelming 
strength  of  the  Congress  as  a  principal  reason  for  establishing  a 
strong  and  independent  judiciary  and  for  demanding  scrupulous 
attention  to  civil  liberties.86  Munshi's  anxiety  on  this  point  well 
ante-dated  the  surge  of  the  Socialist  pattern'  of  society  and  even 
ante-dated  the  passing  of  the  great  'iron  man',  Patel.  Still,  it  is 
possible  to  argue  that  Munshi  could  see  the  handwriting  on  the 
wall  and  favoured  steps  to  check  political  power  as  it  might  be  used 
by  Nehru  and  the  secular  socialists.  This  clearly  seems  to  have  been 
the  case  in  Munshi's  more  recent  defence  of  the  autonomous 
powers  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  his  efforts  to  prevent 
the  offices  of  law  minister  and  attorney-general— an  independent 
legal  adviser  to  the  President— from  being  fused.87  This  concern 
for  constitutional  issues,  for  whatever  reason,  is  still  of  the  utmost 
importance,  because  not  every  opponent  of  socialism  has  re- 
sponded in  this  fashion.  Munshi  steadfastly  talks  in  legalistic, 
constitutionalist  terms,  which  is  to  be  much  admired  in  a  country 
which  is  seeking  to  establish  a  constitutional  democracy  and  the 
'rule  of  law'. 

The  legalistic,  constitutionalist  strain  is  quite  widespread  in  the 
Swatantra  elite  as  a  whole  (and  not  only  in  the  inner  circle),  and 
two  party  undertakings  with  which  Munshi  was  intimately  in- 
volved illustrate  this.  First,  there  was  the  'Public  Advice  Commit- 
tee', established  by  the  party  in  December  1959,  to  consider 
'matters  relating  to  public  policy,  Fundamental  Rights,  corruption 
and  favouritism  of  Ministers  and  officials,  and  interference  by 
members  of  the  ruling  Party  in  administrative  and  judicial 
matters'.88  Munshi  was  chairman  of  this  short-lived  body,  whose 
premature  demise  was  in  part  caused  by  difficulties  with  the  legal 
profession  over  the  question  of  tendering  free  legal  advice;  but  the 
main  point  has  nothing  to  do  with  its  demise  or  with  the  fact  that 
the  body  was  obviously  intended  to  embarrass  the  government. 
The  main  point  is  that  Swatantra,  and  Munshi,  sought  to  challenge 
the  government  in  this  particular  fashion,  by  holding  up  consti- 
tutional and  legal  standards  as  the  basis  for  judgment. 

The  second  Swatantra  body  with  which  Munshi  was  connected 
was  a  Swatantra-sponsored  committee  of  inquiry  into  alleged 
Congress  repression  of  the  Akali  Sikh  agitation  in  the  Punjab. 
Munshi  was  chairman  of  this  body,  too,  and  was  joined  here  by 


102 


The  Swatantra  'Inner  Circle'' 

N.  C.  Chatterjee  (former  President  of  the  Hindu  Mahasabha,  and 
a  Senior  Advocate  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  India),  Sardar  Kartar 
Singh  Campbellpuri  (retired  High  Court  judge,  former  PEPSU 
state),  and  C.  B.  Agarwalla  (retired  judge,  Allahabad  High  Court, 
and  Senior  Advocate  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  India).  Their  report 
reveals  both  Munshi  the  militant  nationalist  and  Munshi  the 
legahst-constitutionalist :  there  was  ample,  careful  criticism  of  both 
the  agitation  and  the  government's  handling  of  it,  but  Munshi  was 
severely  criticized  by  many  Sikhs,  in  whose  view  he  went  beyond 
the  terms  of  the  commission  to  attack  the  Punjabi  suba  demand.89 
It  seems  fair  to  conclude  that  while  Munshi  does  display  some 
unbecoming  hostility  toward  certain  minority  interests,  or  at  least 
a  lack  of  sympathy  for  their  position,  he  tends  very  markedly  to 
stress  constitutional  remedies  here,  as  part  of  a  broader  legalistic 
strain  in  his  thought.  If  such  an  emphasis  helps  to  establish  con- 
stitutional morality  more  securely  in  India,  it  is  to  this  extent  an 
important  'plus'  mark  on  Munshi's  ledger,  and  on  that  of  the 
party.90 

MASANI  AND  LIBERAL  CAPITALISM 

Because  of  Masani's  central  role  in  the  formulation  and  propaga- 
tion of  Swatantra's  formal  doctrine  (see  chapter  8)  and  in  the 
realm  of  party  organization,  we  shall  defer  detailed  consideration 
of  his  views  until  a  later  point,  and  then  it  will  be  from  a  different 
angle.  However,  in  addition  to  radical  views  in  the  1930s,  a  few 
points  should  be  noted  here,  which  will  suffice  to  point  up  some  of 
the  differences  between  his  outlook  and  those  of  Rajaji  and  Munshi. 
First,  Masani,  with  Rajaji,  opposed  the  proposed  ban  on  com- 
munal parties,  but  he  declined  to  take  Rajaji's  approach.  Masani, 
for  his  part,  expressed  his  dislike  for  communalism  and  for  other 
forms  of  parochialism  and  sectarianism;  but  he  insisted  that  a  ban 
would  be  akin  to  treating  the  symptoms  and  not  the  disease  itself.91 
Most  specifically,  education  (in  the  broadest  sense)  to  develop  a 
sense  of  secular,  national  citizenship  was,  for  Masani,  the  appropri- 
ate course  of  action.  Secondly,  in  a  view  also  at  variance  with 
Rajaji,  Masani  has  referred  to  the  joint  family  system  as  '  a  remnant 
of  the  primitive  tribal  community '  which  'had  its  advantages  but 
often  led  to  family  discord  and  encouraged  idleness  and  depen- 
dence even  among  the  able  bodied'.92  There  is  no  concern  here 
for  the  moral  discipline  which  the  joint  family  (or  the  jati)  is 

103 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

presumed  to  foster;  and,  if  anything,  there  is  a  clear  implication 
that  the  effects  of  the  system  are  pernicious  in  terms  of  moral 
development.  Implicit  here  is  an  individualistic  system,  in  which 
everyone  is  permitted,  encouraged,  and  perhaps  even  obliged  to 
*  sink  or  swim '  on  his  own  merits.  That  he  is,  furthermore,  opposed 
to  artificial  maintenance  of  cottage  industries,  Masani  has  made 
quite  explicit;93  and  his  reference  to  the  concept  of  limited  liability 
as  a  'sacred  principle'  and  to  the  joint  stock  company  as  'an 
institution  invented  by  the  genius  of  man  to  increase  industrial 
production'  further  mark  him  as  a  spokesman  for  modern  industry 
—and  more  specifically  for  private  enterprise.94  His  urban,  Parsi, 
highly  anglicized  background,  and  his  association  with  modern 
capitalism  combine  to  define  him  as,  perhaps,  India's  leading 
apostle  of  a  chastened  classical  liberalism  (and  he  is,  in  fact,  a 
patron  of  the  Liberal  International).  On  balance,  it  is  fair  to  say, 
with  Morris-Jones,  that  no  person  prominent  in  Indian  public  life 
today  is  more  unambiguously  modernist  than  Masani.95 

THE  INNER  CIRCLE!   A  BALANCE  SHEET 

From  the  preceding  discussions,  it  is  obvious  that  Rajaji  reaches 
out  toward  those  who  defend  the  idealized  village,  that  Munshi 
reaches  out  toward  the  militant  nationalists,  and  that  Masani 
reaches  out  toward  the  more  secular,  urban,  industrial  elements. 
It  is  also  clear,  if  somewhat  less  so,  that  Rajaji  pulls  back  a  good 
deal  from  the  prototypical  spokesman  for  the  Gandhians  and  the 
RRP,  and  that  Munshi  stays  a  bit  shy  of  the  Jan  Sangh.  It  is  also 
important  to  note  that  neither  was  in  fact  drawn  into  the  Jan 
Sangh  or  any  other  pre-Swatantra  opposition  party,  although 
ideologically  there  was  some  overlap  with  one  or  more  of  these. 
Munshi  has  been  offered  the  presidency  of  the  Sangh  but  has  never 
accepted  it;  Rajaji  has  addressed  Sangh  conventions,  has  written 
for  The  Organiser,  and  was  in  many  ways  sympathetic  to  the 
Sangh's  cause— but  neither,  to  repeat,  turned  to  this  party  as  the 
principal  vehicle  for  opposition  to  the  Congress. 

More  generally,  the  three  Hindus  in  the  inner  circle  do  not 
present  a  united  front.  None,  certainly,  is  a  defender  of  aristocratic 
conservatism  or  of  the  explicit,  hierarchical  conservatism  of  the 
traditional  village.  As  a  trio,  they  cannot  be  classified  as  militant 
nationalists,  because  Rajaji  and  Ranga  balance  Munshi  here. 

104 


The  Swatantra  'Inner  Circle' 

Together,  they  come  closer  to  the  'messiahs  of  backwardness '  with 
their  emphasis  on  spirituality  and  the  village,  but  Ranga  is  quite 
wary  of  the  hierarchical  aspect  of  the  village  (at  least  vis-a-vis  those 
who  are  above  his  caste)  and  Munshi  is  more  concerned  with 
national  institutions,  national  economy,  and  national  strength 
flowing  from  these,  than  is  Rajaji  or  Ranga.  Of  the  three,  however, 
Munshi  finds  the  least  resonance  in  the  party  as  a  whole,  leaving 
the  Rajaji-Ranga  emphasis  on  the  village  as  more  important  in  this 
respect. 

It  is  against  this  backdrop  that  the  significance  of  Masani  and 
Mody  can  be  partly  understood.  As  Parsis,  they  serve  to  balance 
excessive  Hinduism.  As  secularists,  they  help  to  tone  down  exces- 
sive emphasis  on  religious  matters  in  general.  As  westernized 
urbanites  bound  up  with  modern  industry,  they  are  less  village- 
oriented  and  more '  materialistic '  than  their  colleagues.  So,  too,  they 
find  less  that  is  attractive  in  caste  as  a  social  welfare  institution  and 
in  spirituality  as  a  substitute  for  material  progress.  This  contrast  is 
in  some  respects  too  sharply  drawn,  as  we  shall  see  subsequently. 
But  for  the  time  being  we  may  say  that  as  highly  westernized 
and  cosmopolitan  men,  whose  'native'  tongue  is  English,  whose 
dress  is  invariably  western,  whose  style  of  life  is  decidedly  upper- 
class  modern,  whose  tastes  in  food  and  drink  deviate  from  the 
orthodox  Hindu  norm  by  the  widest  margins,  whose  image  of  the 
new  India  draws  heavily  on  the  west,  and  who  would  perforce  be 
disturbed  by  efforts  in  either  a  militant  Hindu  or  village-based 
direction,  Masani  and  Mody  help  to  place  the  centre  of  gravity 
of  the  inner  circle  in  the  more  moderate  part  of  the  political 
spectrum.96  We  shall  say  more  in  a  later  chapter  about  these 
modern  perspectives  in  the  party  and  about  the  tensions  related 
thereto.  For  the  time,  the  most  important  conclusion  is  that  neither 
individually  nor  collectively  could  an  observer  confuse  the  Swatan- 
tra inner  circle  with  that  of  an  aristocratically  based  party  or  with 
those  of  the  RRP,  the  Mahasabha,  or  the  Jan  Sangh.  In  this 
respect,  Swatantra,  through  its  inner  circle,  does  represent  some- 
thing new;  but  to  define  more  precisely  just  what  it  is  and  how  well 
it  might  survive,  further  issues  must  be  raised. 

One  matter  which  is  of  obvious  importance  in  gaining  a  still 
clearer  picture  of  the  inner  circle  and  its  capacity  to  build  a  viable 
party  on  an  essentially  moderate  basis  is  the  political  appeal  and 
political  power  of  these  leaders,  individually  and  collectively.  On 

105 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

this  point,  we  have  already  seen  that  there  was  some  doubt  about 
the  inner  circle  even  among  the  most  highly  placed  Swatantrites, 
and  that  by-and-large  they  were  more  respected  than  popular. 
Beyond  this,  however,  we  must  recognize  that  as  the  Congress 
evolved,  all  of  the  Swatantra  inner  circle  came  to  be  pushed  to  the 
fringes  of  Congress  power,  albeit  in  different  ways  and  for  different 
reasons.  For  convenience,  we  shall  term  this  situation  one  of '  power 

marginality'. 

In  the  case  of  Sir  Homy  Mody,  the  matter  is  entirely  straight- 
forward. He  was  never  a  Congressman  and  was,  for  the  most  part, 
apolitical.  In  fact,  he  served  on  the  Viceroy's  Council  from  1931  to 
1943  and  from  this  vantage  point  he  did  battle  with  a  number  of 
leading  Congressmen— some  of  them  now  his  colleagues,  in 
Swatantra.  In  addition,  he  served  as  Governor  of  UP  after  inde- 
pendence. About  the  most  that  could  be  said  for  Mody  and  the 
political  c mainstream5  is  that  he  resigned  from  the  Viceroy's 
Council  in  1943,  in  protest  against  the  treatment  of  Gandhi,  and 
that  in  1957  he  stood  for  Parliament  but  was  defeated. 

Masani,  although  very  much  involved  in  politics,  could  not  sink 
substantial  roots  in  Indian  political  life,  in  part  because  he  was  an 
extraordinarily  anglicized  Parsi.  His  seat  in  the  Constituent 
Assembly  was  provided  by  Patel  and  in  1957  he  was  returned  to 
Parliament  from  a  tribal  district  in  Bihar,  whence  his  return  was 
facilitated  by  the  Jharkand  Party  leader,  Jaipal  Singh.  There  is, 
moreover,  the  apolitical  dimension  to  his  career,  i.e.  that  of 
ambassador  to  Brazil  and  representative  to  the  UN.97 

Rajaji,  Munshi,  and  Ranga,  as  'political'  Hindus,  were  much 
more  in  the  mainstream  of  nationalist  activity,  but  each  experienced 
more  than  a  little  discomfort.  Rajaji,  as  'the  only  South  Indian 
leader  to  achieve  nation-wide  prominence  as  a  Congress  leader',98 
always  felt  a  bit  remote  from  the  seat  of  national  power  for 
that  very  reason,  and  the  rise  of  non-Brahmin  power  in  Madras 
eventually  undermined  his  local  position  as  well.  In  addition, 
he  seemed  quite  anxious  to  remain  in  office  in  1939.  but  bent 
to  the  Congress  order  to  terminate  his  ministry;  he  resigned 
from  the  Congress  itself,  in  order  to  protest  against  the  'Quit 
India'  resolution  of  1942,  which  he  regarded  as  suicidal  in  the 
face  of  a  possible  Japanese  invasion;  and  he,  too,  moved  into 
apolitical  positions,  including,  first  and  foremost,  that  of  Governor- 
General  of  India. 


106 


The  Swatantra  'Inner  Circle' 

Munshi,  as  we  have  seen,  declined  to  remain  in  the  Congress 
when  Gandhi  *  captured'  it  in  1920,  though  he  did  rejoin  in  the 
1930s.  Moreover,  after  rejoining  the  Congress,  he  endeavoured  to 
revive  the  Swaraj  Party  as  a  constitutionalist  wing  of  the  nationalist 
movement,  and  in  the  1940s  he  withdrew  once  again  from  the 
Congress,  this  time  to  oppose  the  Pakistan  demand."  Throughout 
this  long  period,  he  also  devoted  much  time  to  his  legal,  literary 
and  educational  pursuits;  and  after  holding  for  a  time  the  thank- 
less portfolio  of  agriculture  after  independence,  he,  too,  moved  to 
an  apolitical  position — as  Governor  of  UP.100 

Ranga' s  rather  unstable  political  career  is  in  part  traceable  to  the 
fact  that  he  was  a  Kamma  in  the  Reddy-dominated  Andhra  Congress, 
but  for  whatever  reason,  he  was  recurrently  at  the  fringe  of  the 
Andhra  power  structure.  He  did  achieve  the  position  of  President 
of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Congress,  but  after  narrowly  losing  a  bid 
for  re-election,  in  195 1,  Ranga  and  many  of  his  followers  defected 
to  form  the  Krishikar  Lok  Paksh,  which  contested  the  195 1-2 
elections  with  some  success.101  Communist  successes  in  Andhra  in 
1 95 1-2  led  the  Congress  'high  command'  to  seek  a  rapprochement 
with  Ranga,  and  largely  on  the  condition  that  Ranga  be  permitted 
to  name  the  candidates  for  a  number  of  predominantly  Kamma 
districts,  a  Congress-KLP  united  front  was  formed,  and  Ranga  was 
virtually  back  within  the  fold.  Perhaps  not  very  surprisingly,  Ranga 
did  not  gain  a  position  on  the  APCC  executive  at  this  time,  although 
his  co-operation  was  rewarded  at  a  different  level,  when  he  was 
named  Secretary  of  the  Congress  Parliamentary  party.  It  was  from 
this  position  that  he  resigned  after  the  passage  of  the  Nagpur 
Resolution.102 

Not  too  much  should  be  made  of  these  facts,  but  it  is  fair  to  say 
that  for  a  variety  of  reasons  all  of  those  in  the  Swatantra  inner 
circle  became '  power-marginal '  as  they  personally  and  the  Congress 
developed  over  the  years.  This  is  suggested  by  the  executive 
positions  which  they  have  held.  It  is  this  fact  which  has  given  rise 
to  the  frequently  heard  but  largely  irrelevant  wail  that  they  are 
'frustrated  power-seekers'  and  nothing  more.103  It  is  far  more 
important  here  to  observe  that  they  have  all  had  difficulty  in 
sinking  and/or  sustaining  roots  in  Indian  political  party  life  and  to 
try  to  understand  what  this  in  turn  suggests  about  the  future  of  the 
party.  Could  such  people  be  expected  to  mobilize  a  mass  following 
to  oppose  the  Congress?  Masani  was  concerned  about  the  presence 

107 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

of  Menon  and  Hegde  as  'joint  secretaries'  for  this  reason  and  he 
was  determined  to  'politicize'  the  inner  circle  of  the  party.  But 
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  even  the  new  inner  circle  lacks  a  good 
deal  that  might  be  required  to  build  a  new  party.104 

In  concluding  this  discussion  of  the  Swatantra  inner  circle, 
especially  in  light  of  its  apparent  'power  marginality'  and  present 
lack  of  mass  appeal,  it  is  pertinent  to  point  out  that  at  the  'pre- 
paratory convention'  in  Bombay,  portraits  of  Gandhi,  Patel,  and 
Tilak  were  chosen  to  adorn  the  platform  on  which  Swatantra's 
leaders  appeared.  It  is  possible  to  explain  this  quite  simply. 
Everyone  must  pay  homage  to  Gandhi;  there  is  genuine  regard  for 
Patel  among  Swatantrites,  who  appreciate  his  tough,  law-and-order, 
anti-socialist  approach;  and  it  was  the  time  of  the  birthday  of  Tilak, 
whose  famous  'Swaraj  is  my  birthright'  commends  itself  almost 
universally  in  India.  Furthermore,  all  three  were  local  giants- 
Gandhi  and  Patel  from  Gujarat,  Tilak  from  Maharashtra.  Perhaps 
the  simplest  explanation  is  the  best,  but  one  of  the  organizers  of  the 
convention  acknowledged  that  the  choice  of  Tilak  was,  in  his 
words,  'Machiavellian',  because  of  the  popular  image  his  name 
would  evoke.105  Was  Swatantra,  by  this  choice,  trying  to  link  itself 
more  to  the  mainstream  of  Hindu  nationalism  than  its  own  elite  is 
able  to  do?  Was  Swatantra  attempting  to  modify  its  own  image 
as  a  party  led  by  old,  frustrated,  often  apolitical  people?  The 
admission  about  Tilak  suggests  that  this  might  have  been  the  case, 
and  one  might  want  to  speculate  about  what  this  means  with 
respect  to  the  leaders'  own  self-image.  At  least  for  the  adventure- 
some investigator,  it  would  seem  possible  to  get  some  clues  about 
Swatantra  not  only  from  the  distinguished  living  but  also  from 
some  knowledge  of  the  revered  dead. 


108 


CHAPTER   6 

THE  SWATANTRA  COALITION: 
GROWTH  AND  SCOPE 

The  Swatantra  inner  circle  confronted  a  host  of  pressing  problems, 
as  it  prepared  for  the  1962  general  elections,  a  short  i\  years 
distant.  Organization,  finance,  dissemination  of  propaganda, 
popularization  of  the  electoral  symbol,  and  adjustments  with 
other  parties  were  formidable  tasks,  particularly  in  view  of  the 
party's  stated  aim  of  building  an  effective,  national  opposition  to 
the  Congress. 

The  first  task,  of  course,  was  to  rally  the  potential  faithful,  and 
here  Swatantra  had  a  number  of  alternatives.  It  could  attempt  to 
build  its  own  cadres  and  mass  membership  from '  scratch  \  It  could 
attempt  to  capitalize  on  available  *  vote  banks ',  i.e.  locally  dominant 
caste  groups  and  local  notables.  It  could  attempt  to  absorb  existing 
parties  and  to  pry  loose  some  elements  from  the  Congress,  using 
whatever  formal  and  informal  organizations  these  might  provide. 
Once  it  had  achieved  some  support,  it  could  seek  to  take  maximum 
advantage  of  its  own  strength  by  restricting  its  efforts  on  the  one 
hand  and  by  seeking  to  avoid  undesirable  multi-cornered  con- 
tests on  the  other.  Not  surprisingly,  Swatantra  operated  on  all  these 
fronts. 

In  seeking  to  build  an  effective  opposition  to  the  Congress, 
Swatantra  had  to  decide  whose  support  would  be  welcomed. 
Would  any  and  all  anti-Congress  elements  be  greeted  with  open 
arms,  or  would  Swatantra  be  discriminating  in  admitting  people 
into  its  fold?  The  answer  here  depended  in  part  on  the  leaders' 
sense  of  urgency  in  checking  the  Congress  and  on  their  ability  to 
mobilize  large  numbers  of  people  on  the  basis  of  their  own  party 
programme.  A  feeling  of  intense  urgency,  coupled  with  an  inability 
to  propagate  effectively  Swatantra  doctrine,  would  encourage 
an  'open-door'  policy.  The  reverse  conditions  would  be  more 
favourable  to  a  process  of  selective  admission. 

In  this  chapter,  we  shall  trace  the  growth  of  Swatantra,  particu- 
larly during  the  period  1959-62,  by  indicating  the  existing  parties 
which  merged  with  it,  caste  groups  which  gave  it  support,  and 

109 


I 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

other  groups  and  individuals  who  rallied  to  the  party  banner. 
Their  doctrinal  commitments  will  also  be  discussed.  In  the  follow- 
ing chapter,  the  interaction  of  the  major  components  of  the 
Swatantra  coalition  will  be  considered. 

MERGERS  AND  CASTE  SUPPORT 

Given  the  available,  localized  discontent,  it  was  only  natural  that 
Swatantra  leaders  should  try  to  absorb  many  existing  opposition 
forces,  as  a  short  cut  to  electoral  strength  and  as  a  means  of 
rationalizing  the  opposition  to  the  Congress.  Swatantra  doctrine 
encouraged  the  hesitant,  parochial  forces  by  giving  them  virtual 
carte  blanche  on  all  issues  not  defined  by  the  party  as '  fundamental ' 
to  the  anti-statist  programme.1  Rajaji's  presence,  the  prospect  of 
Bombay  money,  and  a  possibility  of  some  national  prominence 
represented  further  inducements,  doubtless  more  significant. 

At  the  outset  there  was,  however,  a  good  deal  of  doubt  that  the 
parochialism  of  many  of  the  existing  opposition  parties  could  be 
overcome.  One  leading  Indian  journalist  argued  that  a  potent 
challenge  to  the  Congress  was  unlikely,  in  part  because  *  where 
there  are  local  parties,  like  the  Jharkand  Party  of  Bihar,  or  the 
Ganatantra  Parishad  of  Orissa,  they  attach  to  their  local  status  far 
more  importance  than  their  national  loyalties  and  are  desperately 
anxious  to  maintain  a  rigid  local  position  which  prevents  their 
emerging  into  a  national  party  which  may  conceivably  need  to 
compromise  for  Coalition  at  the  Centre5.  He  added,  in  anticipation 
of  the  1962  elections,  that  'because  of  the  failure  of  the  middle 
parties— the  Praja  Socialist,  Swatantra,  and  Jana  Sangh,  and  other 
local  parties,  the  Jharkand,  the  Ganatantra  Parishad,  Ram  Rajya 
Parishad,  the  Tamilnad  Democratic  Party  and  so  on— to  merge, 
the  Congress  Party's  ascendancy  should  not  be  in  question5.2  In- 
deed, Congress  ascendancy  in  1962  was  not  in  question,  and  here 
da  Costa  was  quite  right.  But  Swatantra  did  make  an  almost 
herculean  effort  in  the  direction  of  a  united  opposition  and  achieved 
considerable  success.  It  is  also  fair  to  say  that  most  of  the  blame  for 
the  fragmentation  which  did  persist  cannot  be  laid  at  its  door. 

The  first  merger,  according  to  official  sources,  was  that  of  the 
the  Indian  National  Democratic  Congress  (INDC)  of  Madras,3 
whose  General-Secretary,  S.  S.  Mariswamy,  announced  at  the 
preparatory  convention : 


no 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

I  am  the  General- Secretary  of  that  Indian  Democratic  Party  which  was 
formed  two  years  ago  on  the  eve  of  the  elections  to  fight  mainly  against 
Congress  candidates.  We  contested  46  seats  and  we  managed  to  capture 
23  seats.  Our  party  is  now  functioning  in  the  local  legislature  as  the  major 
official  opposition  party.  When  the  news  came  that  Rajaji  had  started 
this  party,  all  the  members  of  the  party  unanimously  agreed  to  join 
hands  with  the  newly  formed  Swatantra  Party.4 

In  spite  of  this  seemingly  decisive  statement,  some  INDC  leaders 
obviously  did  not  consider  themselves  to  be  Swatantrites  and  there 
was  even  some  question  about  the  actual  extent  of  merger.5  None 
the  less,  the  principal  leaders  of  the  Madras  unit  have  for  the  most 
part  been  former  INDC  men— e.g.  H.  Venkatakrishna  Reddiar, 
the  first  state  President;  Saw  Ganesan,  the  incumbent  President; 
and  Maris wamy,  the  incumbent  General- Secretary — although 
Reddiar,  among  others,  withdrew  from  Swatantra  in  the  early 
stages.6  Thus,  the  leading  opposition  group  in  Madras,  as  of  1959, 
cast  its  lot  with  Swatantra. 

The  centre  of  gravity  of  the  INDC  lay  among  upper  middle 
castes,  such  as  Chettiars,  Mudaliars,  and  Naidus,  whose  position 
in  the  Congress  had  waned  with  the  broadening  of  the  party's 
social  base  under  Kamaraj.  Coupled  with  Rajaji's  appeal  for 
Brahmins,7  whose  political  fortunes  had  dropped  precipitously  as  a 
result  of  lower  caste  pressure  both  inside  and  outside  the  Congress, 
the  presence  of  the  INDC  gave  Swatantra  in  Madras  a  decidedly 
upper-caste  complexion — or,  in  the  words  of  one  hostile  source, 
Swatantra  was  'the  forum  only  of  conservative  Brahmins  and 
profit-minded  baniyas  \8  However,  many  of  the  INDC  men  had 
only  shortly  before  been  in  the  forefront  of  the  effort  to  oust 
Rajaji  as  the  head  of  the  Madras  Congress;  and  this  will  not  be 
the  only  instance  of  former  political  enemies  finding  a  common 
home  in  the  Swatantra  Party. 

This  upper  caste  image  in  Madras  was  in  some  districts  offset 
partially  by  the  later  entry  of  S.  S.  Ramaswamy  Padayachi,  a 
leader  of  the  Tamilnad  Toilers'  Party,  who  announced  his  group's 
desire  to  join  Swatantra  'for  the  purpose  of  achieving  further 
prominence  and  thereby  serving  our  community  better'.9  The 
community  in  question  was  the  Vanniyars,  a  group  of  lower  but  up- 
wardly mobile  castes  of  agriculturalists,  who,  as  a  result  of  their 
inability  to  penetrate  the  Congress  when  Rajaji  was  still  at  its 
helm  (and  even  for  a  time  after),  developed  two  political  parties, 

in 


f 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

the  Tamiinad  Toilers'  and  Commonweal.  The  local  successes  of 
these  two  parties  led  ultimately  to  their  absorption  in  the  Congress 
and  to  the  inclusion  of  Padayachi  and  other  Vanniyars  in  the 
state  ministry  or  other  high  posts.  However,  Padayachi  and  other 
Vanniyar  leaders  still  felt  that  they  had  been  insufficiently  accom- 
modated and  withdrew  from  the  Congress,  although  only  a  segment 
of  them  turned  to  Swatantra,  thus  joining  hands  with  two  erst- 
while adversaries,  Rajaji  and  the  INDC.10 

Wavering  for  a  time  on  the  brink  of  merger  was  the  Forward 
Bloc  of  Madras,  based  on  the  highly  communal  Thevar  group  which 
was  reasonably  strong,  and  in  some  places  dominant,  in  a  few 
districts  in  the  southern  part  of  the  state.  No  merger  occurred, 
although  there  was  close  co-operation  between  the  Forward  Bloc 
and  Swatantra  in  some  districts;  and  the  late  Forward  Bloc  leader, 
U.  M.  Thevar,  did  associate  himself  with  the  Swatantra  group  in 
the  Lok  Sabha.11  All  told,  Swatantra  seemed  to  have  made  a  good 
start  in  the  home  state  of  its  founder-leader. 

Another  existing  party  which  merged  with  Swatantra  at  the 
outset  was  the  Janata  Party  of  Bihar,  at  that  time  the  third  largest 
party  in  the  state.  The  Janata  leader,  the  Raja  of  Ramgarh,  was,  as 
we  have  seen,  a  prominent  zamin Jar-businessman  and  a  Rajput, 
though  not  of  the  highest  status.  An  energetic  and  skilful  political 
organizer,  the  Raja  had  for  a  long  time  entertained  higher  political 
ambitions  than  the  leadership  of  a  small  local  party  and  he  was 
always  looking  for  new  ways  to  carry  on  his  vendetta  against  the 
architect  of  Bihar's  zamindari  abolition  act,  K.  B.  Sahay.12  Unable 
at  the  time  to  pursue  either  goal  effectively  through  the  Congress 
(which  he  was  by  no  means  averse  to  joining  on  the  proper  terms) 
or  through  Janata,  the  Raja  saw  an  opportunity  in  the  Swatantra 
Party.  Thus,  as  a  participant  at  the  preparatory  convention, 
Ramgarh  announced: 

I  represent  the  Janata  Party  at  this  convention.  We  have  in  the  Assembly 
today  23  members. .  .and  in  Parliament  we  have  four  members... 
When  I  received  the  invitation,  we  were  all  very  happy  in  Bihar,  that 
the  day  has  now  come  for  a  unified  opposition,  not  only  in  one  state 
but  throughout  the  country.  I  have  been  sent  here  as  an  observer,  and 
the  views  that  have  been  expressed. .  .have  really  inspired  me.  I  can 
assure  you  that  the  Janata  Party  of  Bihar  will  decide  to  co-operate 
wholeheartedly  with  you  and  we  shall  be  able  to  give  you  a  Swatantra 
Party  Government  in  the  State  of  Bihar.13 

112 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

The  Raja's  promise  of  a  Swatantra  government  in  Bihar  in  1962 
was  far-fetched,  although  he  certainly  pursued  that  goal  with  un- 
common zeal  verging  on  ruthlessness.  This  apart,  the  Janata 
merger  had  the  immediate  effect  of  giving  Swatantra  a  small 
contingent  in  the  Lok  Sabha  (and  in  the  Bihar  assembly),  to  stand 
behind  Masani,  Ranga,  and  a  few  other  MPs  who  had  joined  them.14 
In  addition,  it  brought  into  Swatantra  one  of  the  most  energetic 
political  organizers  in  Bihar,  if  not  in  all  of  India,  in  the  person  of 
Ramgarh,  who  was  almost  immediately  co-opted  to  a  position  as 
national  Vice-President,  with  Munshi. 

Also  merging  from  Bihar,  at  a  later  date,  was  the  Jan  Congress, 
a  group  of  dissident  Congressmen  with  a  tiny  legislative  con- 
tingent, led  by  Jankinandan  Singh,  who  was  a  member  of  the 
Bihar  Legislative  Council  (MLC).  The  latter  was  the  uncle  of 
the  late  Maharajadhiraj  of  Darbhanga,  who  was  the  leader  of  the 
Maithil  Brahmin  community  and  formerly  the  premier  zamindar 
in  Bihar.  Together  with  Ramgarh's  entry,  this  further  reinforced 
the  landed,  aristocratic  complexion  of  Swatantra  in  Bihar  and 
further  bolstered  Swatantra's  hopes  in  the  state,15  although  of  the 
two  groups  Janata  was  by  far  the  more  important. 

Encouraging  on  the  face  of  it,  too,  were  the  decisions  of  two 
veteran  Congressmen,  Paliwal  and  Nagoke,  to  join  Swatantra  in 
UP  and  the  Punjab,  respectively,  and  to  bring  with  them  modest, 
semi-organized  groups  of  supporters.  Paliwal,  who  left  the  Congress 
in  1 95 1,  had  for  fifteen  years  been  either  President  or  General-Sec- 
retary of  the  UP  Congress,  had  sat  in  the  Central  Legislative  Council 
prior  to  independence  and  in  the  state  Cabinet  afterwards.  He  was, 
then,  a  man  who  had  been  a  local  power.  Nagoke,  who  left  the 
Congress  only  after  the  Nagpur  Resolution,  was  one  of  the  most 
senior  Congressmen  in  the  Punjab  and  was,  moreover,  a  former 
leader  of  the  Akali  Sikhs,  a  very  potent  minority  in  that  (now 
bifurcated)  state.  As  a  veteran  leader  who  had  served  very  long 
terms  in  jail  prior  to  independence,  Nagoke  was  widely  esteemed. 

Paliwal,  in  his  own  self-description,  cited  his  long  association 
with  and  admiration  for  Rajaji  and  Ranga  and  his  long-standing 
opposition  to  Nehru  and  the  latter's  brand  of  socialism.  Stressing 
his  ' cent-percent  Gandhism',  Paliwal  pointed  with  pride  and  de- 
light to  the  fact  that  in  the  mid- 1940s  he  was  labelled  by  the  CPI  as 
one  of  the  *  three  evil  Ps'— Patel  and  S.  K.  Patil  being  the  other 
two — among  the  prominent  Congressmen  of  the  day.16 

8  1*3  ESP 


f 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

As  a  result  of  familiar  factional  battles,  involving  the  inevitable 
charges  of  corruption  and  favouritism  against  some  highly  placed 
colleagues,  Paliwal  came  to  be  isolated  from  the  UP  Congress 
leadership;  and  neither  Nehru  nor  Pandit  Pant  seemed  responsive 
to  his  charge  that  a  leading  Cabinet  member  in  UP  had  stolen 
1  many  lakhs'  of  rupees.  In  addition,  Paliwal's  marriage  to  a 
Muslim  lady  brought  forth  a  stream  of  abuse  from  some  of  his 
colleagues,  contributing  to  the  widening  breach.  After  first  leaving 
the  state  Cabinet  and  then  the  party  itself,  Paliwal  sat  in  the 
assembly  and  led  a  group  of  independents  (variously  estimated  at 
between  twenty  and  thirty-five)  in  the  UP  assembly— the  so-called 
' Independent  Progressive  Legislature  Party'— and  he  was  in  the 
process  of  organizing  an  extra-parliamentary  party,  the  Gram 
Raj  (Village  Rule)  Party,  whose  principal  tenets  were  rule  by  rural 
people  and  opposition  to  co-operative  farming.  A  very  staunch 
anti-socialist,  anti-communalist,  and  anti-aristocrat,  Paliwal  de- 
cided to  cast  his  lot,  too,  with  Swatantra,  which,  in  his  view,  repre- 
sented a  combination  of  Gandhism  and  modern  capitalism,  with 
(it  must  be  noted)  too  much  of  the  latter  for  his  liking.17  Thus,  the 
IPLP  and  the  Gram  Raj  Party  were  also  merged  with  Swatantra,18 
and  soon,  thereafter,  Paliwal  was  also  co-opted  to  serve  as  Vice- 
President,  with  Munshi  and  Ramgarh. 

Nagoke,  highly  respected  but  not  a  political  power  in  1959, 
explained  that  his  connection  with  the  Congress  was  not  broken 
4 in  any  light-hearted  manner';  but  the  Nagpur  Resolution  was,  in 
his  view,  a  menace  which  had  to  be  opposed  by  leaving  the 
Congress: '  We  consider  ourselves  morally  bound  to  announce  our 
disapproval  of  this  policy  by  resigning  from  the  Congress,  before 
the  country  is  actually  driven  to  economic  disaster.'19  To  structure 
his  anti-collectivist  protest,  Nagoke  formed  the  Dehati  Janata 
Party  (Rural  Peoples'  Party),  which,  at  the  outset,  was  intended 
to  be  solely  a  vehicle  to  oppose  the  Nagpur  Resolution,  without, 
however,  contesting  elections  itself  or  giving  support  to  any  one 
political  party.20  This  non-partisan  approach  was  quickly  discarded, 
however,  in  part  due  to  pressure  from  Ranga. 

The  Dehati  Janata  Party  received  some  support  from  members 
of  the  Sikh  ruling  family  of  Patiala,  which  gave  it  a  boost  in  that 
area.  It  was  described  by  one  source  as  '  landlord-led  and  anti- 
collectivist  but  fairly  influential',21  and  by  another  as  a  Natural 
extension  into  politics  of  the  forces  of  tradition  in  the  village— the 

114 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

big  zamindar,  his  associates  in  commerce  and  such  of  his  tenants 
as  were  tied  to  him  by  personal  or  caste  loyalties  \22  Thus.,  in  the 
Punjab,  too,  Swatantra  gained  some  support  and  once  again  it  was 
landed  and  conservative  (although  the  term  zamindar  in  the  Punjab 
does  not  have  the  same  connotations  as  it  would  in  Bihar,  for 
example).  Two  Sikhs,  Nagoke  (until  his  death  in  January  1966) 
and  Basant  Singh,  served  as  state  President  and  General- Secretary, 
respectively;  but  it  is  significant  that  both  had  abandoned  open 
association  with  the  Akali  Dal  in  favour  of  less  communal,  eco- 
nomics-oriented channels  of  protest.  For  a  short  time,  until  his 
death,  Nagoke  also  served  as  a  Vice-President  of  the  national 
party.23 

The  most  significant  merger  was  that  of  the  Ganatantra  Pari- 
shad,  which  'unanimously  decided  to  merge  with  the  Swatantra 
Party'  in  mid-November  1961.24  The  actual  merger  did  not  take 
place,  however,  until  after  the  1962  general  elections,  but  the 
Swatantra  Party  contributed  to  the  Parishad's  campaign  treasury 
and  considered  the  latter' s  candidates  as  its  own. 

From  the  time  Swatantra  was  born,  efforts  were  made  to  bring 
the  Parishad  into  the  fold;  and,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Maharaja  of 
Kalahandi  was  among  those  who  had  approached  Rajaji  prior  to 
1959,  concerning  the  possibility  of  forming  a  broader  opposition 
party.25  Ramgarh,  among  others,  negotiated  on  behalf  of  Swatan- 
tra, but  the  early  efforts  proved  unavailing;  and  any  intimation 
that  there  would  be  a  merger  was  usually  met  with  prompt  and 
emphatic  denials  by  Parishad  leaders.  For  a  time,  in  fact,  it  was 
strongly  suggested  that  the  Parishad  would  merge  with  the 
Congress  (which  would  virtually  have  obliterated  the  opposition 
in  Orissa).26 

Until  1 96 1,  there  was  an  obvious  and  understandable  reason  for 
the  failure  of  merger  talks  and  for  the  posture  adopted  by  the 
Parishad:  the  Parishad  was  in  a  coalition  ministry  with  the 
Congress  in  Orissa  and  thus  had  a  share  of  power  in  the  state.  Both 
Parishad  and  Swatantra  leaders  felt  that  from  this  vantage  point  the 
Parishad  could  do  more  to  stabilize  its  position  in  the  highlands 
and  perhaps  to  extend  its  influence  to  the  coastal  regions  (where  it 
was  virtually  impotent)  than  it  could  by  leaving  the  coalition  and 
joining  Swatantra.  It  is  not  surprising,  then,  that  the  Parishad 
leaders  wanted  to  assure  the  Congress  in  the  strongest  possible 
language  that  no  merger  with  Swatantra  was  contemplated.  Swa- 

115  8-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

tantra,  for  its  part,  confined  its  organization  in  Orissa  to  the 
coastal  region;  and  even  when  Kalahandi  said  that  rumours  of  a 
merger  were '  baseless ',  Swatantra  happily  refrained  from  challeng- 
ing the  Parishad  in  any  fashion.27 

The  situation  changed  drastically  when  the  coalition  ministry 
was  terminated  in  1961,  as  a  result  of  Patnaik's  determination  to 
have  the  Congress  dissociate  itself  from  'feudal5  elements  and 
establish  itself  more  securely  as  an  independent  force  in  the  state. 
This  put  the  Parishad  out  of  office  and  forced  it  to  confront  mid- 
term elections,  for  the  state  assembly  only.  It  was  at  this  juncture 
that  serious  negotiations  were  renewed,  bringing  Swatantra  and  the 
Parishad  more  openly  and  more  closely  together. 

In  this  setting  a  variety  of  rumours  was  circulated.  One  was 
that  the  Parishad  'may  seek  the  help  of  the  Swatantra  Party'  in 
the  mid-term  elections,  in  return  for  Parishad  support  for  four 
Swatantra  Lok  Sabha  candidates  in  the  1962  general  elections.28 
What  is  clear  is  that  the  Swatantra  unit  in  Orissa  wanted  to 
contest  the  mid-term  elections  on  a  wide  basis,  leaving  the  high- 
lands to  the  Parishad;  but  the  Swatantra  central  office  refused  to 
countenance  this  and  authorized  only  one  Swatantrite  to  contest.29 
Efforts  to  reach  an  accord  were  unsuccessful  at  this  stage,  even 
though  the  Parishad  felt  at  a  disadvantage  vis-a-vis  the  Congress, 
particularly  in  a  mid-term  election,  where  the  ruling  party  could 
concentrate  all  of  its  efforts  on  this  one  state.30 

The  results  of  the  mid-term  elections  gave  further  impetus  to 
Parishad  leaders  to  seek  closer  co-operation  with  Swatantra. 
Although  the  Parishad  lost  many  seats  by  very  narrow  margins, 
and  although  the  party's  leaders  knew  that  the  Congress  would 
not  be  able  to  concentrate  its  forces  as  fully  in  general  elections, 
they  still  did  not  feel  at  all  confident  about  the  future.  What 
troubled  the  Parishad  the  most  was  Patnaik,  who  was  seemingly 
intransigent  concerning  future  coalitions  (unnecessary  after  the 
mid-term  elections,  in  any  event),  who  was  personally  wealthy,  and 
who,  in  the  words  of  one  Parishad  leader,  controlled  'the  keys  to  a 
vast  treasury'.31  The  future  thus  looked  less  bright  than  the  past, 
not  only  for  the  Parishad  but  also  for  some  of  the  Congress  'old 
guard'  in  Orissa;  and  it  was  at  this  juncture,  as  we  shall  see  below, 
that  Rajaji  referred  to  the  possible  entry  into  Swatantra  of  the 
displaced  Chief  Minister  of  Orissa,  Harekrushna  Mahtab. 

The  renewed  Swatantra-Parishad  talks  'were  satisfactory'  at  all 

116 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

stages,  and  the  decision  to  merge  was  announced  at  the  Parishad 
convention,  which  found  the  principles  of  the  Swatantra  Party 
*  remarkably  similar  to  the  ideals  of  the  Ganatantra  Parishad'.32 
The  main  reason  given  for  the  decision  was  the  need  for  a  united 
opposition  at  the  centre,  to  *  arrest  the  growing  menace  of  the 
Congress  Party'.33  It  is  pertinent  to  point  out,  however,  both  in 
light  of  the  Parishad  statement  and  in  light  of  da  Costa's  remarks 
about  parochialism,  that  many  of  the  Parishad  leaders  had  some 
reservations  about  the  merger.  One  expressed  concern  because 
Swatantra,  in  his  view,  had  a  less  progressive  image  than  did  the 
Parishad,  and  he  was  particularly  distressed  by  the  'free  enter- 
prise' image  which  Swatantra  had  acquired.  On  both  ideological 
and  practical  gounds,  this  man  thought  that  a  bit  more  *  socialism' 
would  help.  Still,  he  said  that  *  a  small  party  cannot  tell  a  big  party 
what  to  do . . .  We  were  not  happy  with  parts  of  the  programme  but 
could  do  nothing.'34  Many  felt  that  they  would  not  be  able  to 
emphasize  local  issues  as  much  as  they  had  done  in  the  past;  and, 
for  example,  Parishad  leaders  pressed  Swatantra,  unsuccessfully, 
to  make  an  explicit  commitment  in  favour  of  redrawing  state 
boundaries  so  that  all  Oriya-speaking  peoples  would  be  under 
Orissa  jurisdiction.35  None  the  less,  most  seemed  to  agree  with 
Kalahandi,  who  said  that  in  the  final  analysis  '  Swatantra  means 
independent,  and  we  are  all  pretty  much  independent '  with  respect 
to  local  issues.36  Thus,  the  second  strongest  party  in  Orissa  and  a 
reasonably  serious  contender  for  power  in  that  state  sought 
refuge  under  the  ' all-India  umbrella  which  Rajaji  supplied', 
hoping,  in  part,  that  more  ample  funds  would  be  available  to  battle 
the  Patnaik-led  Orissa  Congress.37 

Elsewhere,  mergers,  or  alinement  almost  indistinguishable  from 
merger,  also  helped  to  provide  support,  but  of  much  more  modest 
dimensions,  prior  to  the  1962  elections.  Raja  Anand  Chand  of 
Bilaspur,  a  sitting  MP  (Rajya  Sabha)  and  a  relative  of  the  Raja  of 
Ramgarh,  joined  Swatantra  and  brought  with  him  the  Himachal 
Pradesh  Sanyutka  Morcha,  an  anti-Congress  front  which  con- 
trolled a  bloc  of  seats  in  the  Himachal  Pradesh  territorial  council.38 
Ranga  attracted  remnants  of  the  KLP,  a  party  dominated  by 
Kemma  landed  interests  in  the  Andhra  delta;  and  the  Andhra 
Democratic  Party  (a  melange  of  ex-Congressmen,  ex-Justiceites, 
ex-KLPers,  etc.)  split  upon  the  formation  of  Swatantra,  with  some 
joining  the  new  party.  Although  by  1959  there  was  no  Justice 

117 


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The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Party,  a  number  of  landed  ex-Justiceites  from  Andhra  did  join  the 
party;  and  among  them  was  Swatantra's  first  state  President, 
B.  Ramachandra  Reddy,  once  a  CBE,  who  had  been  in  the  Justice 
Party  from  1923  to  1952,  head  of  the  Madras  Legislative  Council 
from  1930  to  1937,  and  a  prime  mover  in  the  AIAF.39 

The  KLP  and  Ranga  personally  had  some  supporters  in 
Rajasthan  and  Gujarat,  and  some  of  these  also  joined  Swatantra. 
In  the  Bharatpur  area  of  Rajasthan,  the  old  KLP  had  some 
influence  among  Jat  peasants  and  had  some  support  from  the 
former  ruling  family  of  the  Jat  state  of  Bharatpur.  In  Gujarat,  there 
were  some  small  local  parties  and  dissident  groups,  including  the 
Saurashtra  khedut  sangh,  which  drew  primarily  on  landed  peasants; 
and  among  these  Gujarat  elements  were  some  locally  influential 
Patidars,  whose  caste  brethren  dominate  the  Gujarat  Congress.40 
From  other  corners  came  assorted  factions,  fractions,  splinter 
groups,  and  the  like;  but  in  no  case  was  the  strength  of  any  one  of 
these  groups  sufficient  to  assure  Swatantra  of  even  a  good,  localized 
electoral  showing. 

Through  the  Ganatantra  Parishad,  Janata,  etc.,  Swatantra 
inherited  existing  political  organizations,  although  in  some 
cases  the  term  ' organization'  is  decidedly  generous.41  The  past 
electoral  performance  of  these  groups  (and,  in  particular,  the 
residual  influence  of  the  aristocracy)  also  augured  well  for  the  new 
party.  Given  the  short  time  in  which  Swatantra  could  go  to  the 
electorate  on  its  own  terms  and  through  a  new,  independently 
created  organization,  such  support  was  indispensable,  if  the  party 
were  to  make  a  good  showing  in  the  1962  elections  and  thereby  to 
encourage  others  to  join. 

Of  great  importance,  too,  in  this  effort  was  the  support  given  to 
Swatantra  by  certain  caste  associations,  some  of  which  did  not  have 
an  explicit  political  party  ' front'.  Here,  however,  distinctions  are 
far  from  neat  and  sharp.  The  Vanniyars  of  Madras  created  two 
parties  to  serve  as  their  political  vehicles,  and  it  is  often  said  that  the 
Janata  Party  was  nothing  more  than  a  vehicle  for  Ramgarh's  caste 
and  business  interests.  But  the  kshatrya  makasabha  in  Rajasthan 
relied  heavily  on  the  RRP,  although  the  RRP  was  not  created  by 
the  mahasabha  or  for  that  purpose.  In  other  cases,  the  connection 
between  a  caste  group  and  a  specific  party  is  even  more  tenuous. 

The  most  conspicuous  and  the  most  important  of  the  caste 
groups  which  turned  to  Swatantra  were  the  Rajput  and,  more 

118 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

generally,  kshatrya  associations  in  northern  India.  At  one  point  or 
another  the  following  groups  all  allegedly  urged  support  for  the 
Swatantra  Party :  the  kshatrya  mahasabha  and  bhooswami  sangh  in 
Madhya  Pradesh;  the  Rajput  Brotherhood  of  Pathankot  and  the 
Zamindara  League  in  the  Punjab;  and  the  Kutch  Rajput  Sabha, 
the  Saurashtra  Girasdars'  Association,  and  the  kshatrya  mahasabha 
in  Gujarat.42  And  at  the  all-India  kshatrya  mahasabha  conference 
in  May  1960,  the  presiding  officer,  the  Maharawal  of  Dungarpur 
(Rajasthan),  encouraged  support  for  the  Swatantra  Party,  which  he 
himself  had  joined;  and  the  conference  as  a  whole  reportedly 
endorsed  his  plea.43  Most  of  these  groups  were  heavily  dominated 
by,  if  not  comprised  exclusively  of  landed  Rajputs,  and  collectively 
they  reinforced  the  aristocratic,  upper-caste,  landed  component 
of  Swatantra  in  the  northern  states.  Here,  however,  Gujarat 
requires  special  note,  because,  in  addition  to  Rajputs  of  high 
status  who  dominated  their  areas  (as  in  Kutch),  there  were  many 
lesser  Rajputs,  often  impoverished  tenants  from  Patidar- dominated 
areas  in  the  central  part  of  the  state.  Moreover,  the  Rajput  leader- 
ship of  the  kshatrya  mahasabha,  especially  Narendrasingh  Mahida, 
had  welcomed  into  the  organization  a  large  number  of  non-Rajputs 
and  accorded  them  kshatrya  status.  The  latter  included  many 
ritually  and  economically  lower  status  elements,  whose  entry — 
often  opposed  by  the  'big'  Rajputs — broadened  the  social  base  of 
the  kshatrya  mahasabha  and,  therefore,  of  Swatantra,  by  bringing 
into  the  party  lower  caste  elements  on  an  essentially  non-derivative 
basis.  In  some  cases,  the  *  little'  Rajputs  and  those  whom  they 
embraced  as  fellow  kshatryas  strongly  favoured  precisely  those 
land  reforms  which  were  opposed  by  the  'big'  Rajputs,  in  Gujarat 
and  elsewhere.44 

In  some  ways,  the  case  of  the  Gujarat  kshatrya  mahasabha 
parallels  that  of  the  Vanniyars.  There  was  much  pressure  for  Con- 
gress tickets,  beneficial  programmes,  etc.,  and  there  was  for  a  time 
a  very  close  association  between  Mahida  (and  the  mahasabha 
generally)  and  the  Congress.  However,  the  Gujarat  Congress  did 
not  satisfactorily  accommodate  the  kshatryas,  whose  numerical 
strength  was  steadily  increasing  through  recruitment.  Frustrated 
by  the  Congress  in  1957  and  after,  they  turned  eventually  to 
Swatantra,  where  they  found  much  greater  opportunity,  on  the 
whole,  to  move  into  leading  positions,  to  secure  tickets,  etc.45  In 
addition,  they  found  in  Swatantra  a  political  vehicle  which  had 

119 


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The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

been  selected  by  other  Rajputs  in  other  states;  and  this  'outside' 
factor,  overlooked  by  those  who  have  analysed  the  Gujarat  ksha- 
tryas,  also  played  a  part  in  drawing  the  Gujarat  group  into  the 
new  party.46 

By  and  large,  Swatantra  did  not  benefit  from  substantial  bloc 
support  in  the  southern  states,  and  neither  the  Swatantra  Newsletter 
nor  Link,  both  of  which  for  different  reasons  dutifully  record  such 
support,  contains  more  than  fleeting  references  to  such  a  phe- 
nomenon. The  southern  units  of  the  party,  particularly  in  Andhra 
and  Mysore,  have  been  built  around  smaller  nuclei  of  landed 
interests,  some  of  whom  had  been  associated  with  local  parties 
and/or  the  AI AF,  and  some  of  whom  were  able  to  '  deliver '  part  of 
the  lower  caste  vote  in  their  areas.47  Disorganized  Brahmin  groups 
also  gave  some  support.  In  Andhra,  however,  a  highly  respected 
harijan  leader  and  a  disciple  of  Ranga's,  G.  Latchanna  (now  state 
President),  chose  to  follow  Ranga  into  Swatantra  rather  than  to 
remain  in  the  Congress,  where  he  was  quite  welcome.  Latchanna's 
following  among  certain  harijan  groups  introduces  a  low  caste 
element  into  the  Andhra  unit,  although  it  is  generally  conceded 
that  the  party's  strength  in  Andhra,  such  as  it  is,  derives  primarily 
from  the  aforementioned  landed  interests.48  It  is  well  to  remember, 
however,  that  not  all  of  Swatantra's  support  is  upper  caste  and  that 
not  all  of  its  lower  caste  support  comes  to  it  on  a  derivative  basis, 
i.e.  through  local  notables. 

SWATANTRA  AND  THE  ARISTOCRATS 

Further  along  the  continuum  ranging  from  organized  parties  to  the 
'common  man'  were  many  eminent  individuals  who  had  some 
local  appeal,  at  least.  For  present  purposes,  these  may  be  cate- 
gorized as  follows:  (i)  aristocrats;  (2)  non-aristocratic  'old 
warriors'  from  the  Congress;  (3)  non-aristocratic,  non-Congress 
old  warriors;  and  (4)  a  broad  and  somewhat  amorphous  group  of 
former  administrators.  We  shall  consider  each  of  these  in  turn  but 
will  start  with  the  aristocrats  for  two  reasons.  First,  because  of  the 
prominence  of  aristocrats  among  the  leaders  of  certain  merged 
parties  and  of  the  major  caste  groups  which  turned  to  Swatantra, 
consideration  of  the  aristocrats  here  follows  logically  from  what 
has  preceded.  Secondly,  because  traditional  loyalties  still  persisted 
over  wide  areas,  the  aristocrats— and  notably  the  major  ex-rulers— 

120 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

were  important  'vote  banks',  indeed  in  many  cases  exceeding  the 
capacity  of  some  of  the  organized  parties  to  help  Swatantra. 

As  the  experiences  in  1951-2  and  1957  showed,  the  aristocrats 
had  abundant  support  in  their  areas,  although  relatively  few  were 
active  and  prominent  politically,  Moreover,  because  of  caste  and 
family  ties,  a  successful  appeal  to  one  ruler  could  set  off  something 
of  a  limited  '  chain  reaction '.  With  this  large  group  of  vote  banks 
available,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Swatantra  looked  hopefully  to  the 
aristocracy,  to  secure  candidates  or  at  least  open  support,  while 
for  the  same  reason,  the  Congress  sought  to  keep  the  aristocrats 
neutral,  at  least.  The  struggle  was  prolonged,  tense,  and  often 
bitter.  The  pitched  battle  was  fought  in  Rajasthan  over  the  great 
houses  of  Jaipur,  Jodhpur,  Udaipur,  Bikaner,  and  one  or  two 
others,  but  there  were  more  than  minor  skirmishes  in  parts  of 
Bihar  (especially  over  Darbhanga),  in  Gujarat  (especially  in  Kutch 
and  Saurashtra),  in  the  Punjab  (particularly  over  Patiala),  and  in 
parts  of  UP,  Madhya  Pradesh,  and  Maharashtra. 

With  few  exceptions— Ramgarh,  the  late  Raja  Raghavendra 
Pratap  Singh  of  Mankapur  (UP),  and  a  handful  of  others— the 
list  of  participants  at  the  preparatory  convention  reveals  few 
aristocratic  names,  and  those  who  did  attend  were  certainly  not 
among  the  most  eminent  ex-rulers  and  ex-landlords.49  Even  the 
states  which  were  the  bastions  of  the  aristocracy  before  indepen- 
dence were  represented  very  largely  by  commoners,  and  there  is  no 
evidence  to  indicate  that  the  actual  participants  were  in  any  way 
agents  for  aristocratic  interests. 

Very  shortly  after  its  inception,  however,  the  aristocrats  started 
to  evince  greater  interest  in  Swatantra,  and  vice  versa,  and  it  was 
not  long  before  a  fairly  steady  trickle  from  this  quarter  flowed 
into  the  party.  To  anticipate  one  of  the  main  points,  however,  the 
outcome  was  disappointing  from  the  Swatantra  standpoint.  Rela- 
tively few  aristocrats  entered  the  party,  and  those  who  did  were 
primarily  of  lesser  status  or  were  relatives  of  leading  families.  Few 
leading  ex-rulers  chose  to  aline  themselves,  at  least  openly,  with 
the  party. 

Of  the  early  entrants  from  this  group,  Ramgarh,  by  virtue  of 
his  position  in  the  Janata  Party,  was  by  far  the  most  important. 
The  Raja  of  Mankapur,  a  smaller  zamindar  and  a  Congressman 
from  1930  to  1955,  had  served  in  the  UP  assembly  continuously 
since  1937  and  brought  much  political  skill  and  experience  as  well  as 

121 


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The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

great  local  influence,  into  the  party.50  Raja  Bhalindra  Singh  and 
Raja  Maheshindra  Singh,  the  younger  brother  and  uncle  of  the 
ex-ruler  of  Patiala,  respectively,  attended  the  preparatory 
convention  and  quickly  joined  the  party,  which  buoyed  Swa- 
tantra's  hopes  around  Patiala.  Raja  Kalyan  Singh  of  Bhinai,  a 
Rajput  jagirdar  who  had  previously  been  associated  with  both  the 
RRP  and  Jan  Sangh  in  Rajasthan,  and  Maharajkumar  Hukam 
Singh  of  Jaisalmer,  also  in  Rajasthan,  both  attended  the  conven- 
tion and  also  joined  the  party  at  an  early  date. 

In  Rajasthan,  Bhinai  and  the  Maharajkumar  of  Jaisalmer  took 
the  lead,  with  the  former  as '  convenor '  of  the  state  unit,  but  joining 
and  superseding  them  very  quickly  were  Maharawal  Laxman 
Singh  of  Dungarpur,  Maharawal  Chandra  Vir  Singh  of  Banswara, 
and  Raja  Man  Singh  of  Bharatpur,  the  brother  of  the  ex-ruler  of 
this  Jat  state.  The  major  Rajput  houses  remained  aloof,  however.51 
In  UP,  Mankapur  was  immediately  joined  by  Raja  Mahendra 
Ripudaman  Singh  of  Bhadawar  and  later  by  Raja  Ram  Singh  of 
Gangwal,  helping  to  give  Swatantra  some  pockets  of  strength  in 
the  northern  part  of  that  state.52  From  Madhya  Pradesh  came 
Rajkumar  Udaisingh  of  Kaluhera  and  a  Brahmin  landholder  named 
N.  C.  Zamindar,  who  over-optimistically  asserted  that  the  party  had 
great  appeal  in  some  of  the  state's  *  feudal  constituencies'.53  Some 
of  these  were  certainly  influential  on  a  local  level  and  some  were 
reasonably  seasoned  politicians.  This  was  to  Swatantra's  good,  but 
for  several  months  the  roster  of  aristocrats  did  not  include  any  of 
the  leading  families,  save  perhaps  the  well-known  house  of  Patiala. 
But  even  Patiala  was  not  represented  by  the  ex-ruler  himself. 

In  this  light,  the  prize  *  catch'  and  a  principal  catalyst  in  the 
entire  struggle  for  the  aristocracy  was  the  beautiful  Maharani 
Gayatri  Devi  of  Jaipur,  whose  entry  into  the  party  was  dutifully 
announced  in  January  1961  by  the  jagirdar  Man  Singh  (Mahar), 
formerly  with  the  RRP.  With  the  Maharani  came  two  of  the  Maha- 
rajkumars  of  Jaipur  (Jai  Singh  and  Prithviraj)  and  a  number  of 
leading  Rajput  jagirdars,  some  of  them  with  more  than  a  little 
trepidation.54  Even  this  development  should  not  be  overestimated. 
The  Maharani  is  not  herself  from  Rajasthan,  and  hence  does  not 
have  the  same  appeal  for  Rajasthan  aristocrats  that  a  native  would 
have.  In  addition,  she  does  not  speak  Hindi  (or  the  local  variant 
thereof)  fluently  and  this  helps  to  mark  her  further  as  an  outsider. 
Finally,  the  Maharaja  of  Jaipur  steadfastly  proclaimed  that  he 


122 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

could  best  serve  '  his '  people  by  remaining  '  above  politics  \  as  an 
independent.55  Yet  a  major  royal  house  had  associated  itself  with 
Swatantra,  and  few  would  believe  that  the  Maharaja  did  not  en- 
dorse his  wife's  activities.  Furthermore,  after  some  Congress 
tirades  against  the  Jaipur  family  during  the  election  campaign,  the 
Maharaja  himself  took  a  more  active  part  in  supporting  anti-Con- 
gress candidates,  although  he  continued  to  remain  an  independent. 

The  impact  of  the  Maharani's  entry  cannot  be  stressed  too 
strongly,  even  considering  the  caveats  just  mentioned.  Her 
political  debut  came  on  the  heels  of  the  Jaipur  '  durbar '  in  honour 
of  Queen  Elizabeth  II,  for  which  former  rulers  and  landed  aristo- 
crats come  from  far  and  wide  to  participate  in  a  massive  display 
of  pomp  and  pageantry.  Many  saw  in  this  event  demonstrable  proof 
that  the  old  aristocracy  was  still  strongly  attached  to  its  old  ways 
and  they  speculated  that  it  presaged  a  resurgence  of  the  great  royal 
families.56  This  would  have  been  less  upsetting  to  the  Congress 
leaders,  both  state  and  national,  were  it  not  for  the  realization  that 
the  aristocrats  still  had  great  appeal  and  were  it  not  for  the  painful 
awareness  that  in  the  1952  elections,  the  Maharaja  of  Jodhpur  led 
an  anti- Congress,  aristocratic  front  (principally  RRP,  Jan  Sangh, 
and  independents)  which  nearly  swept  the  Congress  from  office.57 
The  Maharani's  entry,  then,  conjured  up  the  image  of  another 
aristocratic  assault  on  the  Congress,  and  there  were  few  who  were 
confident  that  the  Congress  in  Rajasthan  could  withstand  such  an 
assault.  As  one  source  aptly  put  it  after  the  Maharani's  decision 
was  announced,  '  the  feudal  snowball  threatens  to  be  turning  into 
an  avalanche'.58 

All  of  this  scarcely  took  the  Congress  by  surprise,  and  there  was 
evidence  of  considerable  anxiety  in  Congress  circles,  in  Rajasthan 
and  elsewhere.  Discussions  were  held  by  Congress  MPs,  by  the 
AICC,  and  other  bodies,  to  consider  a  possible  ban  on  princely 
participation  in  politics  or  else  possible  adjustments  in  the  privy 
purses.  Open  and  private  threats  concerning  the  purses  abounded, 
although  in  Orissa,  where  the  Congress  assemblymen  were  con- 
sidering an  end  to  all  privy  purses,  Morarji  Desai  insisted  that 
such  talk  should  stop  and  that  all  historic  assurances  to  the  princes 
be  honoured.59  According  to  the  Maharani  of  Jaipur,  she  had  been 
asked  to  contest  a  Lok  Sabha  seat  in  1957  on  a  Congress  ticket,  to 
help  fend  off  anti-Congress  activity  by  the  Rajput  aristocracy;  and, 
in  addition,  Rajasthan  Chief  Minister  Sukhadia  had  worked  hard 

123 


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The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

for  many  months  to  dissuade  the  aristocracy,  including  the  Maha- 
rani,  from  opposing  the  Congress.60  Among  the  more  serious 
moves  to  stem  a  possible  anti-Congress  Rajput  tide  was  the  inclu- 
sion in  Sukhadia's  Cabinet  of  Maharaja  Harishchandra  of 
Jhalawar,  a  Rajput  and  the  only  one  in  the  ministry.61  The  serious- 
ness with  which  the  Congress  took  the  Maharani's  subsequent 
decision  to  contest  a  Lok  Sabha  seat  is  suggested  by  the  fact  that 
for  a  time  her  scheduled  Congress  opponent  was  Damodarlal  Vyas, 
the  Revenue  Minister  in  the  state  Cabinet  and  one  of  the  strongest 
candidates  upon  whom  the  Rajasthan  Congress  could  call.62 

Thus,  even  in  i960  the  battle  for  the  aristocracy  was  going  on, 
but  after  the  Maharani's  entry  it  took  on  new  intensity.  On  the 
Swatantra  side  it  was  hoped  that  the  association  of  the  house  of 
Jaipur  with  the  party  would  win  over  other  major  families,  and  the 
latter  were  pursued  with  renewed  vigour.  In  fact,  Dungarpur, 
Swatantra  state  President,  pursued  some  rulers  so  assiduously  that 
other  forms  of '  organizing '  the  party  were  virtually  neglected.63 

Throughout  this  battle,  in  Rajasthan  and  elsewhere,  ties  of 
family  and  caste  played  an  important  part.  Ramgarh  and  Bilaspur 
were  related,  as  we  have  seen;  Dungarpur  was  Bikaner's  father-in- 
law;  the  Maharaja  of  Devgadh-Baria  (a  major  recruit  in  eastern 
Gujarat)  was  the  son-in-law  of  the  Maharaja  of  Jaipur;  and  so  on.64 
In  addition  to  the  attempted  exploitation  of  these  connections, 
Udaisingh  of  Kaluhera  sent  a  written  appeal  to  most  of  the  leading 
aristocrats  in  Madhya  Pradesh  urging  them  to  join  the  party;65 
Dungarpur  joined  Bhailalbhai  Patel  in  efforts  to  mobilize  the 
aristocracy  in  Gujarat;  Dungarpur  and  others  used  kshatrya 
mahasabha  and  Rajput  sabha  platforms  to  encourage  support  for 
Swatantra;  and  V.  P.  Menon  became  as  much  of  a  roving  ambas- 
sador to  the  princes  as  his  poor  health  would  allow. 

The  long  and  tedious  story— of  pulling  and  hauling,  of  entry 
and  defection,  of  the  almost  countless  claims  and  denials  of  entry- 
need  not  detain  us  here,  beyond  a  few  important  cases  and  a  few 
general  points.  In  Bihar,  Maharajadhiraj  Kameshwar  Singh  of 
Darbhanga  was  eagerly  sought  by  Swatantra,  and,  as  an  inde- 
pendent candidate  for  the  Rajya  Sabha,  he  had  been  assured  by 
Ramgarh  of  the  support  of  the  Swatantra  (nee  Janata)  MLAs  in  that 
state.  Some  of  Darbhanga's  friends  and  relatives,  like  Jankinandan 
Singh  of  the  Jan  Congress/ Swatantra  and  Munshi,  pressed  him  to 
join  the  party,  while  others  urged  him  just  as  strongly  to  remain 

124 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

independent  or  to  join  the  Congress.  Swatantra  itself  was  proceed- 
ing with  somewhat  less  than  unilinear  purpose,  for  the  Swatantra 
state  Treasurer — wealthy  businessman  Parmanand  Kejriwal — was 
also  a  candidate  for  the  Rajya  Sabha,  even  though  Darbhanga  had 
been  promised  Swatantra's  support.  Kejriwal  was  finally  prevailed 
upon  to  withdraw,  but  Darbhanga  still  vacillated  and  did  not  join 
Swatantra,  deterred  in  part  by  the  presence  of  Ramgarh  at  the 
helm  of  the  state  unit;  but  he  remained  a  much  sought-after  figure 
until  his  death.66 

The  story  was  much  the  same  elsewhere.  Of  the  leading  pre- 
independence  rulers,  Hyderabad,  Kashmir,  and  Mysore  were 
beyond  reach,  although  some  very  influential  former  members  of 
the  Mysore  maharaja's  service  were  prominent  Swatantrites.67 
Kolhapur,  a  well-known  state  in  Maharashtra,  and  Gwalior,  where 
M.  A.  Sreenivasan  (a  leading  Mysore  Swatantrite)  had  been 
Prime  Minister  and  about  which  Menon  had  said  more  than  a  few 
kind  words,  were  courted  but  remained  aloof.68  The  Maharaja  of 
Bastar  (Madhya  Pradesh),  a  somewhat  'erratic'  man  whose  legal 
adviser,  Rameshwar  Agnibhoj  (an  untouchable)  was  a  Swatantra 
leader  in  the  state,  played  no  active  political  role;69  and  Kaluhera's 
appeal  to  the  Madhya  Pradesh  aristocracy  yielded  very  few 
recruits.  Leaders  of  Swatantra  in  Gujarat  felt  that  the  best  policy 
to  pursue  regarding  the  Maharaja  of  Baroda  was  to  leave  him  alone 
as  a  Congress  candidate,  lest  he  be  forced  to  become  an  active 
campaigner  to  Swatantra's  disadvantage,  although  one  of  the 
Maharaja's  brothers  did  join  Swatantra  at  a  later  date.70 

In  Rajasthan,  the  greatest  stronghold  of  the  Rajput  aristocracy, 
the  Maharaja  of  Jaipur  refused  to  declare  openly  for  Swatantra, 
even  though  others  would  have  joined  if  he  did;  and  in  the  1962 
elections  he  also  supported  some  Jan  Sangh  candidates.  The 
Maharaja  of  Bikaner,  whose  entry  into  Swatantra  was  often  pre- 
dicted and  claimed,  resisted  the  blandishments  of  Dungarpur  and 
remained  an  independent — and  was  rewarded  by  the  Congress, 
which  refrained  from  setting  up  a  candidate  to  oppose  him.71  There 
were  similar  reports  that  the  mother  of  the  late  Jodhpur  Maharaja 
would  contest  as  a  Swatantrite  and  that  she  would  campaign  with 
Gayatri  Devi  and  the  two  Maharanis  of  Banswara,  to  rally  the 
women-folk,  aristocratic  and  otherwise.  She  was  strongly  urged 
'to  complete  the  work  left  half  done'  by  her  late  son;  but  this,  too, 
proved  unavailing,  as  she  contented  herself  with  an  endorsement 

125 


/ 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

of  a  long  list  of  opposition  candidates,  neither  contesting  herself 
nor  campaigning  on  behalf  of  Swatantra.72  Udaipur  and  Kotah 
wanted  nothing  to  do  with  Swatantra  politics,  and  the  Maharaj- 
kumar  of  Jaisalmer  returned  to  the  Congress.73  Strenuous  efforts  in 
Gujarat  netted  only  a  scattering  of  aristocrats  prior  to  the  1962 
elections,  although  in  Masani's  victory  in  the  Rajkot  by-election 
in  1963,  somewhat  greater  support  from  this  quarter  was  evident, 
as  members  of  the  royal  families  of  Rajkot,  Jasdan,  and  Wankaner 
aided  Masani's  campaign  effort.74  Subsequently,  there  has  been 
even  more  open  support  from  Gujarat  aristocrats. 

Swatantra  was  thus  unable  to  recruit  the  major  princes,  and  it 
often  had  to  be  content  with  relatives  of  ex-rulers.  Even  worse,  it 
also  had  to  battle  some  of  these  same  ex-rulers,  who  supported 
the  Congress  candidates  against  their  own  Swatantra  relatives. 
Thus,  Raja  Man  Singh's  brother,  the  former  ruler,  supported  the 
Congress  and  toured  widely  with  the  Congress  candidate  for  a  Lok 
Sabha  seat.75  Raja  Bhalindra  Singh's  brother,  the  former  ruler  of 
Patiala,  refused  to  give  him  open  support,  which  contributed  to 
the  Raja's  decision  to  withdraw  from  a  scheduled  Lok  Sabha  contest, 
in  which  his  successor  was  strongly  opposed  by  the  Maharani  of 
Patiala,  who  openly  supported  the  Congress  and  abused  Swatantra.76 
In  Gujarat,  the  Maharajkumar  of  Kutch  received  no  open  support 
from  his  oldest  brother,  the  former  ruler.  This  is  not  to  say  that 
within  Swatantra  itself  the  aristocracy  is  not  potent.  It  means 
only  that  Swatantra  was  able  to  recruit  a  relatively  small  segment 
of  the  aristocracy,  and  those  who  did  join  were  by  no  means  the 
most  useful  in  electoral  terms. 

All  told,  the  outcome  was  a  disappointment  for  most  Swatantra 
leaders,  for  substantial  aristocratic  support  was  desperately  needed 
if  the  party  were  to  make  a  really  strong  showing  in  the  short  run. 
Admitting  that  some  aristocrats  were  convinced  Congressmen  and 
that  others  had  no  heart  or  talent  for  politics,  most  Swatantra 
leaders  agreed  with  the  Ra)put  jagirdar  who  said,  'in  their  heart  of 
hearts,  all  of  the  princes  are  with  us,  because  they  know  we  will 
protect  their  vested  interests,  but  they  are  afraid  to  join'.77  But  if 
Swatantra  is,  as  Sukhadia  said,  the  'natural  home'  for  the  princes 
and  other  aristocrats,  the  Congress  has  been  notably  reluctant  to 
let  them  repair  to  it  en  masse,  forever  holding  the  privy  purses 
and  compensation  payments,  as  well  as  more  positive  inducements 
over  their  heads.78  It  is  ironical  that  one  of  Swatantra's  principal 


126 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

liaison  men  with  the  princes  was  Menon  and  that  many  Swatantra 
leaders  fondly  remember  Patel  as  a  bulwark  against  socialism, 
because  to  the  policy  engineered  by  Patel  and  Menon  can  be 
attributed  most  of  Swatantra's  difficulties  in  recruiting  the  former 
princes.  Still,  the  problem  goes  beyond  the  threat  of  punishment. 
The  Maharajas  of  Jaipur  and  Patiala  were  offered  and  accepted 
ambassadorships;  and  it  is  difficult  to  conclude  that  partisan 
political  considerations  were  not  involved  here.  Particularly  in  the 
case  of  the  Jaipur  family,  even  a  diminution  of  political  activity 
could  well  be  disastrous  for  Swatantra  in  Rajasthan.79 

In  the  tense  battle  for  princely  support,  there  was  a  moment  of 
comic  relief  when  the  ex-ruler  of  Bastar,  after  being  deprived  of  his 
title  and  privileges,  announced  that '  Minoo  Masani,  the  Swatantra 
Party  leader,  will  be  co-founder  of  the  proposed  chamber  [of 
princes]  with  me  '.  Masani,  in  denying  this  claim,  stated  that  *  there 
can  be  no  place  in  such  a  move  for  us  commoners ' — which  did  not 
prevent  Ranga  and  other  Swatantra  leaders  from  criticizing  the 
government  for  its  alleged  heavy-handed  treatment  of  Bastar.80 

The  influx  of  the  aristocrats,  through  party  mergers  and  indivi- 
dual entry,  has  certainly  been  the  most  important  development 
following  the  consolidation  of  the  inner  circle  of  the  party.81 
India's  ex-princes  and  landed  nobles  either  dominate  or  are  very 
important  in  the  Swatantra  units  in  Bihar,  Orissa,  Rajasthan,  UP, 
the  Punjab,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Gujarat;  and  in  higher  circles, 
first  Ramgarh  and  then  Gayatri  Devi  have  served  as  Vice-Presidents 
of  the  party.  The  Maharani's  remark,  '  I  am  not  a  politician  and 
God  forbid  I  should  ever  become  one3,82  suggests  that  she  is  some- 
thing more  of  a  symbol  than  was  Ramgarh;  but  her  presence 
among  the  top  national  office-bearers  must  come  as  a  happy  re- 
minder to  aristocrats  that  even  in  Swatantra  traditional  rank  seems 
to  have  its  privileges.  But  more  important  than  party  offices  held  is 
the  fact  that  Swatantra's  legislative  strength  is  very  heavily  depen- 
dent on  the  residual  appeal  of  the  aristocrats. 

The  entry  of  the  aristocrats,  who  in  Swatantra  are  very  heavily 
Rajput,  introduced  into  the  leadership  cadres  the  element  of 
aristocratic  conservatism  and  the  often  overweaning  pride  of  this 
kshatrya  group;  and  this  was  true  even  of  the  '  little'  Rajputs  long 
separated  from  dominant  positions.  One  of  the  latter,  fiercely  proud 
of  his  kshatrya  background,  insisted  that  the  government  of  the 
country  be  returned  to  the  *  martial  races',  especially  the  Rajputs. 

127 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

These  alone,  he  said,  could  protect  the  country  against  aggression 
and  maintain  effective  rule  domestically;  and  to  emphasize  his  point 
he  noted  with  obvious  disgust  and  equally  obvious  conviction  that 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Indian  armed  forces  (President 
Radhakrishnan)  could  not  even  ride  a  horse  or  fire  a  rifle.83  A  'big' 
Rajput  from  the  same  state  casually  remarked:  *  I  do  not  believe  in 
democracy,  but  in  autocracy— benevolent,  of  course.'84  In  addi- 
tion the  same  man  wrote  that  'it  is  my  firm  opinion  that  the  only 
persons  who  can  take  over  power  from  the  Congress  Party 
immediately  and  run  the  affairs  of  the  country  successfully  are  the 
princes  of  India.  They  are  not  only  capable  of  ruling  the  country 
well,  but  they  have  the  affection  and  backing  of  the  people.  They 
are  being  well-received  and  trusted  even  in  British  India.'85 
Similarly,  a  Rajput  leader  from  Rajasthan,  who  described  himself 
as '  conservative  socially,  conservative  economically,  and  conserva- 
tive politically',  echoed  the  words  of  almost  every  Swatantra 
aristocrat  when  he  said,  'the  people  now  realize  that  they  were  not 
so  badly  off  when  we  ruled  them'.86  It  was  Ramgarh  who  referred 
to  the  Congress  as  a  'new  class'  of  'demi-gods  and  career  politi- 
cians '  who  exploit  the  ignorant  masses '  for  strengthening  their  own 
class  rule'  and  who  termed  it  'an  upstart  body'  which  'has  not 
built  up  the  traditions  of  authority  and  command  through  time 
with  a  corresponding  attitude  of  obedience  among  the  masses'.87 
A  fitting  last  touch  to  this  monument  to  aristocratic  arrogance  was 
the  passionate  statement  of  the  same  Raja:  'If  I  am  to  function 
as  the  Instrument  of  the  people's  Will,  then  I  must  not  be  fettered 
from  above  or  within ...  If  I  am  not  allowed  to  work  out  our  destiny, 
then  this  is  the  time  someone  else  is  put  in  charge  of  Bihar  affairs 
and  I  am  absolved  of  historic  responsibilities.'88  These  by  no 
means  exhaust  the  available  supply  of  such  statements  by  Swa- 
tantra aristocrats,  but  they  will  serve  as  evidence  that  aristocratic 
sentiment  of  the  type  described  earlier  is  far  from  dead. 

One  should  remember,  however,  that  even  some  of  the  more 
vituperative  aristocrats,  like  Ramgarh,  are  committed  to  modern 
industry  and  are  willing  to  participate  in  the  existing  political 
system,  as  least  as  long  as  there  is  no  plausible  alternative.  More- 
over, we  must  also  remember  that  the  ex-rulers  of  Patna  and 
Kalahandi  took  the  Ganatantra  Parishad  along  a  generally  moder- 
ate path  and  both  proved  to  be  resilient  in  outlook  and  Tory  demo- 
crat in  their  approach.  Kalahandi,  in  addition  to  being  an  effective 

128 


M^i^MI 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

spokesman  for  the  hill  people  of  Orissa  in  the  Lok  Sabha,  acquitted 
himself  well  in  other  respects.  No  friend  of  the  CPI  by  any 
means,  Kalahandi  could  still  say,  upon  the  termination  of  the 
Communist  ministry  in  Kerala: '  I  simply  shudder  to  think  that  an 
Assembly  could  be  dissolved  and  a  Ministry  dismissed,  even 
though  it  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  House.'89  Such  examples 
are  not  sufficient  proof  of  the  acceptance  of  the  new  order,  because 
some  of  the  most  arrogant  and  reactionary  aristocrats  have 
acquitted  themselves  tolerably  well  in  legislative  chambers,  and 
many  will  try  to  score  against  the  Congress,  even  if  it  means  de- 
fending the  CPI.  But  taking  his  public  record  as  a  whole,  Kala- 
handi fares  quite  well.  If  anything,  at  the  state  level,  Patna  fares 
even  better.  Similar  differences  between '  old-style '  and '  new-style ' 
aristocrats  have  been  noted  elsewhere,  as,  for  example,  by  the 
Rudolphs  in  their  comparison  between  Dungarpur  and  Gayatri 
Devi  in  Rajasthan.90  However,  it  is  worth  stressing  another  point 
made  by  the  Rudolphs :  that  in  some  cases,  the  very  act  of  partici- 
pation in  the  democratic  process  has  helped  to  make  this  process 
more  respectable  among  strongly  conservative  segments  of  the 
aristocracy.91 


SWATANTRA  AND  THE  'OLD  WARRIORS5 

The  'old  warriors' — by  which  we  mean  veteran  politicians  with 
some  standing — could  be  useful  to  Swatantra  as  vote  banks  also, 
if  they  retained  some  support  on  a  caste  or  factional  basis.  This  was, 
of  course,  particularly  true  of  Congress  old  warriors,  because  of 
their  association  with  the  nationalist  movement  and/or  with  the 
party  which  had  had  overwhelming  control  of  India's  political 
life  since  independence. 

As  ex-Congressmen  themselves,  some  of  the  leading  Swatan- 
trites  understandably  hoped  that  former  colleagues  would  join 
them  in  their  new  political  venture.  As  interview  and  questionnaire 
data  bear  out,  the  ex-Congress  Swatantra  leaders  were  convinced 
that  the  vast  majority  of  old  Congressmen  were  ideologically  at 
one  with  them,92  and  they  were  particularly  anxious  to  recruit 
certain  of  the  old  warriors  of  the  generation  of  Rajaji,  Munshi, 
et  al.;  and  it  was  in  large  part  because  of  Munshi's  presumed 
appeal  to  such  groups  in  north  India  that  so  much  pressure  was 
put  upon  him  to  join  the  party.93  On  the  other  hand,  the  Swatantra 

9  I29  ESP 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

leaders  knew  that  they  had  to  be  wary  of  carreerists  and  oppor- 
tunists, who  might  seek  (temporary)  refuge  in  Swatantra  because 
they  had  been  denied  a  Congress  ticket,  etc.,  and  who  would  be 
likely  to  rejoin  the  Congress  under  more  favourable  circumstances. 
At  the  outset,  Rajaji  seemed  to  draw  no  distinction  among 
Congressmen.  All,  in  his  view,  had  been  corrupted  by  the  lure  of 
power  and  pelf.  As  he  put  it  on  one  occasion:  'I  do  not  want  to 
attract  Congress  members  into  this— God  forbid.  Let  them  be  in 
the  Congress  and  let  them  carry  on,  and  maybe,  they  will  improve 
also  by  competition.'94  At  least  on  the  verbal  level,  Rajaji  was  con- 
tent simply  to  encourage  Congressmen  to  do  some  soul-searching 
and  to  rethink  their  positions. 

None  the  less,  many  of  those  who  quickly  joined  Swatantra  were 
Congressmen  and  of  the  careerist  type;  and  in  almost  every  area 
there  was  a  scattering  of  such  poeple  who  tried  to  move  into  leading 
party  positions.  Many  early  organizational  problems  in  Madras, 
Rajasthan,  and  Delhi,  for  example,  are  traceable  to  this  influx, 
which  generally  resulted  in  the  self-declared  leadership  of  these 
ex-Congressmen  and  in  conflict  between  them  and  long-standing 
anti-Congress  elements  which  had  also  been  attracted  to  Swatantra. 
Little  was  done  by  Swatantra  leaders  to  keep  such  opportunist 
elements  out  of  the  party,  but  by  the  same  token  they  were  not 
always  given  full  tether  to  do  as  they  pleased.  Some  departed 
voluntarily  after  failing  to  make  much  headway,  after  being 
superseded  by  other  entrants  into  the  party,  or  after  realizing  that 
the  Swatantra  treasury  was  not  a  bottomless  pit  which  could  satisfy 
all  of  their  desires.  Others  (including  some  INDC  leaders)  were 
pressured  into  leaving.  One  member  of  the  Swatantra  inner  circle 
tells  the  story  of  a  party  meeting  at  which  Rajaji  heard  an  ex- 
Congress  Swatantrite  promise  a  Swatantra  ministry  in  his  state  in 
the  near  future.  Rajaji's  mumbled  reply,  according  to  this  source, 
was  a  terse  'God  save  us  from  that'.95  This  neatly  captures  the 
essential  flavour  of  the  issue:  Swatantra  was  not  about  to  turn 
recruits  away  from  the  door,  but  many  leaders  were  far  from  ecstatic 
about  some  of  the  early  entrants  into  the  party.96 

Some  Congressmen  were,  however,  persona  grata, viz.  the  old 
warriors  who  stood  shoulder-to-shoulder  with  Rajaji  during  the 
nationalist  struggle.  Paliwal  was,  of  course,  such  an  old  warrior, 
but  he  had  left  the  Congress  in  1951;  and  Rajaji  was  anxious  to 
recruit  those  who  still  remained,  such  as  Mahtab  in  Orissa, 

130 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

Hanumanthaya  in  Mysore,  Jai  Narain  Vyas  (now  deceased)  in 
Rajasthan,  among  many  more.  Thus,  after  Mahtab's  fortunes 
declined  in  Orissa  (after  the  termination  of  the  Congress-Parishad 
ministry),  Rajaji  commented  on  a  press  report  that  Mahtab  would 
join  Swatantra  by  saying: 

Not  only  Dr  Mahatab  but  all  the  old  warriors  of  the  Congress  who  do 
not  approve  of  and  are  not  happy  with  the  permit-quota-license  raj  that 
goes  by  the  name  of  socialism,  are  to  join  hands  with  me. . .  I  know  that 
some  senior  politicians  hope  to  improve  the  Congress  from  within,  but 
I  am  trying  to  make  them  see  that  this  is  no  longer  possible  and  that  they 
will  thereby  become  instruments  for  the  continuance  of  the  present 
Congress  policy.97 

An  elite  comprised  of  such  people  would  have  been  much  more 
congenial  to  Rajaji  and  much  more  homogeneous  than  the  one 
which  actually  developed.  But  Mahtab  did  not  join,  nor  did  most 
of  the  others  whom  Rajaji  had  in  mind,  even  though  many  of  them 
repeatedly  made  public  pronouncements  of  which  any  Swatantrite 
might  have  been  proud.98 

Failure  was  not  total,  however.  In  addition  to  old  warriors 
already  mentioned  in  other  connections,  Swatantra  was  able  to 
attract  a  few  Congressmen  whose  names  would  mean  something, 
locally,  if  not  nationally.  Dahyabhai  Patel,  son  of  the  Sardar, 
once  mayor  of  Bombay  and  President  of  the  Bombay  Congress, 
and  a  man  who  described  himself  as  ' fairly  orthodox',  'non- 
westernized',  and  a  supporter  of  modern  private  enterprise,  was 
among  these,  and  his  has  been  a  dominant  voice  in  the  Swatantra 
Rajya  Sabha  contingent,  of  which  he  is  the  leader.99  Harihar  Das, 
son  of  a  former  Congress  Chief  Minister,  joined  the  party  in 
Orissa  and  sought  to  organize  it  in  the  coastal  regions ;  and  Maganlal 
Joshi,  a  veteran  member  of  the  States'  Peoples'  organization  in 
Jamnagar  (Gujarat)  and  then  the  Congress,  speaker  of  the 
Saurashtra  assembly,  an  arya  samajist  and  retired  advocate,  joined 
Swatantra  at  its  inception,  because  of  'its  Gandhian  outlook'.100 

A  major  entrant  into  Swatantra  was  Bhailalbhai  Patel  ('Bhai- 
kaka'),  a  highly  respected  Gujarati  who  escapes  easy  classification 
here.  An  engineer  by  profession,  with  a  distinguished  career  behind 
and  ahead  of  him,  Bhaikaka  responded  to  Sardar  Patel's  call  to 
engage  in  Gandhian  'constructive  work'  and  abandoned  his 
career  in  1942.  Since  that  time,  his  abundant  energies  have  been 


131 


9-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

occupied  on  many  fronts,  but  mostly  in  education  and  'rural 
uplift'.  However,  rather  than  idealizing  village  India  and  insisting 
on  maintaining  (or  restoring)  its  pristine  purity,  Bhaikaka  has 
instead  worked  for  a  different  solution:  to  bring  modern  tech- 
niques, modern  education,  and  modern  amenities  to  rural  India, 
i.e.  the  direction  in  which  Rajaji  is  now  tending.  A  major,  modern, 
residential  college  in  a  rural  setting  and  a  wide  range  of  modern, 
highly  efficient  small-scale  industries  are  among  the  accomplish- 
ments which  have  earned  him  the  respect  and  admiration  of  the 
people  of  central  Gujarat,  and  elsewhere.  He  is,  then,  no  techno- 
logical primitivist,  no  obscurantist,  but  a  man  who  wants  swift 
attention  to  the  desperate  problems  of  rural  India;  and  his  entry 
into  politics,  at  the  age  of  sixty-plus  (via  the  Lok  Paksh,  in 
1952),  flowed  largely  from  his  desire  to  redirect  what  seemed  to 
him  a  lethargic,  inept,  and  urban-oriented  government,  along  these 
lines.  Although  he  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  Congress  old  warrior 
(as  this  term  is  used  here)  and  although  he  had  no  political  follow- 
ing in  the  strictest  sense,  his  appeal  and  his  energy  have  played  a 
major  part  in  building  Swatantra  in  Gujarat,  where  he  is  state 
President.101 

Among  the  non-Congress  'old  warriors'  there  were  also  some 

very  distinguished  men.  One  of  the  most  outstanding  of  these 

was  Chatterjee,  the  former  President  of  the  Hindu  Mahasabha, 

whose  role  in  right-wing  unity  talks  has  already  been  cited.  Despite 

his  connection  with  the  Mahasabha,  Chatterjee  has  been  described 

by  a  most  unlikely  source  of  favourable  comment  as  conly  a  causal 

politician '  but  a '  brilliant  lawyer '  and  one  of  the '  ablest  opposition 

members'  in  the  1952-7  Lok  Sabha.  A  man  whose  'objectivity' 

'  was  acknowledged  even  by  the  CPI,  Chatterjee  was  regularly 

courted  by  the  CPI  as  well  as  by  the  Jan  Sangh,  because,  as  a 

1  minimum,  everyone  respected  his  legal  acumen  and  parliamentary 

1  skill  and  diligence.102  Upon  his  entry  into  Swatantra  he  was 

designated  as  President  of  the  West  Bengal  unit. 

Less  well  known  than  Chatterjee  but  also  highly  regarded  was 
Professor  M.  Ruthnaswamy,  one  of  the  'founding  fathers'  of 
Swatantra.  A  veteran  politican,  Ruthnaswamy  had  combined  a 
career  as  professor  of  political  science,  Vice-Chancellor  of 
Annamalai  University  (Madras),  and  extensive  work  as  one  of 
India's  most  prominent  lay  Catholics,  with  his  involvement  in  the 
Justice  Party  in  the  old  Madras  presidency.  After  the  effective 

132 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

demise  of  this  party,  Ruthnaswamy  remained  aloof  from  organized 
politics  until  Swatantra  was  established,  although  for  four  years 
he  published  a  paper  called  The  Democrat,  which,  he  said,  expressed 
Swatantra-type  principles.  Ruthnaswamy  contemplated  starting 
an  opposition  party  as  early  as  1951  but  did  not  consider  himself 
sufficiently  notable  or  wealthy  to  take  the  lead  personally.103  With 
Dahyabhai  Patel,  he  has  been  one  of  Swatantra' s  ablest  spokesmen 
in  the  Rajya  Sabha,  and  after  the  resignation  of  Paliwal,  Ruth- 
naswamy was  named  as  a  Vice-President  of  the  party.  As  a  Catholic 
and  one  who  had  a  long-interrupted  political  career,  Ruthnaswamy 
was  a  less  significant  recruit  than  Chatter jee,  although  he  was 
certainly  respected  locally  and  among  Indian  Catholics  generally. 

Still  another  prominent  non-Congressman  who  joined  Swatantra 
at  the  outset  was  J.  Mohammed  Imam  from  Mysore.  Imam  was  a 
member  of  the  Mysore  legislature  in  princely  state  days  since  1930 
and  was  a  member  of  the  Muslim  League  until  1947.  He  joined 
J.  B.  Kripalani's  Kisan  Mazdoor  Praja  Party  (KMPP)  but  was 
alienated  when  this  Party  joined  with  other  socialist  groups  to 
form  the  Praja  Socialist  Party  (PSP).  After  independence  he  was 
the  leader  of  the  opposition  in  the  Mysore  assembly  from  1952  to 
1957  an(^  sat  m  tne  Lok  Sabha  from  1957  t0  1962,  joining  Swa- 
tantra in  1959.  A  very  staunch  secularist  and  anti-communist, 
Imam  felt  very  strongly  the  need  to  consolidate  the  opposition 
forces  in  India  and,  more  generally,  to  reduce  the  number  of 
parties  overall,  with  the  ultimate  objective  of  establishing  an 
approximation  of  a  two-party  system  in  the  country.104  One  could 
cite  other  recruits  of  comparable  stature,  but  these  three- 
Chatter  jee,  Ruthnaswamy,  and  Imam— will  suggest  the  potency 
of  Swatantra's  appeal.  And  it  is  not  to  be  overlooked  that  these 
three  men  were  of  three  different  religions  and  from  three  different 
political  parties,  yet  all  were  willing  to  cast  their  lot  with  Swatantra. 

On  another  front,  Swatantra  leaders  turned  for  a  time  to  some 
leading  independents  in  the  Lok  Sabha,  first  to  bolster  the  small 
contingent  of  converts  in  the  1957-62  Lok  Sabha  and  then  to  pro- 
vide some  possible  leadership  in  the  absence  of  Masani  and  Ranga, 
who  were  defeated  in  the  1962  general  elections.  The  most  pro- 
minently mentioned  in  this  category  were  Prakash  Vir  Shastri 
(UP)  and  M.  S.  Aney  (Maharashtra).  The  former,  a  leading 
independent,  a  very  vocal  and  competent  MP,  an  arya  samajist 
and  a  leading  exponent  of  Hindi  as  the  national  language,  would 

133 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

certainly  have  been  a  significant  addition  to  the  Swatantra  Lok 
Sabha  group.  Aney,  a  former  Congressman  and  Governor  of 
Bihar,  has  been  a  spokesman  for  the  sanatanist  elements,  the  most 
orthodox  segment  of  Hindu  society,  and  he  has  stressed  the  need 
for  a  simple,  spiritual  life,  for  Hindi  as  the  national  language,  and 
for  a  renaissance  of  Sanskrit  as  an  indispensable  aspect  of  India's 
regeneration.105  Shastri  would  have  reinforced  somewhat  the 
more  militant  strand  in  Swatantra,  Aney  would  have  pulled  more 
strongly  toward  the  conservatism  of  the  RRP,  and  both  in  this 
sense  would  have  run  counter  to  the  broadly  moderate  character 
of  the  Swatantra  inner  circle.  The  fact  that  efforts  were  made  to 
recruit  them  suggests  that  some  leaders  were  not  overly  concerned 
about  this  point,  but,  in  any  event,  Swatantra  did  not  have  to 
confront  the  issue:  neither  Shastri  nor  Aney  nor  any  other  in- 
dependent of  stature  in  the  Lok  Sabha  joined  the  party,  although 
according  to  certain  Swatantra  records,  Aney  had  actually  com- 
mitted himself,  but  subsequently  reneged.106 

SWATANTRA  AND  THE  ADMINISTRATIVE- 
PROFESSIONAL  GROUP 

i  In  addition  to  the  groups  and  individuals  just  discussed,  a  number 

,  of  distinguished  professionals   and  former  administrators   also 

joined  the  Swatantra  Party.  Their  utility  as  vote  banks  was  obviously 

quite  limited,  but  it  was  not  in  every  case  non-existent.  Their 

importance,  however,  lay  primarily  in  other  areas. 

The  presence  of  V.  P.  Menon  among  the  founding  fathers 

provides   a  useful  starting-point.   Menon  entered  government 

I  service  in  1 9 1 4  and  in  1 942  (the  year  of  the '  quit  India '  movement) 

he  rose  to  the  position  of  constitutional  adviser  to  the  Viceroy— a 

•  most  prestigious  post,  indeed.  After  serving  as  Patel's  principal 

\  lieutenant  in  the  integration  of  the  princely  states,  he  became  for  a 

short  time  acting  governor  of  Orissa,  before  withdrawing  from 

active  public  life.  He  was,  thus,  another  older,  distinguished  man, 

without  any  roots  whatever  in  mass  politics;  and  in  this  sense  he 

reinforced  some  of  the  tendencies  we  have  already  noted  in  the 

Swatantra  inner  circle.  After  his  quickly  aborted  role  as  Joint 

Secretary  of  Swatantra,  Menon  held  no  major  party  office,  but  he 

was  involved  in  high-level  national  deliberations  and  in  Mysore 

state  affairs.  In  addition,  he  played  a  major  role  in  liaison  work 

134 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

among  India's  ex-rulers.  For  much  of  this  period,  however,  Menon 
was  extremely  ill  and  virtually  immobilized;  and  in  January  1966 
he  died. 

Menon,  however,  also  serves  as  a  symbol  of  the  attraction  which 
Swatantra  has  had  for  the  older  generation  of  civil  servants, 
judges,  educators,  etc.  For  many  of  them,  the  entry  into  Swatantra 
represented  the  first  venture  into  partisan  politics;  and  the  fact 
that  they,  in  a  sense,  waited  for  Swatantra  for  their  political 
baptism  must  not  be  overlooked. 

Here,  too,  even  a  partial  list  indicates  the  stature  of  some  of 
these  recruits  and  their  role  in  party  affairs.  One  of  Swatantra's 
principal  spokesmen  on  economic  affairs  and  general  administra- 
tion, and  a  Vice-President  of  the  Mysore  unit,  is  J.  M.  Lobo 
Prabhu,  a  Christian  and  former  ICS  officer  of  the  highest  rank; 
and  Lobo  Prabhu  noted  with  satisfaction  that  when  he  served  under 
Rajaji,  the  latter  did  not  'meddle'  in  the  administration  as  does  the 
more  recent  group  of  politicians.107  Also  prominent  in  the  Mysore 
unit  are  K.  H.  Srinivasan,  former  director  of  agriculture  in  Mysore 
state,  and  M.  A.  Sreenivasan,  civil  servant  in  a  number  of  princely 
states,  Prime  Minister  of  Gwalior  state,  director  of  the  state-owned 
Kolar  gold  fields  (after  independence),  and  a  businessman  with 
wide-ranging  and  formidable  interests.  With  Menon  and  Jinraj 
Hegde  (AIAF,  lawyer),  Lobo  Prabhu,  Srinivasan,  and  Sreenivasan 
combined  to  give  the  Mysore  unit  leadership  an  almost  awesome 
aura  of  administrative  experience  and  professionalism,  to  an 
extent  not  duplicated  by  Swatantra  in  any  other  state.108 

Elsewhere,  other  individuals  of  comparable  background  gave 
Swatantra  much  help;  and  even  where  they  did  not  hold  party 
office,  they  played  a  role  in  the  party's  propaganda  efforts,  or  as 
candidates,  etc.  As  we  have  already  noted,  B.  L.  Singh,  who 
headed  the  AIAF  at  the  time  Swatantra  was  founded,  was  a 
professional  agricultural  economist  and  an  adviser  to  the  national 
Planning  Commission.  In  addition,  T.  Krishnamma,  a  retired 
sessions  judge,  has  served  as  General- Secretary  of  the  Andhra  unit; 
Col.  H.  R.  Pasricha,  a  former  army  doctor  and  now  a  practising 
surgeon  in  Delhi,  once  was  President  of  the  Swatantra  unit  in 
that  city;  V.  Narahari  Rao,  a  retired  Comptroller  and  Auditor 
General  of  India,  contributed  frequently  to  Swarajya;  Narayan 
Dandekar,  another  former  ICS  officer  and  now  a  businessman  and 
a  partner  in  a  firm  of  chartered  accountants,  has  headed  the  party 

135 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

in  Bombay  and  Maharashtra  and  is  now  national  Joint  Secretary 
and  a  most  articulate  MP;  R.  V.  Murthy  of  the  Eastern  Economist 
has  served  as  Joint  Secretary  of  the  Bombay  city  unit;  and  Lt.  Gen. 
Thakur  Nathu  Singh  of  Gumanpura,  a  retired  Sandhurst- trained 
Rajput  general,  has  been  sporadically  active  in  the  Rajasthan  unit.109 
More  recently  (1966)  two  exceedingly  prominent  ex-ICS  men 
joined  Swatantra  in  Gujarat  and  were  designated  to  stand  as  Lok 
Sabha  candidates  in  the  1967  general  elections.  One  was  C.  C. 
Desai,  who  at  one  stage  was  the  Indian  high  commissioner  in 
Pakistan.  The  other  was  H.  M.  Patel,  who  had  held  the  highest 
administrative  posts  in  the  finance  and  defence  ministries  and  who, 
after  his  premature  retirement  in  the  wake  of  the  Mundhra 
scandal,  served  as  chairman  of  the  Gujarat  electricity  board  and  was 
associated  with  Bhailalbhai  Patel  in  his  various  activities.110  This 
does  not  exhaust  the  list,  and  it  excludes  in  particular  a  number  of 
prominent  businessmen  who  have  joined  the  party,  and  others, 
like  Professor  B.  R.  Shenoy,  probably  India's  leading  free  enter- 
prise economist,  who  have  given  aid  at  key  junctures,  though  they 
are  not  officially  party  members.111  In  almost  every  state  in  which 
it  has  sought  to  organize  (and  in  some  where  it  has  made  only 
a  very  feeble  effort)  Swatantra  has  managed  to  attract  at  least  a 
small  group  of  such  distinguished  professional  men. 

The  former  civil  servants  and  some  of  the  other  British-trained 
professionals  brought  a  uniform  outlook  into  the  party  only  in  a 
very  general  sense.  The  tie  that  binds  is  a  marked  feeling  that 
since  independence  the  'politicians'  have  let  the  country  down, 
that  there  has  been  a  too  rapid  expansion  of  political — as  opposed 
to  'expert',  'impartial',  or  '  enlightened  '—decision-making,  that 
there  has  been  a  too  rapid  democratization  of  political  life  generally 
and  that  there  has  been  excessive  political  interference  in  all 
I  spheres.112  This  has  led,  in  their  view,  to  sordid  political  manoeuvr- 

*  ings,  corruption,  a  disregard  for  law  and  order,  and  appalling 

decline  in  administrative  efficiency  and  esprit  de  corps,  and  a 
precipitous  deterioration  of  educational  standards— all  quite  apart 
from  the  government's  'socialist'  tendencies.113  This  group  dis- 
plays, in  short,  an  elitist  and  administrative  approach  to  public 
affairs,  a  more  'Platonic'  view,  if  you  will;  and  it  displays  great 
distress  at  what  appear  to  be  inevitable  concomitants  of  the  shift 
from  the  'detached'  and  'expert'  rule  of  administrators  and  of  the 
educated  in  general  to  mass  politics  and  the  ascendancy  of  the 

136 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

politicians.  In  so  far  as  politicians  are  mentioned  with  any  appro val, 
they  are  of  the  tougher,  law-and-order  type,  including  Patel, 
Rajaji,  and  Munshi.114  In  Rajaji's  case,  at  least,  the  admiration  was 
reciprocated:  in  the  mid-1950s,  he  was  calling  for  a  'professional 
authority'  of  senior  civil  servants  to  oversee  public  affairs,  in  order 
that  'the  administrative  services  should  be  saved  from  the  pres- 
sures of  state  politics ',  which  in  his  view  were  verging  on  anarchy.115 

An  important  aspect  of  this  administrative  mentality  is  grave 
suspicion  about  universal  suffrage,  at  least  under  present  Indian 
conditions.  Few  advertise  this  publicly,  of  course,  although  some 
have  indeed  done  so.  Many  more  admit  it  in  private.  One  of  the 
prominent  Swatantra  professionals  from  Mysore  insisted  that  'the 
voting  right  should  be  conceded  only  to  those  who  have  a  minimum 
educational  qualification5,  and  he  added  that  simple  literacy  was 
insufficient.116  Another  Mysore  professional  stated  flatly,  'if  this 
is  democracy,  we  would  have  been  better  off  under  the  British  and 
the  princes'.117  Lobo  Prabhu  has  commented  that  'it  is  one  of  the 
consequences  of  democracy  that  enthusiasts  are  preferred  to 
experts  in  the  administration',  and  Phiroze  Shroff,  a  frequent 
contributor  to  Szvarajya,  has  insisted  that  'in  our  country. .  .the 
overwhelming  mass  of  the  people  are  not  equipped  to  exercise  the 
franchise'.118  He  added,  as  other  Swatantrites  have,  that  'adult 
franchise,  which  is  supposed  to  be  a  boon  for  the  people,  actually 
works  to  their  great  disadvantage',  largely  because  they  are 
'  deceived  and  misguided  by  professional  agitators '  and  are  them- 
selves too  stupid  to  realize  the  cause  of  their  misery.119 

This  view  is,  of  course,  shared  by  many  non-administrators  in 
Swatantra.  Ramgarh's  views  on  the  subject  have  already  been 
noted,  and  like  him,  Dungarpur  accused  the  Congress  of  seducing 
'his'  people  by  making  unfulfillable  promises  which  he  would  not 
make,  because  he  was  'above  misleading  them'.120  A.  D.  Shroff 
betrayed  the  same  sentiments  when  he  commented  in  derogatory 
fashion  that  Nehru  and  the  Congress  had  been  put  in  office  by  an 
illiterate  electorate;  and  Nehru,  among  others,  was  not  long  in 
spelling  out  the  more  ominous  implications  of  such  views.121  Even 
Rajaji  himself  recurrently  refers  to  the  extreme  'gullibility'  of  the 
people,  although  he  is  very  careful  to  disclaim  all  anti-democratic 
implications  of  such  remarks.122 

A  'thinking  man's'  bias  runs  through  all  of  these  remarks,  link- 
ing many  of  the  disparate  groups  which  comprise  Swatantra.  It 

137 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

should  be  clear,  but  must  be  underscored,  that  in  general  this 
view  goes  beyond  the  charge  that  the  masses  cannot  govern  them- 
selves. Most  of  these  remarks  indicate  that  the  people  are  not 
even  capable  of  supporting  a  sound  elite  in  office,  and  they  indicate, 
too,  that  the  argument  about  the  people  knowing  *  where  the  shoe 
pinches'  is  probably  not  apt  either.123 

Vestiges  and  undercurrents  of  a  more  strictly  conservative  out- 
look intrude  into  the  broad  administrative-professional  position. 
Suspicion  about  universal  suffrage  may  flow  from  experiences  under 
the  British,  but  it  may  also  flow  from,  or  be  reinforced  by  upper 
caste  fears  about  lower  caste  assertiveness.  Pertinent  here  is 
Menon's  contention  that  hereditary  village  officers  in  Mysore  should 
be  retained,  because  'the  efficiency  of  the  hereditary  cadre  can 
never  be  equalled  by  men  recruited  on  miserable  salaries  from 
other  families'.124  Similarly,  the  Mysore  unit  of  the  Swatantra 
Party,  heavily  influenced  by  Menon,  Lobo  Prabhu,  Hegde,  M.  A. 
Sreenivasan,  and  other  administrative-professional  men,  opposed 
the  transferral  of  local  government  functions  from  hereditary 
officers  to  those  elected  under  the  system  ofpanchayati  raj.125  This 
was  in  part  due  to  the  fear  that  the  Congress  would  control  these 
elective  bodies  and  reinforce  its  'statist'  tendencies,  but  it  is  clear 
from  Menon's  contention  that  other  factors  were  involved  here  as 
well.  In  analogous  fashion,  Sreenivasan  has  used  the  plea  of 
'efficiency'  to  censure  the  government  for  its  efforts  to  bring 
depressed  classes  into  government  service,  through  reservation  of 
positions.126 

Beyond  this,  Menon  took  a  very  explicitly  conservative  stand. 
He  expressed  his  own  personal  aversion  to  and  suspicion  of '  mass ' 
politics,  and  said,  on  one  occasion,  that  'rightly  understood,  the 
Swatantra  Party  is  a  conservative  Party,  but  there  is  nothing  to  be 
ashamed  of  in  wise  conservatism'.  He  insisted  that  conservatism 
was  not  synonymous  with  reaction,  that  given  the  'fact  of  inces- 
sant, bewildering  change'  there  was  a  need  for  a  conservative 
counterweight,  because  'men  must  have  stability;  they  must  have 
something  to  cling  to. .  .Only  those  who  think  that  nothing  in  the 
national  past  was  good  can  wholly  oppose  conservatism.'127  On  this 
basis,  he  defended  the  inherent  scepticism  of  the  conservative, 
especially  with  respect  to  what  he  termed  the  two  major  sources  of 
change,  'technology  and  social  theories'.  On  this,  he  and  Rajaji 
obviously  had  a  good  deal  in  common. 

138 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

As  in  the  case  of  Rajaji's  defence  of  the  'old  culture'  on  non- 
traditional  grounds,  views  such  as  Menon's  and  Sreenivasan's 
raise  important  questions  in  terms  of  political  development.  As 
was  true  in  Rajaji's  case,  the  use  of  a  newer  vocabulary,  i.e. 
'  efficiency '  for  Menon  and  Sreenivasan,  represents  an  advance  over 
an  explicit  defence  of  the  old  caste  hierarchy  and  of  the  inherent 
superiority  of  the  Brahmins  and/or  kshatryas.  Eventually,  the 
arguments  about  efficiency  might  be  used  against  some  of  those 
who  now  expound  them,  but  in  the  shorter  run  they  reinforce  the 
status  quo.  In  short,  as  in  Rajaji's  case,  though  the  defence  is  not 
explicitly  traditional,  is  not  the  practical  outcome  much  the 
same,  i.e.  a  substantial  reinforcement  of  the  old  order? 

The  anti-democratic  bias  is  not  particularly  edifying  or  en- 
couraging, and  it  certainly  does  not  help  the  prospects  for 
democracy,  if  one  repeatedly  hears  that  the  masses  and  the 
politicians  who  emerge  from  them  are  incapable  of  managing 
public  affairs  properly.  But  the  inveterate  optimists,  at  least, 
could  point  out  that  this  is  a  less  serious  matter  than  might  seem  at 
first  glance.  Most  of  the  administrative-professional  elitists  are 
reluctant  politicians  at  best,  many  are  only  part-time  politicians, 
and  few,  if  any,  have  any  roots  in  mass  politics.  If  they  are  not 
dedicated  democrats,  neither  are  they  dedicated  counter-revolu- 
tionaries. They  certainly  display  no  enthusiasm  for  the  more 
frenzied  militant  Hindus  and,  to  a  lesser  degree,  they  are  not 
enamoured  of  aristocratic  pretensions  either.  As  Weiner  said  of 
the  businessmen,  they  are  not  likely  to  seek  the  overthrow  of  the 
democratic  regime,  although  many  would  not  be  inordinately 
sorry  if  others  did.128  In  this  sense,  the  unreconciled  aristocrats 
are  more  to  be  feared. 

As  long  as  the  political  structure  remains  substantially  secure, 
the  administrative-professional  viewpoint  may,  on  balance,  be 
viewed  in  a  more  optimistic  fashion.  The  presence  of  this  group  in 
Swatantra  suggests  a  willingness  to  work  within  the  contemporary 
political  framework,  even  though  they  dislike  some  of  its  basic 
contours.  Even  if  their  use  of 'efficiency'  as  a  criterion  contains 
elements  of  'disguised  conservatism',  it  does  reinforce  a  more 
modern  political  vocabulary.  They  are  often  conservative  not 
through  the  weight  of  indigenous  Indian  traditions  or  through  a 
desire  to  revert  to  some  nobler  Indian  past.  Rather,  they  are 
influenced  as  much,  if  not  more,  by  more  recent— although  perhaps 

139 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

not  less  outmoded — political  attitudes:  those  of  the  early  Congress 
'  Moderates '  on  the  one  hand  and  of  the  administrative  state  *  above 
polities'  on  the  other.  If  they  do  bring  to  bear  the  administrative, 
judicial,  educational,  and  other  standards  of  the  British  raj,  their 
presence  in  Swatantra  would  seem  to  reinforce  the  moderate 
centre  of  gravity  in  the  party  and  to  give  added  substance  to  the 
party's  emphasis  on  constitutional  propriety  and  administrative 
efficiency  and  integrity.  Frequently  heard  assertions  that  Swatantra 
has  proved  attractive  to  Parsis,  Christians,  and  Anglo-Indians 
would  seem  further  to  underscore  the  arguments  about  secularism, 
moderation,  and  a  respect  for  the  British  raj:  like  the  adminis- 
trative-professional groups,  these  elements  received  some  pre- 
ferential consideration  from  the  British  and  all  suffered,  at  least 
pyschologically,  upon  the  termination  of  the  raj.12*  We  may  borrow 
the  words  which  Rajaji  applied  to  businessmen  and  say  that  many 
such  people  preferred  the  'placid  pool'  of  the  British  days  to  the 
*  swift  river '  of  post-independence  politics.130  The  same,  needless  to 
say,  is  true  of  the  aristocrats  as  well. 

swatantra's  more  'modern'  men 

Swatantra  has  also  managed  to  attract  some  elements  whose  roots 
are  less  deeply  embedded  in  India's  past.  This  more  modern 
component  would  include  many  of  the  businessmen,  but  it  would 
also  include  some  of  the  administrators  and  professionals  as  well. 
Most  prominent,  of  course,  is  the  Bombay  contingent,  including 
Masani,  Mody,  Shroff,  Vaidya,  Dharamsey  Khatau,  among  others 
who  are  primarily  associated  with  business  and  finance;  and 
I  Dandekar,  Murthy,  and  others  who  are  associated  with  other 

professions.  A  small  but  powerful  group  of  predominantly  Patidar 
j  businessmen  from  Baroda,  headed  by  Nanu  Amin,  has  for  a  long 

|  time  been  with  Swatantra;  and  recently  (1966)  they  have  been 

joined  by  Vadilal  Mehta,  a  prominent  Ahmedabad  industrialist, 
who  was  a  close  associate  of  Morarji  Desai  and  former  Treasurer 
of  the  Gujarat  Congress.  There  has  been  other  scattered  support 
from  this  quarter— R.  P.  Patodia  and  S.  P.  Agarwal  (Calcutta), 
K.  Sundaram  (Coimbatore),  S.  S.  Koder  (Cochin),  R.  G.  Gupta 
(Kanpur),  for  example— and  since  the  1962  elections  a  few  more 
businessmen  have  openly  identified  themselves  with  Swatantra— 
as,  for  example,  Chiranjit  Rai,  who  was  designated  as  a  Swatantra 

140 


■■■ 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

Lok  Sabha  candidate  from  Rajasthan.  Thus  far,  however,  the 
names  of  Birla,  Bajaj,  Sarabhai,  et  ah  have  been  conspicuous  by 
their  absence  from  the  roster  of  Swatantra  supporters. 

These  men  are  modern  primarily  in  the  sense  that  they  are  either 
engaged  in  or  are  supporters  of  technologically  advanced,  large- 
scale  industry;  but  many  are  also  secular  and  liberal  (in  the  classical 
sense)  in  outlook  as  well,  and  here  they  derive  support  from 
Lobo  Prabhu,  Pasricha,  Ruthnaswamy,  among  others  already 
mentioned.131 

One  very  crude  index  of  the  modernity  of  this  group,  in  com- 
parison with  most  of  the  aristocratic  and  non-aristocratic  con- 
servatives in  Swatantra,  was  established  by  questionnaire  data, 
which  showed  that  almost  all  of  the  business  and  professional  men 
approved  of,  without  significant  qualification,  the  so-called  Hindu 
Code  measures;  while  among  the  other  groups,  opposition  not  only 
ran  high  but  explanations  for  opposition  were  studded  with 
references  to  the  vedas,  shastraic  principles,  the  'genius  of  Hindu 
society',  etc.132  In  the  economic  sector,  artificial  maintenance  of 
cottage  industries  is  stoutly  opposed,  putting  this  group  at  odds 
with  the  '  Gandhians '. 

The  spirit  of  this  group  can  be  captured  easily  by  examining 
Lobo  Prabhu's  weekly,  Insight  or  by  considering  his  recommenda- 
tions for  help  to  the  backward  classes  in  his  New  Thinking.™  In 
both,  statism  and  the  ancien  regime  come  in  for  sharp  criticism. 
Here,  however,  we  shall  let  Ruthnaswamy  and  Pasricha  speak  for 
the  group,  remembering  that  in  all  important  respects,  Masani, 
Lobo  Prahbu,  et  ah  are  with  them. 

Consider,  for  example,  Ruthnaswamy's  estimate  of  the  accomp- 
lishments of  free  India: 

Nothing  has  been  done  to  make  the  people  want  more,  and  better 
things — in  the  matter  of  food,  clothing,  housing,  nor  to  turn  their 
minds  and  their  lives  to  new  ideas  of  freedom,  equality,  justice,  progress, 
patriotism — to  detach  them  from  their  addiction  to  caste  and  com- 
munity and  family  loyalties  at  the  expense  of  larger  interests  of  country 
and  State.  That  is  why  so  much  of  recent  social  legislation — the  Child 
Marriage  Restraint  Act,  the  Anti-Dowry  Act,  the  Inter-Caste  Marriage 
Act,  the  Women's  Property  Act — is  a  dead  letter.134 

Here  is  a  list  of  desiderata  which  jar  uncomfortably  with  Rajaji's 
basic  positions:  materialism  as  opposed  to  restricted  levels  of 

141 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

living,  concern  for  national  citizenship  as  opposed  to  attachment  to 
parochial  loyalties  as  an  important  aspect  of  social  life,  a  move- 
ment toward  reform  along  liberal,  individualistic  lines,  as  opposed 
to  an  aversion  to  'perverted'  movements  of  social  reform,  and  the 
like.  Ruthnaswamy  is  very  much  oriented  toward  western  liberal- 
ism in  values  and  institutions,  while  Rajaji  is  only  marginally  so, 
although  as  we  have  seen  he  has  moved  in  this  direction  of  late. 

Pasricha  was  even  more  outspoken  in  challenging  most  of  Rajaji's 
basic  perspectives,  although  as  in  Ruthnaswamy's  case  this  was  far 
from  a  battle  between  equals.  Pasricha  was  a  quite  reluctant 
politician;  his  voice  was  never  loud  in  party  circles,  and,  with  his 
departure  from  the  presidency  of  the  Delhi  unit,  it  is  very  largely 
stilled.  But  Masani  was  quite  favourably  disposed  toward  him  and 
considered  Pasricha  the  type  of  educated  professional  whom  he 
hoped  would  come  into  the  party  in  larger  numbers. 

According  to  Pasricha's  almost  complete  indictment  of  things 
Indian,  the  'national  mind'  is  'largely  feudal'  with  'caste  and 
group  considerations  immensely  strong'.  He  further  asserts  that 
most  Indians,  in  the  face  of  any  criticism  of  Indian  culture, '  react 
violently  and  passionately  and  the  pattern  is  the  same  though  the 
shades  may  vary. .  .The  stock-in-trade. .  .is  composed  mostly  of 
two  items :  transcendant  spiritual  philosophy  and  antiquity  of  the 
nation.'  Noting  that  the  'claim  of  antiquity  is  unassailable', 
Pasricha  denies  that  it  has  any  connection  'with  greatness'  in  a 
nation,  which  is  '  determined  not  so  much  by  age  and  antiquity  as 
by  its  achievements  in  the  sphere  of  human  activity'.  Here  he  be- 
moans the  'complete  stagnation  and  retrogression'  of  India's 
'meagrely  educated  and  under-developed'  society;  insists  that 
'Western  liberal  education  opened  and  broadened  the  mental 
horizons',  and  that  this,  coupled  with  the  common  bond  of  the 
English  language  (against  which  'a  number  of  cranks  have  raised 
their  voice  in  a  loud  wail')  amounts  to  an  'enormous  debt  of 
gratitude  we  owe'  to  the  English  people  and  their  culture.  In  his 
attack  on  all  segments  of  Indian  society,  Pasricha  censures  the 
isolation  of  the  enlightened  Indian  from  the  bulk  of  the  population, 
his  aversion  of  social  reform  work,  and  his  '  willing  readiness '  to 
'submit  to  superstitious  rituals  at  the  time  of  marriage  or  deaths  or 
any  of  the  numerous  other  ceremonies  that  afflict  an  Indian'.135  It 
makes  little  difference  in  the  present  context  whether  these  views 
are  sound  or  not,  and  it  makes  little  difference  that  Pasricha  reflects 

142 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

the  widespread  destructiveness  of  many  an  Indian  intellectual, 
taking  almost  fiendish  delight  in  abusing  his  own  country.  What  is 
important  is  that  these  views  have  been  expressed  and  co-exist  in  a 
party  whose  founder-leader  is  Rajaji,  and  whose  cadres  are  heavily 
manned  by  the  aristocratic  and  non-aristocratic  conservatives. 

THE  GROWTH  OF  SWATANTRA:   SUMMARY 

From  1959  to  1962  (and  beyond),  the  Swatantra  leadership  made  a 
determined  bid  to  build  a  party  which  would  be  an  effective, 
nation-wide  opposition  to  the  Congress.  In  the  process,  it  con- 
fronted a  wide  array  of  social  forces,  which  were  organized  and 
self-assertive  in  varying  degrees.  It  absorbed  many  parties,  received 
support  from  many  caste  groups,  drew  upon  more  modern  associa- 
tions such  as  the  FFE  and  AIAF,  as  well  as  upon  segments  of  the 
aristocracy  and  upon  many  distinguished  individuals.  The  initia- 
tive was  not  in  every  case  taken  by  Swatantra,  but  eventually 
many  diverse  interests  came  within  the  purview  of  the  party.  On 
the  surface  of  it,  this  would  seem  to  have  constituted  an  impressive 
start,  at  least. 

Even  without  knowing  anything  about  the  interaction  of  the 
major  components  of  the  coalition  or  about  the  internal  balance  of 
power,  some  specific  points  deserve  to  be  stressed.  The  geo- 
graphical spread,  with  all  its  limitations,136  is  noteworthy,  because 
the  party  did  embrace  significant  elements  from  both  north  and 
south  India.  If,  on  the  whole,  Swatantra's  elites  were  upper  caste 
and  generally  conservative,  there  were  some  lower  caste  elements 
on  a  non-derivative  basis  in  some  states,  and  a  few  untouchables 
have  held  high  party  offices.137  If,  on  the  whole,  the  elites  were 
predominantly  Hindu,  non-Hindus  were  very  prominently  repre- 
sented both  at  the  national  and  state  levels,  which  suggests  a  non- 
denominational,  if  not  a  more  strictly  secular  orientation.138 
Finally,  despite  the  old  adage  about  politics  making  strange  bed- 
fellows, we  should  note  that  the  coalition  included  many  elements 
who  were,  in  the  not-too-distant  past,  political  enemies;  and  it 
included  both  aristocratic  and  industrial  elements,  which  is  of 
major  importance. 

Electorally,  the  start  could  also  be  considered  impressive,  in  light 
of  the  1962  data.139  To  be  sure,  the  party  was  for  all  practical 
purposes  non-existent  in  Assam,  Bengal,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Maha- 

143 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

rashtra,  and  Kerala — and  it  remains  so  as  of  this  writing.  In 
Madras,  the  mergers  and  Rajaji's  personal  appeal  produced  very 
meagre  results;  in  Mysore  the  poll  performance  was  weak,  although 
Swatantra  stood  a  strong  second  in  many  constituencies;  and  in 
the  Punjab,  where  the  emphasis  was  on  the  Sikh  elements,  the 
poll  performance  was  weaker  yet.  However,  in  Andhra,  the  diverse 
elements  which  entered  Swatantra  gave  it  some  small  pockets  of 
support;  and  in  northern  UP  it  had  some  strength  as  well.  In 
Bihar,  Rajasthan,  Gujarat,  and  Orissa,  it  emerged  as  the  principal 
opposition  group;  and  it  ultimately  achieved  this  position  in  the 
Lok  Sabha  as  well.  This  was  no  mean  achievement. 

The  electoral  data  for  1962  merit  a  few  more  detailed  observa- 
tions. Eight  per  cent  of  the  popular  vote  and  contingents  of  the 
size  secured  certainly  fell  far  short  of  Swatantra' s  professed  goal  of 
providing  a  strong  opposition  to  the  ruling  party.  Yet  by  prevailing 
Indian  standards,  the  Swatantra  electoral  achievement  was  still 
notable;  and  if  one  considers  the  four  states  in  which  it  was  the 
major  opposition  group,  the  picture  brightens,  as  the  party  stood 
roughly  1:2  to  1:3  to  the  Congress  in  terms  of  the  popular 
vote,  of  which  it  secured  roughly  20-25  Per  cent.140 

Of  decisive  importance,  however,  is  the  fact  that  in  terms  of 
electoral  support  and  legislative  strength,  the  critical  element  in 
the  coalition  was  the  aristocracy  in  the  northern  states.  In  the  1962 
general  elections,  only  one  Swatantrite  was  elected  from  south  of 
the  Vindhyas  to  serve  in  the  Lok  Sabha',  and  almost  all  of  Swatan- 
tra's  MPs  {Lok  Sabha)  were  from  aristocratic  areas,  and  were  either 
aristocrats  themselves  or  hand-picked  followers  thereof.  Three  of 
the  four  Swatantra  MPs  from  UP  were  themselves  aristocrats  and 
the  fourth,  Dandekar,  was  elected  from  Mankapur's  district, 
Gonda.  Rajasthan  sent  the  Maharani  and  one  of  the  Maharaj- 
kumars  of  Jaipur,  as  well  as  a  scheduled  caste  man  from  the 
Maharani's  jurisdiction;141  Swatantra's  three  MPs  from  Gujarat 
included  the  Maharajkumar  of  Kutch  and  a  scheduled  tribe  man 
from  an  area  influenced  by  the  Maharaja  of  Devgadh-Baria;  and 
the  Orissa  contingent  came  wholly  as  a  result  of  aristocratic  in- 
fluence through  the  Ganatantra  Parishad.  Bihar  must  be  singled 
out,  however,  because  it  not  only  sent  the  largest  group — seven — 
but  the  members  included  Ramgarh's  mother,  wife,  brother, 
sister-in-law,  and  business  manager !  The  same  general  pattern  is 
evident  at  the  state  assembly  level  as  well.  Thus,  not  only  was  the 

144 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  Growth  and  Scope 

influx  of  aristocrats  notable  in  terms  of  party  leadership  positions, 
but  it  was  also  striking  in  electoral  terms  as  well.  Of  Swatantra's 
apparent  strongholds,  only  Gujarat  seemed  to  escape  this  total 
dependence  on  aristocrats,  through  a  more  heterogeneous  com- 
bination of  big  and  little  kshatryas  and  some  non-kshatrya  landed 
and  business  interests,  led  by  Bhailalbhai  Patel. 

We  have  noted  in  passing  some  of  the  negative  aspects  of  Swa- 
tantra's effort,  as  of  1962 — it  was  virtually  non-existent  in  many 
states,  and  it  fell  far  short  of  its  own  aim  of  providing  a  potent 
opposition  to  the  Congress.  Others,  of  course,  could  be  cited:  its 
failure  to  absorb  the  so-called  all-India  rightist  parties;  its  failure 
to  absorb  many  like-minded  local  parties;  its  inability  to  pry  loose 
the  Congress  'right';  its  inability  to  recruit  the  major  aristocratic 
families,  industrialists,  or  business  groups;  and  its  extreme  weak- 
ness in  India's  advanced  cities.  More  important  for  the  moment, 
however,  is  the  fact  that  prior  to  the  1962  elections,  Swatantra  was 
not  able  to  keep  all  of  its  recruits  in  the  fold.  There  were  minor 
defections  among  former  INDC  leaders  and  some  of  Ranga's 
followers;142  some  ex-Congressmen  in  Rajasthan,  Delhi,  and  else- 
where, rejoined  the  ruling  party;  some  aristocrats,  including  the 
Maharajkumar  of  Jaisalmer,  defected;  and  Chatterjee  left  the 
party  in  196 1,  on  the  eve  of  the  elections,  about  which  more  will  be 
said  subsequently.  Some  Ganatantra  Parishad  leaders  responded 
to  the  1 96 1  merger  decision  by  entering  the  Congress  or  by  retir- 
ing to  the  political  sidelines;  but  here,  at  least,  the  key  figures 
(Kalahandi  and  Patna)  remained  with  Swatantra.143 

In  this  respect,  the  period  from  1962  to  1967  was  more  serious 
from  the  Swatantra  standpoint.  Paliwal,  who  contributed  little  in 
1962  but  who  was  still  a  major  figure  in  the  party,  departed  in 
1963;  Ramgarh  and  Bilaspur  departed  in  1964;  and  Padayachi  and 
Mahida  departed  in  1965,  upon  most  of  which  we  shall  dwell 
later  on.  Death  also  took  its  toll  as  B.  L.  Singh,  Shroff,  Mankapur, 
Menon,  and  Nagoke,  among  others,  passed  away.  These  develop- 
ments have  meant,  most  importantly,  that  Bihar,  a  major  source  of 
support,  has  been  totally  lost  for  the  moment;  that  the  important 
Gujarat  kshatrya  mahasabha  front  may  split;  and  that  the  limited 
support  in  UP  has  been  weakened.  In  terms  of  Swatantra's  own 
organization  and  resources,  Gujarat  alone  offered  cause  for 
optimism,  as  increased  aristocratic,  business,  and  ex-ICS  support 
seemed  to  balance  Mahida's  defection. 

J0  145  ESP 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

From  this  vantage  point,  it  could  be  said  that  Swatantra  not 
only  achieved  a  modest  coalition,  but  also  an  unstable  one. 
However,  to  have  expected  Swatantra,  in  such  a  short  time,  to 
build  a  coalition  nearly  equal  in  strength  to  the  Congress  would 
have  been  most  naive;  and  one  must  never  forget  the  difficulties 
which  the  Congress  itself  had  in  creating  and  maintaining  its 
coalition,  with  the  advantage  of  the  anti-imperialist  rallying  point. 
On  balance,  Swatantra  in  1962  should  have  been  judged  quite 
successful,  in  quantitative  terms. 

But  a  quantitative  approach  will  not  suffice  here,  for  we  must 
also  know  what  kind  of  coalition  has  been  created,  not  only  in  terms 
of  viability  but  also  in  terms  of  orientation  and  performance.  Some 
of  the  qualitative  aspects  of  the  coalition  have  already  been  touched 
upon,  e.g.  the  social  bases,  the  strong  element  of  conservative 
elitism,  the  appearance  of  secularism.  However,  we  must  consider 
in  more  detail  how  the  different  components  fit  together,  where  the 
stresses  and  strains  are,  and  where  the  balance  of  power  lies,  before 
we  can  come  to  any  major  conclusions  concerning  Swatantra's 
performance  in  qualitative  terms. 


146 


CHAPTER   7 

THE  SWATANTRA  COALITION: 
THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER 

The  Swatantra  inner  circle  is  itself  a  heterogeneous  group.  With 
the  entry  of  the  parties,  groups,  and  individuals  discussed  above, 
some  of  the  existing  perspectives  in  the  inner  circle  were  re- 
inforced, while  some  new  ones  were  introduced.  Men  like  Paliwal 
were  akin  to  Rajaji  and  Ranga,  and  they  strengthened  an  already 
strong  element  in  the  party.  Chatterjee  temporarily  supplemented 
Munshi's  more  militant  viewpoint,  but  this  continued  to  remain 
a  very  minor  theme  in  Swatantra.  Some  business  recruits  aug- 
mented the  strength  of  Masani  and  Mody,  but  direct  business 
participation  is  less  important  than  its  role  in  party  finance.  The 
administrative-professional  elements  introduced  some  new  per- 
spectives into  Swatantra,  although  in  some  cases  these  turned 
toward  Rajaji's  conservatism,  in  others  toward  Masani's  liberalism. 
The  aristocrats  unquestionably  added  the  major  new  dimension  to 
the  Swatantra  elites.  Thus,  social  and  doctrinal  diversity  is 
present;  and,  for  that  matter,  there  is  evidence  of  considerable 
conflict  among  the  components  of  Swatantra  prior  to  the  creation 
of  Swatantra.  What,  if  any,  are  the  problems  flowing  from  this 
diversity  and  from  this  prior  conflict?  What,  in  particular,  are  the 
relationships  among  the  aristocrats,  the  non-aristocratic  conserva- 
tives, and  the  more  modern  (and  sometimes  liberal)  elements  in  the 
party,  and  what  is  the  balance  of  power  among  them?  These  are 
the  questions  which  must  now  be  answered. 

There  is  probably  a  tendency  to  be  excessively  rationalistic  in 
trying  to  explain  how  and  why  such  diverse  forces  managed  to 
come  together  under  the  Swatantra  banner.  Motives  and  goals  were 
certainly  diverse,  and  even  on  some  fundamental  policy  issues, 
such  as  land  reform,  there  is  far  from  universal  agreement  in  the 
party.  Indeed,  there  is  far  from  universal  agreement  on  the 
minimal  doctrinal  points  to  which  the  party  members  are  supposed 
to  assent.1  To  say  that  all  Swatantra  leaders,  at  least,  are  opposed 
to  communism  as  they  construe  it,  is  doubtless  true;  and  to  say 
that  they  are  also  opposed  to  Congress  socialism  as  they  construe  it 

147 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

is  probably  true,  too.  At  least,  most  have  rejected  the  more  con- 
crete manifestations  of  'statisni'  which  they  have  encountered.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  is  good  reason  to  suspect  that  not  all  Swatan- 
tra leaders  would  be  averse  to  the  'right'  type  of  statism — a  strong, 
law-and-order,  private-property-oriented  regime  which,  shall  we 
say,  '  curbed '  democratic  '  excesses  \ 

There  is  also  a  general  condemnation  of  the  Congress  for  allow- 
ing (or  even  encouraging)  the  political  life  of  the  country  to  decay; 
but  even  here  we  must  be  cautious.  Many  of  those  who  are 
presently  in  Swatantra  would  have  been  very  happy  to  remain  in  or 
to  join  the  Congress,  if  only  the  ruling  party  had  allowed  the 
political  process  to  decay  in  their  favour. 

There  is  certainly  a  broad  current  of  conservative  elitism  in 
Swatantra,  in  which  aristocrats,  some  non- aristocratic  conserva- 
tives, and  some  professionals  share.  There  is,  moreover,  some 
resonance  for  this  view  among  the  more  liberal  business  and 
administrative  groups,  in  a  manner  reminiscent  of  much  nineteenth- 
century  European  liberal  thought.  But  even  here,  there  are  ample 
differences  within  the  party  elite,  as  we  shall  see  shortly.  None  of 
this  should  be  very  surprising,  but  it  is  worth  repeating,  so  that  no 
unwarranted  conclusions  are  drawn  about  what  holds  Swatantra 
together.  Virtually  all  that  may  be  said  with  confidence  on  this 
score  is  that  Swatantra  embraced  many  groups,  of  generally  conser- 
vative inclination,  which  were  for  various  reasons  at  least  tem- 
porarily anti-Congress. 

Whatever  the  ties  that  bind  may  be,  there  are,  in  addition, 
many  serious  conflicts  in  the  party,  due  to  the  social  and  doctrinal 
diversity  of  its  component  groups  and  due  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  party  grew.  An  exhaustive  account  of  these  would  not  only  be 
tedious,  but  in  terms  of  the  main  focus  of  this  study  it  would 
serve  no  useful  purpose.  Here,  the  following  problems  will  be 
examined,  in  the  following  order:  (i)  religious  diversity  and  the 
question  of  secularism;  (2)  status  and  caste  considerations,  partic- 
ularly the  relationship  between  aristocrats  and  commoners ;  (3)  more 
strictly  organizational  problems  related  thereto;  and  (4)  the  use  of 
the  party's  financial  resources  and  other  devices,  by  Masani,  to 
strengthen  the  position  of  the  modern  elements  as  against  the 
conservatives  and  to  establish  the  power  of  the  natonal  party  as 
against  the  states,  which  is  a  closely  related  problem.2  The  conflicts 
between  the  aristocrats  and  the  non-aristocrats  (both  conservative 

148 


M 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

and  liberal)  and  between  the  conservatives  (both  aristocratic  and 
non-aristocratic)  and  the  liberals  are  obviously  more  important  in 
terms  of  social  change  and  will,  therefore,  be  emphasized  here. 


RELIGIOUS  DIVERSITY  AND   SECULARISM 

The  Swatantra  Party,  as  already  noted,  has  managed  to  attract 
people  from  all  religious  groups  in  India,  and  almost  all  are  repre- 
sented in  either  national  or  state  elites.  This  is,  by  itself,  prima 
facie  evidence  of  the  party's  capacity  to  contain  religious  diversity. 
It  suggests  an  emphasis  on  matters  other  than  religion,  if  not  a 
strictly  secular  orientation. 

There  are,  however,  many  people  at  the  higher  levels  of  the 
party  for  whom  religion  is  not  a  matter  of  indifference  or  of  narrowly 
private  expression,  as  it  is  for  many  of  the  liberals.  Thus,  two  sets 
of  relationships  deserve  attention,  viz.  the  relations  between  men  of 
different  religions  who  take  their  religion  seriously,  and  those 
between  people  who  take  their  faith  seriously  and  those  who  do  not. 

Rajaji,  although  devoted  to  the  Hindu  tradition,  cannot  be 
faulted  here,  as  he  has  abundantly  demonstrated  his  tolerance  of 
men  of  all  faiths,  regardless  of  how  devout  they  may  be.3  Most  of 
the  problems  relate,  rather,  to  Munshi's  more  militant  Hindu 
approach;  and  among  the  true  believers,  the  Sikhs  are  the  most 
disturbed.  One  Swatantra  Sikh,  for  example,  asserted  that '  Munshi 
hates  us . . .  and  considers  us  a  menace ',  while  another  insisted 
that ' even  in  the  Jan  Sangh  he  would  be  considered  an  extremist'.4 
Even  disregarding  Munshi,  however,  Hindu- Sikh  relations  in 
Swatantra  have  been  far  from  good,  especially  in  the  Punjab,  of 
course.  Having  relied  primarily  on  the  Sikhs  in  that  state,  Swa- 
tantra leaders  were  obliged  to  demarcate  spheres  of  influence,  in 
effect,  ostensibly  along  linguistic  lines  but  with  an  unmistakable 
religious  dimension.5  This  is,  however,  the  only  reasonably  serious 
instance  of  religious  tensions  within  the  party. 

Those  who  are  inclined  to  be  more  secular  in  their  approach  to 
public  affairs  have  also  taken  exception  to  some  of  Munshi's 
concerns.  Masani,  Mody,  and  Paliwal  have  at  one  time  or  another 
bemoaned  the  inclusion  of  certain  Hindu  ceremonies  at  Swatantra 
meetings,  with  Munshi  allegedly  being  the  villain  of  the  piece.6 
But  have  the  more  secular  elements  been  successful,  in  fact,  in 
going  beyond  mutual  respect  among  true  believers  to  the  point 

149 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

where  religion — anyone's  religion — is  reduced  substantially  in 
importance? 

Here  the  situation  is  quite  complex.  To  be  sure,  the  Hindus  in 
Swatantra  have  had  to  display  some  restraint  in  order  to  retain  the 
support  of  non-Hindus  in  the  coalition,  and  this  is  not  to  be  lightly 
dismissed.  However,  this  is  not  a  one-way  street.  The  religious 
minorities  in  the  party  must  certainly  be  discreet  in  confronting 
Hindu  religiosity;  and  by  and  large  the  minorities  and  the  liberal 
elements  (which  sometimes  overlap)  have  displayed  becoming 
'tolerance'  of  conservative,  if  not  militant  Hindu  opinion.  For 
example,  Masani  often  insisted  that  the  late  President  Rajendra 
Prasad  had  every  right  to  advance  his  rather  conservative  views, 
which  is  fair  enough;  but  Masani  shows  little  zeal  to  argue  strongly 
against  them,  which  is  not  the  mark  of  an  aggressive,  anti-tradi- 
tional liberal.7  Further,  a  number  of  non-Hindu  Swatantrites 
declined  to  express  an  opinion  on  the  Hindu  Code  legislation,  on 
the  grounds  that  as  non-Hindus  they  were  not  concerned.8  More- 
over, the  utility  of  religion  as  a  brake  on  the  alleged  surge  of  com- 
munism further  serves  to  diminish  the  conflict  implicit  here. 
Masani  himself  looked  upon  India's  religions  as  a  bulwark  against 
communism,  presumably  useful  for  this  purpose,  if  for  no  other; 
although  he  also  deplored  the  fact  that  most  religiously  based 
parties  did  not  seem  to  acknowledge  the  seriousness  of  the  com- 
munist threat.9  Thus,  many  secularists  have  blunted  their  critique, 
in  much  the  same  way  as  many  early  Congress  leaders  sought  to 
suppress  the  issue  of  social  reform,  in  the  interests  of  solidarity 
against  the  British. 

Swatantra  is  incontestably  more  secular  than  the  Hindu  Maha- 
sabha,  RRP  and  the  Jan  Sangh,  many  of  whose  leaders  explicitly 
eschew  secular  politics.10  Although  not  without  its  religious  ten- 
sions, Swatantra  has  satisfactorily  accommodated  men  of  all 
religions  within  its  ranks.  This  is  to  the  good.  But  as  in  earlier 
periods  of  Indian  history,  there  is  a  question  which  must  be  raised: 
to  what  extent  can  the  Indian  population  be  effectively  mobilized 
without  invoking  strongly  religious  appeals?  This  question,  for 
which  an  answer  will  be  suggested  in  the  discussion  of  Swatantra's 
formal  ideology,  is  of  central  importance  in  connection  with 
secularism  within  the  party  and  the  role  of  the  Swatantra  liberals. 


150 


wmm 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

STATUS  AND  CASTE  ISSUES 

Conflicts  within  Swatantra  in  the  area  of  status  and  caste  are 
evident  at  a  number  of  levels,  too,  and  have  an  important  bearing 
on  the  nature  and  role  of  the  party.  For  example,  the  relative 
standing  of  various  aristocrats  has  been  a  major  issue  in  a  number 
of  states,  indicating  that  Swatantra  has  not  been  entirely  successful 
in  overcoming  this  aspect  of  aristocratic  parochialism.  In  Bihar, 
Ramgarh's  commanding  position  deterred  higher  status  Rajputs, 
as  well  as  the  Brahmin  Darbhanga  ruler,  from  joining  the  party.11 
In  Gujarat  and  Rajasthan,  there  is  evidence  of  strained  relations 
between  the  'big3  and  'little'  Rajputs;  and  in  the  former  case 
there  is  some  difficulty  with  the  nouveaux  kshatryas  as  well.12  In 
Rajasthan,  considerations  of  status  and  seniority  among  Rajput 
ruling  families  have  led  to  the  almost  automatic  ascendancy  of  the 
most  prominent  Rajputs,  to  the  dismay  of  others  who  may  be 
younger  and/or  of  lower  status,  but  who  joined  Swatantra  earlier  and 
were  quickly  demoted  or  found  the  path  of  advancement  blocked. 
During  the  courtship  of  Bikaner,  a  central  issue  was  the  re-organi- 
zation of  the  state  party  leadership,  in  view  of  his  status;  and  one 
highly  placed  Rajasthan  Swatantrite  said  at  one  point  that  Bikaner 
would  probably  join  if  he  were  made  leader  of  the  state  party,  but 
that  this  was  impossible  as  long  as  the  Jaipur  family  was  involved.13 
All  of  this  is,  however,  like  a  minor  family  squabble  compared  to 
relations  between  Raja  Man  Singh  of  Bharatpur,  a  Jat,  and  the 
Rajputs  generally;  but  this  spills  over  into  the  area  of  inter-caste 
animosities  as  well.  Raja  Man  Singh,  one  of  the  earlier  aristocratic 
entrants  into  Swatantra  in  Rajasthan,  evidently  coveted  the  position 
of  state  General- Secretary.  However,  upon  Dungarpur's  ascend- 
ancy in  the  state,  Man  Singh  was  advised  that  this  post  was  beneath 
his  status  as  a  member  of  a  ruling  family  and  that  he  should  be 
made  a  Vice-President,  with  special  responsibilities  in  the  field  of 
organization — a  decision  which  Man  Singh  evidently  interpreted 
as  being  inspired  by  anti-Jat  prejudices.  Suffice  to  say,  Raja  Man 
Singh  was  also  dismayed  (to  put  it  mildly)  when  a  Rajput  who  had 
likened  Jats  to  '  two  legged  animals '  was  appointed  to  an  important 
party  position  and  when  some  Rajputs  (when '  in  their  cups '  as  one 
of  them  put  it)  at  party  meetings  have  made  vicious  or  derogatory 
remarks  about  Jats,  in  his  presence.  Man  Singh  would  also  doubt- 
less be  gratified  to  know  that  one  of  his  closer  Rajput  associates  in 

I5i 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

the  party  explained  his  (Man  Singh's)  discomfort  by  saying  that 
*  he,  like  all  Jats,  has  communist  tendencies  '.14  It  is  little  wonder 
that  Man  Singh  has  often  threatened  to  resign  from  the  party's 
governing  bodies,  if  not  from  the  party  completely,  and,  short  of 
this,  that  he  has  asked  that  the  Bharatpur  area  be  removed  com- 
pletely from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state  party.15 

Thus  far,  there  has  been  little  animosity  evident  among  aristo- 
crats across  state  lines  (although  it  is  interesting  to  speculate  what 
might  happen  if  some  Maratha  ruling  families  joined  Swatantra). 
However,  it  is  clear  that  the  Rajasthan  Rajputs  consider  them- 
selves the  superiors  of  others  who  have  joined  Swatantra;  and 
there  were  some  complaints  from  Rajasthan  when  Ramgarh  was 
named  a  national  Vice-President — a  difficulty  now  presumably 
overcome,  with  Gayatri  Devi's  ascent  to  that  office.16  In  short, 
many  of  the  historic  animosities  among  aristocrats  themselves 
remain  to  trouble  Swatantra;  and  very  often  matters  pertaining  to 
aristocratic  status  supersede  all  considerations  of  ability,  party 
loyalty,  doctrinal  commitment,  and  so  forth. 

The  inter-caste  problem  is,  not  surprisingly,  evident  in  many 
states.  It  is  discernible  in  the  unhappiness  of  some  lower  caste 
southerners  at  what  they  regard  as  the  excessive  'Brahminism'  of 
some  local  party  units;  and  this,  according  to  one  report,  played  a 
role  in  Padayachi's  departure  from  the  party.17  It  is  certainly  the 
crucial  element  in  Gujarat,  where  Patidars  and  kshatryas  are  often 
at  odds  (in  Congress  as  well  as  Swatantra).  This  was  underscored 
by  the  report  that  the  intransigence  of  some  Patidars  led  to  the 
exclusion  of  kshatryas  as  candidates  in  certain  districts,  to  the 
detriment  of  the  Swatantra  poll  performance  in  1962;  and  there 
is  evidence,  too,  that  Mahida's  defection  from  Swatantra  was  in 
part  based  on  difficulties  with  some  Patidar  leaders.18  (It  is  interest- 
ing to  speculate,  too,  that  inter-caste  problems  may  arise  between 
the  large  number  of  scheduled  caste  and  tribe  MPs  and  MLAs  in 
the  Swatantra  ranks  and  the  higher  caste  leadership.)  However,  the 
intercaste  conflict  is  in  many  cases  tied  to  the  aristocrat-anti- 
aristocrat  cleavage,  which  is  one  of  the  most  serious  to  confront  the 
Swatantra  Party. 

At  the  state  level,  relations  between  aristocrats  and  commoners 
have  naturally  varied  according  to  local  conditions.  In  Gujarat, 
the  aristocrats  are  important  to  Swatantra  but  they  do  not  dominate 
the  state  party  unit  and  they  have,  in  general,  worked  co-operatively 

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The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

with  the  commoners.  However,  in  the  period  between  1962  and 
1967,  more  aristocrats  have  come  into  the  Gujarat  unit,  and  if 
electoral  support  in  non-aristocratic  areas  should  diminish  (or 
remain  fairly  stable)  while  support  in  aristocratic  areas  should 
increase,  it  would  not  be  surprising  to  see  a  change  in  group  re- 
lationships in  Gujarat.19  In  Orissa,  the  aristocrats  are  clearly  the 
dominant  element,  but  they  have  opened  the  doors  of  the  Gana- 
tantra  Parishad/ Swatantra  to  commoners,  some  of  whom  have  held 
high  positions  in  the  state  unit.  There  is  no  marked  conflict  here, 
and  Morris-Jones'  assessment  of  the  Parishad  as  a  '  party  of 
mixed  princely  and  popular  character'  is  well  founded.20  Even  so, 
one  Swatantra  commoner  in  Orissa  stressed  the  importance  of 
'enabling  some  persons  who  actually  come  from  amongst  the  mass 
to  hold  some  prominent  offices',  and  his  was  not  a  lone  voice.21 
The  problem  is  (or  was)  serious  but  somewhat  suppressed  in 
Rajasthan  and  Bihar,  brutal  and  open  in  UP. 

In  Rajasthan,  the  state  unit  is  so  completely  dominated  by  the 
Rajputs  that  the  conflict  has  not  been  particularly  visible.  However, 
the  Rajput-Jat  problem  was  not  only  present  at  the  aristocratic 
level,  but  more  generally  as  well.  Aware  of  the  fact  that  Swatantra 
in  Rajasthan  has  an  anti-Jat  image,  Dungarpur,  the  state  President, 
has  taken  special  pains  to  assure  Jats  that  they  were  welcome  in  the 
party  and  that  'unusual'  concessions  would  be  made  to  them,  to 
prove  the  bona  fides  of  the  Rajput  leadership.22  Furthermore, 
Swatantra  files  contain  ample  evidence  to  show  that  many  in- 
terested commoners  were  deterred  from  entering  the  party,  be- 
cause of  the  hegemony  of  the  Rajputs,  and  that  the  Swatantra 
central  office  is  sensitive  to  this  problem.  Masani  has  occasionally 
sought  to  persuade  the  state  unit  to  enlist  support  from  and  to 
open  party  offices  and  meetings  more  widely  to  Jats  and  other 
non-Rajputs.23  Much  the  same  situation  prevailed  in  Bihar,  where 
Ramgarh  and  his  close  associates  monopolized  high  party  positions, 
de  facto  if  not  de  jure,  to  such  an  extent  that  loud  and  frequent 
complaints  were  heard  about  lack  of  representativeness  in  the 
composition  of  the  state  executive  bodies  and  about  the  reluctance 
of  commoners  to  join  the  party.  In  Bihar,  however,  the  Jan 
Congress/ Swatantra  elements — scarcely  commoners  themselves — 
had  some  influence  and  often  invited  central  office  intervention  in 
state  affairs,  thus  opening  the  latter  to  central  office  scrutiny.24 
There  was,  for  a  short  time,  an  analogous  situation  in  Rajasthan, 

153 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

when  some  ex-Congress  elements  and  the  Rajputs  were  vying  for 
supremacy;  but,  with  the  ascendancy  of  the  Rajputs,  Raja  Man 
Singh  was  virtually  alone  in  pressing  for  central  office  attention. 

In  UP  the  battle  was  not  only  visible,  but,  figuratively  speaking, 
bloody  and  was  fought  largely  on  home  ground.  It  was  in  the 
main  a  contest  between  Paliwal  (and  some  of  his  followers)  and  the 
aristocrats.  On  a  very  modest  level  was  the  complaint  of  one 
disputant  who  said,  in  reference  to  the  aristocrats,  'Swatantra 
Party  needs  more  democratic  ways'.25  But  at  one  juncture  the 
language  became  extraordinarily  abusive,  earning  a  reprimand  to 
the  '  commoners '  from  the  central  office. 

The  basis  for  the  reprimand  requires  little  elaboration.  Paliwal 
complained  in  a  periodical  that  'these  feudalists,  because  of  their 
craze  for  power  and  their  undemocratic  and  uncommon  ideas  and 
activities,  have  created  a  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  common  man 
and  the  active  workers  in  particular'  about  the  nature  of  the  party, 
which  they  are  making  'a  seat  or  jagir  for  their  relatives  and  caste 
brothers'.  Paliwal  concluded  his  attack  by  speculating  that  this 
'may  prove  fatal  to  the  party  in  the  long  run'.26  In  the  same  spirit, 
but  more  colourful,  was  the  article  by  D.  D.  Dubey,  who  an- 
nounced that  'in  this  party  the  blood-suckers  out-number  the 
people  who  are  really  ready  to  shed  their  blood'.  Lack  of  middle- 
class  support  and  workers  was,  he  continued, '  due  to  the  Rajas  and 
other  feudal  lords.  Nobody  is  prepared  to  work  with  them  because 
they  are  out-dated  and  ill-famed.  They  have  more  or  less  become 
the  backbone  of  the  Swatantra  Party.  It  is  high  time  that  the  great 
thinker,  Rajaji,  finds  out  a  way  to  get  rid  of  them  from  the  back- 
bone of  the  party. '  Failure  to  do  so,  Dubey  concluded,  would 
mean  'suicide,  after  a  brief  stage  show'  by  the  feudalists.27  The 
central  office  had  repeatedly  attempted,  unsuccessfully,  to  effect  a 
compromise,  by  assigning  spheres  of  influence  to  Paliwal  and 
Mankapur;  but  neither  was  happy  with  these  efforts.  Finally, 
Paliwal  resigned  from  the  party  in  the  fall  of  1963,  expressing 
doubts  about  its  '  Gandhian'  quality  and  objecting  to  the  nature  of 
the  UP  executive,  i.e.  the  ascendancy  of  the  'feudalists'.28  This 
sort  of  struggle  has  had  its  subdued  parallels  in  many  areas,  but 
nowhere  did  the  localized  aristocrat-anti-aristocrat  battle  assume 
the  vehemence  that  obtained  in  UP. 

It  should  be  clear,  however,  that  absence  of  conflict  is  by  no 
means  a  sign  of  a  satisfactory  state  of  affairs.  It  may  only  mean 

154 


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The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

that  one  group  so  overwhelmingly  dominates  a  state  unit  that 
others  are  deterred  from  joining,  thus  avoiding  a  conflict  situation. 
But  what  happens  if  the  dominant  group  in  a  state  is  an  aristo- 
cratic one?  Do  the  commoners,  in  other  party  units  or  at  the 
centre,  assert  their  positions? 

As  General- Secretary  of  the  national  party,  Masani  has  had  to 
worry  about  such  questions  for  organizational  reasons,  but  he  also 
worries  about  them  for  ideological  reasons,  as  there  is  good 
reason  to  doubt  the  aristocrats'  commitment  to  Swatantra  doctrine 
and  their  ability  (or  willingness)  to  speak  forcefully  for  the  interests 
of  the  private  industrial  sector.  The  fact  that  aristocratic  dominance 
in  so  many  northern  areas  has  deterred  professional  and  business 
interests  from  coming  into  the  party  is  a  related  problem. 

The  entry  of  the  aristocrats  has  also  received  attention,  because 
it  was  widely  heralded  by  opponents  of  Swatantra  as  a  sure  sign  of 
the  party's  submission  to  reactionary  interests.  Even  some  sympa- 
thetic sources  entered  caveats,  for  fear  that  the  party's  image  and 
appeal  would  suffer.  Swatantra  leaders  have  been  so  sensitive  about 
this  point  that  they  have  repeatedly  taken  pains  to  indicate  that 
there  are  more  aristocrats  in  the  Congress  than  in  Swatantra.  This, 
alas,  is  not  the  important  point:  the  fact  is  that  in  Swatantra,  these 
elements  completely  dominate  some  state  units,  as  they  do  not  in 
the  Congress;  and,  as  we  have  noted,  first  Ramgarh  and  then 
Gayatri  Devi  have  served  as  Vice-Presidents  of  the  national  party. 
What,  then,  has  been  Swatantra's  policy— -if  it  had  one  at  all—to- 
ward the  aristocrats? 

Least  persuasive  of  the  views  proffered  was  Rajaji's  statement 
that  entry  into  Swatantra  would  purify  unreconstructed  aristocrats 
(among  others)  much  as  a  dip  in  the  Ganges  would  help  to  expiate 
sins.29  More  pertinent  is  a  reminder  that  when  he  was  Governor- 
General,  Rajaji  did  seek  to  reconcile  the  princes  to  the  new  regime 
and  that  Menon  was  second  to  none  in  his  efforts  along  these  lines. 
Sardar  Patel's  policy  was,  to  repeat,  the  minimum  favoured  by  the 
Swatantra  founding  fathers. 

For  a  more  elaborate  statement  of  the  Swatantra  approach 
generally,  we  may  quote  Ruthnaswamy's  words  at  some  length: 

There  is  one  community,  especially,  which  has  recently  'swum  into  the 
ken'  of  the  Swatantra  Party  and  to  whom  a  special  appeal  is  due.  That 
is  the  community  of  the  princely  order. .  .deprived  of  the  opportunities 
of  political  work  which  they  had  enjoyed  and  used  for  centuries.  Now  in 

155 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

the  era  of  freedom  and  independence  new  opportunities  for  service  have 
opened  to  them.  From  rulers  in  India  they  have  become  citizens  of 
India.  And  as  citizens  they  have  a  right  to  take  part  in  the  political  life 
of  the  country.30 

The  last  point  is  not  as  trivial  as  it  might  sound,  because  some 
people  have,  in  fact,  challenged  this  right,  either  on  technical 
grounds  (as  recipients  of  certain  types  of  compensation  from  the 
government)  or  on  straightforward  political  grounds  (as  repre- 
sentatives of  reactionary  interests). 

Ruthnaswamy  had  more  important  things  to  say,  however.  He 
insisted  that  the  princes  should  be  politically  active,  because 
'members  of  this  order  have  the  education,  leisure,  and  the  inde- 
pendence which  come  from  the  possession  of  property,  the  ex- 
perience of  administration  which  will  enable  them  to  give  disin- 
terested service  to  the  country'31 — this  being  a  variation  on  the 
trusteeship  theme.  Moreover,  he  was  emphatic  that  modern 
political  life  was  organized  and  based  on  parties,  and  that,  as  a 
consequence,  politically  active  princes  should  not  contest  as 
independents,  but  as  party  men.32 

But  why  Swatantra,  and  what  must  the  princes  do  to  be  good 
Swatantrites?  On  the  first  point,  Ruthnaswamy  said: 

Of  all  the  parties  in  India  claiming  the  allegiance  of  the  princely  order, 
the  Swatantra  Party  is  the  one  that  ought  to  appeal  to  them  the  most. 
It  will  conserve  all  the  rights  and  liberties  guaranteed  to  them  in  the 
Covenants  they  concluded  with  the  Government  of  India. .  .The  prin- 
ciples of  the  Swatantra  Party  must  be  agreeable  to  them  for  it  will 
conserve  the  traditions  spiritual  and  secular  to  which  as  an  order  they 
are  attached ...  It  offers  them  opportunities  for  the  service  of  leadership.33 

On  the  second  point  he  said: 

all  they  have  to  do  is  to  step  down  from  the  high  places  in  which  they  have 
lived  and  moved  so  far.  They  must  cultivate  'the  common  touch'  of 
democracy,  rub  shoulders  with  and  act  with  the  common  people . . . 
They  will  have  to  work  hard  to  secure  the  knowledge. .  .to  become  wise 
and  competent  leaders  of  the  people.  They  have  only  to  follow  the 
example  of  the  English  aristocracy. .  .34 

Ideally,  then,  the  princes  should  be  well-rounded,  dedicated '  Tory 
democrats ',  who  are  reconciled  to  the  new  order. 

Ruthnaswamy  did  not  himself  explore  the  extent  of  this  recon- 
ciliation, which  would  have  been  a  most  revealing  exercise,  indeed. 

156 


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The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

However,  another  of  Swatantra's  more  modern  men,  Murthy, 
argued  that  Menon  had  made  much  progress  in  the  direction  of 
reconciling  the  princes  not  only  to  the  new  regime  but  to  associa- 
tion with  political  parties.  Similarly,  Vaidya  has  also  argued  that 
Swatantra  has  educated  the  princes  in  what  he  called  *  the  economic 
dimension  of  conservatism'.35  That  is,  in  his  view,  Swatantra  had 
induced  some  princes  to  go  beyond  a  bitter,  diffuse,  and  largely 
socio-political  anti-Congress  posture  and  to  become  more  rounded 
and  more  constructively  critical  in  their  opposition  to  the  ruling 
party.  Masani's  efforts  in  this  direction  are  unceasing  and  con- 
siderable; and,  as  we  have  seen,  there  were  grounds  for  both 
optimism  and  pessimism,  in  surveying  the  attitudes  of  Swatantra's 
aristocrats. 

Whether  India  would  be  better  off  with  princes  on  the  political 
sidelines  is  a  question  we  shall  not  attempt  to  answer;  but  if  the 
princes  are  going  to  participate  in  politics  against  the  Congress,  it 
is  probably  better  if  they  do  so  through  existing  political  institutions 
and  organized  parties,  thus  helping  to  establish  these  on  a  sounder 
footing  and  to  serve  the  modern  nation-state  and  the  processes 
which  make  it  function  effectively  on  a  competitive,  constitutional 
basis.  And  it  is  also  better  if  the  princes  who  participate  in  this 
fashion  do  so  with  well-rounded,  constructive  programmes.  Here, 
Swatantra's  self-interest  may  also  work  for  the  public  good,  if  the 
party's  efforts  in  political  education  are  successful.  But  that  is  a 
very  big  'if',  indeed. 

Some  Swatantra  leaders,  as  well  as  the  present  author,  remain 
unconvinced  by  the  arguments  about  or  prospects  of  princely 
'conversion'  on  a  wide  scale.  Most,  for  example,  were  quick  to 
agree  with  the  Gujarat  businessman  who  labelled  Ramgarh  'the 
Machiavelli  of  Bihar. .  .a  man  no  better  than  a  communist. .  .the 
end  justifies  the  means  '.36  Other  aristocrats  were  similarly  censured. 
But  while  many  leaders  felt  this  way,  none  supported  Paliwal's 
recommendation  that  princes  should  be  admitted  to  the  party  but 
should  not  hold  any  high  party  offices,  i.e.  he  would  try  to  force 
them  to  be  the  commoners  (of  sorts)  desired  by  Ruthnaswamy.37 
In  fact,  Ramgarh  received  much  support  from  party  leaders  in 
Madras,  in  Bombay  city,  and  in  other  'non-feudal'  areas.38 
Conflicts  with  Ramgarh  and  others  were  generally  suppressed  as 
much  as  possible  and  where  they  did  erupt,  they  were,  as  a  rule, 
very  much  localized.  The  explanation  and  the  implications  seem 

157 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

clear  enough:  with  very  few  exceptions,  only  those  for  whom  the 
ascendancy  of  the  aristocrats  makes  a  tangible  difference  in  terms  of 
power  have  done  battle  with  the  aristocrats.  For  most,  the  aristo- 
crats are  regarded  as  necessary  vote  banks  in  the  accretion  of 
Swatantra  strength.  This  view  was,  however,  reinforced  by  the 
feeling  that  efforts  by  the  national  party  to  tame  Ramgarh  and 
other  aristocrats  would  set  an  unhappy  precedent  for  action  against 
other  state  units,  aristocratic  or  not.39 

The  decisive  issue  has  been  the  maximization  of  anti-Congress 
support,  and,  for  this  reason,  even  many  of  Swatantra' s  more 
liberal  elements  felt  that ' petty'  differences  had  to  be  suppressed 
and  some  doubtful  elements  in  the  party  had  to  be  tolerated.  Rajaji 
made  this  quite  explicit  in  discussing  the  Ramgarh  affair,  which 
ended  with  the  dissolution  of  the  Bihar  unit  and  the  expulsion  of  the 
Raja  by  the  national  executive,  in  the  fall  of  1964: 

Quite  a  few  friends  from  all  parts  of  India  have  been  writing  to  me 
deploring  the  dissolution  of  the  Swatantra  Party  unit  in  Bihar.  Our 
biggest  legislative  party  was  there  and  naturally  all  persons  interested 
in  the  Swatantra  Party's  progress  are  shocked  and  grieved.  We  tried  to 
get  on  with  Sri  Kamakhya  Narain  Singh  and  his  group  all  these  years  in 
spite  of  many  complaints  from  other  friends  in  the  party  in  Bihar. 
Acharya  Ranga,  Sri  K.  M.  Munshi  and  I  supported  him  over  every 
complaint  and  kept  his  authority  in  tact  [sic],  because  we  thought  we 
should  not  weaken  his  hands  or  his  group. 

After  then  recounting  some  of  the  more  recent  developments, 
Rajaji  concluded. 

This  is  the  story  of  Bihar.  I  wish  to  assure  friends  that  it  is  with  the 
greatest  reluctance,  and  under  a  compelling  sense  of  duty,  that  we 
resolved  to  face  the  difficulties  of  beginning  on  a  clean  slate  in  Bihar  on 
democratic  lines.  We  have  sometimes  to  reconcile  ourselves  to  losing 
what  looks  like  strength,  when  that  strength  is  illusory  and  is  ac- 
companied by  dissension  and  total  failure  of  work.40 

What  Rajaji  did  not  say  is  that  the  party  would  probably  have  been 
humouring  Ramgarh  to  this  day  had  Ramgarh  not  taken  it  upon 
himself  to  seek  admission  to  the  Congress,  during  the  course  of  the 
crisis  in  Swatantra's  dealings  with  the  Bihar  unit.  He  also  did  not 
bother  to  note  that  some  other  Swatantra  aristocrats  are  little 
better  than  Ramgarh,  when  it  comes  to  functioning  on  *  democratic 
lines '. 

158 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

As  Rajaji's  statement  indicates,  Masani  was  not  among  those  who 
supported  Ramgarh  over  every  complaint;  and,  indeed,  it  was  in 
large  part  due  to  Masani's  handling  of  Ramgarh  that  the  crisis  came 
about.41  Certainly  Masani  kept  much  pressure  on  Ramgarh,  as  he 
did  on  Dungarpur  and  other  aristocrats  as  well.  The  cynics  could 
easily  say  that  this  was  due  to  Masani's  personal  irritation  at  not 
getting  a  safe  seat  from  Ramgarh  or  from  some  other  aristocrat 
and  they  could  point  to  the  fact  that  Masani  was  quite  prepared 
to  censure  Paliwal  and  Dube  for  their  anti-aristocratic  tirades.  But 
this  would  miss  a  main  point,  even  if  it  contained  a  germ  of  truth: 
Masani  has  a  vastly  different  conception  of  party  organization  and 
discipline  than  do  most  of  his  colleagues,  and  he  is  absolutely 
determined  to  assert  the  position  of  the  more  modern  elements  in 
the  party.  To  both  of  these  ends,  Masani  has  applied  pressure,  even 
where  the  matter  of  a  safe  seat  did  not  arise  and  even  where 
aristocrats  were  not  involved.  Here  is  where  the  social  composition 
and  the  broad  organizational  structure  of  Swatantra  overlap;  and 
for  this  reason,  we  must  restate  some  of  the  modern  perspectives 
and  digress  to  consider  some  more  general  organizational  matters, 
before  concluding  with  an  examination  of  Masani's  major  efforts  in 
this  direction. 

Briefly  restated,  the  issue  is  this.  The  more  modern,  urban,  and 
sometimes  more  liberal  elements  in  Swatantra  differ  sharply  in 
outlook  from  the  other  major  components  in  the  coalition,  whether 
aristocratic  or  not.  This  may  be  underscored,  for  example,  by 
noting  that  Paliwal,  although  anti-aristocratic,  complained  that  in 
the  Swatantra  mixture  of  Gandhism  and  modern  capitalism 
there  was  too  much  of  the  latter  for  his  taste.  And  the  fact  that 
many  aristocrats  are  involved  in  modern  industry  has  done  little 
to  blur  the  lines  of  demarcation  here :  even  those  who  are  them- 
selves important  industrialists  have  not  been  good  spokesmen  for 
private  enterprise  (cf.  Vaidya's  argument)  in  the  Lok  Sabha  or  in 
the  state  assemblies.  For  this  reason,  Masani  and  those  who  are 
most  closely  alined  with  him  have  sought  to  avoid  complete 
inundation  by  the  aristocrats  and  by  the  conservatives  more 
generally;  and  as  a  minimum  they  are  determined  to  see  that  more 
effective  spokesmen  for  modern  private  enterprise  sit  in  the  Lok 
Sabha.i2  Even  though  they  frequently  stress  the  points  that  all 
Swatantrites  allegedly  hold  in  common,43  and  even  though  they 
have  been  obliged  to  avoid  pressing  certain  positions  and  have 

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The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

compromised  others  widely,  they  have  by  no  means  abandoned 
the  field  completely.  In  their  efforts,  they  have  used  two  levers. 
One  is  their  heavy  involvement  in  formal  party  doctrine.  The 
second,  more  critical  lever,  used  with  greater  zeal  in  recent  years, 
is  the  real  or  potential  access  to  funds  in  the  modern  industrial 
sector,  which  Masani  and  a  few  others  have.  After  considering  some 
of  the  organizational  problems  related  to  the  balance  of  social 
forces  within  Swatantra,  we  shall  see  that  it  is  very  much  through 
the  power  of  the  rupee  that  Masani  et  al.  have  tried  to  assert  their 
position. 

SOCIAL  BASES  AND  PARTY  ORGANIZATION 

Swatantra's  organizational  problems  are  intimately  related  to  the 
way  in  which  the  party  grew  (i.e.  the  absorption  of  many  existing 
groups)  and  to  the  attitudes  of  those  who  came  into  the  party 
(i.e.  the  parochial  outlook  of  some,  the  aristocratic  aversion  to 
party  discipline).  It  is  certainly  incontestable  that  in  the  areas  of  its 
greatest  electoral  strength,  Swatantra  is  heavily  dependent  upon 
the  aristocrats;  but  elsewhere,  local  notables — both  aristocratic 
and  non-aristocratic — play  a  major  role.  Paliwal  may  have  accused 
Mankapur  and  others  of  trying  to  make  the  state  unit  of  the  party 
a  jagir  for  themselves  and  their  caste  brethren,  but  Paliwal  and 
others  like  him  were  no  less  anxious  to  establish  their  own  control 
over  particular  areas.  One  theme  running  through  discussions 
with  Swatantra  leaders  was  the  importance  of  the  notion,  *  there 
but  for  the  grace  of  God  go  I ',  as  it  pertained  to  efforts  to  regula- 
rize and  to  discipline  the  functioning  of  the  party. 

While  Masani,  in  particular,  was  anxious  to  establish  a  well- 
disciplined,  bureaucratically  organized  party,  which  would  func- 
tion on  the  basis  of  clearly  defined  procedures,  many  important, 
short-run  considerations  militated  against  this.  For  one  thing,  there 
was  an  almost  universal  use  of  co-option,  on  a  strictly  ad  hoc  basis, 
for  a  prolonged  period.  Thus,  as  a  local  notable  entered  the  party, 
or  as  an  existing  party  was  absorbed,  the  leading  individuals  were 
nominated  by  the  national  leadership  to  hold  state  leadership 
positions,  as  'convenors'  or  as  formal  office-bearers;  and  many 
were  immediately  co-opted  as  well  to  serve  in  national  offices  or  on 
the  party's  General  Council  and  the  Central  Organizing  Committee 
(COC).44  Particularly  in  view  of  the  way  the  party  grew,  this  was  a 
reasonable  approach  in  the  early  stages  of  party  development. 

1 60 


■rii^H^i^H^M 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

However,  continued  use  of  co-option  did  not  augur  well  for  the 
emergence  of  a  stable  organization  based  on  orderly  procedures; 
and  by  the  time  party  elections  were  held,  many  people  who  had 
been  co-opted  to  prominent  positions  were  very  well  entrenched, 
indeed.45 

The  frequent  demarcation  of  spheres  of  influence  within  a  state 
unit,  through  action  by  the  national  leaders,  further  indicates  the 
impact  on  organization  of  the  way  in  which  the  party  grew  and,  in 
turn,  created  further  obstacles  to  the  establishment  of  the  type  of 
party  desired  by  Masani.  In  those  cases  where  divergent  interests 
came  into  the  same  state  unit,  there  was  wide  recourse  to  this 
technique  of  'solving'  apparently  insoluble  problems.  Thus, 
Paliwal  and  Mankapur  were  assigned  different  spheres  of  in- 
fluence in  UP,  and  the  same  was  true  for  Ramgarh  and  Jankinandan 
Singh  in  Bihar.  The  problems  in  Rajasthan,  between  Raja  Man 
Singh  and  the  Rajputs  as  well  as  among  Rajputs  themselves,  led 
to  the  creation  of  a  zonal  division  of  the  state,  with  Gayatri  Devi 
and  Man  Singh  as  two  of  those  who  were  assigned  areas  over 
which  they  would  have  more  or  less  complete  control.  As  we  have 
already  seen,  Man  Singh  has  repeatedly  pressed  to  have  Bharatpur 
district  declared  completely '  off  limits '  to  the  state  leadership,  with 
which  he  gets  on  so  poorly.48  Power  struggles,  as  well  as  death, 
have  settled  some  of  the  underlying  problems;  but  where  they 
have  not  been  so  settled,  the  sphere  of  influence  principle  has  been 
difficult  to  overcome,  even  with  regular  party  election  procedures. 

Swatantra's  problems  here  must  be  differentiated  from  those 
which  exist  in  any  highly  pluralistic  society  and  in  federal  systems 
which  are  not  merely  formal,  wherein  essentially  local  interests  and 
parochial  feelings  will  take  shape  in  local  political  groupings  which 
resist  national  party  discipline.  For  one  thing,  in  many  pluralistic- 
federal  settings,  there  is  more  than  a  rudimentary  party  organiza- 
tion which  provides  a  framework  within  which  local  notables 
function  and  which  can  survive  even  after  a  major  defection.  In 
addition,  in  countries  where  the  electorate  is  politicized  and 
mobilized,  there  is  often  a  marked  identification  with  a  political 
party,  as  opposed  to  loyalty  to  an  individual  leader.  Swatantra,  at 
least  for  the  moment,  has  a  weak  bureaucratic  structure  within 
which  its  notables  function,  and  there  is,  not  surprisingly,  little 
identification  with  the  party  as  such.  This  is  particularly  important 
because  of  Swatantra's  dependence  on  aristocrats,  because  many 

ir  161 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

of  the  latter  retain  the  old  ' style'  and  inject  'feudal'  values  into 
the  party,  i.e.  they  tend  to  resist  regularization  of  party  control, 
either  from  above  or  from  below,  and  they  still  cherish  territorial 
control  on  the  basis  of  highly  personalized  loyalties.  (It  is  signifi- 
cant that  within  the  southern  units  of  the  party  the  sphere  of 
influence  principle  has  not  been  invoked,  suggesting  that  the 
conditions  which  have  given  rise  to  its  use  are  tied  to  the  presence 
of  aristocrats,  and  to  their  relations  with  one  another  and  with 
commoners.)  What  this  means,  however,  is  that  a  few  key  defections 
can  virtually  obliterate  entire  state  units — just  as  the  RRP  in 
Raj  as  than  was  virtually  destroyed  in  many  areas,  when  some  of  its 
key  standard  bearers  switched  to  Swatantra.  Much  depends,  of 
course,  on  who  the  local  leaders  are  and  on  how  fully  they  control 
the  local  scene;  but  by  and  large  it  can  be  said  that  a  very  small 
group  of  people  has  the  power  of  life-or-death  over  the  short-run 
future  of  Swatantra,  precisely  in  those  areas  where  its  electoral 
strength  has  been  greatest.47  In  this  sense,  Swatantra  seems  to  be 
little  more  than  an  umbrella  under  which  a  number  of  disparate 
elements  have  taken  refuge;  and,  to  pursue  the  analogy  a  bit 
further,  it  would  seem  quite  likely  that  if  it  either  stopped  raining 
or  if  someone  came  along  with  a  better  umbrella,  Rajaji  and  his 
colleagues  could  well  find  themselves  deserted.  This  is  one  of  the 
major  reasons  for  Masani's  concern. 

Other,  albeit  related  effects  of  an  organization  based  heavily  on 
local  notables  are  discernible  in  many  states  and  in  both  parlia- 
mentary and  extra-parliamentary  affairs.  Of  Swatantra's  strong- 
holds, Gujarat  has  consistently  given  the  least  trouble,  because  the 
principal  aristocratic  figure  at  the  state  level — Devgadh-Baria — 
has  proved  to  be  a  reasonably  co-operative  party  man,  amenable  to 
some  control  from  above,  at  least.  Still,  Devgadh-Baria's  other 
interests  and  commitments  have  kept  him  from  devoting  the 
necessary  time  to  his  role  as  General- Secretary  of  the  state  unit; 
and  this,  among  other  reasons,  was  responsible  for  the  major 
organizational  role  entrusted  to  H.  M.  Patel,  upon  his  entry  into 
Swatantra  in  1966.48  Orissa  has  given  little  trouble  here,  although 
grass-roots  organizational  work  continues  to  be  decidedly  limited; 
and  with  Faliwal's  resignation  and  Mankapur's  death,  the  problems 
in  UP  have  not  flared  up.  Rajasthan  and  Bihar  merit  attention  in 
detail. 

In  Rajasthan,  as  already  noted,  leadership  in  the  Swatantra 

162 


_!_«-!_ 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

Party  is  very  much  a  matter  of  seniority  in  the  Rajput  hierarchy. 
Dungarpur  was  almost  automatically  raised  to  the  positions  of 
state  President  and  leader  of  the  opposition  in  the  state  assembly. 
With  him  in  these  positions,  Swatantra  has  not  only  been  able  to 
survive  in  the  state  but  also  to  do  tolerably  well.  Furthermore,  in 
his  legislative  performance,  Dungarpur  introduces  a  measure  of 
dignity  and  restraint,  by  happy  contrast  with  the  disruptive  tactics 
preferred  by  some  Indian  legislators. 

The  negative  aspects  of  Dungarpur's  positions  are  also  evident, 
however.  His  rise  alienated  some  earlier  entrants  into  the  party. 
His  preference  for  associating  with  other  leading  Rajput  aristocrats 
and  for  attempting  to  organize  the  party  on  this  basis  has  not  only 
alienated  lesser  Rajputs  and  non-Rajputs,  but  it  has  also  meant  that 
other  aspects  of  building  up  the  party  have  been  neglected,  much 
to  Masani's  displeasure.  This,  in  turn,  led  to  an  effort  by  Masani  to 
appoint  a  special  organizer  who  would  tour  the  state,  to  do  the  job 
that  neither  Dungarpur  nor  the  General- Secretary,  Devi  Singh 
(Mandawa),  seemed  willing  to  do.49  As  part  of  his  general  approach, 
Dungarpur  doggedly  refused  to  clean  out  'dead  wood'  from  state 
cadres,  and  he  was  reluctant  even  to  eliminate  from  leadership 
rosters  the  names  of  some  individuals  who  were,  ostensibly,  no 
longer  connected  with  the  party,  because  to  do  so  would  have 
obliged  him  to  take  action  against  fellow  Rajput  aristocrats.50 

Another  episode  which  illustrates  Dungarpur's  negative  impact 
on  party  affairs  was  the  election  of  members  to  a  committee  in  the 
assembly,  where  Swatantra's  strength  would  have  justified  three 
committee  men.  At  one  of  the  relatively  infrequent  formal  party 
meetings — itself  an  index  of  Dungarpur's  style— three  names  were 
agreed  upon,  but  someone  reportedly  prevailed  upon  Dungarpur  to 
depart  from  the  agreed  list  and  to  name  him  as  a  party  candidate 
for  committee  assignment.  This  greatly  upset  Raja  Man  Singh  as 
well  as  some  younger  Rajputs  in  the  assembly  party,  but  in  part 
through  Man  Singh's  efforts,  all  four  men  were  ultimately  elected 
to  sit  on  the  committee  in  question.51  More  generally  demoralizing, 
both  inside  and  outside  the  assembly,  is  Dungarpur's  well-known 
view  that  he  has  'had  his  innings'  and  that  he  does  not  aspire  to 
become  state  chief  minister.52  Yet  it  has  proved  impossible  thus  far 
for  younger,  more  energetic,  and  in  many  ways  more  able  leaders 
to  come  to  the  fore  while  Dungarpur  is  at  the  helm  of  the  party. 
Even  by  relatively  modest  standards,  Dungarpur  is  an  ineffectual 

163 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

leader  and  the  Swatantra  unit  in  Rajasthan  is  a  travesty,  rising  from 
its  doldrums  only  when  a  handful  of  aristocrats  decide  some- 
thing must  be  done.  Opposition  to  Dungapur  is  by  no  means 
confined  only  to  non-Rajputs,  but  little  can  be  done  to  replace  him 
or  to  regularize  party  procedures  while  he  remains. 

The  entry  of  the  Maharani  had  comparable  effects,  although  she 
has  been  more  willing  than  Dungarpur  to  adapt  to  the  modern 
political  style.  Her  swift  rise,  too,  led  to  resentment  among  many 
long-standing  Swatantrites  and  many  were  upset  that  a  celebration 
was  held  in  her  honour  when  she  joined  the  party.  Others  sneered 
at  the  sum  (Rs.  5,000)  which  she  allegedly  contributed  to  the  party 
upon  her  entry  and  with  which  she  'bought'  the  party,  according 
to  these  critics.  Most  important  in  the  present  connection  was  her 
impact  on  the  organization  of  the  party.  As  the  great  Swatantra 
luminary  in  Rajasthan,  she  was  aware  of  her  critical  role,  but  as  a 
political  novice,  she  was  uncertain  as  to  the  best  way  of  establishing 
her  position  and  of  protecting  her  interests.  Thus,  she  is  reported 
as  insisting  that  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  joining  the  party,  the  state 
General-Secretary  must  be  a  man  whom  she  knew  and  trusted 
implicitly.  The  post  was  bestowed  almost  by  fiat  on  a  Rajput 
jagirdar  (the  aforementioned  Devi  Singh),  again  much  to  the 
consternation  of  many  other  Swatantrites.  At  a  later  juncture,  when 
Masani  secured  Dungarpur's  agreement  to  have  an  'organizing 
secretary '  appointed,  the  man  selected  was  Ayuwan  Singh,  one  of 
the  Maharani's  personal  assistants.  Neither  Devi  Singh  nor  Ayuwan 
Singh  have  particularly  happy  reputations  but  this  seemed  to  be 
no  deterrent:  loyalty  to  the  Maharani  outweighed  all  else.  No 
wonder  that  many  Swatantrites  in  Rajasthan  and  elsewhere  are 
disturbed  at  the  course  of  events.53 

The  moral  of  this  is  clear.  Dungarpur,  although  a  weak  leader, 
is  almost  unchallengeable  within  the  state,  as  is  the  Maharani. 
Organizational  efforts  have  been  pathetic,  and  no  one  in  the  state 
leadership  seems  willing  or  able  to  establish  a  stable,  bureaucratic 
organization  or  to  spread  the  Swatantra  message.  What  passes  for 
an  organization  is  heavily  dependent  on  the  wishes  and  whims  of 
the  leading  Rajputs.  Meetings  are  held  at  their  pleasure,  party 
officers  are  appointed  or  replaced  almost  at  their  pleasure.  Given 
this  pattern  of  events,  it  is  reasonably  clear  that  should  the  Maha- 
rani leave  the  party,  or  remain  in  it  but  lose  interest,  many  of  the 
Jagirdars  who  responded  to  her  call  would  probably  fall  by  the 

164 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

wayside,  leaving  Swatantra  little,  if  any  better  off  in  Raj  as  than 
than  it  was  before  the  Maharani's  entry  into  the  party. 

This  situation,  and  the  Rajput-Jat  problem  would  seem  to  con- 
stitute an  open  invitation  for  intervention  by  the  central  office, 
and  Masani  has  intervened  on  many  occasions.  He  has  sought  to 
establish  a  modus  vivendi  between  Rajput  and  Jat  but  has  largely 
failed  in  the  face  of  Rajput  recalcitrance;  he  has  sought  to  have 
Dungarpur  take  up  his  role  with  greater  zeal  and  to  refrain  from 
announcing  that  he  had '  had  his  innings '  again  with  little  successs ; 
he  has  sought  to  place  the  functioning  of  the  assembly  group  and 
of  the  state  unit  as  a  whole  on  a  more  regularized  basis,  but  again 
with  little  success.  As  we  shall  see  in  more  detail  subsequently, 
Masani  also  applied  considerable  pressure  to  have  Dungarpur  for- 
get his  dislike  for  Congressmen  and  to  seek  to  establish  cordial 
relations  with  Sampurnanand,  Governor  of  Raj  as  than  and  a  leading 
conservative  Congressman.  Even  in  the  matter  of  appointing  an 
*  organizing  secretary ',  about  which  he  felt  very  strongly,  Masani 
yielded  to  local  feelings  and  agreed  to  Ayuwan  Singh,  one  of  the 
last  men  in  the  state  unit  who  could  secure  the  confidence  of  Jats. 
In  sum,  Masani  has  thus  far  relied  primarily  on  persuasion  and 
even  this  has  elicited  resentment  and  charges  of  *  meddling'  among 
state  leaders,  although  not  openly  from  Dungarpur  or  Gayatri 
Devi.  Masani  would  dearly  love  to  establish  the  Rajasthan  unit  on 
a  sounder  footing,  but  thus  far  he  has  sought  to  do  so  within  the 
broad  framework  imposed  by  the  dominant  Rajput  interests  and 
related  patterns  of  deference.  Any  efforts  beyond  this  would  require 
steps  inimical  to  the  interests  of  Dungarpur  and  theMaharani,and 
neither  Masani  nor  other  national  leaders  have  been  willing  to  take 
this  risk  (cf.  Ramgarh).  It  is  little  wonder  that  many  Swatantra 
leaders  look  with  envy  upon  the  RSS-Jan  Sangh  cadres,  which  are 
more  stable,  more  disciplined,  and  more  likely  to  function  on  a 
sustained  basis  than  the  highly  personalized  and  more  traditional 
associations  upon  which  Swatantra  has  to  rely  in  many  states.54 

The  impulse  to  intervene  in  state  affairs  and  the  dangers  related 
thereto  are  best  illustrated  by  the  situation  in  Bihar.  As  we  have 
seen,  Ramgarh  was  one  of  the  earliest  entrants  into  the  party  and 
he  was  certainly  one  of  its  very  best  organizers,  which  could  not  be 
said  for  Dungarpur  or  Gayatri  Devi.  Although  some  Swatantra 
leaders  have  argued  that  the  Ramgarh- Janata  Party  forces  repre- 
sented a  minority  in  the  state  unit,  the  electoral  results  indicate  that 

165 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Swatantra  successes  were  virtually  co-extensive  with  Ramgarh's 
sphere  of  influence  in  the  state  unit.  A  tempestuous  and  headstrong 
man,  Ramgarh,  again  unlike  Dungarpur  and  Gayatri  Devi,  made 
abundantly  clear  his  determination  to  be  free  of  all  unnecessary 
encumbrances  on  his  personal  position — and  in  his  view  all  were 
unnecessary.  Given  his  undeniable  organizational  abilities,  and  his 
desire  for  complete  autonomy,  Ramgarh  (by  no  means  feeling  he 
had  £had  his  innings')  was  perhaps  an  obvious  choice  for  a  laissez 
faire  approach  on  the  part  of  the  central  party.  But  as  in  the  Rajas- 
than  case,  where  the  problem  with  Man  Singh  and  the  Jats 
obliged  the  central  office  to  take  cognizance  of  the  state  situation, 
there  was  a  serious  internal  rift  in  Bihar.  This,  again  coupled  with 
Masani's  determination  to  establish  a  modicum  of  party  discipline, 
set  the  stage  for  a  bitter  and  decisive  battle. 

The  seeds  of  conflict  were  sown  early  in  the  history  of  Swatantra 
in  Bihar  and  lay  in  the  differences  between  the  Ramgarh/ Janata  and 
the  Jankinandan  Singh/Jan  Congress  elements.  Very  quickly, 
however,  the  conflict  went  beyond  the  state  boundaries.  Masani's 
position  as  General- Secretary  obliged  him  to  take  cognizance  of 
difficulties  in  Bihar,  and  his  own  interest  in  securing  a  safe  con- 
stituency, possibly  in  Bihar,  reinforced  his  official  concern. 
Munshi's  friendship  with  the  Darbhanga  family  added  another 
dimension  to  the  problem.  The  conflict  was  by  no  means  unex- 
pected, and  with  two  such  strong  personalities  as  Masani  and 
Ramgarh  involved,  it  had  the  potential  to  become  a  very  bitter  one, 
indeed. 

On  Ramgarh's  part,  there  were  a  number  of  provocations — 
whether  intentional  or  unintentional  we  cannot  say — of  the  centre 
and  of  Masani  in  particular.  Ramgarh  was  generally  not  very 
responsive  to  requests  for  information  about  the  state  unit  of  the 
party,  and,  for  example,  certain  information  about  party  nominees 
for  public  office  was  not  forwarded  to  the  central  office  as  requested. 
Similarly,  the  list  of  names  for  election  to  the  Rajya  Sabha  was  not, 
in  Masani's  view,  properly  cleared  with  the  Parliamentary  Sub- 
Committee  of  the  COC.  Also  irritating  to  Masani  was  Ramgarh's 
successful  appeal  to  the  Election  Commission  that  he  be  permitted 
to  retain  the  'bicycle'  symbol  of  the  Janata  Party  for  the  1962 
elections.  This  was  an  indication  that  Ramgarh  considered  the 
Bihar  unit  virtually  co-terminous  with  Janata,  which  was  not  far 
off  the  mark,  and,  in  terms  of  communicating  with  the  electorate, 

166 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

Ramgarh's  request  made  much  sense.  For  Masani,  however,  this 
was  a  sign  that  Ramgarh  was  not  disposed  to  be  a  good  party  man, 
and  a  plausible  interpretation  was  that  Ramgarh  was  anxious  to 
protect  his  political  future — which  did  not  necessarily  include 
Swatantra — by  retaining  the  Janata  symbol55 

Throughout  1961  there  were  serious  problems  in  Bihar,  and  the 
central  office  attempted  to  resolve  some  of  them  by  ordering  a  re- 
organization of  the  state  executive,  to  make  it  more  representative 
of  different  interests  in  the  state,  and  by  the  aforementioned 
technique  of  delimiting  spheres  of  influence,  both  of  which 
Ramgarh  doggedly  tried  to  subvert.  The  situation  became  so  bad 
that  not  only  were  Jankinandan  Singh  and  his  group  given  the 
right  to  designate  the  candidates  for  certain  districts  and  to  dis- 
burse certain  funds,  without  reference  to  Ramgarh,  but  Ramgarh 
was  also  requested  to  stay  out  of  those  districts  for  a  specified 
length  of  time.  This  caused  tremendous  resentment  among  the 
Ramgarh  forces,  who  felt  quite  rightly  that  they  constituted  the 
hard  core  of  the  state  unit,  that  Ramgarh  was  the  most  effective 
organizer  in  the  state,  and  that  as  President  of  the  state  unit,  he 
ought  not  to  be  deprived  of  the  right  to  screen  candidates  and  to 
travel  at  will  on  behalf  of  the  party.  There  is  some  evidence  to 
show  that  Ramgarh-designated  'independents'  stood  against 
Jankinandan  Singh's  official  party  nominees,  in  a  move  calculated 
to  subvert  the  latter' s  position  and  to  show  that  Ramgarh  was  the 
only  man  to  be  reckoned  with  in  the  Bihar  unit.  After  the  elections, 
in  which  Ramgarh  fared  less  well  than  he  had  hoped,  these  accumu- 
lated grievances  came  to  the  surface,  in  a  bold  move  by  Ramgarh 
to  establish  himself  as  'king'  of  Swatantra  in  Bihar  and  to  weaken 
the  position  of  Munshi  and  Masani,  particularly  the  latter.56 

The  principal  vehicle  for  Ramgarh's  attack  on  the  central  office 
was  an  appeal  from  the  Bihar  unit  of  the  party,  submitted  to  the 
General  Council  of  Swatantra  while  Ramgarh,  who  was  in  ill- 
health,  was  in  Europe.  There  was  no  doubt,  however,  that  it 
accurately  represented  Ramgarh's  personal  sentiments,  for  it  was  a 
lengthy  catalogue  of  alleged  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  central  office 
to  meddle  in  Bihar  affairs  and  to  subvert  Ramgarh's  personal 
position,  with  the  result  that  Swatantra  in  Bihar  fell  far  short  of 
expectations  electorally  and  was  in  a  state  of  demoralization  and 
disarray.  According  to  the  appeal,  if  only  Masani,  et  al.>  would 
have  refrained  from  meddling  and  allowed  Ramgarh  to  have 

167 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

complete,  unrestricted  control  of  the  Bihar  unit,  Swatantra  would 
have  been  much  better  off — and  there  were  many  people  outside 
of  Bihar  who  fully  agreed  with  this  view.  The  reason  for  Masani's 
intervention,  according  to  the  appeal,  was  his  difficulty  in  securing 
a  safe  seat. 

The  matter  came  to  a  head  early  in  1963,  when  the  appeal  was 
considered  by  the  General  Council,  which  had  also  been  advised  of 
Masani's  threat  to  resign  if  the  appeal  were  sustained.  Each  side 
had  deputed  certain  people  to  line  up  supporters  prior  to  the 
meeting,  which  ended  with  at  least  a  nominal  victory  for  Masani.57 
Ramgarh,  almost  obsequiously  contrite  for  having  been  associated 
with  an  appeal  which  was  somehow  ( !)  misconstrued  as  an  attack 
on  the  party's  leaders,  was  prevailed  upon  to  withdraw  it,  and  this 
action  was  followed  by  an  explicit  vote  of  confidence  in  Munshi 
and  Masani.  All  of  this  fully  satisfied  none  of  the  principals,  but 
Ramgarh,  who  had  been  forced  to  eat  a  modest  amount  of  crow, 
was  far  less  pleased  than  Masani.  But  even  many  of  the  more 
modern  interests  in  the  Party  felt  that  Ramgarh  was  too  valuable  to 
offend  and  felt  that  Masani  himself  had  gone  too  far  in  provoking 
the  Raja. 

In  the  aftermath  of  the  elections  and  the  bitterness  flowing  from 
the  outcome  of  the  appeal  to  the  General  Council,  Ramgarh,  still 
in  control  of  his  bicycle  symbol,  came  to  consider  a  restoration 
of  the  Janata  Party,  which  had  disappeared  in  name  only.  In 
addition  to  long-standing  grievances,  there  was  a  more  recent  one. 
During  the  1961  election  campaign,  a  very  substantial  loan  was 
secured  by  the  Raja  from  the  Central  Bank  of  India  (the  'Tata 
bank',  of  which  Mody  was  chairman  of  the  board)  to  purchase  jeeps 
for  the  state  unit  of  the  party.  After  the  election,  Ramgarh  failed  to 
commence  repaying  the  loan,  claiming  that  the  party  as  a  whole, 
not  he  personally  or  the  state  unit,  was  responsible  for  this  debt. 
The  Central  Bank  then  brought  suit  against  Ramgarh  who  tried  in 
vain  to  have  the  court  declare  the  Swatantra  Party  as  the  responsible 
party.  This  incident,  which  suggests  the  manner  in  when  the  men 
who  control  funds  can  seek  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  local 
leaders,  was  regarded  by  Ramgarh  as  an  obvious,  malicious  move, 
inspired  by  Masani,  to  'break'  him.58 

Relations  between  Ramgarh  and  the  Swatantra  leaders  were, 
thus,  very  poor  and  the  situation  in  the  Bihar  unit  was  just  as  poor 
and  deteriorating.  As  indices  of  this,  the  party's  first  candidate 

168 


m^m 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

(Parmanand  Kejriwal,  a  businessman)  for  the  Rajya  Sab  ha  was 
not  elected,  because  Swatantra  MLAs  withheld  votes  from  him, 
while  the  second  candidate  (the  Raja  of  Bilaspur)  was  elected;  and 
a  similar  incident  occurred  in  an  election  for  the  state  Legislative 
Council,  which  is  also  indirectly  elected.  Moreover,  twelve 
Swatantra  MLAs,  opposed  to  Ramgarh,  defected  from  the  party 
and  applied  for  member  ship  in  the  Congress.  At  this  juncture, 
Ramgarh  succeeded  in  passing  a  resolution  to  expel  Jankinandan 
Singh  from  the  party,  and  at  the  same  time  he  belaboured  his  old 
political  adversary,  Chief  Minister  K.  B.  Sahay,  for  f  attempting  to 
kill  democracy  in  the  State',  by  weaning  away  members  of  opposi- 
tion parties.  This,  Ramgarh  said,  was  in  direct  violation  of  the 
National  Integration  Committee's  directive  concerning  political 
parties,  and  he  warned  that  'naziism,  fascism  and  some  other  form 
of  dictatorship  will  emerge  if  the  Opposition  parties  are  wiped  out 
one  by  one'.59 

The  central  office  of  the  party  demanded  a  full  account  of  the 
disintegration  and  '  demoralization '  of  the  Bihar  unit,  but  this  was 
not  forthcoming.  As  a  result,  the  national  executive,  through 
Munshi,  dissolved  the  state  unit,  another  in  a  long  series  of  actions 
taken  against  the  state  unit  by  the  centre.60  Coupled  with  the  other 
difficulties  with  the  central  office,  this  action  pushed  Ramgarh 
even  further  toward  defection.  Driven  to  despair  by  his  difficulties 
with  Masani  and  still  nursing  a  long-standing  grudge  against 
Sahay,  who  was  then  the  Chief  Minister  of  Bihar,  Ramgarh  came 
to  feel  that  the  time  was  ripe  to  seek  entry  into  the  Congress  and  to 
throw  his  weight  behind  Sahay's  opponents,  the  so-called  non- 
ministerial  wing  of  the  party.  This  seemed  more  likely  to  lead  to 
power,  pelf  and  privilege  than  did  continued  participation  in 
Swatantra;  and  at  the  same  time  it  gave  Ramgarh  hope  that  he 
could  even  the  score  with  Sahay.  Finally,  Ramgarh  applied  for 
entry  into  the  Congress,  and  he  obviously  spoke  as  well  for  the 
overwhelming  number  of  Swatantra  MPs  and  MLAs  in  Bihar.61 

The  national  executive  discussed  these  developments  and  con- 
sidered an  appeal  from  Ramgarh  against  the  decision  to  dissolve 
the  state  unit.  Confronted  with  the  fact  that  Ramgarh  had  already 
asked  to  be  admitted  to  the  Congress,  the  national  executive 
rejected  the  appeal  and  expelled  Ramgarh  and  one  other  state 
leader  from  the  party.  The  national  executive  insisted,  however, 
that  all  other  state  office-holders,  MPs,  MLAs,  etc.,  were,  in  its 

169 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

own  eyes,  still  members  in  good  standing  in  the  party,  even  though 
most  of  the  MLAs  had  affixed  their  signatures  to  the  request  for 
Congress  membership.62 

The  expulsion  may  seem  to  have  been  quite  academic,  given 
Ramgarh's  negotiations  with  the  Congress.  It  was,  however,  at 
least  marginally  important  and  still  required  a  modicum  of  courage, 
just  as  the  fairly  steady  pressure  maintained  by  Masani  on  Ramgarh 
required  some  courage.  Whatever  inspired  Masani  to  bring  such 
pressure  to  bear,  it  was  clear  from  the  outset  that  it  was  going  to 
antagonize  Ramgarh.  This  meant  that  Masani,  at  least,  was  not  so 
desperate  to  maximize  the  anti-Congress  effort  that  complete 
laissez  faire  would  be  observed  in  state  units.  Similarly,  the 
expulsion  of  Ramgarh  from  the  party  meant  that  it  would  be 
more  difficult  to  re-establish  him  in  Swatantra,  if  the  Congress 
turned  a  deaf  ear,  as  had  been  the  case  until  1966.  The  party's 
declaration  that  all  other  Bihar  party  men  were  considered  mem- 
bers in  good  standing,  even  though  many  had  joined  Ramgarh  in 
applying  for  Congress  membership,  flowed  in  part  from  the  desire 
to  make  it  easier  to  reconstitute  the  Bihar  unit,  if  Kamaraj  turned 
the  applications  down;  and  Dahyabhai  Patel  was  sent  by  the  party 
to  salvage  as  much  as  he  could  in  Bihar,  in  co-operation  with  some 
'loyalists'.  Thus,  for  all  practical  purposes,  ended  the  Ramgarh 
affair,  as  far  as  Swatantra  was  concerned;  and  here,  as  earlier,  the 
party  high  command  was  praised  by  various  journalists  for  re- 
fusing to  allow  Ramgarh  to  function  unchecked.63 

The  Ramgarh  affair  points  up  many  aspects  of  Swatantra's 
internal  functioning,  as  well  as  of  the  context  in  which  it  functions. 
Masani's  sense  of  party  organization,  his  own  personal  political 
interests,  his  influence  in  the  realm  of  finance,  his  impatience  and 
quick  temper,  were  all  evident  here.  On  Ramgarh's  side  there  was 
an  imperiousness  and  arrogance,  and  a  determination  to  be  an 
autocrat,  which  offended  many,  both  inside  and  outside  the  state, 
and  which  revealed  one  aspect  of  the  aristocratic  ethos  at  its  worst. 
From  Rajaji  we  have  the  admission  that  he,  Ranga  and  Munshi — 
and  most  other  Swatantra  leaders,  for  that  matter — bent  over 
backward  to  keep  Ramgarh  happy,  in  the  interests  of  their  anti- 
Congress  crusade,  subordinating  their  doubts  and  criticisms  to 
this  end.  With  respect  to  the  Congress,  we  see  that  factionalism 
provided  an  opportunity  for  exploitation  by  outside  interests  and 
that  political  alinements  in  India  are  still  extremely  fluid. 

170 


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The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

What  is  most  pertinent  in  the  present  context  is  that  Ramgarh's 
departure  has  virtually  destroyed  Swatantra  in  Bihar,  notwith- 
standing some  brave  words  by  the  central  office.  With  at  least 
five  MPs  and  most  of  the  fifty  Swatantra  MLAs  in  his  pocket, 
Ramgarh  has  amply  demonstrated  that  Swatantra's  largely  de- 
rivative organization  is  very  precarious.  Commenting  on  a  reported 
visit  by  Masani  to  reorganize  the  Bihar  unit,  Ramgarh  overstated 
only  slightly  when  he  said,  *  there  is  nothing  left  now  in  this  state 
to  be  reorganized.  Mr  Masani  will  have  to  start  from  scratch.'64  The 
same  would  be  true  if  a  few  other  key  aristocrats  were  to  leave  the 
party  in  other  states. 

PARTY  FINANCE 

Party  finance  is  of  great  importance  for  a  variety  of  obvious  reasons. 
Funds  are  necessary  for  the  normal  bureaucratic  activities,  for  the 
inevitable  transportation  and  propaganda  involved  in  an  electoral 
campaign,  and  for  other  basic  requirements.  Further,  in  the 
absence  of  dedicated  volunteers,  funds  are  necessary  to  secure  paid 
workers  to  perform  some  of  these  tasks. 

Beyond  this,  however,  finances  are  critical.  Assuming  that  a 
party  is  anxious  to  contest  a  sufficient  number  of  seats  to  make  an 
impact — usually  enough  seats  so  that  it  is  mathematically  possible 
for  it  to  form  a  government  if  it  wins  all  or  most  of  them — the 
quantum  of  funds  available  determines  in  large  measure  the  options 
which  will  be  open  to  the  party.  If  resources  are  no  problem,  then 
the  party  leaders  (or  those  who  control  the  funds)  can  seek  to  set 
up  those  candidates  who  are  most  congenial  to  them,  who  are 
ideologically  sympathetic,  reasonably  hard  workers,  etc.,  or  at 
least  people  who  combine  some  of  these  qualities  with  local 
appeal.  In  the  absence  of  ample  funds,  however,  a  high  premium  is 
put  on  self-financing  candidates  or  on  notable  local  figures  who 
can  win  with  a  modest  expenditure  of  funds.  In  this  case,  the 
central  party  organization  becomes  extremely  dependent  on  such 
candidates  and  is  not  likely  to  establish  substantial  control  over 
them.65 

Shortage  of  funds  also  makes  the  party  less  attractive  to  possible 
recruits.  In  the  case  of  Swatantra,  this  is  especially  true  regarding 
some  right-wing  Congressmen  who  might  well  be  sympathetic  to 
the  party  but  who  might  also  require  financial  support  and  some 
modest  prospect  of  getting  elected,  if  they  are  to  join.  It  is  naive  to 

171 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

expect  veteran  politicians  to  commit  their  futures  to  a  party— 
especially  a  new  one— if  a  decent  prospect  for  public  office  does  not 
exist.  In  sum,  this  makes  it  difficult  to  rally  the  potential  faithful  and 
it  induces  many  to  bore  from  within  the  Congress  rather  than  to 
go  into  opposition.  This  helps  to  account  for  the  fact  that  Swa- 
tantra has  drawn  so  heavily  on  elements  who  either  never  were  in 
the  Congress  or  who  were  'power-marginal'  within  the  Congress; 
and  it  also  helps  to  account  for  the  general  tendency  of  opposition 
parties  to  put  up  a  number  of  Congress  'rejects'  as  candidates.66 

Thirdly,  party  discipline  and  party  doctrine  are  likely  victims 
of  insufficiency  of  funds.  It  is  not  uncommon  in  India  for  a  Lok 
Sabha  candidate  to  spend  Rs.  75,000  to  Rs.  100,000  and  even 
quite  prosperous  people  do  not  look  forward  to  that  sort  of 
expenditure  with  equanimity.  Those  who  are  willing  to  pay  their 
own  way  on  such  a  scale  are  not  likely  to  submit  to  the  discipline  of 
a  party  which  does  little  else  but  give  encouragement  and,  perhaps, 
lend  some  modest  prestige  to  a  candidacy. 

Notwithstanding  the  ties  of  some  leading  Swatantrites  with 
Bombay  and  other  business  interests  and  its  reputation  as  a  rich 
man's  party,  Swatantra  confronted  all  of  these  problems  in  acute 
form  in  1962.  As  we  have  seen,  Masani  has  been  anxious  to  dis- 
abuse people  of  the  idea  that  the  Swatantra  treasury  is  a  bottom- 
less pit  from  which  all  would-be  candidates  can  be  well  supplied. 
Rajaji,  with  considerable  justification,  said  that '  the  very  rich  are  in 
the  grip  of  the  ruling  party';  and  as  Mody  put  the  matter,  most 
businessmen  'are  busy  cultivating  the  ruling  party'  and  though 
belaboured,  periodically  they  get  their  due.67  G.  D.  Birla,  one  of 
India's  pre-eminent  businessmen,  suggested  as  much  when  he 
told  a  business  gathering  'that  Swatantra  politics  were  not  good 
businessmen's  polities',  and  a  writer  generally  hostile  to  Swatantra 
grudgingly  conceded  that '  indications  are  that  India's  industrialists 
and  capitalists  do  not  want  to  burn  their  boats  with  that  Party'.68 
Suffice  to  say,  Swatantra's  treasury  at  the  national  level  was  of 
modest  proportions  even  though  many  of  its  policy  recommenda- 
tions were  very  congenial  to  India's  capitalists. 

Swatantra,  for  a  time,  sought  to  underscore  the  superior  financial 
position  of  the  Congress  by  recommending  a  ban  on  all  corporate 
contributions  to  political  parties;  but  there  was  no  immediate 
prospect  for  such  a  ban.  While  reiterating  the  party's  position  that 
corporate  gifts  should  be  banned,  Masani  said  that  if  they  were  to 

172 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

be  permitted,  *  we  want  a  fair  share  of  it ',  and  Rajaji  and  Mody  took 
the  lead  here.69 

The  nature  of  the  Swatantra  appeal  is  instructive  in  terms  of  the 
party's  aims  and  its  assessment  of  the  prevailing  climate  of  opinion 
in  the  business  communities.  Swatantra  leaders  sent  letters  to  two 
key  businessmen — J.  R.  D.  Tata  and  Dharamsey  Khatau — who 
were  known  to  be  sympathetic  to  the  party,  asking  for  funds  for 
Swatantra.  The  request  emphasized  the  need  for  a  strong,  con- 
stitutional alternative  to  the  Congress,  if  parliamentary  democracy 
were  to  flourish  in  India;  and  Swatantra  was,  of  course,  presen- 
ted as  that  alternative.  At  the  same  time,  the  letter  cited  the  role 
of  the  Congress  in  achieving  independence  and  stability  in  the 
country  and  encouraged  continued  support  to  the  Congress  for 
that  reason.  In  short,  Swatantra  leaders  tried  to  provide  business- 
men with  a  rationale  for  giving  to  both  Swatantra  and  the  Congress, 
and  that  rationale  was  not  couched  solely  in  terms  of  explicit 
business  self-interest.70 

When,  as  expected,  Tata  and  Khatau  responded  favourably  to 
the  appeal,  Swatantra  circulated  copies  of  the  Tata-Khatau 
replies,  together  with  a  further  request  for  funds  by  Rajaji  or  Mody, 
to  scores  of  other  businessmen.  The  latter  were  thus  provided  with 
evidence  that  some  leading  industrialists  were  willing  to  support 
Swatantra  and  with  a  reason  for  doing  the  same,  viz.  to  help 
develop  an  opposition  party,  which  only  'incidentally 'happened  to 
be  markedly  more  pro-private  enterprise  than  other  major  parties. 

The  result  of  Swatantra's  courtship  of  the  business  communities 
fell  far  below  party  hopes  and  needs,  and  only  a  few  businessmen 
were  openly  identified  with  the  party,  but  that  was  expected.  More 
importantly,  the  party's  hopes  for  a  'fair  share'  of  corporate  con- 
tributions were  not  fulfilled.  Between  2  February  i960  and  1  March 
1961,  the  central  office  received  donations  of  a  modest  Rs.  250,000. 
The  appeal  for  funds  outlined  above  led  to  further  contributions  of 
Rs.  3,200,000  between  1  April  1961  and  1  July  1962,  the  latter  date 
falling  after  the  election  period.  There  were  some  very  substantial 
donations  during  this  period,  including:  Rs.  400,000  from  Tatas, 
Rs.  300,000  from  Indian  Iron  and  Steel,  Rs.  200,000  from  Associ- 
ated Cement,  and  about  Rs.  200,000  from  the  Martin  Burn  group 
of  industries.  There  were  a  number  of  contributions  ranging 
between  Rs.  25,000  and  Rs.  50,000,  mainly  from  the  Bombay- 
Baroda  area.  Finally,  there  were  contributions  of  approximately 

173 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Rs.  1,000,000  from  donors  who  asked  to  remain  anonymous,  lest 
their  support  for  Swatantra  hurt  their  relations  with  the  Congress. 
Most  of  these  firms,  as  well  as  most  of  the  anonymous  donors,  gave 
more  money  to  the  Congress  than  to  Swatantra,  and  most  of 
India's  leading  businessmen  gave  only  to  the  Congress.  Symbolic 
of  this  was  Bhailalbhai  Patel's  claim  that  a  group  of  Ahmedabad 
textile  men  whom  he  approached  (at  the  state  level)  ultimately 
gave  Rs.  750,000  to  the  Congress  but  only  Rs.  5,000  to  Swatantra. 
As  far  as  this  author  has  been  able  to  determine,  Nehru's  threat  to 
reject  any  gifts  from  a  firm  that  also  gave  to  Swatantra  remained 
an  idle  one.71 

As  the  election  approached,  it  became  clear  that  the  projected 
national  campaign  fund  of  slightly  over  Rs.  5,000,000  would  not 
materialize.  The  central  office  repeatedly  sent  out  the  bad  news 
that  it  would  have  to  trim  its  aspirations  and  to  renege  on  some 
promises.72  All  candidates  for  Parliament  who  were  scheduled  to 
receive  financial  aid  from  the  central  office  were  advised  that  instead 
of  the  Rs.  40,000-50,000  promised,  the  available  funds  permitted 
only  Rs.  20,000  to  be  disbursed.  They  were  also  advised,  however, 
that  a  last-minute  appeal  for  funds  would  be  made  to  increase 
this  to  Rs.  30,000  per  candidate,  and  the  evidence  indicates  that 
this  was  finally  achieved.73 

The  precise  figures  are  not  of  great  importance,  because  it  is 
evident  that  Swatantra  was  in  difficult  financial  straits.  Interviews 
and  party  files  make  it  clear  that  relations  with  many  state  units 
and  many  key  individuals  were  severely  strained,  as  a  result  of  the 
inability  of  the  central  office  to  meet  its  financial  obligations. 

What  was  even  more  distressing  to  Swatantra  leaders  was  the 
expectation  on  the  part  of  many  wealthy  aristocrats  that  they,  too, 
get  their  '  fair  share '  of  election  funds  from  the  national  treasury, 
and  the  Maharani  of  Jaipur  was  among  them.  To  illustrate  this 
expectation  in  a  different  situation,  we  need  only  note  the  cir- 
cumstances attendant  upon  the  appointment  of  one  of  the  Maha- 
rani's  personal  assistants  as  the  special  organizing  secretary  for 
Rajasthan.  In  the  course  of  the  discussions  it  was  estimated  that  a 
minimum  of  Rs.  4,800  would  be  required  to  secure  the  services  of 
the  man  whom  they  wanted.  When  asked  by  a  representative  of  the 
central  office  if  the  Maharani  would  'foot  the  entire  bill',  a  state 
leader  said  that  she  would  not,  and  would  not  contribute  at  all, 
unless  the  state  party  and  the  central  office  contributed  as  well. 

174 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

When  asked  if  the  Maharani  would  pay  half  the  amount,  the  state 
leader  replied  that  equal  shares  alone  would  probably  be  acceptable, 
and  it  was  decided  that  the  Maharani,  the  state  party,  and  the 
central  office  each  contribute  Rs.  i,6oo  per  annum  for  the  organi- 
zer's salary  and  expenses.  That  such  a  laborious  discussion  should 
take  place  over  Rs.  4,800  suggests  neither  a  generous  aristocracy 
nor  a  well-filled  central  party  treasury.74  What  this  suggests 
further  is  that  some  local  notables  feel  that  they  cannot  only  demand 
money  but  also  refuse  to  submit  to  party  discipline,  because 
Swatantra  needs  them  more  than  they  might  need  Swatantra. 

In  light  of  such  developments,  it  is  little  wonder  that  Masani 
emphasized  'two  basic  reasons'  for  the  party's  'distressing 
experience'  in  the  financial  realm: 

The  first  is  the  supine  and  cowardly  attitude  of  the  larger  part  of  Big 
Business  in  India,  which,  aside  from  a  few  honourable  exceptions  who 
practice  enlightened  free  enterprise,  continues  to  turn  its  back  on  a  Party 
that  stands  for  a  way  of  life  in  which  free  enterprise  can  flourish,  while 
lavishing  its  financial  support  on  the  ruling  Party  which  is  progressively 
engaged  in  destroying  a  free  economy. 

All  one  can  do  is  to  deplore  the  fact  that  fear  of  reprisals  from  those  in 
office  under  a  highly  controlled  economy  and  the  short-sightedness  of 
those  who  wish  to  make  a  quick  rupee  through  obtaining  permits  and 
licenses  should  thus  combine  with  an  inadequate  awareness  of  the  need 
to  make  sacrifices  for  a  way  of  life  in  which  one  believes.  The  party 
must  persist  in  its  work  in  the  strong  conviction  that,  however  unworthy 
the  attitude  of  many  of  those  in  business  may  be,  it  has  to  work  for  the 
cause  of  a  free  society  of  which  competitive  free  enterprise  is  an  integral 
part. 

The  second  reason  for  the  Party's  financial  plight  is  the  failure  of 
Party  members  to  contribute  adequately  from  their  own  pockets . . .  and 
to  collect  small  contributions  from  those  in  their  respective  towns  and 
villages.  Small  contributions  in  the  way  of  the  poor  man's  mite  spread 
over  a  large  number  of  people  can  give  just  as  much  money  and  in  a 
manner  much  more  satisfying  to  all  concerned  than  dependence  on  a 
small  number  of  people  with  means.75 

Swatantra  may  have  had  relatively  wealthy  leaders  and  it  may  have 
spoken  on  behalf  of  men  of  property  in  both  rural  and  urban  India. 
In  these  respects  alone  was  it  a  'rich  man's  party'.  No  one  who  has 
seen  the  party's  financial  records  would  conclude  that  it  was 
generously  supported  by  India's  richest  men. 

175 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

In  the  months  between  the  1962  elections  and  Nehru's  death, 
and  particularly  after  the  Chinese  invasion  and  its  aftermath, 
Swatantra's  financial  future  seemed  brighter,  although  aspirations 
could  well  have  run  higher  as  well.  Reports  from  Baroda  and  Jaipur, 
for  example,  indicated  greater  sympathy  and  support  for  Swa- 
tantra from  some  locally  prominent  businessmen.  Also  important 
was  the  increasing  support  from  Ahmedabad  textile  interests 
which  had  been  very  reticent  prior  to  the  1962  elections.76  This  is 
particularly  important,  because  it  could  help  to  tilt  the  balance  in 
Gujarat  more  toward  the  modern,  capitalist  side  (both  urban  and 
rural)  than  it  is  elsewhere. 

This  improved  prospect  flowed  in  part  from  Swatantra's 
respectable  showing  in  1962,  coupled  with  a  certain  post-invasion 
boldness  on  the  part  of  anti-Nehru  and  anti-leftist  forces.  Further- 
more, those  who  had  supported  Swatantra  seemed  to  have  *  gotten 
away  with  it',  although  there  have  been  arguments  to  the  con- 
trary. However,  to  capitalize  on  this,  Swatantra  could  not  rest  on 
its  past  laurels.  Its  organization  had  to  be  stabilized  and  to  be  kept 
trim,  if  the  party  were  to  build  upon  the  accumulated  grievances 
of  the  population.  Yet,  in  many  areas,  this  was  not  done.  Stagna- 
tion has  set  in  in  Raj  as  than  and  in  some  other  states,  and  the  unit 
in  Bihar  has  disintegrated.  This  is  not  the  sort  of  situation  which  is 
likely  to  induce  India's  captains  of  industry  to  'burn  their  boats' 
with  Swatantra  in  1967  any  more  than  they  were  willing  to  in  1962. 
Furthermore,  business  support  is  contingent  upon  another  matter 
in  which  Swatantra  has  been  deficient:  returning  its  ablest  pro- 
private  enterprise  spokesmen  to  the  Lok  Sabha,  and  this  in  turn 
depends  on  the  ability  of  the  more  modern  wing  of  the  party  to 
assert  itself  in  the  face  of  the  more  conservative  elements.  In  short, 
Swatantra  must  consolidate  and  strengthen  its  position  and  it 
must  send  more  modern  spokesmen  to  the  Lok  Sabha  if  it  is  to 
stand  a  chance  of  improving  its  financial  position  markedly. 
Furthermore,  the  behaviour  of  the  Congress  toward  private 
enterprise  also  cannot  be  ignored  in  these  calculations.77  Few,  if 
any  Swatantra  leaders  have  betrayed  much  optimism  on  any  of 
these  points. 

The  fact  that  business  is  supporting  Swatantra  to  some  modest 
extent  does,  however,  give  the  party  an  edge  over  the  Jan  Sangh, 
whose  volunteer  cadres  make  fewer  dollars  go  a  good  deal  further. 
In  this  area,  one  can  see  a  multi-sided  battle:  within  Swatantra, 

176 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

between  the  conservatives  and  the  more  modern  interests,  and 
between  the  Jan  Sangh's  militant,  more  disciplined  but  poorer 
cadres  and  these  Swatantra  forces. 


FINANCE,    ORGANIZATION,   AND   CANDIDACIES 

The  broad  relationship  between  finance,  organization,  and  candi- 
datures in  Swatantra's  short  history  owes  much  to  (i)  the  limited 
funds,  given  the  party's  aspirations;  (2)  the  Swatantra  estimate  of 
the  Indian  political  situation;  and  (3)  Masani's  determination  to 
create  a  reasonably  disciplined  and  ideologically  committed  party. 
Under  any  circumstances,  Masani  would  have  been  anxious  to  use 
the  financial  resources  of  the  central  treasury  to  discipline  the 
party,  by  screening  candidates  before  funds  were  allocated.  How- 
ever, this  tendency  was  reinforced  because  of  the  shortage  of 
funds;  and  Swatantra's  view  that  the  seat  of  really  pernicious 
power  was  New  Delhi,  not  the  state  capitals,  gave  an  important 
twist  to  the  national  party's  effort  to  affect  candidacies.78 

The  approach  decided  upon  by  the  Swatantra  elite  restricted 
central  treasury  funds  to  approximately  one  hundred  screened 
Lok  Sabha  candidates  and  constituencies  and  left  it  to  the  approved 
nominees  to  decide  how,  if  at  all,  to  help  the  aspiring  MLAs  in 
their  constituencies.  This  was  consonant  with  the  party's  desire 
to  'go  for  the  jugular';  it  enabled  the  national  leadership  to  cope 
with  (at  some  peril,  to  be  sure)  the  almost  universal  tendency  for 
local  leaders  to  exaggerate  local  strength,  and  to  ignore  the 
'careerists'  who  wanted  Swatantra  tickets  and  who  claimed  they 
were  sure  of  election,  if  only  the  party  gave  them  ample  funds;  and 
it  was  a  potential  asset  in  the  battle  to  overcome  parochialism,  in 
the  interests  of  a  national,  anti-statist  effort.  Depending  on  how 
much  leverage  Masani  could  muster,  this  approach  also  could  be 
favourable  to  the  modernists  in  the  party,  who  generally  lacked 
substantial  political  roots  of  their  own. 

This  decision  was  not  an  unmixed  blessing,  for  a  number  of 
reasons.  For  example,  happy  though  some  of  the  leaders  might 
have  been  with  a  small  but  dedicated  cadre  of  MPs,  it  was  evident 
to  all  concerned  that  for  '  psychological '  reasons,  many  more  than 
one  hundred  MP  candidates  would  have  to  be  set  up.  In  part, 
Swatantra  hoped  to  meet  the  psychological  problem  by  having  a  far 
larger  number  file  nomination  papers,  with  the  understanding  that 

12  177  ESP 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

many  candidates  would  be  withdrawn  at  the  last  minute,  to  relieve 
the  central  treasury  of  any  financial  obligations.  This  principle  was 
to  be  applied  at  the  state  level,  too,  where  it  was  felt  that  the  party 
ought  to  nominate  at  least  enough  candidates  so  that,  if  all  or  most 
of  them  won,  it  would  be  possible  to  form  a  Swatantra  ministry. 
In  both  cases,  however,  the  desire  to  make  a  respectable  showing 
over  a  wide  area,  combined  with  local  pressures,  led  Swatantra  to 
spread  its  limited  resources  too  thin,  which  probably  cost  the  party 
a  few  seats.79 

This  was  not  the  only  problem,  however.  By  emphasizing 
parliamentary  constituencies,  the  central  office  was  asking  a  host 
of  local  aspirants  to  subordinate  their  own  ambitions  (mostly  to  sit 
in  the  assemblies)  to  the  goal  of  securing  more  MPs;  and  even  if  the 
full  complement  of  MLA  candidates  were  to  be  set  up  in  the 
approved  constituencies,  the  funds  were  still  earmarked  for  the 
MPs.  Not  very  surprisingly,  such  self-sacrifice  was  not  easy  to 
secure,  and  many  local  leaders  expressed  their  strong  dislike  for  the 
approach  favoured  by  the  central  office.80  Also,  by  insisting  that  all 
supported  MP  candidates  had  to  be  given  prior  clearance  by  the 
parliamentary  board,  the  national  leadership  (especially  Masani) 
opened  itself  to  the  charge  of  meddling  in  state  affairs.  This  led  to 
much  strain  on  relations  between  the  national  leadership  and  the 
state  units. 

Moreover,  shortage  of  funds,  coupled  with  the  desire  to  set  up  a 
respectable  number  of  candidates,  put  a  heavy  premium  on  self- 
financing  candidacies,  in  order  to  free  central  party  funds  for 
'needier'  cases.  As  Duverger  has  pointed  out,  'investiture'  in  such 
cases  is  relatively  easy  to  secure;81  and,  as  we  have  suggested,  ideo- 
logical commitment  and  party  discipline  are  likely  to  be  victims  of 
heavy  reliance  on  the  local  notables  who  are  likely  to  be  self- 
financing.  Finally— and  this  is  central  to  an  understanding  of 
Swatantra's  financial-organizational  problems  as  they  relate  to 
social  bases — the  reliance  on  local  notables  and  self-financing 
candidacies  hurt  the  party's  efforts  to  secure  financial  support  from 
big  business.  The  Swatantra  modernists  in  particular  found  them- 
selves in  a  vicious  circle  involving  finance,  big  business  and  the 
aristocrats,  and  a  breaking  of  this  circle  is  one  of  Masani's  greatest 
personal  concerns. 

The  situation  in  West  Bengal  illustrates  the  problem  of  finance, 
organization  and  candidacies  in  one  form.  A  key  figure  in  the 

178 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

nascent  West  Bengal  Swatantra  party  was  Chatterj  ee,  a  man  who 
could  be  a  valuable  asset  in  the  Lok  Sabha',  and  Swatantra  was  as 
anxious  as  Chatter jee  himself  to  win  a  seat.  However,  Chatter jee 
and  the  West  Bengal  unit  wanted  to  contest  a  very  large  number  of 
seats,  which  the  central  office,  on  the  basis  outlined  above,  refused 
to  countenance.  The  organization  in  Bengal  was  rudimentary, 
local  funds  severely  limited,  and  derivative  support  (through  local 
notables)  minimal,  and  the  central  office  was  unable  to  pour  vast 
sums  into  any  state,  let  alone  such  an  unpromising  one.  The 
parliamentary  board  announced  that  it  would  authorize  and 
support  only  one  Lok  Sabha  candidate  in  Bengal,  or,  if  Chatter  jee 
were  self-financing,  it  would  authorize  two  (supporting  only  one 
financially,  of  course).  The  outcome  of  all  this  was  the  resignation 
of  Chatterj  ee  from  the  party  and  considerable  strain  in  relations 
between  the  state  unit  and  the  central  office.82 

Chatterj  ee  was  apparently  the  only  leading  figure  who  defected 
as  a  consequence  of  these  financial-electoral  problems,  but  in  many 
other  ways  the  same  issue  intruded.  Ruthnaswamy  was  repeatedly 
denied  additional  funds  for  his  1962  campaign;  the  party  leaders 
in  Madhya  Pradesh — where  the  organization  never  really  took 
shape,  even  on  a  derivative  basis — were  ostensibly  not  given  any 
election  funds  at  all,  in  spite  of  repeated  requests;  and  com- 
parable cases  could  be  cited  from  most  other  states.  It  is  under- 
standable that  people  should  turn  to  the  central  party  and  that  they 
should  be  disturbed  when  their  requests  are  turned  down;  but  the 
Swatantra  files  indicate  that  his  occurred  on  a  very  wide  and  in  many 
ways  damaging  scale.83 

Relations  with  the  unit  in  Orissa  provide  one  example  of  a 
general  finance-related  strain  within  the  Swatantra  Party.  As  noted, 
one  element  in  the  decision  of  the  Ganatantra  Parishad  to  merge 
was  the  desire  to  be  placed  on  a  sounder  financial  footing  in  order 
to  fight  the  Patnaik-led  Congress.  However,  some  leaders  of  the 
Parishad/  Swatantra  have  felt  that  the  hoped-for  financial  benefits 
of  merger  have  not  materialized  and  may  not  be  forthcoming, 
even  though  Swatantra  did  give  a  substantial  sum  for  the  Parishad 
Lok  Sabha  candidates  in  1962.  In  the  absence  of  ample  financial 
support,  it  may  well  seem  more  attractive  to  some  Orissa  leaders 
to  reconstitute  the  Parishad.  This  would  enable  them  to  concen- 
trate on  local  issues  and  be  free  of  the  association  with  the  'rich 
man's  party'.  There  is  no  immediate  prospect  of  such  a  defection 

179  12-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

in  Orissa,  but  once  again  the  danger  to  Swatantra  is  magnified 
because  of  the  dependence  on  Patna  and  Kalahandi  for  the  party's 
position  in  Orissa.  It  goes  without  saying  that  neither  organiza- 
tionally nor  financially  could  this  be  called  a  satisfactory  situation 
for  the  Swatantra  Party. 

Another  absolutely  critical  aspect  of  Swatantra's  financial  prob- 
lems and  its  relations  with  big  business  and  the  aristocracy  turned 
on  the  matter  of  candidacies.  A  number  of  leading  industralists 
had  expressed  a  willingness,  and  some  a  determination,  to  support 
Swatantra,  on  the  condition  that  certain  key  individuals,  like 
Masani,  Dandekar,  and  Shroff  were  reasonably  sure  to  sit  in  the 
Lok  Sabha.  Some  industrialists  specifically  tied  their  prospective 
support  to  the  candidacies  of  the  more  modern  Swatantra  leaders. 
However,  such  men  find  it  difficult  to  locate  even  reasonably  *  safe ' 
constituencies  without  the  benevolent  assistance  of  local  notables. 
Thus  in  1957  Sir  Homy  Mody  ran  as  an  RRP- Independent  from 
Rajasthan  and  R.  V.  Murthy,  of  the  Eastern  Economist  and  another 
more  modern  Swatantrite,  ran  as  a  Jan  Sangh-Independent  in  the 
same  state — both  being  defeated.  Masani  himself  was  returned  from 
a  tribal  constituency  from  Bihar— about  as  far  away  as  he  could 
get  physically  and  psychologically  from  the  highly  westernized 
Parsi  family  in  which  he  grew  up  in  Bombay. 

Swatantra  did,  of  course,  contain  within  its  ranks  a  number  of 
people  (i.e.  the  aristocrats)  who  could  have  helped  to  return  these 
men,  had  they  themselves  been  willing  to  forego  their  personal 
ambitions,  or  at  least  those  of  relatives.  The  national  leadership 
sought  such  co-operation  but  generally  found  it  wanting.  Masani's 
case  is  the  most  pertinent  because  he  was  not  only  the  party's 
General-Secretary  but  he  was  also  the  most  able  parliamentarian 
in  the  party's  ranks. 

At  one  or  another  juncture,  Masani  and  those  who  were  anxious 
to  return  him  to  Parliament  considered  two  or  three  constituencies 
in  Ramgarh's  area,  at  least  three  in  or  around  the  former  Jaipur 
state,  among  others  in  Gujarat  and  Himachal  Pradesh,  where 
aristocrats  could  have  helped  him.  In  most  cases  Masani  expected 
there  to  be  more  enthusiasm  for  his  candidacy  than  was  actually 
evinced.  In  almost  every  instance  he  was  deterred  by  doubts 
expressed  by  the  local  notables  concerning  his  electoral  appeal, 
and  in  some  cases  there  were  quid  pro  quos  demanded,  which  he 
found  distasteful.  In  Rajasthan,  for  example,  Dausa  (won  by 

180 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

Maharajkumar  Prithviraj  of  Jaipur),  Sikar  and  Pali  were  mentioned 
as  possible  seats  for  Masani;  and  Dungarpur,  who  thought  Dausa 
the  safest,  estimated  a  plurality  of  between  5,000  to  10,000  votes 
for  Masani.  Dungarpur  insisted,  however,  that  as  an  outsider  whose 
Hindi  was  poor,  Masani  would  face  an  uphill  fight,  and  the  Maha- 
raja of  Jaipur  agreed  to  give  only  two  or  three  talks  on  Masani's 
behalf,  instead  of  the  more  sustained  campaigning  for  which 
Masani  had  hoped.84 

Much  the  same  situation  obtained  in  Bihar,  with  the  added 
problem  of  the  poor  relations  between  Masani  and  Ramgarh.  It  is 
generally  conceded  that  Ramgarh  offered  the  Giridih  and  other 
constituencies  to  Masani  (who  claimed  that  unacceptable  quid  pro 
quos  were  demanded)  but  that  no  final  decision  was  taken  in  the 
matter  through  August  1961.  Ramgarh  did  not  submit  a  list  of  Lok 
Sabha  candidates  from  the  Hazaribagh  area,  but  he  assured  Masani 
that  every  effort  would  be  made  to  find  a  secure  seat.  However,  it 
was  noted  by  the  Bihar  leadership  that  '  there  was  vehement 
opposition  from  all  sides  to  the  proposal  of  giving  a  seat  to  Shri 
Masani  on  two  main  grounds' — fear  that  the  change  in  nomen- 
clature from  Janata  to  Swatantra  would  confuse  the  electorate  and 
that  well-known  local  people  could  alone  overcome  this  obstacle, 
and  fear  that  an  outsider  simply  would  not  have  sufficient  appeal 
to  win  the  Lok  Sabha  seat  and  to  carry  the  MLAs  with  him.85  A 
letter  containing  the  assessment  was  sent  to  Masani,  to  which  he 
sent  a  reply  urging  Ramgarh  not  to  trouble  himself  further.  Rajaji 
was,  however,  most  anxious  to  have  Masani  sit  in  the  Lok  Sabha 
and  he  kept  a  modest  amount  of  pressure  on  Ramgarh.  In  late 
September,  however,  the  internal  dissensions  in  Bihar  and  growing 
suspicions  about  Masani  on  Ramgarh's  part  led  Masani  to  write 
to  Rajaji  as  follows:  'I  feel  far  from  happy  about  being  beholden 
to  the  Raja  Saheb  for  being  put  up  from  one  of  the  two  Hazaribagh 
constituencies . . .  Personally  I  would  rather  not  stand  for  Parlia- 
ment at  all  if  this  is  the  atmosphere  in  which  one  has  to  function.'86 
Shortly  thereafter  relations  became  so  strained  that  for  a  time,  at 
least,  the  question  of  a  safe  seat  from  Bihar  did  not  arise  in  any 
serious  fashion. 

Masani's  election  prospects  seemed  somewhat  brighter  when, 
after  considering  some  constituencies  in  Raj  as  than,  he  apparently 
came  to  an  understanding  with  the  Raja  of  Bilaspur  (Himachal 
Pradesh),  one  of  Ramgarh's  relatives.  However,  according  to 

181 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Masani,  some  last-minute  subterfuge,  related  to  the  Bilaspur- 
Ramgarh  tie,  weakened  his  prospects  there  and  he  claims  to  have 
withdrawn  his  candidacy.  None  the  less,  in  the  official  election 
returns  Masani' s  name  appears,  although  he  did  not  campaign, 
and  he  is  listed  as  a  very  poor  second.87 

Even  this  did  not  put  an  end  to  the  matter.  After  the  elections, 
efforts  by  Masani  and  his  friends  continued  unabated.  The  sug- 
gestion was  made  in  at  least  two  cases  where  Swatantrites  had 
won  both  a  Lok  Sabha  and  an  assembly  seat — the  Maharajkumar 
of  Kutch  and  Ramgarh's  mother — that  the  Lok  Sabha  seat  be 
resigned,  to  permit  Masani  to  stand  in  a  by-election.  Here,  the 
role  of  finance  in  connection  with  organization  is  once  again 
evident,  because  at  least  in  the  Bihar  case  a  prominent  Bombay 
businessman  agreed  to  finance  the  by-election  if  Masani  were 
permitted  to  stand.  Yet  even  with  this  sort  of  assurance,  co-opera- 
tion was  not  forthcoming,  even  though  some  Swatantra  aristocrats 
were  notably  uninterested  in  spending  much  time  in  Parliament 
and/or  were  incapable  of  helping  the  party  as  much  as  Masani 
could  have  in  that  forum.88 

Further  details  of  these  efforts  need  not  detain  us,  save  for  the 
following  points :  relations  between  Masani  and  some  state  leaders 
were  severely  strained  as  a  result  of  this  activity;  no  one  seemed  to 
respond  eagerly  to  his  candidacy,  while  on  Masani's  part  warnings 
about  his  position  as  an  outsider  and  personal  doubts  made  him 
reluctant  to  enter  some  constituencies  in  which  he  might  have 
stood;  and  it  was  only  in  mid- 1963  that  Masani  was  elected  to  the 
Lok  Sabha  from  Rajkot  district  in  Gujarat.  Here  he  was  somewhat 
less  of  an  outsider  and  his  candidacy  was  supported  not  only  by  all 
of  the  top  Swatantra  leaders  (including  the  Maharani  of  Jaipur, 
Dungarpur,  the  Maharajkumar  of  Kutch,  the  Maharaja  of  Devgadh- 
Baria,  who  solicited  the  Rajput  vote),  but  by  some  local  aristocrats 
(notably  members  of  the  families  of  Rajkot,  Jasdan  andWankaner), 
the  recently  victorious  J.  B.  Kripalani,  and  A.  B.  Vajpayee,  a 
Jan  Sangh  leader  and  MP  (Rajya  Sabha),  who  deployed  the  local 
Sangh  cadres  to  good  effect.89  In  short,  it  was  a  long,  hard  battle  to 
fight,  in  order  that  Swatantra's  ablest  parliamentarian  could  sit  in 
the  Lok  Sabha,  and  the  victory  was  by  no  means  due  to  Swatantra 
strength  alone.90 

While  Masani's  case  was  the  most  important,  it  was  by  no  means 
the  only  one.  Dandekar,  also  a  Bombay  man,  had  also  to  find  a 

182 


The  Swat  antra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

suitable  constituency;  and  he  finally  stood  from  Gonda,  Mankapur's 
district  in  UP.  In  a  very  close  election,  he  was  declared  loser  on  a 
recount,  after  winning  on  the  original  count;  but  he  finally  gained 
the  seat  after  a  judicial  inquiry  revealed  improprieties  on  behalf  of 
the  Congress  candidate.  The  point  here,  however,  is  that  some  local 
Swatantrites  resented  his  candidacy  and,  in  some  cases,  their  weak 
efforts  on  Dandekar's  behalf  reflected  this.91  Moreover,  with 
Mankapur's  death  and  the  new  Raja's  loyalty  to  the  Congress, 
Gonda  was  not  even  seriously  considered  as  a  possible  seat  for 
Dandekar,  who  has  once  again  had  to  embark  on  the  great  search. 
As  of  November  1966,  Dandekar  had  still  not  found  a  seat,  although 
there  were  reports  (1)  of  an  abortive  approach  to  Devgadh-Baria 
to  facilitate  Dandekar's  return  from  Panchmahals  in  Gujarat,  and 
(2)  of  the  possibility  that  he  might  stand  from  Jamnagar  (also  in 
Gujarat),  where  Swatantra  expected  much  help  from  the  newly 
recruited  Thakur  of  Dhrol.  There  was,  moreover,  a  report  that 
Dandekar  might  well  not  contest  in  the  general  elections,  but 
would  stand  in  a  by-election  for  a  resigned  seat,  much  as  Masani 
tried  to  do  in  1962.  Thus  Dandekar,  one  of  Swatantra's  very  ablest 
spokesmen  in  the  Lok  Sabha,  is  in  the  same  boat  with  Masani  and 
some  other  modern  Swatantrites.92 

In  analogous  cases,  Swatantra  MLAs  showed  little  enthusiasm 
to  use  their  votes  to  return  such  men  to  the  Rajya  Sabha,  although 
it  is  far  from  clear  that  Masani,  at  least,  would  have  tolerated  the 
indignity  of  entering  Parliament  via  this  route.  In  any  event, 
Rajasthan  MLAs  voted  for  the  Maharaja  of  Jaipur,  nominally  an 
independent,  rather  than  for  a  declared  Swatantrite  of  any  stripe. 
This  may  seem  only  natural  (Rajputs  supporting  a  friendly  Rajput) 
but  necessary  (as  a  reward  for  his  help  or  perhaps  to  bring  him 
into  the  party),  but  it  did  mean  that  a  Rajya  Sabha  seat  was  lost 
to  Swatantra  and  to  its  modern  wing  in  particular.93  And  it  should 
be  recalled  that  Jaipur  did  not  seem  notably  co-operative  in  the 
matter  of  supporting  Masani's  own  candidacy  from  Rajasthan. 
Kindred  factors  were  at  work  when  Kejriwal,  a  businessman  openly 
in  Swatantra,  was  asked  to  withdraw  from  one  Rajya  Sabha  race  in 
favour  of  Darbhanga,  also  an  independent;  and  in  the  death  throes 
of  the  Bihar  unit,  Kejriwal,  Swatantra's  first  candidate  for  the 
Rajya  Sabha,  was  not  elected,  while  Bilaspur,  the  second  candidate 
was.94 

Swatantra  was  thus  caught  in  something  of  a  vicious  circle.  The 

183 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

leaders  felt  that  a  strong  showing  had  to  be  made  in  1962,  and  the 
aristocrats  provided  the  possibility  of  a  short-cut  to  success.  But 
this  success  was  obviously  purchased  at  a  very  high  price,  in  terms 
of  party  organization,  discipline,  legislative  performance,  and  so 
on.  Moreover,  because  local  notables  displayed  little  enthusiasm 
for  facilitating  the  return  of  more  modern  Swatantrites  to  the 
Lok  Sabha,  Swatantra's  financial  position  suffered,  because  its 
candidates  were  not  widely  acceptable  to  many  people  who  were 
anxious  to  contribute,  if  only  the  right  candidates  were  put  up. 
Thus,  Swatantra's  financial  future  depends  in  part  on  the  nature 
of  the  organization — more  specifically  on  the  ability  of  the  more 
modern  wing  to  assert  its  position,  at  least  in  the  matter  of  some 
key  candidacies  to  the  Lok  Sabha — just  as  its  organization  obviously 
depends  in  part  on  its  financial  position.  It  was  no  accident,  then, 
that  two  men  in  Swatantra's  inner  circle,  when  asked  where  the 
party  was  best  organized  in  terms  of  its  fundamental  principles, 
cited  Bombay  City,  Delhi,  Gujarat,  and  Mysore,  and  omitted 
Rajasthan,  Orissa,  and  Bihar.  And  it  was  no  accident,  either,  that 
of  the  last  three,  Orissa  was  judged  the  most  satisfactory.95 

More  important  than  this  evidence  of  distress  with  the  nature  of 
the  party  in  certain  areas  are  certain  post- 1962  developments  which 
are  obviously  designed  to  escape  this  multi-faceted  impasse.  First, 
the  party  declared  its  intention  to  become  a  *  cadre '  rather  than  a 
'mass'  party,  a  decision  which  in  part  reflects  the  feeling  that  the 
Swatantra  message  could  not  be  effectively  communicated  to  the 
masses.96  This  meant  that  the  party  would  try  to  recruit  a  smaller 
number  of 'better'  people,  who  alone  would  be  dues-paying,  card- 
carrying  members  and  who  alone  could  vote  in  party  elections. 
Certain  organizational  and  propagandizing  tasks  were  also  assigned 
to  these  people,  at  least  in  principle.97  From  the  standpoint  of  the 
national  party,  however,  the  key  point  was  that  membership  cards 
for  such  people  were  to  be  issued  only  by  the  central  office,  directly 
to  the  prospective  worker  (by  registered  post).  The  central  office 
hoped  that  this  technique  would  enable  it  (1)  to  minimize  bogus 
membership;  (2)  to  have  on  hand  an  up-to-date  list  of  active 
workers;  (3)  to  have  some  information  (to  be  forwarded  by  the 
state  unit  with  the  application  for  membership)  on  them;  and  (4)  to 
have  more  direct  access  to  party  workers,  without  relying  on  the 
state  leadership  as  heavily.98 

The  second  major  step,  foreshadowed  in  1962,  was  the  recom- 

184 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

mendation  for  electoral  strategy.  Once  again,  this  involved  the 
selection  of  a  number  of  Lok  Sabha  seats  upon  which  the  national 
party  would  concentrate  its  resources,  but  there  was  to  be  an 
added  effort.  Constituencies  and  prospective  candidates  were  to 
be  designated  well  in  advance  of  the  elections;  a  three  man  group, 
including  the  prospective  candidate,  was  to  supervise  the  *  cultiva- 
tion' of  the  constituency;  and  satisfactory  reports  of  work  and  of 
disbursement  of  central  office  funds  were  required  for  continua- 
tion of  financial  support  and  for  retention  of  the  prospective  candi- 
date as  the  final  candidate.  This  represented  a  partial  retreat  from 
an  idea  that  had  once  been  mooted,  viz.  that  the  central  office  itself 
designate  and  pay  special  organizers  to  cultivate  constituencies; 
but,  even  so,  the  adopted  method  has  the  clear  purpose  of  strengthen- 
ing central  party  control  over  Lok  Sabha  candidacies,  at  least.  A 
major  aim  of  this  is,  of  course,  the  developing  of  constituencies  for 
Swatantra's  modern  men;  and  it  is  no  secret  that  several  business- 
men assured  Masani  of  support  for  this  venture,  with  this  specific 
purpose  in  mind." 

As  of  this  writing  (1966),  the  effects  of  this  strategy  are  by  no 
means  clear.  In  some  cases,  constituencies  have  been  cultivated 
without  a  prospective  candidate  being  designated — either  because 
no  satisfactory  candidate  was  at  the  moment  available  or  because 
a  potential  candidate  did  not  want  to  commit  himself  before  the 
constituency  was  'tested'.  Elsewhere,  central  office  aid  has  been 
terminated,  owing  to  the  prospective  candidate's  failure  to  submit 
the  required  reports  and  financial  statements — action  which  goes 
beyond  anything  that  was  done  in  1962.  Finally,  this  strategy  (and 
the  effort  to  control  membership  more  closely)  has  already  been  a 
source  of  irritation  to  many  state  and  local  leaders,  while  at  the 
same  time,  it  has  not  solved  the  problems  of  a  man  like  Dandekar.100 
But  Masani  has  none  the  less  made  it  clear  that  he  regards  this 
approach  as  indispensable,  if  Swatantra  is  to  be  placed  on  a  proper 
organizational  and  ideological  footing. 

A  third  significant  post- 1962  development,  related  to  this  one, 
concerns  the  prospective  candidates.  Here  one  can  see  a  fairly 
strenuous  effort  to  find  seats  for  more  of  the  administrative-pro- 
fessional-business elements  in  the  party;  and  one  can  see  as  well  a 
heightened  feeling  on  the  part  of  businessmen  that  they  themselves 
should  stand  for  the  Lok  Sabha,  to  assure  the  type  of  representation 
they  desire.  For  example,  Swatantra  designated  as  Lok  Sabha 

185 


The  Swalantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

candidates  in  Gujarat  the  following  group  from  the  ranks  of  its 
more  modern  men:  Masani;  Dandekar;  leading  Bombay  indus- 
trialists Viren  Shah  and  Manu  Amersey;  Pashabhai  Patel,  a 
relative  of  Sardar  Patel  and  a  prominent  Baroda  industrialist  who 
contested  as  an  independent  in  the  two  previous  general  elections; 
Piloo  Mody — Sir  Homy's  son,  a  Bombay  architect;  the  afore- 
mentioned H.  M.  Patel  and  C.  C.  Desai,  both  ICS  retired;  U.  N. 
Mahida,  a  retired  chief  engineer  of  Bombay  State;  and  economics 
professor  R.  K.  Amin.  There  was  also  considerable  pressure 
brought  to  bear  on  Nanu  Amin,  a  very  prominent  and  highly 
respected  Baroda  industrialist,  to  stand  for  the  Lok  Sabha,  but 
this  was  resisted.  Throughout  this  effort,  Vadilal  Mehta,  Ahmed- 
abad  industrial  tycoon  and  former  Treasurer  of  the  Congress, 
played  a  major  role  for  the  Swatantra  Party.101 

Comparable  developments  can  be  seen  in  Rajasthan  as  well. 
Chiranjit  Rai,  another  wealthy  industrialist,  was  designated  to  stand 
from  Dausa,  a  seat  won  by  one  of  the  Maharajkumars  of  Jaipur  in 
1962.102  More  important,  however,  was  the  decision  finally  taken 
by  R.  K.  Birla  to  stand  for  the  Lok  Sahha  from  Jhunjhunu,  where 
the  Swatantra  candidate  in  1962  was  a  prominent  Rajput  jagirdar 
and  for  which  constituency  the  same  man  had  already  received  the 
party's  blessings  for  1967.  It  was  not  clear  whether  Birla  would  stand 
officially  as  a  Swatantra  candidate  or  as  an  independent  using  the 
Swatantra  symbol;  and  there  was  always  the  possibility  of  a  with- 
drawal under  pressure.  But  Birla,  as  of  November  1966,  had  re- 
portedly assured  the  Swatantra  Party  that  he  would  not  stand  as  a 
Congressman,  that  he  would  be  entirely  self-financing,  and  that  he 
would  support,  financially  and  otherwise,  the  Swatantra  MLA 
candidates  from  his  district.  Whatever  the  outcome,  even  a  tenta- 
tive decision  by  a  Birla  to  stand  against  the  Congress  is  something 
of  a  landmark  in  Indian  business  politics ;  and  the  willingness  of  the 
local  aristocrats  to  stand  aside  in  two  Jaipur-area  constituencies  is 
also  notable.  Needless  to  say,  considerable  pressure  had  been 
brought  to  bear  by  Congress  leaders  on  G.  D.  Birla,  patriarch  of 
this  industrial  empire,  to  dissuade  R.  K.  Birla  from  this  venture 
or  to  persuade  him  to  support  Congress  MLAs,  the  apparent  quid 
pro  quo  being  the  absence  of  a  Congress  opponent  in  the  Lok 
Sabha  contest.103 

Whatever  the  outcome  of  these  specific  contests  may  be,  it  is 
clear  that  business  interests  (both  inside  and  outside  of  Swatantra) 

186 


The  Swatantra  Coalition:  The  Balance  of  Power 

are  not  content  to  leave  the  field  to  aristocrats,  Gandhians,  et  al. 
who  have  not  proved  to  be  sufficiently  attentive  to  the  needs  of  the 
private  sector  industrialists.  Masani  has  also  underscored  his  per- 
sonal desire  to  build  an  effective,  articulate,  and  less  conservative 
Lok  Sabha  contingent  by  pressing  for  the  inclusion  of  some  major 
ex-ICS  figures  in  the  list  of  prospective  candidates.  Lest  the 
significance  of  this  be  overstated,  we  must  note  that  in  most  of 
the  specific  cases  mentioned  above,  the  prospective  candidates  were 
local  men  or  had  strong  local  ties,  which  still  does  not  solve  the 
problems  of  men  like  Masani  and  Dandekar.  Still,  the  significance 
should  not  be  missed,  either.  Through  the  power  of  the  rupee  and 
through  strenuous  personal  efforts  by  Masani  in  the  central  office, 
the  more  modern  elements  in  Swatantra  are  trying  to  make  them- 
selves felt,  and  to  a  modest  extent  they  have  succeeded.  This  may 
be  more  a  victory  for  private  enterprise  than  for  liberalism;  but  in 
the  intra-party  battle  between  the  conservatives  and  the  non- 
conservatives,  this  is  in  itself  an  important  development.104 


187 


CHAPTER   8 

SWATANTRA  DOCTRINE 

After  a  detailed  examination  of  the  views  of  the  Swatantra  inner 
circle  and  of  the  elements  which  grouped  around  it,  it  may  seem 
redundant  to  add  a  discussion  of  Swatantra's  formal  doctrine. 
However,  a  consideration  of  party  doctrine  will  provide  a  clue,  if 
nothing  more,  to  the  basis  on  which  the  coalition  was  brought 
together  and  to  the  framework  within  which  the  components  were 
presumably  to  function.  It  will  indicate  which  of  the  diverse  per- 
spectives present  in  the  party  has  been  emphasized  for  public 
purposes.  That  is,  the  formal  doctrine  represents  what  at  least 
some  doctrinal  leaders  would  like  party  members  to  be,  in  terms  of 
personal  commitment  and  in  terms  of  public  image.  And  even  if 
there  be  a  substantial  gap  between  formal  doctrine  and  the  views 
of  individuals  or  groups  within  the  party,  the  formal  doctrine  may 
exert  a  disciplinary  influence,  as  public  ideology  often  does.  These 
are  not  irrelevant  matters. 

THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES 

Rajaji,  in  responding  to  Nehru's  charge  that  it  was  impossible  to 
know  what  Swatantra  stood  for  because  it  contained  diverse 
elements,  once  said  that  'the  straight  and  easy  path  to  understand 
our  party  is  to  read  what  has  been  said  in  the  twenty-one  short 
articles  of  the  party's  foundation  document.  There  is  no  ambiguity 
or  prolixity  in  it. n  The  heart  of  the  party's  doctrine  is,  to  be  sure, 
embodied  in  these  few  'fundamental  principles',  and  in  elabora- 
tions of  and  additions  to  these.  Unhappily,  these  would  not  suffice 
to  define  the  nature  and  role  of  Swatantra,  even  if  they  were 
crystal-clear;  and  the  truth  is  that  the  fundamental  principles  are 
by  no  means  as  unambiguous  as  Rajaji  has  asserted.  Many  of  the 
conflicts  and  tensions  revealed  by  a  study  of  the  social  bases  of  the 
party  emerge  in  the  realm  of  doctrine  as  well.  None  the  less,  since 
attention  must  be  paid  to  the  official  pronouncements  of  the  party, 
the  twenty-one  points  serve  as  the  appropriate  starting-place. 

If  one  had  to  categorize  them  en  bloc  and  briefly,  the  twenty-one 
points  could  be  called  predominantly  classical  liberal  in  tone, 

188 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

suggesting  a  moderate,  non-traditional  outlook.  They  reflect  the 
general  aversion  of  the  national  leaders  to  reactionary  and  to 
authoritarian  nationalist  views;  and  they  reflect,  as  well,  the 
influence  of  the  modernists  in  the  realm  of  doctrine.  The  Indian 
heritage,  especially  via  Gandhi,  is  also  present,  but  in  an  under- 
stated way;  and  socialist  rhetoric,  also  virtually  inescapable  in 
contemporary  India,  also  intrudes.  In  the  latter  case,  too,  however, 
it  is  important  to  stress  the  limited  extent  to  which  it  does  so. 

The  fundamental  principles  are  important,  moreover,  not  only 
for  what  they  say  and  how  they  say  it,  but  also  for  what  they  do 
not  say.  Much  is  excluded  from  their  purview,  and  on  all  such 
issues,  party  members  are  permitted  to  advance  any  position  not 
inconsistent  with  a  fairly  narrow  reading  of  the  twenty-one  points. 
Significantly,  foreign  policy,  linguistic  policy,  and  religious  and 
cultural  issues  in  detail,  receive  little  or  no  explicit  attention  within 
the  framework  of  the  fundamental  principles.  This  reflects  the 
conviction  that  the  principal  task  is  that  of  opposing  Congress 
'statism',  and  that  those  who  can  agree  on  this  should  not  be 
divided  by  other  issues  deemed  to  be  less  significant.  The  extent  to 
which  this  can  be  successfully  accomplished  is  one  of  the  most 
important  problems  in  evaluating  the  position  of  the  Swatantra 
Party. 

The  liberal  aspects  of  the  twenty-one  points  are  abundantly 
evident.  The  first,  for  example,  calls  for  equality  for  all,  'without 
distinction  of  religion,  caste,  occupation,  or  political  affiliation'.2 
This  is  followed  by  a  defence  of  'individual  initiative,  enterprise 
and  energy'  in  all  areas,  with  emphasis  on  the  economic  sphere. 
The  subsequent  points  are  best  described  as  rigorously  anti-statist, 
with  attacks  on  'the  policy  of  Statism',  'expropriation',  'the  con- 
ferment of  more  and  more  powers  on  the  officials  of  the  Govern- 
ment', 'collectivization  and  bureaucratic  management  of  the  rural 
economy',  'crippling  taxation,  abnormal  deficit  financing,  and 
foreign  loans  which  are  beyond  the  capacity  of  the  country  to 
repay',  and  so  forth.  The  party  also  condemns  'official  directives' 
on  education,  'political  pressure. .  .on  officials',  the  'wastefulness 
and  inefficiency'  inherent  in  state  'controls  and  official  manage- 
ment '  and '  the  pervading  sense  of  uncertainty  that  has  been  created 
by  the  present  policies  of  the  Government'.  In  calling  for  'mini- 
mum interference  by  the  State'  in  all  spheres,  with  emphasis  again 
on  economic  affairs,  Swatantra's  leaders  urge  the  restoration  of 

189 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

private  initiative  'in  land,  ship  and  factory  alike'  and  emphasize 
'freedom  of  property ',  'just  compensation  for  any  property  com- 
pulsorily  acquired  ',  and '  strict  adherence '  to  all  basic  constitutional 
rights.  To  this  last  end,  there  is  a  plea  for  'the  full  play  of  the 
powers  of  judicial  review  given  to  the  Courts  by  the  Constitution  \3 
All  of  this  is  reminiscent  of  the  'night-watchman'  state,  and  party 
men  are  not  only  fond  of  quoting  Hayek  but  also  have  insisted  (in 
the  1962  manifesto)  that  'that  government  is  best  which  governs 
least '  and  that '  the  business  of  the  State  is  not  business  but  govern- 
ment'. This  is  entirely  consistent  with  Rajaji's  assertion  that  'the 
Swatantra  Party  stands  for  the  protection  of  the  individual  against 
the  increasing  trespasses  of  the  State.  It  is  an  answer  to  the 
challenge  of  the  so-called  Socialism  of  the  Indian  Congress  party.'4 
Masani,  arguing  from  a  different  vantage  point,  none  the  less 
concurs  in  the  basic  judgment,  viz.  that  'under  the  cloak  of  a 
socialist  pattern,  the  new  Brahmins  of  New  Delhi  are  trying  to 
create  a  new  class  of  sudras  who  will  remain  hewers  of  wood  and 
drawers  of  water  for  the  greater  glory  of  what  Djilas...has 
rightly  described  as  the  new  class  of  State  capitalists  '.5 

This  basic  conviction  is  translated  into  a  variety  of  specific 
proposals  on  topical  issues.  Among  those  which  the  party  has 
stressed,  at  one  juncture  or  another,  are:  (1)  the  creation  of  an 
Ombudsman  to  hear  grievances  against  and  in  general  to  police  the 
bureaucracy;  (2)  the  creation  of  a  non-political  board,  along  the 
lines  of  the  Election  Commission,  to  assign  all  permits  and  licences 
necessary  under  present  government  legislation;  (3)  an  early 
termination  of  the  state  of  emergency  declared  during  the  Chinese 
invasion,  and,  related  to  this,  greater  discrimination  in  the  use  of 
the  preventive  detention  law;  and  (4)  a  voluntary  departure  from 
office  by  the  Congress  six  months  prior  to  a  general  election,  so 
that  the  ruling  party  could  not  use  the  agencies  of  government  to 
enhance  its  electoral  prospects.  The  last  of  these  was  naive,  if  not 
preposterous,  but  the  others  have  received  much  more  than  passing 
attention  of  a  serious  nature.  However,  none  of  these  issues  is 
particularly  likely  to  animate  very  many  people:  they  are,  by  and 
large,  issues  for  the  intelligentsia,  as  is  the  general  plea  concerning 
the  need  for  an  opposition  party  to  help  establish  viable  constitu- 
tional-democratic procedures. 

Getting  closer  to  mass  issues,  the  Swatantra  Party  also  took 
exception  to  a  number  of  measures  adopted  as  a  consequence  of  the 

190 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

Chinese  invasion.  Included  here  were  the  rise  in  the  level  of  taxa- 
tion, a  compulsory  savings  scheme,  and  the  gold  control  order 
whereby  it  became  illegal  for  anyone  to  have  or  to  process  gold  of 
twenty-two  carats,  which  had  theretofore  been  the  Indian  norm. 
The  last,  in  particular,  was  given  a  mass  twist,  through  the  argu- 
ment that  it  was  an  attack  not  only  on  the  large  numbers  of  gold- 
smiths but  on  the  customary  practices  of  all  Hindu  women,  who 
prized  their  twenty-two  carat  gold  jewelry  for  the  security  it 
provided,  if  for  no  other  reason.  The  party  tried  to  gain  maximum 
advantage,  however,  from  the  proposed  seventeenth  amendment  to 
the  constitution,  by  which,  in  its  view,  the  meaning  of  the  word 
'  estate ' — theretofore  applicable  only  to  such  tenures  as  jagirdari 
and  zamindari  holdings — would  be  expanded  to  include  ryotwari 
tenures.  In  the  Swatantra  view,  this  violated  the  basic  right  of 
private  property  by  removing  questions  of  *  public  purpose '  and 
compensation  from  the  purview  of  the  courts,  and,  it  was  argued, 
was  the  stepping-stone  to  collectivization  of  agriculture.  Granted, 
the  threat  was  not  palpably  felt,  but  it  was  the  party's  hope  that  by 
tying  this  to  land  ceiling  policy,  tax  policy,  and  the  like,  a  pattern 
of  action  against  free  agriculture  could  be  delineated.  And  this,  at 
least,  would  make  it  a  broad  middle-class  issue.6 

The  Gandhian  element  is  not  absent,  but  it  provides  only  a  thin 
veneer  on  this  essentially  liberal  document.  The  fundamental 
principles  call  for  a  reaffirmation  of  'the  cardinal  teachings  of 
Gandhiji',  but  these  are  not  spelled  out  in  any  elaborate  way. 
The  party  also  wants  '  to  foster  and  maintain  spiritual  values  and 
preserve  what  is  good  in  our  culture  and  tradition ',  but  this  is  also 
not  spelled  out.  However,  these  formulations  allow  Gandhians 
and  others  of  a  more  conservative  stripe  to  £read  in'  virtually 
anything  they  want,  and  this  is  precisely  what  Rajaji  and  others 
have  done.  Thus  Rajaji,  Munshi,  and  others  may  defend  much  of 
the  Indian  tradition,  on  the  grounds  that  '  survival  is  a  proof  of 
fitness,  not  of  worthlessness  ',7  and  one  prominent  Swatantrite  in 
Andhra  can  condemn  the  Hindu  Code  legislation  *  as  it  has  not  only 
tried  to  root  out  the  Shastraic  Principles  and  doctrines  of  Dharma 
(Religion)  but  important  principles  of  health  and  medical  science'.8 
On  the  other  hand,  Pasricha  and  Ruthnaswamy  can  belabour  the 
very  same  things  as  not  worthy  of  preservation.9  This  is  but  one 
aspect  of  the  ambiguity  of  the  twenty-one  points,  wherein  almost 
diametrically  opposed  opinions  can  be  held  by  members  of  the 

191 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

same  party,  each  ostensibly  being  blessed  by  the  obscure  wording 
of  the  fundamental  principles.  This  down-grading  of  social  issues 
in  favour  of  a  politico-economic  one  is  reminiscent  of  the  Congress' 
own  problem  during  the  pre-independence  days,  when  many 
leaders  insisted  that  all  social  questions  should  be  avoided  in  the 
interest  of  a  maximum  anti-imperialist  effort.  Swatantra  is 
obviously  attempting  to  do  much  the  same  thing.  The  Swatantra 
hope  is  clear;  but  it  is  also  clear  that  the  failure  to  define  that  which 
is  quintessentially  Gandhian  or  Indian— whether  it  be  in  terms  of 
prohibition,  ban  on  cow  slaughter,  ayurvedic  medicine,  cottage 
industries,  village  institutions  generally — will  irritate  if  not 
alienate  many  for  whom  anti-statism  is  not  sufficient  as  a  battle  cry. 

Virtually  the  only  specific  Gandhian  item  which  is  developed  is 
'  the  principle  of  trusteeship  adumbrated  by  Gandhi '  which  reflects 
'the  sense  of  moral  obligation,  the  pride,  satisfaction,  and  fulfil- 
ment felt  by  individuals  in  serving  others,  which  are  inherent  in 
our  tradition'.  In  general,  this  concept  implies  an  abandonment 
of  coercion,  including  legislative  'coercion',  as  an  instrument  of 
policy  and  a  reliance  on  voluntary  use  of  advantages  by  the  rich,  the 
wise  and  the  well-born  in  particular,  for  the  good  of  society  as  a 
whole.  Rajaji  makes  this  explicit  in  his  assertion  that '  the  new  party 
does  not  believe  that  legislative  compulsion,  any  more  than 
violence. .  .can  contribute  to  true  or  lasting  human  happiness.  We 
must  depend  on  the  moral  sense  of  the  people  in  order  to  equalize 
without  destroying  freedom.'10 

It  is  important  to  understand  that  this  particular  item,  while  not 
without  its  appeal  to  dedicated  Gandhians  as  well  as  to  the  more 
self-interested  people  whom  it  protects,  was  not  only  included 
largely  at  Rajaji's  insistence  but  also  that  it  played  a  larger  part  in 
the  earlier  drafts  of  the  party's  doctrinal  statement,  viz.  a  fourteen- 
point  manifesto  presented  at  the  Madras  meeting  and  an  eighteen- 
point  draft  submitted  for  consideration  at  the  Bombay  (Prepara- 
tory) Convention.11  The  fact  that  it  stood  first  among  the  original 
principles  but  was  subsequently  '  demoted ',  in  favour  of  a  more 
liberal  statement  about  individual  equality  reflects,  in  part,  the 
hand  of  Masani,  among  others,  who  soon  became  involved  in 
doctrinal  matters.12  Here,  too,  is  an  indication  that  the  funda- 
mental principles  are  by  no  means  as  unambiguous  as  Rajaji  might 
like;  and  here  again  is  evidence  of  liberal  assertiveness,  now  in  the 
realm  of  doctrine. 

192 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

The  emphasis  on  '  decentralized  distribution  of  industry '  also 
has  a  Gandhian  ring  (and  Rajaji  and  Ranga,  among  others  would 
give  it  a  Gandhian  interpretation),  but  this  is  somewhat  misleading. 
Swatantra's  leading  ideologians,  especially  Masani  and  his  Bombay 
colleagues,  have  in  mind  the  decentralization  of  larger-scale, 
modern  enterprise,  not  the  maintenance  of  primitive  technology 
such  as  characterizes  village  India  and  as  advanced  by  the  extreme 
Gandhians.  Thus,  while  Ranga  has  objected  even  to  the  smaller- 
scale  introduction  of  power  looms  on  a  local  level,13  the  party 
4  believes  in  a  balanced  development  of  capital-goods  industries, 
organized  consumer  goods  industries,  and  rural  industries  that 
afford  supplementary  employment  in  the  small-scale  processing  of 
the  products  of  agriculture'.  There  is  no  defence  of  small-scale, 
handicraft  production  because  of  any  virtues  it  is  presumed  to 
foster;  and  the  above  principles  presumably  would  not  justify  the 
creation  of  rural  industries,  with  restrictions  on  urban  output, 
simply  to  give  supplementary  income  to  villages.14  Here  is  where 
Masani,  Mody,  Vaidya,  and  other  businessmen  come  into  conflict 
with  Rajaji  and  Ranga,  regardless  of  the  '  clear'  implications  of  the 
fundamental  principles.15 

One  of  the  most  critical  aspects  of  Swatantra  doctrine  is  that 
which  defines  the  proper  role  of  state  intrusion  into  the  economy 
and  into  social  life  more  generally,  and  a  number  of  introductory 
points  are  relevant  here.  First,  the  doctrine  of  trusteeship  severely 
blunts  the  edge  of  legislative  efforts  to  close  the  gap  between 
India's  wealthy  and  her  poor,  to  effect  social  reforms,  and  the  like. 
This  is  reinforced  in  the  economic  sense  by  the  party's  view  that 
taxation  is  already  *  crippling'.  Secondly,  Swatantra's  Lok  Sahha 
votes  against  the  five-year  plans  and  the  condemnation  of  the 
Planning  Commission  suggest  further  a  laissez  faire  approach;16 
and  thirdly,  many  of  Masani's  statements  about  free  enterprise 
only  add  grist  to  the  mill  of  those  who  charge  Swatantra  with 
adherence  to  nineteenth-century  economics.17 

Few  things  elicit  more  derisive  comment  in  contemporary  India 
than  support  for  laissez-faire  capitalism,  and  the  party's  critics 
quickly  sought  to  tar  it  with  this  brush  by  calling  it  a  ' projection' 
of  the  FFE  and  a  'rich  man's  party'.  In  fact,  this  view  seems  to  be 
quite  widely  held,  both  within  and  outside  the  party,  and  frag- 
mentary evidence  suggests  that  this  image  has  hurt  the  party  badly. 
One  indication  of  this  is  the  list  of  prospective  candidates  who  asked 


13 


193 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

the  central  office  for  permission  to  contest  as  independents,  be- 
cause of  the  bad  party  image,  with  the  promise  that  they  would 
join  formally  at  a  later  date;  and  these  requests  came  from  virtually 
every  state  unit.18 

One  indication  of  the  image  which  the  party  had  acquired  and  the 
manner  in  which  it  jarred  with  the  prevailing  socialist  rhetoric  is 
the  justification  given  by  some  Swatantrites  upon  their  resignation 
from  the  party.  A  one-time  convenor  of  the  Kerala  unit,  K.  C. 
Jacob,  resigned  with  the  statement  that  a  party  which  'bravely 
fights  shy  of  all  shades  of  socialist  thought  is  an  anachronism 
today  \19  Similarly,  Raja  Hutheesing,  for  a  time  organizing  secre- 
tary of  the  Bombay  (city)  unit,  gave  the  following  reason  for  his 
resignation:  'I  have  gone  through  the  party  platform  most  care- 
fully and  I  am  extremely  disappointed.  The  programme,  if  ever 
put  into  practice,  will  subject  the  Indian  people  to  economic  chaos 
and  ruthless  exploitation. .  .Must  India  go  through  the  inhuman 
suffering  of  the  industrial  revolution  in  Europe? '  Criticizing  what 
he  regarded  as  the  party's  attachment  to  laissez  faire,  he  termed  it 
'  an  historical  and  ridiculous  oddity '  and  claimed  that '  selfish  and 
evil  forces  have  worked  to  mislead  the  party'.20  It  is  really  im- 
material whether  this  was  the  actual  cause  for  defection  in  these 
and  comparable  cases.  The  important  thing  is  that  such  views  were 
obviously  expected  to  strike  a  responsive  chord.  It  goes  without 
saying  that  the  same  terms  of  abuse  were  used  against  Swatantra 
by  virtually  all  other  parties,  including,  in  some  instances,  the 
right-wing  opposition. 

From  the  outset,  Swatantra  has  been  of  two  minds  as  it  con- 
fronted this  issue.  On  the  one  hand,  the  leadership  was  anxious 
to  develop  a  sharply  distinct  alternative  to  the  Congress,  by  con- 
trast with  the  other  major  parties,  all  of  which  echoed  in  one  form 
or  another  the  'socialist'  rhetoric  of  the  ruling  party.  Moreover, 
Masani  was  particularly  anxious  to  develop  a  strong  ideological 
challenge  to  Congress  socialism.  This  suggested  that  the  role  of 
the  state  should  be  minimized,  and  to  this  end  Rajaji  urged  the 
deletion  from  a  draft  of  the  1962  manifesto  many  items  which  in 
his  view  too  closely  resembled  Congress  positions.  And  he  did  this 
in  some  cases  not  because  he  actually  opposed  the  draft  statement 
but  because  he  wanted  to  present  as  sharp  an  alternative  as  possible.21 
On  the  other  hand,  the  prevalence  of  socialist  rhetoric  and  the 
recognition  by  even  the  most  ardent  champions  of  private  enter- 

194 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

prise  that  some  state  activity  was  indispensable,  worked  in  the 
opposite  direction. 

In  the  fundamental  principles  themselves  a  role  for  the  state  is 
present,  both  explicitly  and  implicitly.  For  example,  the  state  may 
establish  'heavy  industries  such  as  are  necessary  to  supplement 
private  enterprise'  and  may  start  'new  enterprises  which  are 
difficult  for  private  enterprise'.  While  the  state  is  to  interfere 
minimally,  this  principle  must  be  'consistent  with  the  obligation 
to  punish  anti-social  acts,  to  protect  the  weaker  elements  of  society, 
and  to  create  the  conditions  in  which  individual  initiative  will 
thrive  and  be  fruitful '.  Specifically,  there  must  be  '  adequate  safe- 
guards for  the  protection  of  labour,  and  against  unreasonable 
profits,  prices  and  dividends  where  there  is  no  competition  and 
where  competition  does  not  secure  the  necessary  corrective'.  This, 
of  course,  is  a  tacit  admission  that  trusteeship,  by  itself,  is  insuffi- 
cient; but  the  divergence  in  emphasis  and  outlook  (between  those 
who  stress  trusteeship  and  those  who  stress  legislative  correctives) 
has  in  no  significant  way  been  resolved.22  And  once  again,  some  of 
these  specific  items  represent  additions  to  the  original  party  pro- 
gramme tentatively  set  forth  at  the  Madras  meeting. 

If  these  principles  and  their  implications  be  broadly  conceived, 
the  re-entry  of  the  much-condemned  statism  would  be  justified. 
In  the  existing  economic  situation,  there  is  relatively  little  com- 
petition of  the  type  that  would  regulate  profits,  prices  and  divi- 
dends; and  there  is  abundant  scope  for  the  state  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  economic  infrastructure,  at  least.  It  is  no  secret,  for 
example,  that  many  leaders  of  Indian  private  enterprise  favoured 
the  entry  of  the  government  into  the  iron  and  steel  industry,  which 
private  industry  was  not  able  to  develop  on  the  same  scale  and 
which  provided  much  indispensable  material  for  private  enterprise. 
Moreover,  if  the  weaker  elements  are  to  be  protected  and  if  they 
are  to  be  given  equal  opportunity,  regardless  of  caste,  the  state 
must  intrude  in  a  vigorous  fashion  into  the  social  life  of  the  coun- 
try— in  a  way  which  would  appal  Rajaji,  and  probably  most  other 
Swatantrites.  The  abundant  village  studies  demonstrate  that  a 
'hands-off'  policy  will  not  suffice  to  rescue  India's  depressed 
millions  from  their  misery,  much  of  which  is  due  to  the  self- 
conscious  animosity  of  the  dominant  rural  castes.  As  one  source 
put  it,  however,  'the  positive  aspects  of  the  obligations  of  the 
State  have  thus  been  given  grudging  recognition  even  by  the 

195  13-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Swatantra  Party  and  its  differences  with  other  political  parties  on 
this  point  would  be  one  of  degree  rather  than  of  principle  \23 
Swatantra,  on  its  part,  has  come  around  to  the  view  that  a  good 
deal  must  be  done  to  protect  and  to  strengthen  the  weak  but  that 
total  control  over  the  entire  society  and  economy  was  not  an 
acceptable  means  to  this  end.  Once  again,  however,  we  are  con- 
fronted with  a  good  deal  of  ambiguity  on  the  matter  of  where  the 
lines  will  be  drawn  between  legitimate  and  illegitimate  intervention 
for  these  purposes. 

In  the  economic  sphere,  Swatantra  has  steadfastly  denied  that  it 
stands  for  laissez  faire  and  that  it  opposes  all  planning;  and  it  has 
moved  more  toward  Congress  views,  suggesting  once  again  the 
importance  of  taking  a  'dialectical'  approach  to  Swatantra's 
position  in  Indian  political  life.  In  response  to  the  charge  of  laissez 
faire,  many  Swatantrites  have  echoed  the  words  of  Shroff,  already 
quoted:  'It  should  be  clear. .  .that  Free  Enterprise. .  .is  not  advo- 
cated today  in  terms  of  the  outmoded  doctrine  of  laissez-faire. . . 
The  laissez-faire  is  as  dead  as  dodo.  It  is  a  singular  triumph  of  the 
dynamic  urge  of  democratic  ideals  to  have  developed  a  new  aware- 
ness of  social  justice  and  equality.'24  In  the  same  vein,  party  leaders 
deny  that  they  are  opposed  to  planning  per  se.  Instead,  they 
object  to  'Soviet  style'  planning— ' total '  and  heavy-industry- 
oriented — as  now  undertaken  by  the  Planning  Commission,  which 
they  hold  is  a  non-constitutional  body  not  properly  accountable  to 
Parliament.25  At  many  junctures,  Swatantra  leaders  insist  that 
they  would  engage  in  planning,  if  called  upon  to  form  a  govern- 
ment. As  Ranga  put  it  in  his  usually  flamboyant  language,  ' . . .  we 
believe  in  plan.  But  our  plan  is  a  Gandhian  plan,  a  plan  that  has 
for  its  foundation  Dharma,  a  plan  that  is  based  on  the  initiative  of 
our  people,  a  plan  that  stands  for  self-employment  and  security  of 
our  people,  a  plan  that  believes  in  our  people.'26  Most  other  leaders 
agree,  in  less  florid  language,  that  the  party  would  have  to  plan,  but 
they  insist  that  it  would  pay  greater  heed  to  smaller-scale  projects 
which  would  yield  tangible,  short-run  results;  and  the  planning 
itself  would  be  done  by  a  Cabinet  sub-committee.27  But  here,  too, 
there  are  ambiguities.  Obviously,  if  the  word  planning  is  to  have 
any  meaning,  a  government  cannot  respond  to  every  possible 
public  pressure;  and  it  is  just  as  obvious  that  no  plan  can  content 
itself  solely  with  miniscule  projects  that  are  cheap  and  have  immedi- 
ate impact.  Thus,  the  Swatantra  preference  for  the  'Gandhian' 

196 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

test,  i.e.  how  will  this  particular  project  affect  the  life  of  the 
common  man,  does  not  get  us  very  far.  Even  such  ' display'  pro- 
jects as  the  Bhakra-Nangal  Dam,  which  Swatantra  leaders  like  to 
abuse,  are  of  immense  benefit  to  the  common  man,  in  terms  of 
irrigation  and  power,  if  in  no  other  way.  Once  again,  Swatantra 
differs  in  degree,  not  in  principle,  save  with  respect  to  the  *  total' 
planning  which  it  attributes  to  the  Congress. 

To  avoid  further  the  anti-plan  image,  Swatantra  leaders  re- 
currently announce  that  they  are  trying  to  develop  '  an  alternative 
plan'  and  they  have  succeeded  in  convincing  some  observers  that 
the  party  'has  travelled  far  since  the  days  when  planning  was 
anathema  to  its  founding  fathers  '.28  Nothing  much  has  yet  seen  the 
light  of  day,  nor  is  anything  of  consequence  likely  to,  but  this  does 
reflect  Swatantra's  concern  with  its  public  image,  as  a  'rich  man's ', 
laissez  faire,  capitalist  party.  The  party's  emphasis  on  a  rural- 
oriented,  'people's  plan'  reflects  the  same  concern. 

Students  of  intellectual  history  should  be  intrigued  by  another 
phase  of  the  Swatantra  effort  to  come  to  grips  with  the  problem  of 
socialist  rhetoric  in  India.  For  a  variety  of  reasons,  'socialism'  is  a 
good  word  in  India  and,  again  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  individual- 
ism and  competition,  as  associated  with  laissez  faire,  are  bad.  The 
former  is  progressive,  the  latter  retrograde  or  reactionary.  Swa- 
tantra then  not  only  confronts  the  problem  of  cutting  through  a 
variety  of  parochial  issues  to  establish  its  anti-statist  position;  it 
also  has  an  uphill  fight  to  overcome  the  weight  of  socialist  rhetoric. 
The  burden  of  this  effort  has  been  assumed  by  Masani,  and  his 
arguments  reflect  his  own  cosmopolitan  interests,  his  Marxist 
background,  and  his  desire  to  relate  the  Indian  experience  to 
'world-historical'  issues.  The  main  thrust  of  the  Swatantra 
counter-attack  against  the  charge  that  it  is  reactionary  while 
socialists  are  progressive  is  simple.  The  argument  is  inverted:  in 
world-historical  terms,  socialism  as  advanced  by  Nehru,  the  PSP, 
the  CPI,  et  al,  is  retrograde,  while  the  controlled  free  enterprise  of 
Swatantra  is  progressive,  and  is,  in  fact,  more  representative  of  the 
'  spirit '  of  socialism. 

The  argument  is  woven  from  a  number  of  sometimes  inconsistent 
strands.  On  one  level,  Swatantra  leaders  simply  quote  from  Marx, 
Lenin,  and  other  spokesmen  for  socialism  to  the  effect  that  socialism 
was  to  come  about  only  in  advanced  industrial  countries  and  that 
collectivized   agriculture   was   an   impossibility   in   a   primitive 

197 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

economy.29  The  plea  is  entered  to  let  capitalism  perform  the 
world-historical  task  that  Marx  assigned  to  it.  No  matter  that 
some  contradictory  interpretations  of  the  socialist  revolution 
could  be  cited  and  that  many  positions  have  been  updated: 
Swatantra  takes  the  old  Menshevik  line,  in  effect,  and  tells  the 
socialists  and  the  CPI  to  go  back  and  read  Marx  and  Lenin 
afresh. 

Were  Swatantra  to  stop  here,  it  would  be  obliged  to  admit  that 
socialism  has  a  future,  if  not  a  present,  in  India.  In  attempting  to 
cut  closer  to  the  heart  of  the  sociahst-communist  position, 
Swatantra's  dominant  theme  is  that  socialism  was  either  never 
relevant  or  is  passe.  Party  leaders  insist  that  the  USA,  Canada,  and 
West  Germany,  among  other  leading  nations,  achieved  material 
J  prosperity  under  controlled  capitalism.  The  Swatantra  conclusion 

I  is  that  if  this  was  the  path  of  the  richest  nations  in  the  world,  it  is 

||  the  best  way  for  India.  This  still  does  not  account  for  welfare- 

statism  in  Great  Britain,  nor  does  it  demonstrate  that  socialism  has 
)m  no  future.  Arguing  the  latter  point,  Masani  contends  that  the 

j||  '  debacle  of  world  socialism  is  spreading  from  country  to  country ', 

and  Rajaji  terms  the  idea  of  class  war  'obsolete  in  Britain. . . 
premature  [sic!]  and  most  dangerous  in  India'.30 
mi  Masani  takes  pains  to  enumerate  the  specifics  of  the  '  debacle  '. 

He  cites  Tory  victories  and  the  ideological  retreat  of  the  Labour 
Party  in  Great  Britain;  the  split  in  the  Japanese  socialist  movement, 
with  a  social  democratic  offshoot  repudiating  more  doctrinaire 
Marxism;  defeats  of  or  ideological  retreats  by  Socialist  parties  in 
Austria  (1958),  the  Netherlands  (1959)3  Sweden  (i960),  and 
Ceylon  (i960).31  Very  heavily  stressed  by  Masani  is  the  fact  that  the 
German  Social  Democrats,  long  regarded  as  the  most  dedicated 
standard-bearers  of  orthodox  Marxism,  have  explicitly  rejected 
doctrinaire  socialism,  in  favour  of  a  more  moderate,  '  pragmatic ' 
approach.  Swatantra  leaders  delight  in  juxtaposing  excerpts  from 
their  manifesto  and  similarly  worded  counterparts  in  the  German 
social- democratic  programme,  to  show  the  virtual  identity  with 
the  erstwhile  socialist  forces  of  the  west.32  Thus,  Masani  has 
argued  that  'the  whole  world,  including  the  peoples  in  the  Iron 
Curtain  countries,  is  moving  away  from  the  shibboleths  of 
collectivism.  The  danger  of  India's  being  committed  to  outmoded 
dogmas  which  the  rest  of  the  world  is  discarding  must  be 
combatted.'33 

198 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

Accepting  the  'socialism'  of  the  Tories  in  Great  Britain,  of  the 
German  Social  Democrats,  and  so  on,  Swatantra  leaders  alternately 
called  Nehru,  a  'nineteenth-century  socialist'  as  opposed  to 
Swatantra's  'twentieth-century  socialists',  or  else  a  'reactionary 
state  capitalist'  and  no  real  socialist  at  all!34  While  this  set  of 
arguments  can  hardly  be  called  a  logical  tour  de  force,  it  has  per- 
mitted Swatantra  leaders  to  argue  that  the  socialists  are  outdated, 
not  Swatantra.  This  illustrates  an  important  dimension  of  intel- 
lectual history,  viz.  the  compulsion  to  respond  to  the  strong  and 
proximate  challenge  of  Marx  and  socialism  and  the  need  to  accept, 
to  some  extent,  the  enemy's  political  vocabulary.  This  was  noted 
in  passing  in  connection  with  the  Jan  Sangh  and  the  Hindu 
Mahasabha;  and  Swatantra  is  only  joining  the  throng  (at  which  it 
shakes  a  censuring  finger  most  of  the  time)  albeit  in  a  different 
way  than  the  other  parties.35 

If  Swatantra  has  been  obliged  to  make  concessions  to  the  rhetoric 
of  socialism  in  the  field  of  economic  development,  it  has  thus  far 
declined  to  dwell  in  detail  on  the  implications  of  bringing  about 
equality  for  all.  We  see  that  Swatantra  has  emphasized  the  protec- 
tion of  the  weak  rather  than  the  strengthening  of  the  weak.  Both 
are  important,  but  the  latter  would  draw  Swatantra  more  fully  into 
social  intervention,  and  here  the  party  remains  painfully  silent. 
Reliance  on  trusteeship  does  more  to  protect  the  strong  than  to 
protect  or  to  strengthen  the  weak,  and  reliance  on  individual 
initiative  is  manifestly  insufficient  to  emancipate  the  Indian  masses 
from  their  century-old  burdens  and  afflictions,  particularly  where 
the  harijans,  landless  labourers,  and  other  particularly  depressed 
groups  are  concerned.  Rajaji  certainly  does  not  display  any 
righteous  indignation  over  the  glaring  inequalities,  and  those  who 
are  sensitive  to  this  situation  have  not  spoken  out  in  positive  terms 
about  ways  of  helping  the  weak.  Masani,  certainly  no  friend  of  the 
caste  system  or  of  the  ethos  which  underlies  it,  has  also  spoken 
more  of  the  mass  ofsudras  which  he  feels  that  statism  is  creating, 
rather  than  the  sudras  and  untouchables  already  extant,  and  the 
causes  responsible  for  their  unhappy  state. 

This,  too,  has  not  escaped  attention,  in  part  because  of  sharp 
criticism  from  outside  as  well  as  inside  the  party.  In  considering 
various  drafts  of  the  1962  election  manifesto,  Latchanna,  the 
highly  regarded  untouchable  leader  in  Andhra,  and  Basant  Singh 
of  the  Punjab,  among  other  Swatantra  state  leaders,  criticized  the 

199 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

inadequate  provisions  concerning  the  untouchables  and  the  de- 
pressed classes  generally.36  So,  too,  after  the  1962  elections,  Masani 
insisted  that  attention  to  this  problem  'is  a  moral  and  political 
imperative'.37  Thus  far,  however,  the  concern  has  not  borne  any 
fruit,  in  terms  of  a  substantial  critique  of  the  old  order;  there  has 
been  no  detailed  statement  concerning  mass  welfare;  and  the 
difficulties  generated  by  the  emphasis  on  trusteeship  have  not  been 
resolved.  Admittedly,  the  problem  is  not  an  easy  one  to  solve,  but 
Swatantra  cannot  escape  some  blame  for  neglecting  it,  as  Masani, 
Latchanna  and  Basant  Singh,  at  least  are  willing  to  admit. 

There  is  one  obvious  reason  for  Swatantra' s  reticence:  its  virtual 

obsession  with  the  task  '  of  opposing  statism,  which  is  the  greatest 

enemy  of  freedom'.38  In  the  same  vein,  Rajaji  declared  in  1950 

(speaking  to  the  CPI  members  of  the  Madras  assembly),  '  I  am 

your  enemy  Number  One. .  .May  I  say  you  are  my  enemy  Number 

One?  That  is  my  policy  from  A  to  Z.'39  Given  this  prevailing 

attitude,  which  is  reflected  in  the  widespread  but  by  no  means 

I  universal  insistence  among  Swatantra  leaders  that  the  CPI  should 

I  be  banned,40  it  is  not  particularly  surprising  that  the  party  does  not 

speak  out  against  the  many  suffocating  influences  of  the  old  order 

|i  or  against  the  obstacles  and  dangers  to  freedom  which  lie  on  the 

mi  right.  It  is  partly  for  this  reason  that  the  critique  of  traditionalism 

i,  which  is  implicit  in  the  party's  fundamental  principles  is  muted  to 

the  point  of  inaudibility.41 

In  the  case  of  the  Congress  movement  itself,  there  was  a  sub- 
ordination of  social  issues  in  the  interests  of  the  largely  negative 
political  goal  of  ousting  the  British;  and  there  were  a  variety  of 
points  of  view  within  the  Congress  concerning  the  post-British 
bii  course  of  policy.  Many  felt  that  the  attainment  of  independence 

was  virtually  the  end  of  the  struggle  and  that  little  remained  to  be 
I  done  thereafter.  Obviously  men  like  Nehru  had  vastly  different 

1"1  conceptions  of  future  agendas.  Swatantra  in  many  ways  presents  a 

parallel  case.  Its  primary  goal,  its  very  raison  d'etre,  is  to  oppose 
statism,  and,  as  in  the  Congress,  there  are  divergent  points  of  view 
of  future  policy. 

From  the  earlier  analyses  it  is  easy  to  see  that  for  many  Swatan- 
trites,  too,  the  battle  would  be  over  if  only  statism  could  be 
defeated.  For  many,  the  more  conservative  elements  in  the  party, 
the  effort  ends  there.  For  others,  however,  there  is  a  bigger  agenda 
of  tasks  that  have  to  be  undertaken.  It  is  uncontestable,  however, 

200 


i^UHtfMfttf*MtaH^l^«M 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

that  the  people  tending  toward  the  former  position  outnumber 
those  who  tend  toward  the  latter.  The  social  composition  and 
attitudes  of  much  of  the  leadership  reinforces  the  conclusion  that 
there  is  a  marked  tendency  to  fight  the  left  only,  leaving  the  weight 
of  tradition  and  the  threat  of  a  right  authoritarianism  outside  the 
pale  of  relevant  concerns.  Moreover,  if  the  pressure  from  the  left 
remains,  as  it  almost  surely  will  in  one  form  or  another,  it  is 
unlikely  that  Swatantra  will  ever  articulate  a  serious  challenge  to 
the  old  order.  One  may  take  some  solace  from  the  fact  that,  in  such 
a  dialectical  situation,  the  interplay  of  forces  may  produce  a  not 
unhappy  result;  but  this  does  not  make  Swatantra  a  'progressive, 
liberal  party'.  Swatantra  is,  in  short,  in  a  very  difficult  historical 
position,  and  much  of  one's  assessment  of  the  party  will  depend  on 
how  one  reads  history,  Indian  and  otherwise.  Yet  as  long  as  Swa- 
tantra attacks  only  the  left  and  as  long  as  its  own  more  progressive 
elements  remain  subdued,  it  will  represent  at  best  a  drastically 
truncated  form  of  liberalism.  It  is  not  necessary  to  go  as  far  as 
Swatantra's  adamant  critics — who  argue  that  no  one  in  the  party 
has  any  progressive  ideas —  for  there  to  be  very  legitimate  appre- 
hension on  this  point.42 

NON-FUNDAMENTAL  POSITIONS 

Just  as  Swatantra  has  been  obliged  to  respond  to  the  prevailing 
socialist  rhetoric,  so  also  has  it  been  obliged  to  deal  with  many 
subjects  which  lie  beyond  the  bounds  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples. The  party's  leaders  do  this  with  some  reluctance,  of  course, 
because  their  aim  is  to  develop  Indian  political  consciousness  along 
new,  i.e.  statist-anti-statist,  lines,  and  they  do  not  want  to  divert 
attention  from  this  to  issues  which  it  regards  as  of  lesser  importance. 
Thus,  Rajaji,  in  a  statement  deploring  the  tendency  for  prolifera- 
tion of  political  parties  in  India,  has  said: 

For  parliamentary  democracy  to  work  satisfactorily,  we  need  two  clearly 
distinguishable  political  parties,  based  on  two  clearly  understandable 
systems  of  national  economy ...  Questions  which  affect  particular 
groups  adversely  or  favourably  should  not  be  party  issues,  but  should  be 
treated  as  ethical  issues  to  be  dealt  with  irrespective  of  party  cleavages. 
Party  cleavages  should  only  be  on  issues  affecting  the  national  economy, 
and  so  it  is  necessary  to  polarize  all-India  politics  on  the  single  question, 
1  Do  you  want  the  State  to  dominate  over  the  economy  and  reduce  the 

201 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

citizen  to  a  regulation-ridden  slave-worker,  or  do  you  stand  for  maximum 
free  economy  with  minimum  State-controls  in  the  interest  of  the 
general  welfare . . .  ?  '43 

Just  as  social  issues  were  glossed  over  in  the  interest  of  opposing 
statism,  so  all  other  issues  which  are  not  directly  related  to 
questions  of  political  economy  must  also  be  subordinated. 

The  fundamental  principles  offer  some  hope,  however,  that  the 
party  will  be  able  to  address  itself '  unofficially '  to  a  host  of  these 
'lesser'  issues  and  thus  to  accommodate  India's  diversity  and  local 
interests  within  its  framework.  The  last  of  the  twenty-one  points 
allows  party  members  to  adopt  any  positions  they  may  choose  'on 
all  questions  not  falling  within  the  scope  of  the  Principles  stated 
above',  which  Rajaji  had  explained  in  the  following  way:  'This 
party  of  freedom  is  further  making  a  novel  experiment  in  restrict- 
ing disciplinary  control  over  party  members  to  essential  issues, 
giving  freedom  in  all  other  matters  to  vote  according  to  individual 
opinion.  This  is  not  mere  strategy  to  "net  in"  discordant  miscel- 
laneous elements  as  first  might  appear.'44  Without  denying  that  a 
principled  commitment  to  democratic  procedures  plays  a  part  in 
this  formulation,  it  is  none  the  less  clear  that  many  'discordant 
miscellaneous  elements'  can  be  brought  into  the  party,  as  long  as 
they  ostensibly  adhere  to  the  basic,  anti-statist  fundamental 
principles.  Thus,  pro-Hindi  Swatantrites  in  the  north  can  co-exist 
with  pro-English  Swatantrites  in  the  south;  supporters  of  linguistic 
states  can  co-exist  with  opponents  thereof;  social  reformers  can 
co-exist  with  steadfast  conservatives;  pacifists  can  co-exist  with 
sabre-rattlers;  local  groups  can  stress  strictly  local  issues,  and  so 
on — as  iong  as  they  are  able  to  subordinate  their  passions  on  these 
issues  in  order  to  consolidate  the  anti-statist  front. 

Among  the  many  unofficial  matters  which  have  received  atten- 
tion, the  question  of  national  language  is  particularly  revealing, 
because  virtually  all  Swatantra  notables  argue  that  English  should 
be  retained  until  such  time  as  all  Indians  agree  voluntarily  to  use 
Hindi  as  the  official  or  'link'  language.45  They  have  openly  pro- 
claimed that  English  was  one  of  the  two  great  sources  of 'national 
consciousness',  the  other  being  the  independence  struggle  itself; 
and  they  bemoan  the  decline  in  the  'leadership  of  the  English- 
educated  minority'  and  regret  that  'the  psychological  and  social 
unity  of  educated  men  and  women. .  .is  being  undermined'  by 
ill-considered  decisions  in  linguistic  matters.46  This  view  has  not 

202 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

found  favour  with  many  Swatantrites,  especially  those  from  UP  and 
Bihar,  and  Swatantra  ranks  reveal  considerable  disarray  and  friction 
during  consideration  of  linguistic  matters.47  This  is  one  view  which 
infuriates  the  Jan  Sangh  and  other  pro-Hindi  militants,  whose 
spokesmen  repeatedly  deplore  the  fact  that  Indians  are  still  created 
in  Macaulay's  image.48  The  late  President  of  the  Jan  Sangh, 
Raghuvira,  referred  to  a  bill  to  extend  the  period  in  which  English 
could  be  used  '  anti-democratic,  anti-Gandhian,  and  anti-national 
. . .  a  continuation  of  colonialism'.  He  added  that  'all  opportunities 
in  the  high  sectors  of  life  are  reserved  for  those  who  have  mastered 
English5  and  he  referred  to  the  English-knowing  people  as  a 
'  giant  monopoly'  in  India.  Suggestive  of  the  passions  aroused  here 
is  the  fact  that  on  more  than  one  occasion  in  the  Hindi  areas  Rajaji 
has  been  obliged  to  abandon  an  address  when  the  crowd  heckled 
him  for  failing  to  speak  in  Hindi,  or  at  least  another  indigenous 
tongue.49  The  pro-English  stand  also  offends  many  other  groups 
which  are  pressing  for  exclusive  use  of  indigenous  tongues  for  all 
government  business  and  as  the  medium  of  instruction  in  all 
schools,  at  all  levels.  Also  this  stand  reflects  the  more  moderate, 
upper-class  temperament  which  is  widespread  in  the  national 
elite  of  the  party.50 

In  the  linguistically  related  Punjabi  suba  agitation  and  the 
recently  terminated  DMK  demand  for  an  independent  Dravidian 
state,  i.e.  for  secession,  Swatantra  ran  afoul  of  one  of  the  most 
vexing  issues  of  post-independence  Indian  politics.  Outright  en- 
dorsement of  such  agitations  would  infuriate  the  militant  national- 
ists once  more;  but  it  would  also  offend  more  moderate  national- 
ists, as,  for  example,  the  party's  language  position  does  not.  Out- 
right condemnation  of  these  agitations  would,  however,  deprive 
Swatantra  of  some  possible  local  support  in  its  battle  against  the 
Congress.  Swatantra,  not  very  successfully,  has  tried  to  have  it 
both  ways :  it  frequently  defends  these  movements  as  legitimate 
expressions  of  democratic  rights  (i.e.  to  organize  and  to  plead  one's 
case),  but  it  insists  that  it  is  not  thereby  endorsing  the  ends  of  these 
agitations.  The  situation  was  particularly  vexing  in  the  case  of  the 
DMK,  because  of  the  demand  for  secession;  and  throughout, 
Rajaji  and  others  willing  to  seek  a  common  front  with  the  DMK 
had  to  insist  that  this  party  did  not  seriously  intend  to  secede — a 
view  which  gained  some  credence  during  and  after  the  Chinese 
invasion  of  1962.51 

203 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

As  we  have  already  seen,  Rajaji  and  Munshi  differ  very  sharply 
on  such  problems,  about  which  more  will  be  said  in  the  discussion 
of  electoral  alliances.  For  the  time,  a  brief  review  of  some  of 
Rajaji's  pronouncements  will  suggest  the  delicacy  of  this  issue. 

Rajaji  has  throughout  steadfastly  insisted  that  the  party  as  such  has 
no  official  position  on  any  but  fundamental  principles.  None  the 
less,  he  said  that  he  personally  did  not  consider  the  demand  for  a 
Punjabi  suba  improper,  given  the  prevailing  pattern  of  linguistic 
states,  to  which  he  also  said  he  was  personally  opposed!52  Further, 
Rajaji  pointed  to  the  Swatantra  report  on  the  government's 
handling  of  the  agitation,  in  which  the  action  against  the  Akalis  was 
termed  'excessive  and  indiscriminate',  and  to  a  later  charge  that 
this  action  constituted  '  a  ridiculous  exercise  of  arbitrary  power,  a 
provocative  move  on  the  part  of  the  Punjab  Government,  with 
some  sinister  design,  and  a  flagrant  defiance  of  the  Constitution 
with  no  precedent  even  in  the  worst  period  of  British  terrorism'.53 
The  latter  referred  to  the  detention  of  Akali  leaders  under  the 
preventive  detention  act,  which  Rajaji,  who  was  instrumental  in  its 
passage  (to  curb  the  Communists),  said  justified  the  worst  fears  of 
its  opponents.54  So,  too,  when  Tara  Singh  undertook  a  fast  unto 
death  on  behalf  of  the  Punjabi  suba  demand,  Rajaji  asked  him  to 
keep  a  limited  fast  and  also  asked  the  government  to  respond  to  it 
in  the  same  generous  way  as  the  British  responded  to  Gandhi's 
Poona  fast  (1932)  on  behalf  of  the  untouchables.  Finally,  at  the  end 
of  the  fast,  Rajaji  said:  'I  hope  the  distress  gone  through  will  bear 
some  fruit  and  in  adequate  measure.  '55 

The  Swatantra  leaders,  Munshi  excepted,  responded  in  much 
the  same  way  to  the  demands  of  the  DMK.  There  is,  on  the  one 
hand,  great  stress  on  government  repression  in  dealing  with 
demonstrations;  and,  for  example,  in  Ranga's  by-election  cam- 
paign in  Chittoor  (Andhra,  August  1962),  DMK  men  supported 
him  and  frequently  displayed  bruises,  cuts,  etc.,  which  were 
attributed  to  police  brutality  during  Madras  demonstrations.  On 
the  other  hand,  with  respect  to  the  demand  for  secession,  the 
matter  has  been  dealt  with  by  denying  that  the  DMK  is  serious 
about  this.  Thus,  Rajaji  called  the  hope  for  a  separate  Dravidistan 
'chimerical'  and  he  deplored  efforts  'to  besmirch  the  name  of  the 
DMK'.56 Throughout,  the  leaders  insisted  that  there  was  no  official 
position  on  either  issue  and  that  by  defending  the  right  to  protest 
they  were  not  thereby  defending  the  professed  goals  of  the  protest. 

204 


mm 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

This  sort  of  equivocal  or  ambivalent  approach  is  designed  to 
provide  some  basis  for  anti-Congress  activity  in  concert  with  the 
Akali  Dal  and  the  DMK,57  and  may  appear  attractive  to  those  for 
whom  the  linguistic  or  Secessionist'  issue  does  not  bulk  large,  but 
it  cannot  help  but  offend  those  for  whom  these  are  the  issues.  Thus, 
while  Rajaji  has  emphasized  that  the  party  is  not  'governed  by  its 
founder-leader's  personal  views  on  the  official  language  issue  and 
on  the  Punjabi  suba  claim'58  this  has  not  satisfied  much  of  Indian 
critical  opinion,  nor  has  it  pleased  all  Swatantrites.  The  Times  of 
India  complained  of  Rajaji's  'sophistry'  in  linguistic  matters,59  and 
Munshi,  who  is  vehemently  opposed  to  both  the  Akali  Dal  and  the 
DMK,  has  made  known  his  distress  over  Swatantra  approaches  to 
these  groups.60  On  the  other  hand,  many  Akalis  in  the  Punjab  felt 
that  Swatantra  did  not  permit  sufficient  scope  for  advancing  the 
Punjabi  suba  claim  and  many  felt  that  the  party  could  have  gone 
further  in  supporting  the  Akali  efforts.61  Some  Sikh  Swatantrites 
either  resigned  from  party  office  or  from  the  party  completely,  to 
have  greater  freedom  to  speak  out  on  Punjabi  suba;  while  one 
disgruntled  Swatantrite  in  the  Punjab  has  stated:  'We  do  not 
agree  with  Mr  Rajagopalachari's  view  on  Punjabi  suba.  His  recent 
utterances  have  shaken  our  confidence  in  the  principles  of  the 
organization. .  .They  are  trying  to  appease  the  Akalis  and  the 
Hindus  simultaneously  on  the  eve  of  the  general  election.'62  Such 
are  the  difficulties  involved  in  trying  to  establish  anti-statism  as  the 
pivotal  consideration  in  politics,  in  areas  where  people's  pre- 
occupations lie  elsewhere,  and  such  are  some  of  the  problems  in- 
volved in  trying  to  build  an  all-India  opposition  out  of  the  diverse 
interests  of  the  sub-continent. 

The  fundamental  principles  of  the  Swatantra  Party  are  also 
silent  on  foreign  policy,  and  here,  too,  individual  members  are 
privileged  to  adopt  whatever  personal  positions  they  may  choose.63 
Both  historically  and  in  recent  years,  there  have  been  sharp  differ- 
ences in  the  leaders'  approaches  to  international  events.  Rajaji,  for 
example,  has  a  very  strong  element  of  pacifism  in  his  outlook, 
made  his  first  trip  out  of  India  (at  the  age  of  83)  to  plead  with  the 
nuclear  powers  to  cease  nuclear  testing,  and  has  been  inclined  to  be 
conciliatory  towards  communists  who  seem  to  believe  in  peaceful 
co-existence  (just  as  he  was  happy  when  the  CPI  ostensibly 
reconciled  itself  to  parliamentarism).  Munshi,  by  contrast,  shares 
many  Jan  Sangh  views,  while  Masani,  in  particular,  is  a  vehement 

205 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

anti-communist  ideologian,  wholeheartedly  pro-western  in  foreign 
affairs,  and  determined  to  sustain  a  remorseless  battle  to  turn  back 
communists.  Not  surprisingly,  one  of  Masani's  principal  efforts 
was  to  persuade  Rajaji  to  be  less  'soft  on  communists',  and  his 
efforts,  coupled  with  the  Chinese  invasion,  have  apparently 
succeeded. 

Such  differences  are,  however,  less  significant  than  the  high 
degree  of  agreement  which  has  prevailed,  especially  with  respect  to 
the  challenge  of  Communist  China  and  the  means  of  combating  it. 
Long  before  the  Chinese  invasion  in  late  1962,  Swatantra  had 
insisted  that  at  least  towards  Communist  China  the  principles  of 
non-alinement,  panch  sheel,  and  others  pillars  of  Indian  foreign 
policy  would  have  to  be  replaced.  While  acknowledging,  perhaps 
for  reasons  of  expediency,  that  under  '  normal '  conditions  these 
might  be  appropriate  principles,  Swatantra  leaders  insisted  that  with 
the  '  rape  of  Tibet '  and  Chinese  border  incursions  (including  the 
construction  of  the  Aksai  Chin  road,  which  connects  Sinkiang 
with  Tibet,  across  Indian  territory)  the  old  notions  had  been 
rendered  meaningless,  if  not  suicidal.  Demanding  a  more  deter- 
mined posture,  Swatantra  opposed  all  gestures  of '  appeasement  '64 
and  condemned  the  '  Krishna  Menon  pattern  of  politics ',  which 
was  considered  to  be  pro-communist  'neutralism'.65  Supporting 
Masani's  very  tough  anti-communist  stance,  Swatantra  has 
endorsed  recommendations  that  India  (1)  sever  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Communist  China;  (2)  terminate  all  trade  between  the 
two  countries;  (3)  refuse  to  sponsor  her  admission  to  the  UN; 
(4)  recognize  a  Tibetan  refugee  government;  and  (5)  attempt  to 
negotiate  joint  defence  agreements  against  China  with  other  Asian 
nations,  including  Pakistan,  and  more  recently  with  Japan.  Both 
before  and,  especially,  after  the  Chinese  invasion,  the  party  was 
very  emphatic  that  India  seek  a  detente  with  Pakistan,  putting 
Kashmir  in  the  'freezer',  and,  if  necessary,  that  India  should 
aline  more  closely  with  the  non-communist  West.  Few  have 
supported  Masani's  private  view  that  Chiang  Kai-Shek  might  be 
encouraged  to  attack  mainland  China,  even  at  the  risk  of  broaden- 
ing the  scope  of  military  activities  to  involve  the  great  powers  in  a 
potential  nuclear  war.66 

This '  tough '  foreign  policy  line  against  China  provides  a  basis  for 
co-operation  among  many  parties,  including  not  only  the  rightists, 
but  also  the  PSP  and  Socialists.  However,  Swatantra's  rather 

206 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

generous  approach  to  Pakistan  and  its  Kashmir  stand  have 
certainly  alienated  many  of  the  more  militant  Hindus.  Very  im- 
portantly, however,  Swatantra  alone  of  the  major  Indian  parties 
censured  the  government  for  the  seizure  of  Goa,  claiming  that  it 
was  a  diversionary  action  designed  to  deflect  attention  from  the 
failings  of  the  ruling  party  and  to  enhance  the  prestige  of  the  then 
Defence  Minister,  Krishna  Menon.67  Thus,  on  a  matter  which 
elicited  the  enthusiastic  support  of  both  the  extreme  left  and  the 
extreme  right  in  Indian  politics,  Swatantra  chose  to  stand  apart.68 

Swatantra' s  formulations  concerning  the  Punjabi  suba  and  DMK 
agitations  undoubtedly  have  a  *  Machiavellian'  dimension,69  but 
both  here  and  elsewhere  the  party's  views  are  more  principled  and 
ideologically  based  than  many  critics  admit.  Retention  of  English 
has  some  support,  especially  in  non-Hindi  areas,  but  only  in  a 
small  minority  of  the  population;  and  especially  when  Swatantra 
leaders  emphasize  English  as  the  medium  of  instruction  in  colleges 
and  universities  (as  many  leaders  do),  they  antagonize  many  ardent 
supporters  of  regional  languages,  as  well  as  the  proponents  of 
Hindi.  The  same  is  true  when  the  issue  of 'linguistic  states '  versus 
'zonal  divisions'  arises.70  Its  insistence  that  India  take  the  lead  in 
effecting  a  detente  or  settlement  with  Pakistan  is  similarly  not 
calculated  for  mass  appeal,  for  in  so  far  as  strong  feelings  in  the 
country  are  concerned,  these  tend  to  be  decidedly  hostile  towards 
Pakistan.71  The  Goa  issue  did  not  bulk  very  large,  but  Swatantra 
stood  virtually  alone  in  its  adverse  reaction.  Finally,  the  ambivalent 
approach  to  the  Akalis  and  the  DMK  has  tended  to  isolate  the 
party  from  the  prevailing  passions  in  these  areas. 

That  Swatantra  has  ultimately  addressed  itself  to  issues  not 
directly  related  to  statism  is  by  no  means  surprising;  but  the  party's 
insistence  that  all  such  views  are  unofficial  and  the  fact  that  many 
of  these  views  are  devoid  of  mass  appeal  reflect  certain  biases  and 
preoccupations  of  the  leadership.  To  be  sure,  the  party  has  found 
some  resonance  among  the  mass  of  the  voters  through  its  opposi- 
tion to  enhanced  taxation  and  through  other  anti-statist  positions, 
and  it  has  used  other  appeals  to  good  effect.  But  its  official  doctrine 
and  many  unofficial  views  still  seem  relatively  remote  from  popular 
interests  and  passions.  In  fact,  the  liberal  tone  of  the  fundamental 
principles;  the  stress  on  such  matters  as  constitutional  propriety, 
administrative  efficiency,  and  judicial  review;  the  penchant  for 
adopting  rather  unpopular  positions,  all  suggest  the  moderate, 

207 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

middle-  and  upper-class  sentiments  of  much  of  the  party's 
leadership  and  the  debt  which  Swatantra  owes  to  the  early 
'Moderate'  leaders  of  the  Congress.72 

This  raises,  however  remotely,  the  question  of  the  ways  in  which 
Swatantra,  like  the  Moderates  (and  their  descendants,  the 
Liberals),  might  be  out  of  the  mainstream  of  Indian  political  life;73 
and  this  is  a  question  to  which  some  Swatantra  leaders  have  also 
addressed  themselves.  For  example,  many  Swatantra  leaders, 
particularly  in  the  north,  have  argued  that  the  party  is  at  a  dis- 
advantage vis-d-vis  the  Jan  Sangh,  because  of  the  latter's  more 
militant  posture  and  because  of  what  is  regarded  as  the  Sangh's 
intrinsically  more  appealing  ideology.74  Many  Swatantrites  echo 
the  words  of  Lobo  Prabhu  who  argued  that 

there  is  a  little  despondency  in  some  quarters  that  while  the  Swatantra 
Party  has  convinced  those  who  can  think,  it  has  still  to  reach  the  masses, 
less  disposed  to  question  their  conditions.  This  idea  has  been  vigorously 
spread  by  the  Congress  in  order  to  emphasize  the  weakness  of  the  Swa- 
tantra Party.  But  surely,  if  a  Party's  principles  appeal  to  the  educated 
and  thinking  classes,  it  is  a  demonstration  of  the  party  being  in  the 
right.75 

The  same  feeling  of  intellectual  superiority  (not  to  say  arrogance) 
was  touched  upon  earlier  in  discussing  the  dislike  for  universal 
suffrage  and  intrudes  in  a  different  fashion  in  Rajaji's  reference  to 
the  'incredible  degree  of  gullibility  in  the  electorate'.76 

This  sort  of  sentiment  calls  into  question  once  again  the 
commitment  of  certain  leaders  to  democracy  based  on  universal 
suffrage,  which  would,  for  example,  be  important  to  gauge  if  a 
right-wing  authoritarian  regime  became  a  possibility  in  India.  It 
also  evokes  memories  of  the  early  Congress  Moderates  and  their 
lineal  descendants,  the  Liberals,  who  came  to  feel  isolated  from 
(emerging)  mass  politics. 

Parallels  between  the  Liberals  and  Swatantra  are  worth  pursu- 
ing, not  only  for  reasons  of  historical  curiosity,  but  also  to  sharpen 
our  understanding  of  Swatantra.  Lobo  Prabhu's  statement  pro- 
vides such  a  parallel,  because  it  is  little  more  than  a  rephrasing  of  a 
statement  by  Sir  Sivaswamy  Aiyar,  a  prominent  Moderate : 

Our  party,  many  of  us  feel,  is  in  the  minority  in  the  country . . .  [but] 
Sobriety  and  judgement  are  bound  in  the  long  run  to  rule  the  world.  It 
may  be  that  we  feel  discouraged  at  times  by  the  fact  that  we  are  not  able 

208 


___—_— 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

to  muster  in  thousands  as  the  members  of  the  other  party  [the  Congress 
'  Extremists ']  can  claim,  but  let  not  that  depress  us  in  the  least ...  We  are 
bound  to  succeed.77 

In  the  same  spirit,  Srinivasa  Sastri  declared  that 

I  may  be  a  heretic,  but  I  do  maintain  that  that  it  is  no  disgrace  to  a  party 
not  to  win  success  at  elections . . .  We  still  are  elders  knowing  life  some- 
what deeper  than  other  people. .  .such  men  have  a  value  and  I  am 
confident  that  we  should  continue  to  perform  our  most  necessary, 
though  often  neglected  task; 

and  Venkataram  Sastri  declared  that 

we  know  as  liberals  we  are  a  handful  in  a  vast  country — we  who  have 
courage  and  are  not  ashamed  to  own  ourselves  to  be  liberals.78 

Many  Swatantrites  share  some  of  these  basic  perspectives,  viz. 
that  they  are  older,  wiser,  and  more  responsible  people  than  those 
who  dominate  the  political  scene,  and  that  it  is  no  disgrace  that 
Swatantra  has  received  such  a  small  percentage  of  the  popular  vote. 
The  explicit  aversion,  in  many  quarters,  to  universal  suffrage 
indicates  further  that  some  leading  Swatantrites  doubt  that  the 
party  can  get  its  message  across  in  a  context  of  mass  politics.  They 
also  seem  to  feel  that  they  must  continue  to  fight  their  battle,  even 
against  heavy  odds. 

One  Swatantra  leader  argued  that  many  of  the  retired  administra- 
tors and  professionals,  in  particular,  would  withdraw  from  Swatantra 
if  it  became  'just  another  political  party',  indulging  in  communal 
appeals  and  the  like  to  maximize  its  strength.79  Some  doubtless 
would  do  so,  and  in  this  respect  they  would  also  parallel  the  earlier 
Moderate-Liberal  position.  Most,  however,  are  determined  not  to 
suffer  the  same  fate  which  befell  these  early  Congress  leaders, 
i.e.  almost  total  eclipse,  and  do  not  seem  prepared  to  go  down  with 
colours  flying. 

This  determination  has  led  many  Swatantrites  to  turn  their 
backs  on  a  broader  liberalism,  in  the  interests  of  anti-statism  and 
the  development  of  the  broadest  possible  anti-Congress  front.  One 
form  that  this  'compromise'  has  taken  is  the  willingness  to  derive 
aid  and  comfort  from  people  both  inside  and  outside  the  party 
who  are  anything  but  liberal  and  for  whom  the  liberal  aspects  of 
the  fundamental  principles  are  utterly  meaningless,  save  in  the 
very  truncated,  anti-statist  sense.  The  Swatantra  dilemma  here  was 

I4  209  ESP 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

aptly  portrayed  by  one  MP  from  the  party,  when  he  was  asked 
about  the  extent  to  which  the  liberal  aspects  of  party  doctrine 
animated  those  who  supported  the  party.  His  response  was  terse: 
'  Swatantra  is  like  a  parasite  plant.  It  attaches  itself  to  anything 
which  can  give  it  nourishment,  but  has  no  roots  of  its  own.'80 

Another  aspect  of  the  party's  departure  from  a  broadly  liberal 
stand  is  the  nature  of  its  electoral  appeals  in  many  areas.  Swatantra 
candidates  almost  universally  emphasized  certain  of  the  funda- 
mental principles,  such  as  opposition  to  heavy  taxes,  to  deficit 
financing,  and  to  land  ceilings.  Save  on  a  very  limited  scale,  how- 
ever, the  emphasis  was  on  the  anti-statist  issues,  not  on  a  set  of 
broadly  liberal  ideas. 

Furthermore,  in  many  areas,  even  basic  anti-  statist  positions 
were  subordinated  to  other  appeals.  Party  files  contain  numerous, 
detailed  studies  of  the  religious  and  caste  composition  of  certain 
areas,  with  recommendations  as  to  how  communal  factors  may 
be  exploited  in  the  selection  of  candidates,  in  electoral  appeals, 
and  the  like.81  In  some  districts  in  Gujarat,  religious  appeals  were 
made  and  old  Rajput  war  cries  were  so  widely  prevalent  that  even 
party  leaders  admitted  that  nothing  could  save  certain  candidates 
whose  elections  had  been  challenged  on  the  grounds  of  use  of  such 
appeals.82  By  almost  universal  assent  of  those  immediately  involved, 
a  declaration  against  prohibition  was  one  of  the  most  widely  heard 
from  Swatantra  platforms  in  Gujarat;  and  it  was  apparently  one  of 
the  more  effective. 83  In  the  Punjab,  Swatantra  sought  to  capitalize 
on  the  land  question  and  on  opposition  to  the  Hindu  Succession 
Act  (particularly  the  provision  which  gave  inheritance  rights  to 
women),  and  leaders  in  that  state  were  frank  to  admit  that  the  latter 
was  very  important  in  their  campaign  effort.84  In  Madras,  Ganesan, 
the  very  devout  state  President,  cited  chapter  and  verse  from  the 
Vedas  to  show  the  identity  of  Swatantra  doctrine  and  classic 
doctrines;  and  he  threatened  to  organize  a  satyagraha  in  protest 
against  the  inclusion  of  mutt  and  temple  lands  under  the  Madras 
land  ceiling  legislation.85  This  is,  however,  one  area  where  the 
public  ideology  was  invoked,  for  some  Swatantra  leaders,  as  well 
as  the  press,  deplored  the  fact  that  Ganesan' s  efforts  were  not 
directed  against  land  ceilings  per  se  but  against  this  specific  pro- 
vision, which  had  obviously  religious  overtones.  More  recently, 
however,  the  Gujarat  state  convention  of  the  party  had  as  its  key- 
note speaker  a  Hindu  holy  man  who  was  about  to  embark  on  a  fast 

210 


Swatantra  Doctrine 

over  the  question  of  cow-slaughter;  and  the  state  party  passed  a 
resolution  favouring  a  ban  on  cow-slaughter  at  the  same  convention. 
Such  concessions  to  religious  sentiment,  as  well  as  the  necessity  to 
cultivate  caste  loyalties  and  to  respond  to  parochial  concerns  (such 
as  boundary  issues  in  Bihar  and  Orissa),  indicate  the  difficulties 
confronting  Swatantra  in  this  realm. 

Many  of  these  issues  can,  of  course,  be  linked  in  some  fashion  to 
the  general  issue  of  statism,  but  usually  this  was  not  done.  Even 
more  rarely  was  an  effort  made  to  link  these  issues  to  any  broadly 
liberal  stance.  This  is  not  surprising  but  it  does  indicate  that  a 
broadly  liberal  approach  was  not  deemed  relevant  in  most  areas. 
At  best,  Swatantra  emphasized  anti-statism,  which,  to  repeat,  is 
not  synonymous  with  liberalism. 

The  future  of  Swatantra  as  a  progressive  party  depends  to  a 
great  extent  on  its  ability  to  reach  supporters  on  the  basis  of  a  more 
rounded  liberalism,  not  the  drastically  circumscribed  liberalism- 
as-anti-statism.  This,  in  turn,  depends  on  other  factors,  including 
the  balance  of  power  within  the  Swatantra  elites,  the  existence 
and/or  development  of  potentially  liberal  classes,  the  nature  of  the 
challenge  from  the  left,  among  others.  Thus  far,  however,  in  the 
contest  between  the  proponents  of  ideological  purity  and  those 
who  adopt  a  victory-at-any-cost  posture,  the  centre  of  gravity  lies 
with  the  latter.  Swatantra's  formal  doctrinal  pronouncements, 
which  are  generally  liberal  in  temper  and  which  have  exerted  some 
disciplinary  pressure,  must  be  read  with  these  other  considerations 
in  mind.86 


211 


14-2 


I  »,#  »> 


I II  in 


CHAPTER   9 

ELECTORAL  ADJUSTMENTS 

INTRODUCTION 

Swatantra  leaders  have  always  felt  that  multi-cornered  contests  had 
contributed  substantially  to  Congress  victories  over  the  dis- 
organized opposition  in  195 1-2  and  1957.  With  this  in  mind,  the 
party  supplemented  its  efforts  to  build  itself  up  through  mergers 
and  grass  roots  organization  with  a  determined  campaign  to  make 
electoral  adjustments  with  non-merging  parties.  Some  of  the 
parties  whom  Swatantra  approached  were  not  considered  likely 
prospects  for  merger  under  any  circumstances,  while  in  other 
cases,  Swatantra  hoped  for  merger,  but  had  to  settle  for  second 
best. 

Broadly  speaking,  the  governing  principle  of  Swatantra's  efforts 
was  'my  enemy's  enemy  is  my  friend' — at  least  temporarily.  This 
opened  up  a  very  wide  field,  the  only  salient  exception  being  that 
no  negotiations  were  to  be  undertaken  with  the  CPI.1  Neither 
Swatantra  nor  the  CPI  saw  much  advantage  in  such  moves,  and  the 
CPI  remained  well  outside  the  range  of  Swatantra's  actual  and 
potential  allies.  None  the  less,  both  direct  and  indirect  adjust- 
ments with  the  CPI  were  in  some  cases  made;  and  Rajaji's  remark 
that  he  would  ally  with  the  devil  himself  if  this  would  help  defeat 
the  Congress  seemed  to  sanction  such  adjustments.2  In  particular, 
some  Swatantra  candidates  in  Andhra  came  to  direct,  explicit 
understandings  with  local  CPI  units;  and,  elsewhere,  Swatantra 
often  negotiated  understandings  with  parties  which  in  turn  had 
made  adjustments  with  the  CPI,  thus  bringing  Swatantra  into  some 
indirect  relations  with  the  CPI.3 

In  confronting  the  non-Communist  opposition,  Masani  ex- 
pressed concern  over  indiscriminate  alliances.  He  preferred  that 
Swatantra  contest  only  '  on  its  own  platform  and  in  furtherance  of 
its  own  policies  without  entering  into  any  alliance  with  other 
parties'.  Yet  he  was  'painfully  aware'  that  'a  policy  of  electoral 
understandings  and  adjustments '  was  indispensable,  if  the  Con- 
gress majority  were  to  be  weakened.4  The  policy  ultimately 
favoured,  reflecting  Masani's  distinction  between  an  'alliance' 

212 


Electoral  Adjustments 

and  an  ' understanding ',  was  that  of  'reciprocal  courtesy',  where 
Swatantra  and  other  'democratic'  opposition  parties  would  defer 
to  one  another  according  to  local  strength,  without  necessarily 
speaking  on  behalf  of  or  supporting  financially  each  other's  candi- 
dates.5 Swatantra  leaders  made  it  clear  that  even  if  other  opposition 
parties  declined  to  co-operate  widely  in  such  a  venture,  it  was  still 
likely  that  Swatantra  would  act  unilaterally,  and  stand  aside  in 
favour  of  another  party,  if  this  would  weaken  the  Congress/ 
Communist  position.  Moreover,  party  leaders  also  stated  that  they 
would  by  no  means  feel  compelled  to  contest  against  the  CPI  in  all 
areas,  especially  where  the  latter  was  strong,  because  this  would 
involve  a  wasting  of  resources.  Finally,  Swatantra  leaders  also 
insisted  that  their  party  would  not  feel  bound  by  any  understand- 
ings reached  by  their  'allies'  with  the  CPI.  If,  for  example,  the 
DMK  and  CPI  came  to  an  understanding,  and  if  Swatantra  and 
the  DMK  also  came  to  an  understanding,  Swatantra  reserved  the 
right  to  set  up  candidates  in  those  districts  in  which  the  DMK  had 
deferred  to  the  CPI.  Such  a  declaration  was  felt  to  be  necessary, 
because  the  DMK  and  the  Akali  Dal  in  particular  were  negotiating 
with  the  CPI  and  with  Swatantra,  and  Swatantra  did  not  want  to 
find  itself  in  the  potentially  embarrassing  position  of  being  in- 
directly alined  with  the  Communists.  In  fact,  the  latter  principle 
proved  to  be  rather  difficult  to  apply  in  some  instances,  as  we  shall 
see  in  due  course.6 

Many  negotiations  were  undertaken  at  the  very  highest  level — 
e.g.  between  Rajaji,  Ranga,  Masani,  el  aL,  with  their  counterparts 
in  the  various  opposition  groups  with  which  Swatantra  considered 
working  out  electoral  adjustments.  In  some  cases  (e.g.  Rajasthan), 
state  leaders  declined  to  enter  into  discussions  until  they  were 
provided  with  some  guidelines  by  the  national  leadership,  on  the 
basis  of  such  negotiations.7  For  the  most  part,  however,  the  relevant 
discussions  ultimately  took  place  at  the  state  or  district  level 
(although  in  some  of  these  cases,  Swatantra  national  leaders  still 
spoke  for  the  party),  on  the  sound  assumption  that  local  conditions 
would  prove  to  be  the  decisive  factor.  Most  important  were  the 
talks  with  the  Jan  Sangh,  both  nationally  and  in  Rajasthan,  the 
Punjab,  UP,  Madhya  Pradesh,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  elsewhere; 
with  the  RRP  nationally  and  in  Rajasthan,  UP,  and  Madhya 
Pradesh;  with  the  Akali  Dal  in  the  Punjab;  and  with  the  DMK  in 
Madras.8 

213 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

As  in  the  case  of  Swatantra's  efforts  to  build  its  own  strength  and 
to  induce  other  parties  to  merge,  the  negotiation  of  understandings 
involved  serious  problems.  Rajaji  argued  that  'over  and  above  the 
desire  of  every  party  to  maintain  its  own  importance,  there  is  con- 
siderable difficulty  in  appraising  the  strength  of  the  parties  in 
order  to  reach  electoral  adjustments.  It  is  these  difficulties  that 
have  stood  in  the  way  of  coming  to  agreed  adjustments  so  far.  '9  In 
this  he  was  quite  correct,  on  both  counts.  Even  obviously  weak  and 
declining  parties  seemed  reluctant  to  compromise  their  own  inde- 
pendent standing,  while  the  more  vital  ones  were  reluctant  to 
concede  much  to  a  new,  untested  party.  In  some  cases,  we  can  see 
with  the  advantage  of  hindsight  that  there  was  a  substantial  mis- 
reading of  political  strength.  Swatantra  proved  much  stronger  than 
imagined  in  some  areas,  while  elsewhere,  other  opposition  groups 
proved  surprisingly  strong.  For  example,  shortly  before  the  elec- 
tions of  1962,  leading  newspapers  seriously  underestimated  DMK 
and  Jan  Sangh  possibilities  in  Madras  and  UP,  respectively,  and 
exaggerated  Swatantra  strength.10  Quite  apart  from  other  factors 
which  worked  against  co-operation  among  opposition  parties,  this 
difficulty  in  appraising  strength  was  a  serious  obstacle;  and  here, 
as  in  the  effort  to  induce  mergers,  Swatantra's  limited  success  must 
be  weighed  against  the  difficulties  encountered.  But  Rajaji  was 
certainly  over-optimistic  when  he  stated  that '  I  expect  in  the  course 
of  time,  necessary  accommodations  will  be  made  and  triangular 
contests  avoided'.11 

In  some  important  respects,  Swatantra's  problems  with  the 
Jan  Sangh  and  the  DMK  were  similar.  Both  were  older  parties 
and  both  had  fairly  strong,  dedicated  cadres,  at  least  in  some  areas. 
Both  prided  themselves  on  their  dynamism  and  their  militancy, 
which  generally  took  a  markedly  'populist'  form  and  which  gave 
them  a  'mass'  party  image.  Both  tended  to  regard  Swatantra  as  a 
presumptuous  interloper  which  should  approach  them  somewhat 
as  supplicants  and  both  tended  to  portray  Swatantra  as  a  tired, 
moderate,  rich  man's  party.  The  buoyant  confidence  of  both, 
coupled  with  modest  electoral  successes  in  1952  and  1957,  helped 
to  keep  Swatantra  at  arm's  length,  at  least  until  it  had  proved  itself 
a  significant  political  force.  Both  felt  that  for  an  untried  party 
Swatantra  was  certainly  asking  too  much,  but  it  was  by  no  means 
clear  that  they  would  respond  any  better  if  Swatantra  were  success- 
ful. Given  their  general  'style'  of  political  action,  both  the  Jan 

214 


Electoral  Adjustments 

Sangh  and  the  DMK  were  not  likely  to  be  particularly  chastened 
by  Swatantra  victories.  By  and  large,  these  considerations  were  less 
important  in  dealing  with  the  Akali  Dal,  the  RRP  and  the 
Mahasabha.12 

On  the  other  hand,  these  opposition  parties  realized  that  Swa- 
tantra did  have  some  distinguished  national  and  state  leaders, 
that  it  did  have  the  ear  of  some  monied  interests,  that  it  shared 
a  desire  to  oust  the  Congress,  and  that  full-scale  internecine  war- 
fare among  opposition  parties  was  not  the  way  to  achieve  this  goal.13 
Thus,  happily  or  not,  elaborate  negotiations  were  undertaken  by 
the  opposition  parties;  but  the  Jan  Sangh  and  DMK  approached 
them  with  the  proverbial  chip  on  their  shoulders. 

THE  DMK 

Because  Rajaji  came  from  Madras,  a  determined  effort  was  made 
by  Swatantra  to  ensure  a  reasonably  good  showing  in  that  state. 
After  Swatantra  absorbed  the  INDC,  the  DMK  was  the  principal 
opposition  group  in  Madras,  and  Swatantra  had  to  decide  how  to 
come  to  grips  with  it.  There  were,  however,  some  very  knotty 
problems,  in  addition  to  those  just  mentioned.  The  DMK  was  an 
offshoot  of  the  virulently  anti-Brahmin  Dravida  Kazagham,  and  it 
was  not  clear  to  what  extent  Swatantra's  Brahmins  could  reconcile 
themselves  to  working  out  adjustments  with  a  party  with  this  back- 
ground.14 In  addition,  the  DMK,  as  we  have  seen,  openly  preached 
secession,  and  as  part  of  its  electoral  plans  it  favoured  adjustments 
with  the  CPI.  Both  within  Swatantra  itself  and  among  certain  seg- 
ments of  the  electorate,  these  issues  could  not  easily  be  dodged. 

On  the  communal  question,  Rajaji  himself  insisted  that  a  dis- 
tinction had  to  be  made  between  the  DK  and  the  DMK,  even 
though  in  the  mid-1950s  he  had  accused  both  of '  openly  preaching 
a  creed  of  hatred  based  on  ethnological  conjectures  and  unrecorded 
and  unproved  historical  conflicts . . . ',  at  which  time  he  also  added 
the  comment:  'Is  it  not  remarkable  that  this  hatred-mongering  is 
going  on,  with  little  disapproval  or  discouragement  from  those  in 
authority?  '15  In  more  recent  remarks,  the  DK  was  still  said  to  be 
vehemently  anti-Brahmin  and  communal,  according  to  Rajaji;  but 
by  contrast  the  DMK  had  abandoned  its  communal  bias  and  was  a 
party  with  which  Brahmins  need  not  feel  uncomfortable.  One 
source  argued  that  it  was  on  Rajaji's  advice  that  Anandorai,  the 

215 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

DMK  leader,  had  broken  away  from  Naicker  and  the  DK,  and  the 
same  source  speculated  that  Rajaji  stood  a  good  chance  of  per- 
suading the  DMK  to  follow  the  Ganatantra  Parishad  into  Swa- 
tantra.16 Others  have  given  Rajaji  somewhat  less  credit  in  these 
matters  but  have  argued  that  he  did  try  to  persuade  Annadorai  to 
temper  the  communal  and  secessionist  appeals,  in  the  interest  of 
maximizing  anti-Congress  support  behind  the  DMK.  Certainly, 
some  of  Rajaji's  colleagues  in  the  Madras  unit  of  Swatantra  (as  well 
as  some  in  Andhra  and  Mysore)  were  either  former  Justiceites  or 
non-Brahmin  Congressmen  who  had  been  in  the  forefront  of 
efforts  to  oust  Rajaji  as  Chief  Minister  of  the  state,  which  suggests 
that  some  old  animosities  have  been  overcome  under  the  pressure 
of  new  conditions  and  needs.  This,  however,  would  seem  in- 
sufficient evidence  to  think  that  a  Swatantra-DMK  merger  was 
likely,  because  the  'communal'  question  seems  less  relevant  here 
than  broader  social  and  economic  considerations. 

On  the  DMK  plea  for  '  Dravidistan ',  Rajaji  simply  insisted,  as 
we  have  seen,  that  it  should  not  be  taken  seriously  and  that  DMK 
leaders  had  a  tiger  by  the  tail  without  knowing  how  to  let  it  go. 
The  demand  was  at  worst  an  exaggerated  reaction  against  north 
Indian  'imperialism5,  and  at  best  a  legitimate,  if  also  exaggerated 
reaction  against '  statism  \  Thus,  Rajaji  tried  once  again  to  make  the 
DMK  a  respectable  party,  in  this  instance  in  the  eyes  of  the  nation- 
alists (both  militant  and  moderate)  who  looked  upon  the  '  Dravidi- 
stan' demand  as  a  menace  to  the  integrity  of  India.17 

Swatantra  tried  to  dispose  summarily  of  the  CPI-DMK  issue 
by  restating  its  principles  concerning  understandings:  the  party 
would  not  consider  itself  bound  to  stand  aside  in  favour  of  a  CPI 
candidate,  even  if  the  DMK  chose  to  do  so.  In  this  fashion,  the 
leadership  tried  to  counter  some  of  the  charges  of  political  oppor- 
tunism levelled  against  Swatantra  when  it  announced  its  own  talks 
with  the  DMK. 

There  were  some  plausible  reasons  for  possible  DMK  interest 
in  reaching  an  understanding,  apart  from  the  desire  to  avoid  any 
self-defeating  triangular  contests.  Swatantra  was  a  national  party; 
it  might  provide  some  help  financially,  if  it  turned  out  to  be  a  'rich 
man's  party';  it  could  help  to  make  the  DMK  more  respectable 
among  upper  caste  voters ;  and  it  unofficially  supported  English  as 
the  official  language  of  India.  As  discussions  proceeded,  however, 
it  became  evident  that  Swatantra  had  relatively  little  to  contribute, 

216 


Electoral  Adjustments 

financially  or  otherwise.  For  the  DMK,  the  disadvantages  of 
associating  with  a  'rich  man's  party'  which  was  not  actually  rich 
outweighed  more  remote  advantages  which  might  accrue. 

Whatever  differences  might  have  kept  them  apart,  the  negotia- 
tions were  certainly  sustained  and  intense.  The  result,  at  one  stage, 
was  the  preparation  of  two  lists  of  seats,  one  in  which  final  adjust- 
ments for  dividing  constituencies  had  been  reached,  the  second 
which  required  further  negotiations  and  which  also  would  have 
required  the  DMK  leadership  to  secure  the  withdrawal  of  some  of 
its  own  candidates.  It  became  clear  that  Swatantra  asked  too  much 
of  the  DMK,  particularly  in  the  matter  of  prestige  Lok  Sabha  seats 
which  both  wanted  to  contest  but  in  which  the  DMK  felt  it 
could  make  a  much  better  showing.  When  it  became  clear  that  the 
difficulties  on  the  second  list  could  not  be  resolved,  Annadorai 
insisted  on  reconsidering  both  lists  afresh,  and  with  this,  the 
talks  broke  down  on  a  state-wide  basis.18  Rajaji  was  obliged  to 
announce  that  'the  Swatantra  Party  will  have  to  face  the  elections 
without  the  advantage  which  we  had  hoped  to  secure.  Perhaps  it  is 
all  for  the  good  that  we  are  forced  to  stand  on  our  own  legs.  '19 
Annadorai  spoke  of  the '  unattainability  of  an  agreement'  and  of  the 
futility  of  any  further  state-wide  talks,  and  he  attributed  the  failure 
of  the  talks  to  '  acute  differences  of  opinion  about  certain  con- 
stituencies'.20  Thus  they  abandoned  'the  joint  expedition  to  the 
Congress  mountain',  which  Rajaji  termed  'our  eve-of-the-election 
gift  to  the  Congress';  but  as  Annadorai  stated,  'though  a  pact  has 
become  impossible. .  .the  area  of  agreement  wherein  there  will  be 
no  contest  between  the  DMK  and  Swatantra  Party  will  naturally 
be  fairly  large,  and  triangular  contests  will  be  only  for  a  small 
number  of  places  \21  In  this,  Annadorai  was  quite  right,  and,  for 
example,  a  full  and  harmonious  agreement  was  reached  for  the 
entire  Madurai  district.22 

The  failure  to  achieve  a  general  understanding  with  the  DMK 
was  in  small  part  responsible  for  what  Rajaji  himself  termed  'a 
great  defeat  amounting  to  a  rout'  in  Madras  state,  as  Swatantra  did 
not  win  a  single  Lok  Sabha  seat  and  secured  only  nine  assembly 
seats,  as  opposed  to  seven  and  fifty,  respectively,  for  the  DMK. 
The  DMK's  successes  in  1962  naturally  heightened  the  party's 
confidence  and  led  to  plans  to  contest  virtually  every  Lok  Sabha 
and  assembly  seat  in  1967,  which  did  not  leave  much  room  for 
negotiations  with  Swatantra!23 

217 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

In  addition  to  limited  co-operation  in  1962,  as  in  Madurai 
district,  the  DMK  showed  some  willingness  to  work  with  Swa- 
tantra on  a  limited  basis,  in  spite  of  Swatantra's  1962  electoral 
debacle  in  Madras.24  In  return  for  Swatantra  support  in  a  key 
Madras  by-election,  the  DMK  supported  Ranga's  successful 
candidacy  in  the  Chittoor  by-election,  thus  helping  the  Swatantra 
President  to  return  to  the  Lok  Sabha,  after  his  defeat  in  the  Feb- 
ruary 1962  general  elections.25  The  DMK  also  helped  to  send 
Ruthnaswamy  and  Mariswamy  to  the  Rajya  Sabha  from  Madras, 
which  suggests  that  all  may  not  yet  be  lost,  and  that  the  DMK  might 
have  had  some  debts  to  repay.  Now  that  the  DMK  has  formally 
abandoned  its  secessionist  pleas,  and  with  recurrent  difficulties  in 
the  linguistic  situation,  there  is  still  a  distinct  possibility  that  a 
modus  vivendi  may  be  worked  out  for  1967,  in  which  Swatantra 
would  probably  hope  to  barter  support  for  DMK  assembly  candi- 
dates in  return  for  the  opportunity  to  contest  for  the  Lok  Sabha.2Q 

THE  JAN  SANGH 

Negotiations  between  Swatantra  and  the  Jan  Sangh  have  ranged 
from  discussions  of  all-India  merger  to  modest  efforts  at  local 
electoral  adjustments.  The  parties  never  seem  to  have  come  close 
to  merger,  although  the  idea  has  been  mooted  repeatedly  since  very 
shortly  after  Swatantra  was  formed.27  Even  a  general '  non-aggres- 
sion' pact  proved  to  be  beyond  their  grasp  in  1962,  as  Swatantra 
and  the  Jan  Sangh  fought  each  other  bitterly  in  many  areas.  Many 
local  adjustments  were,  however,  worked  out  in  1962,  and  at  the 
present  time  (1966)  talk  of  a  merger — still  very  unlikely — can  still 
be  heard. 

The  major  *  public '  issue  that  had  to  be  faced  in  dealing  with  the 
Jan  Sangh  was  its  de  facto  communalism.  Among  other  reasons 
given,  this  de  facto  communalism  of  the  Sangh  was  cited  by 
leaders  of  the  Ganatantra  Parishad  and  of  the  Gujarat  kshatrya 
mahasabha  to  explain  why  they  did  not  join  or  aline  with  the 
Sangh;  and  most  leading  Swatantrites  echoed  this  sentiment.28  For 
a  party  which  set  itself  before  the  electorate  as  a  secular  body,  as 
Swatantra  did,  close  association  with  '  communalists '  would  be  a 
liability  in  some  quarters.  Moreover,  the  Sangh's  association  with 
Hindi  imperialism,  a  key  component  of  its  militant  nationalism, 
also  smacked  of  intolerance. 

Swatantra  dealt  with  the  problem  primarily  by  ignoring  it,  or  by 

218 


Electoral  Adjustments 

white-washing  the  Sangh.  Proclaiming  its  own  secular  basis, 
Swatantra  insisted  that  association  with  the  Sangh  did  not  con- 
stitute endorsement  of  any  of  its  views  and  Swatantrites  were  not 
permitted  to  speak  from  Sangh  platforms  in  support  of  Sangh 
candidates.  In  addition,  Masani,  among  other  leaders,  has  listed  it 
among  the  *  democratic'  opposition  parties,  and  Rajaji  has  simply 
denied  that  the  Jan  Sangh  could  be  called  communal.  At  a  Jan 
Sangh  convention  which  he  addressed  he  is  reported  to  have  called 
the  delegates  '  fellow  workers  for  individual  freedom  and  con- 
firmed opponents  of  the  totalitarian  tendencies  of  the  Congress  \29 
While  this  writer,  among  many  others,  remains  unconvinced  when 
confronting  such  pro- Sangh  statements,  these  remarks  suggest  not 
only  Swatantra's  concern  about  the  Sangh  'image'  but  also  the 
way  in  which  it  sought  to  justify  its  association  with  that  party. 

Leaders  of  both  parties  have  always  contended  that  the  points  of 
difference  are  few,  but  they  have  not  always  agreed  on  what  the 
critical  differences  are.  For  some,  economic  issues  bulk  large;  for 
others,  it  will  be  linguistic  problems  or  foreign  policy,  or  some  non- 
doctrinal  matter  (such  as  Sangh  discipline),  that  will  be  decisively 
divisive.  For  example,  leaders  of  both  parties  usually  assert  that 
economic  issues  do  not  separate  them;  and  many  point  to  'an 
identical  programme  on  the  question  of  nationalization  and  co- 
operative farming'  as  evidence  of  this  proximity.30  They  often 
make  common  cause  on  these  and  other  economic  questions,31  but 
it  remains  true  that  the  Sangh  is  less  solicitous  of  the  interests  of 
large  property  holders  (both  urban-industrial  and  rural)  than  is 
Swatantra.  This  is  suggested  by  the  Sangh  charge  that  Swatantra 
is  a  crich  man's  party'  and  was  underscored  in  Raj  as  than,  where 
the  Sangh  joined  all  other  parties  against  Swatantra,  in  supporting 
land  reform  legislation  which  would  further  weaken  the  position  of 
the  princes  and  big  jagirdars.  This  reflects  the  long-standing 
conflict  between  'big'  and  'little'  Rajputs,  and  indicates  that  in 
some  areas,  economic  issues  may  continue  to  divide  the  two  parties, 
although  national  leaders  underplay  them.32 

Ranga,  emphasizing  non-economic  factors,  said  that  it  was 
foreign  policy  which  kept  the  two  parties  from  merging,33  and 
certainly  with  respect  to  Pakistan  and  Kashmir,  there  have  been 
and  are  today  some  very  serious  differences.  Thus,  while  Swatantra 
was  emphasizing  the  need  for  a  detente  with  Pakistan  and  closer 
ties  with  the  non-Communist  West,  the  Sangh  stressed  forcible 

219 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

liberation  of  all  Indian  territory  held  by  both  Pakistan  and  China, 
and  withdrawal  from  the  British  Commonwealth.34  However, 
balancing  this  is  the  fact  that  Red  China  provides  a  common  foreign 
policy  focus,  which  even  Jan  Sanghis  are  inclined  now  to  take  more 
seriously  than  Pakistan;  while,  contrariwise,  many  Swatantrites 
are  as  hostile  towards  Pakistan  as  are  the  most  militant  Jan  Sanghis.35 
Thus,  there  are  ties  that  bind  as  well  as  points  of  difference  in  the 
area  of  economics  and  of  foreign  affairs. 

There  is  one  subject,  however,  which  generates  considerable 
friction  and  which  is  likely  to  persist— the  question  of  national 
language  and  the  linguistically  related  issue  of  regionalism.  The 
Sangh  has  had  some  non-Hindi  speaking  Presidents  in  recent  years, 
but  the  party  continues  to  favour  an  immediate  shift  to  Hindi  at  the 
national  level  and  to  regional  tongues  for  state  government  and 
educational  purposes.36  From  its  militant  nationalist  perspective, 
the  Sangh  is  also  severely  critical  of '  fissiparous '  forces  in  India, 
including  the  DMK  and  the  Akali  Dal.  Jan  Sanghis  were  among 
those  in  Banaras  who  so  badly  heckled  Rajaji  for  speaking  in 
English  that  he  could  not  complete  a  scheduled  address;  and 
Swatantra  is  roundly  abused  for  its  association  with  the  DMK  and 
the  Akalis.37  Clearly,  the  relations  between  the  two  parties  will 
depend  in  large  measure  on  the  issues  which  animate  the  country. 
Serious  pressure  from  the  left  at  home  and/or  from  Red  China 
abroad  would  seem  to  provide  the  bases  for  closest  co-operation 
between  the  two,  but  it  is  clear  from  the  Rajasthan  case  that  some 
manifestations  of  domestic  *  radicalism5  are  acceptable  to  the 
Sangh  but  not  to  Swatantra.  On  balance,  the  differences — both 
actual  and  potential — seem  serious  enough  to  preclude  complete 
merger.  Even  so,  a  Swatantra  leader  in  Rajasthan,  with  no  love 
lost  for  the  Sangh,  has  none  the  less  said  that  close  co-operation, 
if  not  merger,  between  the  two,  'will  be  a  great  step  forward  for 
democracy,  individual  liberty  and  general  well-being  of  the 
country'.38 

Prior  to  the  1962  elections,  the  Sangh,  like  the  DMK,  was 
critical  of  Swatantra  not  only  on  doctrinal  grounds  but  also 
because  it  demanded  so  much  for  a  new,  untested  party.  In  this 
instance,  the  Sangh  could  point  with  undisguised  glee  to  a  Lok 
Sabha  by-election  in  Delhi,  in  which  a  Swatantra  candidate  was 
entered,  against  the  better  judgment  of  the  party  inner  circle  which 
finally  yielded  to  pressure  from  the  local  organization.  The  candi- 


220 


Electoral  Adjustments 

date,  one  of  the  many  ex-Congressmen  who  gravitated  to  Swatantra 
in  Delhi  in  the  early  months,  lost  her  security  deposit,  as  the 
Sangh  candidate  was  victorious.  This  was  widely  used  as  an 
example  of  Swatantra  overconfidence,  when  the  Sangh  was 
approached  in  connection  with  electoral  understandings.39 

The  state  in  which  the  most  serious  effort  was  made  to  reach  an 
agreement  with  the  Jan  Sangh  was  Rajasthan.  The  Sangh  was  by 
no  means  a  great  power  in  the  state,  nor  did  it  contain  any  great 
local  notables  upon  whom  it  could  count  for  derivative  support, 
but  in  some  areas  it  was  well  organized  and  its  dedicated  workers 
were  highly  regarded  by  other  political  leaders.  Moreover,  it  had 
scored  well  in  some  municipal  elections,  giving  it  greater 
confidence.40 

Relations  in  Rajasthan  might  have  been  less  close  than  they 
ultimately  were  had  the  Maharani  of  Jaipur  not  entered  Swatantra; 
but  her  presence  did  much  to  convince  some  Sangh  leaders  that 
Swatantra  was  a  potential  power  in  the  state,  a  power  with  which 
they  could  not  afford  to  be  too  cavalier  and  high-handed.  Swatantra 
on  its  part  sought  to  implement  its  general  policy  of  avoiding  all 
multi-cornered  fights  which  could  redound  to  the  advantage  of  the 
Congress,  and  elaborate  negotiations  were  undertaken,  especially 
by  Dungarpur  and  the  Jaipur  family  for  Swatantra  and  by  the  very 
able  and  energetic  Jan  Sangh  leader,  Bhairon  Singh,  although 
national  leaders  of  both  parties  were  involved  at  various  stages.41 

At  least  as  early  as  May  1961,  Dungarpur  said  that  final  decisions 
depended  on  the  views  of  the  national  leadership.  However,  he  said 
that  the  state  unit  of  Swatantra  hoped  to  come  to  some  under- 
standing with  the  Jan  Sangh,  which  he  called  a '  progressive '  party, 
though  he  criticized  its  anti-Pakistan  position  quite  strongly.42  In 
November  1961  it  was  reported  that  'an  electoral  adjustment 
between  the  Swatantra  Party  and  the  Jana  Sangh  is  now  almost 
certain'  as  a  result  of  the  labours  of  Dungarpur  and  both  the 
Maharaja  and  Maharani  of  Jaipur,  with  Bhairon  Singh.43  Particu- 
larly with  the  full  grant  of  power  to  the  Maharani  to  organize  the 
electoral  campaign  and  arrange  adjustments  in  four  major  districts 
around  Jaipur,  prospects  for  these  areas,  at  least,  looked  bright. 
In  commenting  on  this  situation,  Raj  aji  insisted  that  a  final  decision 
would  depend  on  the  precise  lists  of  candidates  nominated  and  on 
their  prospects  for  success :  until  these  points  were  clear,  the  matter 
could  not  be  settled  but,  pending  this,  negotiations  continued.44 

221 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

As  in  the  case  of  the  DMK,  however,  state- wide  talks  ultimately 
broke  down.  Although  the  agreement  had  been  reached  'in 
principle ',  Dungarpur  refused  to  concede  Bhairon  Singh's  de- 
mands for  seats,  which  were  to  be  split  '  50-50 ',  with  any  other 
adjustments  made  by  Swatantra  having  to  come  from  its  own  half.45 
There  were  also  reports  that  the  Jan  Sangh  had  insisted  on  financial 
assistance  in  some  areas  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  an  understanding, 
which  Swatantra  leaders  also  found  unacceptable.46  With  only 
eighty- eight  seats  to  claim  as  their  own  and  to  use  in  bargaining  with 
the  other  opposition  groups,  under  the  Sangh  formula,  Swatantra 
leaders  were  forced  to  announce  that  'an  overall  settlement  with 
the  Jana  Sangh  is  something  we  do  not  approve  of.  As  usual, 
however,  there  was  an  important  addition:  'The  door  is  wide 
open  for  local  adjustments.'47 

In  the  last  weeks  before  the  elections,  many  local  adjustments 
were,  in  fact,  worked  out,  but  in  Jaipur  City  itself  there  was  a 
curious  spectacle.  In  some  assembly  contests,  Jan  Sangh  and 
Swatantra  candidates  opposed  each  other,  and  the  Maharaja  of 
Jaipur  made  speeches  supporting  the  Sangh  !48  Elsewhere,  a  number 
of  Swatantra- Sangh  contests  took  place,  indicating  that  even 
between  these  two  parties,  in  a  state  where  a  concerted  effort  might 
have  borne  ample  fruit  for  them,  much  remained  to  be  done 
before  the  Congress  would  confront  a  reasonably  cohesive 
challenge  from  the  right-wing  opposition. 

The  results  of  the  Rajasthan  election  were  disastrous  for  the 
Congress,  as  most  of  the  state  ministers  were  defeated  and 
Congress'  percentage  of  assembly  seats  slipped  to  50  per  cent. 
Taken  together,  the  Swatantra,  Sangh,  and  other  rightist  forces 
netted  at  least  fifty  seats,  to  eighty-seven  for  the  Congress,  and 
internal  bickering  in  the  ruling  party  suggested  considerable 
instability.  It  was  in  this  context  that  the  Jan  Sangh,  at  the 
national  level,  considered  authorizing  its  Rajasthan  unit  to  form  an 
alliance  with  Swatantra;49  while  on  its  part,  Swatantra  for  a  time 
toyed  with  the  idea  of  attempting  to  form  a  coalition  ministry  (if 
the  opportunity  arose)  with  the  Sangh,  some  independents,  and 
some  Congressmen  whose  support  was  to  be  secured  by  offering  the 
chief  ministership  to  the  late  Jai  Narain  Vyas,  a  former  Congress 
Chief  Minister  whose  power  had  waned  considerably.  A  variety  of 
circumstances  combined  to  preclude  such  a  possibility:  Masani 
opposed  such  a  move  if  its  success  would  depend  on  '  buying  off' 

222 


Electoral  Adjustments 

dissident  Congressmen;  other  Swatantra  leaders  felt  that  even  if 
such  a  ministry  could  be  formed  it  could  be  squeezed  from  office 
by  the  central  government  because  of  the  state's  precarious 
financial  position;  some  Swatantra  leaders  were  fearful  that  their 
party  would  be  overwhelmed  by  the  more  energetic  Sangh  MLAs; 
some  sharp  conflicts  arose  between  the  two  parties  (as  on  the 
question  of  further  land  reform  and  the  constitutional  amendment 
creating  Nagaland);50  the  Congress  ministry  did  not  collapse,  and 
Vyas  died!  Still,  it  is  evident  that,  under  certain  circumstances,  the 
Jan  Sangh  is  willing  to  consider  alliances  and  coalitions,  at  least  in 
some  states.51  By  contrast,  in  UP,  where  Swatantra  is  weak  and  has 
become  weaker  with  the  resignation  of  Paliwal  and  the  death  of 
Mankapur,  there  have  been  rumours  of  a  possible  merger  of  the 
Swatantra  unit  in  that  state  with  the  Jan  Sangh;  and  here  the 
language  issue  plays  a  part.52 

There  was  a  widespread  feeling  in  Swatantra  circles  that  the 
Sangh  would  be  a  bit  chastened  after  Swatantra  had  demonstrated 
some  strength  in  the  1962  elections.  This  seems  not  to  have  been 
the  case  to  any  significant  extent.  In  the  main,  Sangh  leaders 
concede  that  Swatantra  did  better  than  Mrs  Sehgal's  disaster  in 
Delhi  would  have  suggested,  and  for  this  reason  they  have  been 
somewhat  more  cordial  in  their  relations  with  the  new  party.  Until 
his  death,  Dr  Raghuvira,  Jan  Sangh  President,  met  recurrently 
with  Masani  and  other  Swatantra  leaders,  to  discuss  merger  pro- 
posals, legislative  fronts,  etc.,  and  as  we  have  seen  there  was  a 
willingness  to  co-operate  in  Rajasthan,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  else- 
where. But  Jan  Sangh  sentiment  still  runs  fairly  strong  against 
close  association  with  Swatantra,  and  the  Sangh  shows  signs  of 
resenting  the  Swatantra  successes.  It  feels  that  the  latter 's  organiza- 
tion is  weak  and  derivative  and,  thus,  of  uncertain  staying  power. 
Moreover,  smaller  Jan  Sangh  contingents  consistently  outperform 
Swatantra's  forces,  as  in  Rajasthan,  where  Bhairon  Singh  repeatedly 
dominates  the  right-wing  effort.53 

As  in  the  case  of  the  DMK,  there  have  been  some  encouraging 
signs  for  Swatantra  in  its  dealings  with  the  Sangh.  In  the  series  of 
prestige  by-elections  in  1963 — Farrukhabad,  Amroha,  Jaunpur, 
and  Rajkot — many  opposition  parties  joined  together  in  supporting 
one  candidate  against  the  Congress,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  Vajpayee, 
a  leading  Sangh  parliamentarian,  and  the  Sangh  cadres  joined  in 
Masani's  successful  campaign  in  Rajkot.  In  addition,  the  President 

223 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

(1964)  of  the  Jan  Sangh,  D.  P.  Ghosh,  announced  that  Masani  and 
Sangh  General- Secretary  Upadhyaya  had  reached  an  accord  for 
electoral  adjustments  between  the  two  parties.  Against  this,  how- 
ever, we  must  balance  Upadhyaya's  assertion  that  no  alliances  or 
fronts  have  been  agreed  upon  and  that  'ordinarily  we  are  not  for 
election  adjustments'.  So,  too,  we  must  note  the  announcement 
that  the  Sangh  at  one  point  planned  to  contest  the  Rajkot  Lok 
Sabha  seat  against  Masani,  whom  it  supported  in  the  1963  by- 
election.  In  this  area,  however,  the  hard  decisions  of  1966-7  alone 
will  indicate  the  degree  to  which  the  parties  can  co-operate.  Most 
probably,  however,  the  Sangh  will  be  willing  to  work  closely  with 
Swatantra  only  where  the  latter  is  overwhelmingly  strong  or  where 
both  parties  are  weak;  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  the 
Sangh  will  be  co-operative  where  it  itself  is  fairly  strong.54 

The  departure  of  Ramgarh  and  the  possible  decline  of  Swatantra 
in  Rajasthan  have  hurt  Swatantra  once  more,  because  it  now  looks 
decidedly  less  like  a  prospective  national  opposition  than  it  did  after 
the  1962  elections.  Under  the  prevailing  circumstances,  no 
Swatantra- Sangh  merger  is  likely  to  occur,  at  least  on  terms 
presently  acceptable  to  Swatantra.  Swatantra  leaders  made  this 
clear,  in  commenting  on  a  press  report  that  merger  talks  were  in 
progress.55  However,  many  people  have  taken  note  of  a  lead  article 
in  the  Statesman,  which  called  for  a  merger  of  the  Sangh  and 
Swatantra,  because  both  were  'unfinished  structures' — the  Sangh 
with  a  base  but  no  apex,  Swatantra  with  an  apex  but  no  base.56 
Swatantrites  are  certainly  envious  of  the  Sangh's  dedicated  cadres, 
if  not  excited  about  the  issues  which  animate  them.  The  Sangh, 
while  publicly  scornful  of  the  'rich  man's  party',  is,  for  its  part, 
aware  that  big  business  prefers  Swatantra  to  the  Sangh  among 
available  opposition  parties;  and  Vajpayee  noted,  but  not  with  any 
particular  sadness  or  distress,  that  Tatas  had  given  Rs.  200,000 
(cf.  our  figures)  to  Swatantra  but '  did  not  give  a  pie  to  the  Sangh  '.57 
Also,  there  are  some  signs  that  in  order  to  expand  its  activities 
into  non-Hindi  regions,  the  Sangh  has  had  to  reconsider  its  thus 
far  rather  virulent  stand  in  favour  of  Hindi;  and  any  retrenchment 
here  would  narrow  the  doctrinal  gap  between  the  two  parties.58 
Such  matters  are  important  but  are  not  likely  to  prove  decisive,  for 
there  are  other  barriers — such  as  the  power  factor — which  will 
continue  to  keep  the  parties  apart.  Discussions  at  all  levels  will 
certainly  continue,  and  there  will  doubtless  be  a  number  of  local 

224 


Electoral  Adjustments 

adjustments,  A  coalition  ministry  in  Raj  as  than  is  not  out  of  the 
question,  either.  But  a  full  union  of  the  two  parties,  or  even  some 
sort  of '  federation '  as  Rajaji  once  discussed,  seems  remote,  indeed.59 


THE  AKALI  DAL 

One  state  in  which  relations  with  the  Jan  Sangh  have  not  been 
particularly  cordial  is  the  Punjab,  where  Swatantra  has  decided, 
for  the  time  at  least,  to  aline  itself  with  the  Akali  Dal,  a  Sikh  com- 
munal organization,  sometime  partner  of  the  Congress,  and  spear- 
head of  the  drive  for  a  separate  Punjabi-speaking  state,  which 
would — not  incidentally  either— be  a  Sikh-majority  state.60  Neither 
Swatantra's  proximity  to  the  Akalis,  nor  the  Sangh's  displeasure  is 
at  all  surprising.  The  late  Udham  Singh  Nagoke  and  Basant  Singh, 
Swatantra  state  President  and  General-Secretary  respectively, 
were  formerly  closely  alined  with  the  Akalis,  and  the  early  support 
for  Swatantra  from  members  of  the  Sikh  ruling  family  of  Patiala 
reinforced  this  proclivity.  The  Sangh  on  its  part  was  unequivoc- 
ally opposed  to  the  demand  for  a  division  of  the  Punjab,  and  hence 
to  the  Akalis  and  to  those  who  gave  them  aid  and  comfort.61  More- 
over, given  the  tendency  to  aline  with  the  Akali  Dal,  it  then  followed 
that  some  triangular  contests  involving  the  Congress,  the  Sangh, 
and  Swatantra-Akali  Dal  could  actually  be  advantageous  to  Swa- 
tantra. At  least  it  was  hoped  in  some  quarters  that  the  Sangh  and 
Congress  would  split  the  Hindu  vote,  enabling  the  Sikh-oriented 
Swatantra-Akali  forces  to  capture  some  seats.  However,  Swatantra 
did  not  rush  headlong  into  this  association  with  the  Akalis,  nor  has 
the  association  been  without  its  very  serious  problems. 

In  principle,  Swatantra  hoped  to  break  the  Punjabi  saha 
'complex5  by  appealing  to  the  electorate  on  non-communal  issues, 
i.e.  by  opposing  the  proposals  for  joint  co-operative  farming,  by 
rallying  both  Hindu  and  Sikh  in  opposition  to  new  inheritance  laws 
and  other  social  reforms,  by  stressing  tax  burdens,  corruption,  and 
the  like.  In  dealing  with  the  Punjabi  suba  demand  specifically,  it 
was  the  Swatantra  view  that  proponents  of  a  divided  Punjab  were 
politically  short-sighted:  with  the  menace  of  'statism'  flowing 
from  New  Delhi,  the  creation  of  a  separate  Punjabi-speaking  state 
would  be  of  no  consequence,  because  the  centre  would  continue  to 
enforce  its  will  against  all  states.  Only  if  statism  were  checked,  in 
other  words,  would  it  become  relevant  to  worry  about  the  issue  of  a 


15 


225 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

united  versus  a  divided  Punjab.  On  the  principle  of  'first  things 
first',  Akalis  were  encouraged  to  concentrate  on  defeating  the 
Congress  and  to  co-operate  with  others  who  were  striving  for  that 
goal. 

The  efforts  to  use  anti-statism  as  the  solvent  for  communal- 
linguistic  problems  were  generally  unsuccessful.  As  we  have  seen, 
within  the  Swatantra  Party  itself  there  were  tensions  between 
Hindu  and  Sikh  interests:  Judge  Gurnam  Singh,  an  outspoken 
defender  of  the  Akali  cause,  was  first  expelled  by  the  Chandigarh 
unit  of  Swatantra  because  his  'recent  activities  were  communal  in 
nature  and  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  Swatantra  Party'.62 
After  being  reinstated  at  the  insistence  of  Nagoke,  Gurnam  Singh 
finally  withdrew  from  Swatantra,  under  some  pressure,  in  order  to 
be  free  to  advocate  the  Akali  cause,  although  there  have  been 
reports  that  he  retains  his  party  membership  and  consults  fre- 
quently with  his  erstwhile  colleagues.  As  we  have  also  seen, 
within  the  state  Swatantra  Party  there  were  recurrent  complaints 
by  the  Sikhs  that  the  party  was  too  generous  towards  Hindus,  and 
vice  versa — a  point  which  is  illustrated  by  the  written  charge  by  a 
Hindu  Swatantrite  in  the  Punjab  that  Basant  Singh,  a  Sikh,  'has 
betrayed  the  party  and  become  an  Akali'.63  Even  the  Swatantra 
committee  of  inquiry  into  alleged  repression  of  Akalis  in  the  Punjab 
became  bound  up  with  the  pro-  and  ami- suba  positions.64 

Consistent  with  its  goal  of  minimizing  internecine  strife  among 
non-Communist,  anti-Congress  forces,  Swatantra  none  the  less 
tried  hard  to  find  a  modus  vivendi  with  the  Akalis.  This  effort  was 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  in  the  tangle  of  Punjab  politics,  the 
Akalis  were  also  striving  for  electoral  adjustments  with  the  local 
Communist  Party  organization,  and  the  latter  proved  to  be  very 
demanding  in  its  terms  for  co-operation.  Swatantra  had  hoped  to 
forge  an  anti-Congress  front,  excluding  the  CPI,  recommending 
that  'non-party'  candidates  be  selected  for  the  prestige  seats  which 
each  component  of  the  front  would  probably  want  to  contest  itself.65 
Yet  the  CPI  intended  to  put  up  a  rather  large  number  of  candi- 
dates under  its  own  banner,  announced  some  of  the  names  rather 
early,  and  declined  to  consider  withdrawing  candidates  so  named. 
The  Akalis  themselves  had  to  reduce  the  number  of  candidates  they 
would  put  up,  so  as  to  avoid  wholesale  conflicts  with  the  CPI,  and, 
as  a  result,  the  Akalis  had  relatively  few  seats  over  which  they 
could  bargain  with  Swatantra.66  Moreover,  the  CPI  was  violently 

226 


Electoral  Adjustments 

opposed  to  Akali  support  for  Nagoke,  and  in  the  final  outcome 
Nagoke  was  withdrawn  as  a  candidate  for  the  Lok  Sabha  in  the 
interests  of  broader  co-operation  among  opposition  parties.67 
Swatantra  was  thus  being  ground  away  between  the  Akalis  and  the 
CPI  and  found  itself  obliged  to  settle  for  only  a  scattering  of  seats 
— unless  it  wanted  to  'go  it  alone' — instead  of  the  hundred  or  so 
assembly  and  Lok  Sabha  candidates  it  had  hoped  to  put  up.68  Very 
distressing  from  the  standpoint  of  the  national  party  leaders, 
particularly  Masani,  was  the  fact  that  some  Swatantra  candidates 
choose  to  contest  on  the  Akali  'hand'  symbol  or  jointly  under  the 
'hand'  and  the  Swatantra  'star',  rather  than  with  the  Swatantra 
'  star '  alone.69 

These  complicated  manoeuvrings  did  not  result  in  very  many 
'straight  fights',  and  even  the  Akalis  and  the  CPI  fought  one 
another  in  many  constituencies.70  Yet  in  the  February  1962  elec- 
tions, no  Swatantrites  contested  against  Akalis  for  the  Lok  Sabha 
seats  (while  in  five  of  the  state's  twenty- two  Lok  Sabha  contests 
Swatantra  fought  the  Jan  Sangh);  Swatantra  itself  often  ran  Sikhs 
as  its  assembly  candidates  in  the  Punjabi-speaking  regions;  and 
Akali  candidates  for  the  Lok  Sabha  received  financial  support  from 
the  Swatantra  Party,  on  the  condition  that  those  who  were  elected 
join  the  Swatantra  parliamentary  group  as  'associate'  members.71 

Such  close  ties  as  those  prevailing  in  the  Lok  Sabha,  coupled 
with  the  widespread  belief  that  the  social  and  economic  views  of 
Swatantra  and  the  Akali  Dal  'are  more  or  less  identical'72  have 
given  rise  to  recurrent  post-election  reports  of  a  possible  merger. 
Occasionally,  a  high-ranking  Akali  has  joined  Swatantra,  and  one 
Akali- Swatantra  MP  called  for  a  merger  and  said  that  his  two 
colleagues  also  favoured  such  a  move.73  Rajaji  himself  noted  this 
possibility  much  earlier,  but  he  also  argued  that  even  a  close 
alliance  would  require  as  a  quid  pro  quo  on  Swatantra's  part  a 
reasonably  full  and  open  endorsement  of  the  Punjabi  suba  demand; 
and  this  was  not  forthcoming  in  a  manner  acceptable  to  most  Akali 
leaders.74  Somewhat  paradoxically,  Swatantra  and  the  Akalis  were 
likely  to  have  made  common  cause  particularly  if  the  Punjabi  suba 
issue  remained  unresolved,  yet  it  appeared  that  if  political 
temperatures  ran  high  over  this  issue,  Swatantra  could  not  have 
supported  the  Akalis  to  the  extent  necessary  for  close  co-operation, 
let  alone  merger.75  In  this  context  it  is  understandable  that  Swatan- 
tra continued  in  its  efforts  to  find  non-communal,  non-linguistic 

227  15-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

common  ground  and  that  it  continued  to  argue  that  the  *  statist' 
policies  of  the  government  would  render  illusory  the  greater 
autonomy  involved  in  a  separate,  Punjabi-speaking  state. 

In  early  1963,  Sant  Fateh  Singh,  one  of  the  two  pre-eminent 
Akali  leaders,  ruled  out  the  possibility  of  a  merger  between  his 
group  and  Swatantra  and  indicated  that  the  three  Akalis  might  be 
asked  to  dissociate  themselves  from  the  Swatantra  Lok  Sabha 
group,  although  nothing  was  done  on  this  score  at  the  time.76  It  has 
also  been  announced  that  the  Sant-led  Akalis  would  ally  with  the 
CPI  (Right)  in  the  1967  elections.77  Finally,  in  1965,  the  three 
Akali  MPs  were  asked  to  dissociate  themselves  from  the  Swatantra 
group,  but  they  and  the  Akali  leadership  were  prevailed  upon  to 
permit  their  continued  association  with  Swatantra.  Master  Tara 
Singh,  a  declining  and  somewhat  discredited  Akali  leader,  attempted 
to  make  something  of  a  political  comeback;  and  he  talked  extensively 
with  Rajaji,  Ranga,  and  other  Swatantra  leaders  about  the  Sikh- 
Punjabi  question  and  about  relations  with  Swatantra.  Rajaji  insisted 
on  first  things  first,  i.e.  defeat  the  Congress  and  then  worry  about 
the  Sikh-Punjabi  question;  but  some  of  the  Akalis  were  not 
inclined  to  be  restrained  and  patient.  Sardar  Kapur  Singh,  an 
Akali- Swatantra  MP  in  the  Lok  Sabha  (Oxford-educated,  ex-ICS), 
complained  that  the  Sikhs  had  been  ignored  and  not  given  their 
rightful  place  in  free  India.  Tara  Singh  disregarded  Rajaji's 
advice  about  the  need  for  'putting  smaller  issues  aside  now'  and 
for  having  the  Sikhs  take  '  full  part  in  saving  the  country  from  the 
Congress  Party  and  its  ruinous  economic  policies':  Tara  Singh 
declared  strongly  for  an  autonomous  Sikh  state  within  India,  by 
contrast  with  the  earlier,  linguistically  based  Punjabi  suba  appeal. 
In  this  he  was  seconded  by  Judge  Gurnam  Singh  who  demanded 
a  'self-determined  political  status  for  the  Sikhs',  a  demand  which 
was  repudiated  by  Fateh  Singh,  the  Maharaja  of  Patiala,  and  other 
Sikh  leaders.78  At  the  time  of  the  bifurcation  of  the  Punjab  (1966), 
Swatantra  leaders  were  rethinking  their  approach  to  that  state, 
i.e.  a  heavy  reliance  on  the  Akalis,  especially  the  Tara  Singh  group. 
The  latter  appeared  to  be  losing  ground  and  a  commitment  to 
self-determination  for  the  Sikhs  would  have  been  most  difficult  to 
reconcile  with  Swatantra' s  own  internal  politics  and  its  desire  to  be 
a  national  party  which  must  work  co-operatively  with  the  Jan 
Sangh.  For  the  moment,  the  parliamentary  alliance  remains,  and 
Tara  Singh  and  Rajaji  have  been  in  close  contact;  but  it  appears 

228 


Electoral  Adjustments 

unlikely  that  Swatantra  will  maintain  its  close  proximity  to  a 
section  of  the  Akalis,  or  that  if  it  does  it  will  do  either  much  good.79 

At  the  present  juncture,  it  appears  most  unlikely  that  any  mergers 
involving  the  Jan  Sangh,  DMK,  or  the  Akalis  will  take  place,  and 
Swatantra  will  confront  much  the  same  range  of  problems  in  the 
future.  It  will,  however,  confront  them  as  a  tested  party  with  some- 
what better  financial  support,  which  will  help  in  its  dealings  with 
these  other  groups.  Neither  the  Jan  Sangh  nor  the  DMK  seems 
anxious  to  get  too  close  to  the  'rich  man's  party',  although  well- 
filled  Swatantra  coffers  would  exert  considerable  appeal.  Moreover, 
the  departure  of  Ramgarh  and  the  apparent  demise  of  Swatantra 
in  Bihar  casts  some  doubt  on  the  viability  of  Swatantra,  which  will 
further  reduce  the  likelihood  of  important  mergers. 

Within  the  Swatantra  Party  itself,  there  is  by  no  means  universal 
assent  to  a  policy  of  indiscriminate  alliance  and  efforts  at  merger. 
For  example,  Raja  Anand  Chand  of  Bilaspur,  Dungarpur,  and 
many  another  aristocrat,  complained  of  Jan  Sangh  electoral  tactics 
towards  Swatantra;  Dungarpur  also  expressed  concern  at  the 
'socialism'  of  the  Sangh  and  said  that  too  many  of  its  stalwarts 
were  'fanatical';  members  of  the  Jaipur  family  censured  it  for  its 
'militancy'  and  its  anti-Muslim  stance;  Pasricha  termed  it  'com- 
munal and  fascist';  and  a  Bombay  businessman  called  the  Sangh  a 
'subsidiary  owned  outright'  by  the  RSS,  and  said  that  Swatantra 
should  have  minimal  relations  with  the  party  for  this  reason.  Many 
Swatantrites  are,  in  short,  upset  about  the  Sangh's  communal 
tendencies,  its  fanaticism,  and  what  many  consider  an  under- 
current of  anti-property  sentiment.80  Others,  more  sympathetic  to 
the  Sangh  (like  Munshi  and  Vaidya)  are  troubled,  on  the  other 
hand,  by  the  Akali  and  DMK  demands  and  their  anti-national 
implications.  This  has  generated  considerable  strain  within 
Swatantra,  as  questionnaire  and  interview  data  bear  out.81  Respon- 
dents run  the  gamut  from  'go-it-alone'  purists  to  ' victory-at-any- 
cost'  compromisers;  and  evident  throughout  are  the  many  currents 
and  cross-currents  which  have  made  the  creation  of  a  reasonably 
unified,  all-India  opposition  an  extraordinarily  difficult  task.  But 
within  Swatantra,  the  question  of  alliances  has  generally  been 
handled  in  a  manner  analogous  to  the  question  of  the  role  of  the 
aristocracy :  maximization  of  anti-Congress  strength  is  the  principal 
desideratum  and  real  trouble  is  generated  only  where  local  power 
considerations  bulk  large.  For  all  his  complaints  about  the  Sangh, 

229 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

Dungarpur  wants  to  work  closely  with  that  party,  at  least  under 
prevailing  conditions;  and  the  Maharani  of  Jaipur  is  similarly 
disposed.  Paliwal,  certainly  no  sympathizer  of  the  militant  Hindus 
after  their  abuse  of  his  Muslim  wife  and  their  criticism  of  his  own 
allegedly  pro-Muslim  sympathies,  still  explained  his  willingness 
to  co-operate  by  reference  to  the  Hitler-Stalin  pact;  and  Ruthna- 
swamy  was  almost  equally  blunt  about  political  'imperatives'.82 
Masani  and  a  handful  of  others  among  the  top  leaders  do,  however, 
seem  genuinely  concerned  about  the  consequences  of  excessive 
political  'pragmatism'. 

Swatantra  did  not  limit  its  negotiations  to  those  parties  discussed 
in  detail  above.  However,  in  other  cases,  either  the  party  in  ques- 
tion or  the  negotiations  were  virtually  inconsequential.  For  example, 
Ranga  mentioned  the  Peasants'  and  Workers'  Party  of  Maha- 
rashtra as  a  potential  ally,  but  almost  nothing  was  done  along  these 
lines,  in  part  because  Swatantra  itself  could  not  get  off  the  ground 
in  that  state.  In  Bihar,  the  Jharkand  Party  was  locally  potent  in  the 
Hazaribagh  plateau  region,  where  Ramgarh's  strength  also  lay; 
and  between  them,  these  two  parties  almost  completely  routed  the 
Congress  in  the  region.  At  one  point,  there  were  rather  serious 
talks  of  merger  between  Swatantra  and  Jharkand,  and  Ramgarh 
claimed  that  there  was  no  serious  bar — save  the  question  of  Jhar- 
kand leader  Jaipal  Singh's  position  in  the  Swatantra  hierarchy. 
Jharkand  ultimately  merged  with  the  Congress  but  has  latterly 
dissociated  itself,  to  resume  its  independent  identity.  At  present, 
however,  Jharkand  shows  no  signs  of  leaning  toward  what  remains 
of  Swatantra  in  Bihar.83 

In  a  few  instances,  Swatantra  and  local  PSP  units  entered  into 
negotiations.  Apart  from  random  reports  of  some  PSP  entrants  into 
Swatantra  (e.g.  Imam),  there  was  a  feeling  that  with  the  apparent 
decline  of  the  PSP,  its  more  Gandhian  elements  were  vulnerable  to 
appeals.  Pasricha,  among  others,  insisted  that  few  PSPers  were 
genuine  socialists  of  a  type  that  Swatantra  need  shun,  and  they 
carried  on  sporadic  negotiations  to  win  some  of  them  over.  One 
Swatantra  leader  from  Bombay  City  laboured  long  to  win  over  en 
bloc  the  PSP  units  in  Saurashtra  and  claimed  to  be  on  the  verge  of 
success — when,  he  said,  Masani  insisted  on  joining  the  negotiations 
and  alienated  the  would-be  recruits.  Devgadh-Baria,  to  name  only 
one  Swatantra  leader  in  Gujarat,  insists  that  relations  between  the 

230 


Electoral  Adjustments 

PSP  and  Swatantra  in  that  state  are  good,  that  a  merger  would  not 
be  out  of  the  question,  and  that  for  the  time,  the  true  test  'is  whether 
they  walk  out  when  we  walk  out ' — which  has  been  the  case,  accord- 
ing to  him.  H.  V.  Kamath,  a  leading  PSP  man  from  Mysore,  was 
at  one  point  reported  to  be  'very  close'  to  Swatantra  and  efforts  were 
made  to  work  out  a  strictly  personal  understanding  with  him,  as  a 
prelude  to  broader  efforts  to  recruit  among  the  Mysore  PSP.  There 
is  little  evidence  to  indicate  that  many  in  the  PSP  share  Swatantra's 
confidence  about  future  relations;  and  many  leaders  on  both  sides 
are  adamantly  opposed  to  close  co-operation.  Yet  there  are  many 
Swatantra  leaders,  at  least,  for  whom  the  socialism  of  the  PSP 
holds  no  terrors;  and  they  will  doubtless  continue  to  work  quietly 
to  bring  the  parties  closer  together.  Given  the  demoralization 
evident  in  PSP  ranks,  it  is  not  difficult  to  visualize  some  defectors 
to  Swatantra,  particularly  in  the  non-aristocratic  areas.84 

Negotiations  with  the  RRP  were  carried  on  for  some  time  at  the 
national  and  state  levels,  particularly  in  Rajasthan,  where  Swa- 
tantra was,  in  effect,  the  heir  of  the  RRP.  At  one  point,  it  was 
reported  that  the  RRP  leadership  had  agreed  to  merge  with 
Swatantra  on  a  national  basis  but  that  a  last-minute  appeal  from  the 
Jan  Sangh  prevented  this.  The  RRP  was  involved  in  a  variety  of 
conferences  among  opposition  parties  in  Rajasthan,  the  Punjab, 
UP,  Madhya  Pradesh,  and  elsewhere,  as  part  of  the  effort  to  secure 
more  straight  fights  with  the  Congress.  Agreements  were  reached 
with  the  remnants  of  the  RRP  in  Rajasthan,  in  which  Swatantra 
was  asked  for  and  conceded  too  much,  judging  from  the  RRP's 
1962  electoral  performance;  and  Swatantra  will  doubtless  virtually 
ignore  the  RRP  henceforth,  save  in  a  few  constituencies.  To  some 
extent  this  may  be  an  academic  question  in  view  of  the  RRP's  weak- 
ness and  in  light  of  the  fact  that  the  RRP  man  elected  in  1962  to  the 
Lok  Sabha  from  Rajasthan  has  joined  the  Swatantra  group.85 

A  recent  and  inconclusive  development  of  potentially  great  in- 
terest flowed  from  a  decision  on  the  part  of  Swatantra's  top  leaders 
to  nominate  as  many  scheduled  caste  men  as  seemed  feasible, 
for  the  Lok  Sabha  and  the  assemblies.  This  suggests  that  Swatantra 
may  have  decided  to  make  a  move  to  rally  the  largely  inarticulate 
untouchable  vote;  and  to  this  end,  Masani  undertook  negotiations 
with  the  Republican  Party  of  India  (the  successor  to  Ambedkar's 
Scheduled  Caste  Federation),  to  discuss  electoral  alliances  or 
adjustments.86  It  seems  unlikely  that  Swatantra  will  put  up  large 

231 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

numbers  of  scheduled  caste  men  (in  part  for  financial  reasons 
already  discussed),  but  it  may  well  try  to  work  something  out  with 
the  Republicans  and  to  display  its  own  bona  fides  by  running  a  few 
scheduled  caste  men  on  its  own,  outside  of  the  reserved  con- 
stituencies. Masani  and  a  few  others  feel  that  such  a  move  might  be 
politically  opportune,  but  they  also  feel  that  it  is  not  only  consonant 
with  but  required  by  the  party's  commitment  to  equality  for  all. 
This  commitment  is  not  sufficiently  well  received  by  very  many  in 
the  party,  to  the  extent  that  caste  Hindus  would  stand  aside  in 
non-reserved  constituencies;  and  the  unspeakable  condescension 
with  which  harijan  MLAs  are  treated  by  most  of  the  Swatantra 
leadership  in  the  Raj  as  than  assembly  (and  the  extent  to  which 
they  are  excluded  from  the  normal  functioning  of  the  party  there) 
reflects  the  problems  in  this  area.  Yet  in  areas  where  Swatantra  has 
not  been  able  to  gain  a  foothold  through  other  caste  groups,  a  turn 
to  the  scheduled  castes  (and  to  the  Republican  Party)  may  yield 
some  results.  Swatantra  already  has  in  its  ranks  a  few  intelligent 
and  highly  respected  scheduled  caste  men  and  its  legislative 
contingents,  both  nationally  and  in  the  states,  contain  a  high 
proportion  of  scheduled  caste  and  tribe  representatives.  If — and 
this  is  a  very  big  if— it  could  build  upon  this  base  to  some  extent, 
come  to  treat  the  scheduled  caste  legislators  as  equals  and  prepare 
them  for  effective  legislative  performance,  the  Swatantra  Party 
might  broaden  its  social  base  and  improve  its  position  as  a  party  of 
equality  and  of  the  common  man.  Much  depends  here  on  the 
extent  to  which  Swatantra  successfully  converts  the  aristocrats,  in 
particular,  into  Tory  democrats  and  persuades  them  to  be  trustees 
for  and  educators  of  the  lower  classes.  It  would  be  foolish  to  expect 
much  to  come  of  this,  but  once  again  political  imperatives  seem  to 
coincide  with  certain  Swatantra  principles,  at  least  as  understood 
by  Masani  and  a  few  others.  Efforts  along  these  lines  will  certainly 
bear  watching.  They  could  conceivably  presage  a  bold  move  to 
link  the  old  elites  with  the  lowest  classes,  against  the  broad,  middle 
peasantry  which  is  thus  far  political  dominant,  inside  the  Congress 
and  in  many  other  parties,  too.  This,  to  speculate  further  and  even 
more  wildly,  could  help  to  generate  an  Indian  variant  of  Tory 
democracy,  if  only  on  a  modest  scale. 


232 


Electoral  Adjustments 

SWATANTRA  AND  LOCAL  PARTIES 

The  negotiations  with  the  Akali  Dal  point  up  PaliwaPs  early 
suggestion  that  Swatantra  be  a  'federal'  party,  existing  primarily 
at  the  national  parliamentary  level  as  a  'holding  company'  for 
local  parties.  Swatantra  support  for  the  Akali  Lok  Sabha  candidates, 
on  the  condition  that  they  become  'associate'  members  of  the 
Swatantra  parliamentary  group  is  an  apt  illustration  of  PaliwaPs 
'federal'  notion.  Beyond  this,  however,  Swatantra  was  in  many 
ways  'federal'  in  a  de  facto  sense,  if  not  de  jure.  Ramgarh  retained 
the  bicycle  symbol  of  his  Janata  Party  for  the  1962  elections,  even 
though  his  party  had  officially  merged  with  Swatantra.  The 
Ganatantra  Parishad  was  denied  the  right  to  use  its  bow-and- 
arrow,  if  it  merged  with  Swatantra  before  the  February  1962 
elections,  and  it  decided  to  postpone  the  merger  until  after  the 
general  elections.  In  both  cases,  retention  of  the  old  symbol  and 
stress  on  local  issues  put  these  parties  in  a  good  position  to  resume 
an  independent  position.  Akin  to  this  was  the  request  by  certain 
Swatantrites  in  the  Punjab  to  the  party  office  that  they  be  permitted 
to  contest  under  the  Akali  hand  symbol,  or  j  ointly  under  the  hand  and 
Swatantra  star.  So,  too,  J.  Mohammed  Imam  asked  party  permis- 
sion to  contest  either  as  an  independent  or  under  the  PSP  symbol, 
and  many  others  similarly  asked  to  contest  as  independents.  In  all 
such  cases,  there  was  considerable  strain  between  Masani  and  the 
local  units  and  the  individuals  involved,  because  Masani  desired  to 
build  a  strong  and  disciplined  Swatantra  Party,  using  its  own 
symbol  and  its  own  programme,  as  opposed  to  the  tendencies 
toward  parochialism  and  uncertain  commitment  implicit  in  the 
federal  scheme. 

As  the  Akali  case  indicates,  this  bears  on  the  question  of  under- 
standings and  alliances  in  an  important  way.  It  has  been  suggested 
periodically  that  given  Swatantra' s  determination  to  challenge  the 
Congress  at  the  centre,  it  should  sacrifice  assembly  seats,  for  which 
it  would  support  local  parties,  on  the  condition  that  these  local 
parties  would  in  turn  support  Swatantra  candidates  for  the  Lok 
Sabha.  This  is  a  variant  on  the  Akali  theme;  it  formed  the  basis  for 
talks  with  the  DMK  at  one  juncture;  and  it  is  an  intriguing  tech- 
nique for  reconciling  Indian  diversity  with  national  political  life. 

It  is  probable  that  the  pluralism  of  the  Indian  subcontinent  will 
force  recurrent  attention  to  this  technique  by  would-be  consoli- 

233 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

dators  of  the  party  system,  and  it  suggests  one  possible  approach 
to  coalition-building.  Masani  is  inclined  to  resist  this  doggedly, 
but  recalcitrant  'raw  materials'  have  obliged  him  to  yield,  but  not 
without  protest.  However,  the  half-way  house  represented  by  the 
division  of  assembly  seats  (to  the  local  party)  and  Lok  Sabha  seats 
(to  Swatantra)  is  not  likely  to  bear  much  fruit  in  the  rigorous 
Indian  political  environment.  To  defer  wholly  to  local  parties  for 
Lok  Sabha  support  would  put  Swatantra  at  the  mercy  of  these 
parties.  In  rejecting  this,  Masani  has  a  good  deal  of  company.  If, 
however,  Swatantra  develops  its  own  ranks  to  provide  cadres  for 
Lok  Sabha  elections,  these  local  units  will  not  want  to  forego  local 
power  for  the  possible  advantage  of  capturing  some  Lok  Sabha 
seats.  Similarly,  the  local  parties  with  which  Swatantra  deals  in 
such  situations  are  not  willing  to  forego  national  politics  in  order  to 
accommodate  Swatantra,  particularly  where  the  basic  perspectives 
of  the  latter  diverge  from  their  own.  The  Akalis  wanted  to  be  free 
to  press  for  Punjabi  suba  and  the  DMK  for  retention  of  English, 
neither  of  which  Swatantra  was  willing  to  endorse  as  formal  party 
policy  at  the  legislative  level. 

Furthermore,  such  a  system  would  complicate  the  electoral 
campaign,  if  Swatantra  insisted  on  putting  up  its  own  candidate 
for  the  Lok  Sabha,  while  supporting  those  of  other  parties  for  the 
assemblies.  With  a  largely  illiterate  electorate,  the  principal  means 
of  identifying  a  party  and  its  candidates  is  the  electoral  symbol,  the 
importance  of  which  has  already  been  suggested  at  many  junctures. 
If  the  Swatantra  scheme  were  to  be  tried,  Swatantra  and  the  local 
party  with  which  it  was  allied  would  have  different  symbols  with 
which  to  designate  their  candidates;  and  it  would  be  quite  con- 
fusing to  tell  the  same  voter  to  vote  for  symbol  'x'  on  the  white 
ballot  and  symbol '  y '  on  the  pink  ballot.  At  least  it  would  be  much 
simpler  if  the  voter  had  to  worry  about  only  one  symbol.  It  would 
appear  that  either  a  more  strenuous  effort  to  develop  a  'unitary' 
party,  which  Masani  obviously  wants,  or  a  greater  willingness  to 
accept  a  radically  'federal'  scheme  as  proposed  by  Paliwal  and  as 
illustrated  by  the  Akali  case,  would  seem  more  feasible  than  the 
hybrid  we  have  just  examined.  Of  course,  this  is  not  simply  an 
'either-or'  proposition,  because  Swatantra  can  combine  all  three 
techniques  as  circumstances  may  require.  But  it  is  clear  from  this 
discussion  that  power,  doctrine,  and  electoral  complications  work 
against  the  hybrid  solution  to  the  multi-party  problem  with  which 

234 


Electoral  Adjustments 

Swatantra  has  been  wrestling;  and  Swatantra's  electoral  predica- 
ment, both  in  terms  of  its  own  internal  situation  and  in  its  relation- 
ships with  other  parties,  reveals  only  too  clearly  the  barriers  which 
stand  in  the  way  of  a  would-be  national  party  in  India.  Once  again, 
leadership,  ample  finances,  and  some  organizational  stability  bulk 
large  in  any  assessment  of  present  achievements  and  future 
prospects. 

SWATANTRA  AND  THE  CONGRESS  RIGHT 

In  an  earlier  chapter,  we  saw  that  Swatantra's  efforts  to  recruit 
*  old  warriors '  who  were  actually  still  in  the  Congress  went  largely 
unrewarded.  Still,  no  one  doubted  that  there  was  much  pro- 
Swatantra  sentiment  within  the  Congress,  and  there  were  many 
ways  in  which  this  was  manifested.  Thus  far,  defection  has  been 
more  spiritual  than  physical,  and  there  is  no  likelihood  that 
Swatantra  ranks  will  be  flooded  with  Congress  defectors,  partic- 
ularly with  Nehru  gone.  Here  as  elsewhere  Congress  hegemony 
and  the  Congress  name,  organization,  and  finances  inhibit  a  more 
rational  alinement  of  political  forces  in  India;  and  once  again, 
Swatantra  is  at  a  serious  disadvantage  because  of  its  own  organiza- 
tional and  financial  problems.  In  addition,  in  many  northern 
states  many  conservative  Congressmen  are  by  no  means  fully 
reconciled  to  co-operating  with  the  aristocrats,  and  vice  versa. 
This  also  hurts  Swatantra's  chances  somewhat. 

The  existence  of  a '  Swatantra  lobby '  in  the  Congress  has  received 
ample  attention.  Link,  for  example,  has  adverted  to  the  'thinly 
disguised  Swatantras  on  the  Congress  benches ',  the  '  creation  of  a 
Swatantra  lobby  in  the  Congress  Parliamentary  Party',  'the 
growth  of  reactionary  lobbies  in  the  Congress '  generally,  and,  in 
connection  with  the  Punjab,  it  has  observed  that  'inside  the 
Congress . . .  especially  in  its  dissident  wing,  the  Swatantra  outlook 
is  gaining  ground'.87  A  UP  Congressman,  Govind  Sahay,  in 
launching  a  general  broadside  against  Swatantra  and  against  the 
pot  pourri  that  is  the  Congress,  stated  that  'the  Congress  has  a 
good  number  of  Swatantrites  in  its  fold  '.88  Sanjivva  Reddy,  when 
Congress  President,  announced  what  everyone  already  knew, 
namely  that  there  are  many  Congressmen  who  '  do  not  believe  in 
the  policies  we  are  trying  to  implement '  ;89  and  of  course  Nehru 
himself  often  enjoined  the  acknowledged  dissidents  to  remove 
themselves  from  the  party.  This  is  what  some  leading  figures, 

235 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

including  some  prominent  Swatantrites,  did,  but  no  one  can 
doubt  that  far  more  remained  than  opted  out. 

This  pro- Swatantra  sentiment  has  many  channels  through  which 
to  express  itself.  It  is  common  knowledge  that  two  former  Congress 
Chief  Ministers  in  Rajasthan— the  late  Jai  Narayan  Vyas  and 
Hiralal  Shastri — were  consulted  about  Swatantra  candidates  prior 
to  the  1962  elections  and  that  they  gave  aid  and  comfort  to 
Swatantra,  while  retaining  their  Congress  labels.  It  is  also  no 
secret  around  Jaipur  that  some  Swatantrites  wanted  to  offer  Vyas 
the  chief  ministership  in  a  Swatantra-Jan  Sangh-independent 
coalition  which  seemed  a  remote  possibility.90  Swatantra  leaders 
in  Gujarat  gratefully  acknowledge  in  private  the  help  received 
from  some  Congressmen  who  abused  Swatantra  in  public  but  who 
worked  behind  the  scenes  on  behalf  of  its  candidates.91  So,  too,  in 
parts  of  Andhra  some  Reddy  landlords,  nominally  Congressmen, 
worked  for  Swatantra  in  the  same  sub  rosa  fashion.  Many  of  these 
insisted  that  they  would  join  Swatantra  were  it  not  for  possible 
Congress  reprisals  and  they  insisted  that  if  ever  Swatantra  mounted 
a  well-financed  challenge  to  the  Congress  they  would  shed  their 
timidity  and  come  into  open  opposition. 

Further  evidence  of  support  for  Swatantra  within  the  Congress 
is  provided  by  the  Rajya  Sahha  elections,  where  the  selection 
devolves  upon  MLAs,  whose  party  affiliation  is,  of  course,  known. 
Prior  to  the  1962  elections,  Swatantra  had  only  a  small  scattering 
of  MLAs,  and  the  Swatantra  contingents  had  little  hope  of  sending 
a  fellow  party  man  to  the  Rajya  Sabha,  without  support  from  other 
parties  or  independents.  However,  in  UP  Rajya  Sabha  elections  in 
i960,  Swatantra  industrialist  Ram  Gopal  Gupta  (whose  brother 
was  a  prominent  Congressman)  was  elected  to  the  upper  house, 
with  the  help  of  Congress  MLAs,  who  defied  the  party  whip  to 
vote  for  him.  Similarly,  in  the  Punjab,  Swatantra  leader  Nagoke 
lost  his  bid  for  election  to  the  Rajya  Sabha,  in  part  because  the  CPI 
instructed  its  MLAs  to  vote  for  Congressmen,  rather  than  to  allow 
Nagoke  to  be  elected  with  the  aid  of  Congress  votes.  It  was  also 
reported  that  in  Andhra,  eighteen  Congressmen  defied  the  party 
whip  to  help  elect  another  Swatantrite  to  the  Rajya  Sabha,  and 
such  activities  persist.92  In  Madras,  after  the  1962  elections,  Mari- 
swamy  received  the  highest  vote  total  of  any  Rajya  Sabha  candi- 
date, even  though  Swatantra  itself  had  a  very  small  group  in  the 
assembly.  It  is  known  that  the  DMK  gave  some  support,  but  there 

236 


Electoral  Adjustments 

is  evidence  that  some  Congressmen  voted  for  him  as  well.93  Actual 
physical  defectors  are  thus  supplemented  by  spiritual  defectors, 
whose  sentiments,  extra-parliamentary  efforts  and  occasional 
Rajya  Sabha  votes  lie  with  Swatantra. 

While  it  would  seem  that  close  co-operation  with  these  sympa- 
thetic Congress  elements  would  be  a  major  goal  from  the  Swatan- 
tra standpoint,  some  historical  animosities  stand  in  the  way, 
particularly  in  the  northern  states.  For  example,  a  number  of 
Swatantra  national  leaders  have  insisted  that  Sampurnanand,  a 
veteran  Congressman  who  is  now  Governor  of  Rajasthan  and  an 
acknowledged  conservative,  is  sympathetic  to  Swatantra.  Some 
Swatantra  MLAs  in  Rajasthan  also  believe  this,  although  they  have 
not  had  substantial  contact  with  the  Governor.  However,  as  of 
1963,  Dungarpur  had  not  even  paid  his  respects  to  the  Governor 
or  communicated  with  him  in  any  way,  and  he  made  it  very  clear 
he  was  loath  to  do  so.  The  reasons  for  this  he  also  made  clear: 
Dungarpur  is  fighting  the  old  battles  against  the  Congress.  In  some 
of  her  parliamentary  work,  the  Maharani  of  Jaipur  categorically 
refused  to  contact  some  members  of  the  Congress  with  whom 
relations  had  been  far  from  cordial  in  the  c  good  old  days ',  even 
though  Swatantra  leaders  strongly  urged  her  to  do  so.  Ramgarh, 
Dungarpur,  the  Maharani  and  many  of  their  aristocratic  colleagues 
still  bitterly  resent  Congress  abuse,  and  even  conservative  Con- 
gressmen are  steadfastly  shunned.  The  aristocrat/non-aristocrat 
split  which  plagued  Swatantra  internally  in  UP  and  elsewhere  also 
works  against  Swatantra  in  its  relations  with  other  groups  and 
individuals,  as  in  Rajasthan.  This  is  a  real  problem  for  those  who 
would  seek  to  unify  the  conservative  forces  in  the  country,  and 
Swatantra  is  no  exception.94 

The  feeling  for  support  in  the  Congress,  and  the  aristocrat/non- 
aristocrat  split  were  examined  through  questionnaires,  and  the 
findings  support  the  preceding  arguments.  Swatantrites  who  had 
been  in  the  Congress,  and  the  'old  warriors'  in  particular,  almost 
invariably  argued  that  'in  their  heart  of  hearts'  virtually  all  older 
Congressmen  were  sympathetic  to  Swatantra.  On  the  other  hand, 
those  Swatantrites  who  had  never  been  in  the  Congress,  particularly 
the  aristocrats,  almost  invariably  argued  that  all  Congressmen  were 
'socialists'  or  'communists'.  The  old  saying  has  it  that  politics 
makes  strange  bedfellows,  which  is  indisputably  true;  but  in  the 
case  of  Swatantra,  political  necessity  has  not  yet  been  sufficiently 

237 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

felt  in  some  quarters  to  help  overcome  some  long-standing  social 
conflicts.95 

No  one  could  seriously  expect  a  sudden,  massive  defection  from 
the  Congress  to  Swatantra,  although  there  are  circumstances  under 
which  some  Congressmen  would  join  Swatantra.  The  apparent 
optimum  situation  from  Swatantra's  standpoint  would  involve  a 
gradual  but  steady  pressure  toward  the  left  by  the  Congress.  This 
would  be  more  likely  to  drive  out  smaller  groups  of  Congressmen 
who  would  be  less  able  by  themselves  to  constitute  a  significant 
political  force.  Even  so,  such  defectors  would  prefer  to  start  a 
'reformed  Congress'  or  a  'democratic  Congress5,  etc.,  rather 
than  lose  all  contact  with  the  Congress  name.  One  high-ranking 
Congressman  sympathetic  to  Swatantra  said  that  he  would  in  all 
probability  prefer  to  remain  in  the  Congress  and  that  if  he  did 
depart,  he  would  not  join  Swatantra.  He  mentioned  specifically 
that  he  would  form  a  new  party,  retaining  the  Congress  name  in 
some  way,  and  that  he  would  hope  to  attract  Swatantrites  into  it.96 

In  the  period  between  1962  and  1967,  this  has,  in  fact,  come  to 
pass,  as  dissident  Congressmen  have  formed  such  groups  in  Bengal, 
Kerala,  and  Orissa.  Orissa  is,  of  course,  the  most  important  from 
the  Swatantra  standpoint,  first  because  it  has  some  strength  there 
and  second  because  the  leader  of  the  Jana  Congress  is  Mahtab,  who 
headed  the  Congress-Parishad  coalition  ministry  in  the  late  1950s. 
Swatantra  has  sought  to  work  very  closely  with  Mahtab's  group, 
with  an  eye  to  a  possible  coalition  ministry;  and  there  was  some 
hope,  for  a  time,  that  the  two  parties  would  contest  on  the  basis  of 
a  common  manifesto  and  with  a  full  accord  on  the  division  of 
seats.97  Whatever  the  outcome,  the  widespread  entry  of  such 
Congressmen  into  Swatantra  is  not  likely,  unless  Swatantra  makes 
a  strong,  national  showing. 

Throughout  all  of  this,  we  must  remember  the  tendency  of  the 
Congress  to  shift  according  to  what  Kothari  has  called  pressure  at 
the  'margin'.98  Given  its  dominant  position,  Congress  has  had  the 
capacity  to  undercut  opposition  forces  by  modifying  policies,  by 
opening  ranks  to  significant  segments  of  the  opposition,  and  by 
less  ennobling  techniques.99  Swatantra,  along  with  other  opposi- 
tion parties,  will  have  to  face  this  problem;  and  at  least  for  the 
moment  Swatantra  should  hope  for  little  more  than  a  few  defectors 
and  some  marginal  help  (as  in  Rajya  Sabha  elections),  as  well  as 
some  co-operation  with  rump  Congresses. 

238 


Electoral  Adjustments 

SWATANTRA  AND  LEGISLATIVE  UNITY 

Swatantra  has  endeavoured  to  achieve  greater  unity  at  the  legis- 
lative level  also,  and  in  the  Lok  Sabha  and  in  some  states,  these 
efforts  have  met  with  modest  success.  It  was  noted  earlier  that 
Swatantra  once  tried  to  enlist  the  support  of  leading  independents, 
especially  Aney  and  Prakash  Vir  Shastri,  in  a  move  to  strengthen  its 
own  legislative  group  and  to  consolidate  the  opposition.  Particularly 
since  1962,  the  party  has  sought  to  forge  something  of  a  united 
front  at  the  legislative  level,  in  terms  of  a  *  minimum  programme' 
or  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.  The  problem  is  most  important  in  the  Lok 
Sabha  and  in  Rajasthan,  because  in  Bihar,  Orissa,  and  Gujarat, 
the  Jan  Sangh  and  other  potentially  close  allies  have  been  incon- 
sequential. In  UP  and  elsewhere,  Swatantra  is  a  very  junior 
partner  to  the  Sangh  or  another  party. 

Efforts  at  legislative  unity  have  been  affected  by  such  con- 
siderations as  the  relative  size  of  delegations,  the  quality  of  legis- 
lative performance  and  leadership,  and  the  nature  of  the  extra- 
parliamentary  situation  prevailing  in  the  respective  parties.  From 
1959  to  1962,  Masani  and  Ranga  sat  in  the  Lok  Sabha  and  led  a 
small  group  of  MPs  who  had  joined  the  Swatantra  party.  The 
Swatantra  performance  was  good,  mainly  due  to  Masani  and 
Ranga,  but  the  group  they  led  was  small  and  the  viability  of  the 
new  party  uncertain.  Hence,  there  was  little  opportunity  to  rally 
other  parties  to  the  Swatantra  cause,  even  on  a  very  modest  basis. 
When  Masani  and  Ranga  failed  to  return  to  the  Lok  Sabha  in  1962, 
the  position  of  'acting  leader'  was  bestowed  on  Kalahandi,  a 
generally  modest,  hard-working,  but  rather  unimpressive  leader. 
Under  his  leadership,  the  Swatantra  Lok  Sabha  group,  com- 
prised heavily  of  newcomers  who  were  reluctant  to  participate  or  of 
members  disposed  to  maintain  a  high  rate  of  absenteeism,  was  less 
impressive  than  the  far  smaller  group  of  1959-62.  Yet  Kalahandi's 
leadership  had  its  redeeming  features,  too.  Party  meetings  were 
held  regularly,  and  Kalahandi  personally  maintained  quite  good 
relations  with  the  members  of  the  group,  being  neither  oppressive, 
nor  arrogant,  nor  short-tempered,  etc.  Kalahandi  also  tried  to 
encourage  wider  participation  by  members  of  the  group,  in  part 
because  he  was  not  personally  disposed  to  sustain  the  burden  of 
debate  on  behalf  of  his  party. 

It  was  during  this  period,  according  to  one  report,  that  Kala- 

239 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

handi  recommended  that  Aney  be  approached  with  a  request  that 
he  join  the  Swatantra  group  and  assume  leadership  of  the  group. 
That  this  effort  had  proceeded  rather  far  is  indicated  by  Swatantra 
Party  files,  in  which  it  is  noted  that  Aney  had  agreed  to  join  and 
that,  because  of  his  seniority  and  experience,  he  would  be  designated 
leader  of  the  group.100 

It  also  appears  that  Aney  and  Shastri  were  approached  for  a 
more  general  reason,  viz.  to  increase  the  likelihood  of  a  joint 
Swatantra-Jan  Sangh  parliamentary  group.  On  paper,  at  least, 
either  of  these  men  would  have  been  congenial  to  the  Sangh,  itself 
deprived  of  certain  of  its  best  legislative  spokesmen.  Aney  and 
Shastri  insisted,  however,  that  commitments  be  secured  from 
other  independents,  before  they  would  commit  themselves;  and 
this  was  not  done.  On  the  other  hand,  according  to  one  report, 
Masani  was  far  from  enamoured  of  Shastri  and  his  followers, 
largely  of  the  militant  Hindu  variety,  vehemently  pro-Hindi, 
virulently  anti-Pakistan.101  These  and  other  factors  combined  to 
preclude  the  recruitment  of  Aney  and  Shastri,  and  in  this  fashion 
helped  to  keep  Swatantra  and  the  Jan  Sangh  from  drawing  closer 
together. 

After  the  entry  of  Ranga  in  1963  and  of  Masani  in  1964,  Swa- 
tantra was  certainly  much  better  led  in  the  Lok  Sabha.  Dandekar's 
even  later  entry  provided  yet  another  very  able  spokesman.  Masani 
and  Dandekar,  in  particular,  have  been  effective  critics  of  the 
economic  policies  of  the  government  of  the  day. 

This  larger,  better  led  Swatantra  group  might  have  been  expected 
to  command  greater  respect  and  attention  from  the  other  opposi- 
tion parties,  and  in  many  ways  it  did.  However,  the  presence  of 
Ranga  and  Masani  involved  liabilities  as  well,  even  for  the  Swatan- 
tra group  itself.  Ranga's  arrival  led  to  the  demotion  of  Kalahandi 
to  the  position  of  deputy  leader,  which  the  latter  took  entirely  in 
stride.  In  the  re-organization  of  the  legislative  group,  however, 
Mahida,  who  had  been  secretary  under  Kalahandi  and  who  had 
got  on  well  with  the  latter,  also  found  himself  demoted,  and  he  did 
not  take  this  in  his  stride.  Mahida,  in  fact,  wanted  even  greater 
recognition  in  the  group  and  had  apparently  been  satisfied  that 
this  was  possible  under  Kalahandi's  rather  mild  leadership,  but 
not  under  Ranga's.  Upset  at  his  demotion,  he  insisted  on  a  regular 
election  to  avoid  what  he  considered  the  humiliation  of  a  personal 
rejection  by  Ranga;  and  he  said  he  would  even  leave  the  party,  if 

240 


Electoral  Adjustments 

he  was  so  unwanted  by  the  party  high  command.  Although  this 
was  not  the  only  reason,  Mahida  did  in  fact  resign  from  the  party 
and  rejoined  the  Congress.102 

Another  consequence  of  the  entry  of  Ranga,  Masani,  and  Dan- 
dekar, and  of  the  somewhat  improved  position  of  C.  L.  N.  Reddy, 
a  friend  of  Ranga,  was  the  dilution  of  the  heavily  Rajput  image  of 
the  Swatantra  group  in  the  Lok  Sabha.  Under  Kalahandi,  all 
office  bearers  in  the  Lok  Sabha  group  were  Rajputs,  save  for  Reddy, 
who  was  chief  whip.  All  were  nominated  and  approved  by  the  party's 
parliamentary  board,  and  it  was  understood,  at  least  by  the  board, 
that  this  arrangement  was  subject  to  immediate  alteration,  upon 
the  entry  of  Ranga  and/or  Masani.  After  Ranga's  entry,  the  pre- 
ponderance of  the  office  bearers  were  still  Rajputs,  but  Ranga  and 
Reddy  worked  closely  together,  party  meetings  were  less  frequent; 
Ranga,  Masani,  and  Dandekar  assumed  the  principal  roles  in 
parliamentary  debates;  and  the  relative  importance  of  the  Rajputs 
declined  as  a  consequence.  Save  in  Mahida' s  case,  there  is  no 
indication  that  the  Rajputs  chafe  at  this  development;  but  it  is  a 
possibility  that  cannot  be  overlooked  in  trying  to  gauge  the 
condition  of  the  Swatantra  Lok  Sabha  group,  which  remains  heavily 
Rajput.103 

The  post-Ranga  situation  as  regards  other  parties  also  has  its 
negative  side,  from  Swatantra's  standpoint.  None  of  the  Swatantra 
leaders  in  the  Lok  Sabha  is  a  Mookerjee,  even  though  some  may  try 
to  be.  In  part,  this  would  appear  to  be  a  function  of  the  fact  that 
neither  Ranga,  nor  Masani,  nor  Dandekar  articulates  views  which 
find  much  resonance  in  the  great  Hindi  heartland  of  north  central 
India.  In  part,  however,  it  is  a  function  of  personality  and  style. 
Ranga  remains  flamboyant  and  impassioned,  occasionally  to  the 
point  of  hysteria,  in  his  public  performances;  and  this  appears  to 
mar  his  image  as  a  legislative  leader.  Certainly  Ranga  is  less  steady, 
less  quietly  yet  strongly  persuasive,  and  less  modest  than  effective 
performance  of  this  difficult  task  would  require.  Masani,  for  all  of 
his  efforts  in  this  direction,  has  no  appreciable  chance  of  galvanizing 
the  opposition  forces  either.  He  is  too  westernized  and  pro- 
western,  too  quick  and  imperious,  and  too  little  inclined  to 
suffer  those  he  considers  fools  to  rally  Jan  Sanguis,  conservative 
rural  Hindus,  and  the  other  groups  that  would  have  to  be  mobilized. 
If  Rajaji  were  twenty  or  thirty  years  younger  and  were  sitting  in  the 
Lok  Sabha3  he  could  do  a  better  job,  but  there  is  no  one  like  him  at 

16  241  ESP 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

present  available.  Swatantra's  self-estimate  in  relation  to  the  Jan 
Sangh  points  up  this  problem.  There  is  considerable  anxiety  on 
the  part  of  certain  leaders  that  the  Sangh,  with  its  more  militant 
posture  and  more  experienced  parliamentary  group,  would  come  to 
dominate  Swatantra's  larger,  but  less  experienced  and  often  less 
diligent  contingent.  Some  co-operative  efforts  have  been  made, 
however,  in  large  measure  through  Swatantra's  persistence. 

Swatantra  has  not  troubled  itself  excessively  with  such  negligible 
groups  as  the  Mahasabha  and  the  RRP.104  At  one  point,  the  Maha- 
sabha  reportedly  pressed  for  very  close  ties  with  Swatantra,  at 
least  in  Parliament;  but  Masani  rejected  the  overtures  because  of 
the  anti-Muslim  and  anti-Christian  approach  of  the  Mahasabha 
and  because  of  what  he  considered  its  policy  of  appeasement  in 
relations  with  Communist  countries.105  Not  much  energy  has  been 
expended  on  the  RRP,  although,  as  noted,  the  RRP  member  from 
Rajasthan  has  joined  the  Swatantra  parliamentary  group. 

The  Jan  Sangh  is  a  different  matter,  because  of  its  far  greater 
strength.There  is  some  evidence,  as  we  have  seen,  that  some  lead- 
ing Swatantrites  are  wary  of  the  de  facto  communalism  of  the 
Sangh  and  that  this  was  one  reason  for  avoiding  close  electoral 
alliances.106  In  so  far  as  Swatantra  has  kept  the  Sangh  at  arm's 
length,  however,  it  has  been  for  more  practical  reasons :  rather  than 
fear  of  contamination,  it  is  fear  of  domination.  To  state  the  matter 
simply,  as  Masani  once  did,  'the  Jan  Sangh  tail  might  start 
wagging  the  Swatantra  dog'.107  This  was  much  more  serious  when 
Kalahandi  was  acting  leader  of  the  Lok  Sabha  group,  but  there  is 
still  considerable  reluctance  to  formalize  a  close  relationship  with 
the  Sangh  in  the  Lok  Sabha. 

In  Rajasthan,  the  situation  resembles  that  which  prevailed  in  the 
Lok  Sabha  prior  to  the  entry  of  Ranga,  Masani,  and  Dandekar. 
Dungarpur,  like  Kalahandi,  is  a  quiet,  dignified  speaker,  but  he 
and  his  colleagues  are  consistently  outperformed  by  the  Jan  Sangh 
— and  almost  single-handedly  by  Bhairon  Singh.  Many  Swatantra 
MLAs  are  disconsolate  and  demoralized,  and  the  party's  MLAs 
often  take  their  cues  from  the  Sangh  rather  than  from  their  own 
ineffectual  leadership.108  Here  again  the '  feudal '  style  of  Swatantra 
politics  in  Rajasthan  virtually  precludes  a  substantial  change  in 
the  situation,  although  there  are  some  MLAs  who  have  the  capacity 
to  improve  the  party's  effort.  Thus  far,  Swatantra  has  been  unable 
to  make  its  numerical  superiority  'pay  off'  in  terms  of  clear  leader- 

242 


Electoral  Adjustments 

ship  of  the  opposition,  and  the  younger,  better  organized,  and  more 
aggressive  Sangh  shows  no  sign  of  subordinating  itself  to  Swatantra 
in  the  near  future. 

That  Swatantra  has  not  thrown  itself  into  the  Sangh's  arms, 
despite  much  admiration  for  the  latter' s  dynamism  and  organiza- 
tion, is  worth  pondering  a  moment.  A  variety  of  factors  underlies 
this  reluctance,  but  one  of  them  certainly  is  the  unwillingness  of 
most  leading  Swatantrites  to  bend  to  the  Sangh's  fanaticism  on 
the  official  language  and  the  Kashmir /Pakistan  questions  or  to 
yield  to  its  de  facto  communalism.  A  victory-at-any-cost  mentality 
has  not  yet  emerged  in  sufficient  breadth  and  depth  in  Swatantra 
to  cause  it  to  yield  on  such  matters;  and  from  this  we  may  derive 
some  very  cautious  optimism  about  the  strength  of  the  party's 
commitment  to  moderation,  if  not  to  a  well-rounded  liberalism. 

Confronting  all  of  these  difficulties,  Rajaji,  Kripalani,  and  other 
opposition  leaders  have  attempted  to  define  a  minimum  programme 
on  which  diverse  opposition  parties  could  come  together,  as  a  first 
step  to  fuller  co-operation.  Rajaji,  for  example,  suggested  that  the 
creation  of  a  non-partisan  board  to  grant  permits  and  licences — 
not  a  very  inspiring  issue — could  serve  as  such  a  rallying  point, 
while  Kripalani  has  been  more  ambitious.109  A  renewed  Chinese 
Communist  challenge  would  certainly  bring  the  groups  closer  to- 
gether, and  Swatantra  has  tried  to  weld  a  legislative  front  regarding 
the  government's  China  policy  specifically  and  its  policy  of  non- 
alinement  more  generally.  Serious  troubles  with  Pakistan  would 
not  be  nearly  as  effective  a  cement,  and  the  Sangh  could  easily  take 
the  initiative  in  such  a  case,  because  of  Swatantra's  moderate  and 
conciliatory  stands  in  this  area.  None  the  less,  proposals  such  as 
those  made  by  Rajaji  and  Kripalani,  electoral  co-operation  as  in 
north  Bombay  against  Krishna  Menon  and  as  in  the  crucial  1963 
by-elections,  and  co-operation  in  the  1963  no-confidence  motion, 
bespeak  an  awareness  of  the  need  to  work  toward  greater  unity. 
That  these  efforts  continue  is  proof  that  certain  party  leaders  feel 
the  compulsions  of  the  contemporary  political  situation.  That  they 
have  not  borne  much  fruit  is  proof  of  the  very  substantial  barriers 
to  the  creation  of  a  more  stable,  unified  party  system,  even  on  the 
state  level. 

In  its  dealing  with  other  opposition  parties,  Swatantra  has  been 
cautiously  co-operative.  As  in  the  matter  of  its  own  internal 
composition  and  organization,  it  is  caught  between  the  desire  to 

243  16-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

maximize  anti-Congress,  anti-Communist  strength  and  the  desire 
to  maintain  a  respectable  party.  Certain  caveats  aside,  most  Swa- 
tantra leaders  are  willing  to  associate  with  virtually  any  party,  if  it 
will  help  to  weaken  the  Congress.  Thus  far,  this  co-operative 
spirit  has  been  limited  primarily  to  'reciprocal  courtesy'  and  has 
not  included  more  than  marginal  Swatantra  support  for  such 
parties  as  the  Jan  Sangh.  Again  as  in  the  case  of  its  own  composi- 
tion, however,  Swatantra  tends  toward  an  obsessive  determination 
to  challenge  the  Congress  effectively,  and  this  pushes  it  to  a 
victory-at-any-cost  position  towards  the  right-wing  opposition. 
Masani's  rejection  of  Mahasabha  overtures  and  the  worries  about 
close  association  with  the  Sangh  must  be  viewed  cautiously.  If  the 
Mahasabha  should  merge  with  the  Sangh,  would  Swatantra 
assume  that  the  former  had  been  purified  and  had  become  a  more 
acceptable  ally  thereby?  If  Swatantra  and  the  Sangh  should  be  able 
to  form  a  coalition  in  Rajasthan,  how  far  would  Swatantra  yield  to 
the  Sangh  to  bring  this  about?  If  difficulties  with  Pakistan  should 
be  intensified,  how  far  would  Swatantra  yield  to  the  Sangh's 
intransigence  toward  Pakistan,  if  only  to  keep  from  being  out- 
flanked by  the  Sangh's  more  militant  posture?  The  early  Congress 
1  Moderates '  withdrew  to  form  the  Liberal  Party  rather  than  yield 
widely  to  the  more  militant,  populist  elements  which  had  risen  in 
the  nationalist  movement.  Would  many  Swatantrites  do  something 
comparable,  if  anti-Congress  efforts  led  to  closer  contact  with  a 
Jan  Sangh  that  retained  approximately  its  present  tendencies?  Put 
most  simply,  the  question  is:  can  Swatantra  hope  to  oust  the 
Congress  without  unholy  alliances,  if  not  marriages  of  convenience, 
and  can  it  hope  to  exist  as  a  respectable  party  if  it  feels  that  it 
must  cultivate  them?  Even  though  Swatantra  has  not  thus  far 
succumbed  to  the  Sangh,  there  is  room  for  pessimism  here. 


244 


CHAPTER    10 

SWATANTRA:  ACHIEVEMENTS, 
PROBLEMS  AND  PROSPECTS 

Short  as  its  life  has  been  and  uncertain  as  its  future  may  be, 
Swatantra  deserves  close  study  by  students  of  the  political  process. 
Its  efforts  at  building  and  sustaining  an  effective  coalition  and  its 
relationships  with  other  parties  etch  sharply  the  problem  of 
interest  aggregation  in  the  Indian  context.  Its  efforts  in  the  direc- 
tion of  secularism,  its  emphasis  on  matters  of  political  economy,  its 
attempt  to  reconcile  the  aristocracy  to  modern  political  institutions 
and  processes,  and  so  on,  bear  on  the  question  of  political  develop- 
ment, as  it  is  understood  by  Silvert  and  others.1  More  traditional 
approaches,  such  as  Emerson's  study  of  the  evolution  of  nationalist 
movements2  or  Duverger's  study  of  political  parties,  are  also 
enriched  by  an  examination  of  Swatantra. 

On  the  Indian  side  more  specifically,  the  divergent  perspectives 
within  Swatantra  and  the  way  in  which  they  interact  provide  a 
major  case  study  of  what  Morris- Jones  has  termed  India's 
'political  idioms'.3  So,  too,  the  discussion  of  the  relationships 
between  Swatantra  and  the  Congress  Party  ties  in  with  Kothari's 
analysis  of  the  Congress  'system'.  Here,  however,  a  detailed 
examination  of  the  Congress  response  to  Swatantra  lay  beyond  the 
bounds  of  the  study;  and  this  would  have  to  be  available  to  do 
justice  to  Kothari's  argument.4 

The  summary  which  follows  is  not  written  with  any  one  of  the 
above  approaches  in  mind,  but  it,  like  the  arguments  on  which  it  is 
based,  bears  upon  many.  Two  main  themes  have,  however,  been 
stressed  in  the  preceding  analyses  and  will  be  stressed  here: 
(i)  Swatantra's  capacity  to  perform  the  function  of  interest  aggrega- 
tion on  any  basis ,  and  (2)  the  qualitative  aspects  of  its  performance, 
most  specifically  in  terms  of  conservatism  and  liberalism. 

SWATANTRA  AND  INTEREST  AGGREGATION 

The  task  of  interest  aggregation  in  India  has  always  been  difficult, 
because  of  social  heterogeneity  and  fragmentation.  Weber  made 
much  of  this  point,  and  such  contemporary  writers  as  Harrison 

245 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

and  Shils  have  underscored  one  or  more  of  Weber's  points.5  Much 
of  the  argument  here  pointed  in  the  same  direction. 

None  the  less,  history  affords  examples  of  effective  political 
groupings  which  have  been  wrought  out  of  disparate  materials,  and 
the  Congress  itself  is  one  such  case.  Certainly  the  Indian  historical 
evidence  must  not  be  read  so  as  to  preclude  further  developments 
along  these  lines.  Indeed,  a  number  of  recent  studies  have  shown 
that  under  the  prevailing  conditions  of  competitive  party  politics 
in  India,  much  social  fragmentation  is  being  overcome,  at  least  to 
the  extent  that  broader  caste  federations  are  replacing  narrowly 
parochial  castes,  in  the  interests  of  greater  electoral  effective- 
ness.6 

Opposition  parties  in  India  not  only  confronted  obstacles  im- 
posed by  social  heterogeneity.  In  addition,  the  very  heterogeneity 
of  the  Congress,  the  importance  of  the  Congress  name  and 
organization,  and  the  party's  hegemony  and  flexibility  have  com- 
bined to  inhibit  a  substantial,  more  'rational'  alinement  of  political 
forces  among  either  rightists  or  leftists.  Kothari  rightly  stresses 
this  point,  but  fails  to  set  his  argument  against  the  backdrop  (i)  of 
the  general  problems  of  interest  aggregation  in  India  and  (2)  of  the 
way  in  which  the  Congress  surmounted  this  problem.  Moreover, 
the  rightist  parties  confronted  distinctive  obstacles,  which  Kothari 
again  does  not  properly  stress.7  These  would  include,  for  example, 
aristocratic  reluctance  to  join  parties  (at  least  if  the  aristocrats 
themselves  did  not  control  them);  Nehru's  savage  attacks  on  the 
right  wing  particularly;  and  the  prevalence  of  socialist  rhetoric, 
which  helped  to  suppress  explicitly  rightist  positions.  Under  such 
circumstances,  the  creation  of  a  cohesive,  explicitly  rightist, 
national  party  has  been  an  extremely  difficult  task. 

How  has  Swatantra  fared  against  this  backdrop?  Swatantra,  with 
its  distinguished  (if  generally  superannuated)  leadership,  with  one 
general  issue  on  which  it  tried  to  capitalize,  with  some  prospect 
of  financial  support,  and  with  an  approach  to  party-building  which 
Morris-Jones  has  rightly  termed  'certainly  the  most  flexible  and 
realistically  power-oriented'  of  the  rightist  parties,8  was  able  to 
rally  a  wide  array  of  parties,  groups,  interests,  and  individuals 
(many  of  them  erstwhile  enemies)  to  an  extent  that  surpassed  earlier 
efforts  by  Mookerjee  and  others.  Largely  through  the  residual 
appeal  of  the  aristocrats,  but  also  through  the  entry  of  such  groups 
as  the  Gujarat  kshatrya  mahasabha,  Swatantra  was  able  to  achieve 

246 


Swatantra:  Achievements,  Problems,  Prospects 

some  semblance  of  mass  support.  While  it  was  unable  to  forge  a 
massive,  anti-Congress  front,  it  managed  to  work  out  many  local 
adjustments  with  other  opposition  parties,  reflecting  the  compul- 
sions of  the  electoral  system  and  the  need  to  co-ordinate  opposition 
efforts  in  order  to  transform  the  Congress  System'.  In  one  stride, 
it  moved  well  up  on  the  list  of  Indian  parties,  and  to  have  become 
the  leading  opposition  in  four  states  and  eventually  in  the  Lok 
Sabha  was  a  major  accomplishment.  For  reasons  given  in  chapter  6, 
this  has  to  be  judged  a  significant  but  obviously  not  an  irreversible 
step  in  the  political  development  of  India  on  the  party  level. 

Against  this  must  be  weighed  the  following  facts.  Swatantra  was 
non-existent  in  many  states ;  it  was  very  weak  in  India's '  advanced ' 
cities;  and  it  was  overwhelmingly  dependent  on  the  aristocracy  for 
its  electoral  support.  The  truly  stupendous  majorities  secured  by 
Gayatri  Devi  and  Devgadh-Baria,  among  others,  and  the  heavily 
Rajput  Lok  Sabha  contingent  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  difficulties  of  Masani,  Dandekar,  et  al,  in  getting  elected 
at  all,  point  up  some  of  the  problems  here. 

For  this  reason,  even  Swatantra' s  strong  showing  in  four  states 
must  be  viewed  cautiously,  because  questions  of  viability  and 
effectiveness  are  also  involved,  as  the  Ramgarh  affair  (among  other 
less  cataclysmic  events)  makes  clear.  All  things  considered, 
Gujarat,  of  the  major  Swatantra  strongholds,  must  be  adjudged  the 
most  satisfactory  from  the  party's  standpoint,  because  of  a  more 
socially  diverse,  better  organized,  and  generally  better-led  party— 
though  even  this  unit  is  not  free  of  the  problems  already  noted.  It 
is  for  reasons  such  as  these  that  some  Swatantra  leaders  were  quite 
pleased  with  the  poorer  electoral  performance  in  Mysore  and 
Andhra  and  that  the  size  alone  of  a  legislative  contingent  is  not 
necessarily  a  source  of  satisfaction  or  a  sign  of  strength. 

Given  the  limitations  of  the  Swatantra  coalition,  its  internal 
strains,  and  its  vulnerability  to  virtual  decimation  if  a  few  aristo- 
crats become  slothful  or  defect,  Swatantra's  performance,  good  as 
it  was,  cannot  be  taken  to  presage  the  coming  amalgamation  of  all 
forces  to  the  right  of  the  'Nehruites'  or  a  decisive  confrontation 
with  the  Congress  in  the  near  future.  The  party's  achievements 
do  not,  for  that  matter,  even  guarantee  an  overall  reduction  in  the 
number  of  political  parties  in  India.  Apart  from  Swatantra's  own 
internal  problems,  a  major  reason  for  this  questioning  of  the  party's 
'staying  power'  is  the  nature  of  the  Congress  'system'.  Swatantra, 

247 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

as  we  have  seen,  is  in  many  respects  a  holding  company  for  local 
dissident  groups  which  were  brought  together  for  a  variety  of 
reasons,  one  of  which  was  the  feeling  that  some  degree  of  unity  had 
to  be  achieved  to  provide  an  effective  opposition  to  the  Congress  in 
New  Delhi.  (To  say  that  many  who  joined  Swatantra  were  not 
animated  by  such  considerations  is  true  enough  but  misses  a  major 
point:  Swatantra  would  not  have  come  into  existence  had  it  not 
been  for  the  fact  that  many  of  its  founding  fathers  were  animated 
by  precisely  these  considerations.)  A  weakening  of  the  position  of 
New  Delhi  vis-a-vis  the  states  and/or  a  more  '  pragmatic '  Congress 
could  markedly  undermine  Swatantra's  position  and  could  frustrate 
its  efforts — in  part  by  eliminating  the  need — to  build  a  viable, 
national  opposition.  Judicious  use  of  carrots  and  sticks,  conciliatory 
gestures  toward  offended  interests — characteristics  of  the  Congress 
4  system ' — could  well  take  much  of  the  wind  out  of  Swatantra's 
sails. 

Even  sizeable  defections  from  the  Congress  are  not  likely  to 
redound  to  Swatantra's  advantage,  partly  because  of  the  dissi- 
dents' desire  to  retain  the  Congress  name  in  some  form  (which 
was,  however,  also  true  of  the  INDC  and  the  Bihar  Jan  Congress  at 
the  outset),  but  also  because  of  Swatantra's  position  and  vulner- 
ability. Only  if  Swatantra  seems  strong  and  viable  in  a  few  states  at 
least,  if  Rajaji  or  another  leader  of  stature  (not  presently  on  the 
horizon)  is  at  the  helm,  and  if  there  is  a  strong  national  focus  in 
Indian  political  life  would  Swatantra  seem  to  stand  much  chance  of 
benefiting  markedly  from  the  emergence  of  rump  Congresses.  A 
broader  Congress  right- Swatantra  merger— not  an  unhappy  out- 
come for  many  Swatantrites  in  any  event — would  mean  a  more 
rational  alinement  of  political  forces  but  it  would  probably  mean 
the  virtual  demise  of  Swatantra  as  an  independent  political  force, 
even  though  not  everyone  in  Swatantra  could  be  accommodated  by 
such  a  coalition  or  reconciled  to  its  formation.  Had  Nehru  lived 
longer,  sustained  gradual  pressure  on  the  right-wing  elements, 
driven  out  small  groups  of  dissidents,  while  resisting  counter- 
pressures  from  the  'margin',  Swatantra's  future  would  have  been 
more  promising  than  it  now  seems.  Here,  the  party's  future  be- 
comes bound  up  with  major  questions  of  national  leadership  in 
India,  of  centre-state  relations,  and  so  on,  which  cannot  be 
examined  here.  But  if  Harrison  (among  others)  is  correct  about 
pressures  toward  devolution  of  leadership  and  political  power,9  and 

248 


Swatantra:  Achievements,  Problems,  Prospects 

if  the  Congress  becomes  more  conservative  in  its  social  and 
economic  engineering,  then  a  large  part  of  Swatantra's  raison 
d'etre  will  evaporate. 


swatantra's  qualitative  performance 

Given  this  generally  pessimistic  assessment  of  Swatantra's  capacity 
to  survive  and  to  thrive  in  the  Indian  environment,  it  may  seem 
superfluous  to  consider  its  qualitative  performance.  However,  even 
if  Swatantra  is  inevitably  relegated  to  the  'margin',  this  question 
is  still  worth  considering.  Constitutional-democratic  politics  are 
still  far  from  securely  rooted  in  the  new  nations,  and  exponents  of 
liberal  doctrines  are  few  and  far  between.  Assuming  that  these  are 
desirable,  any  significant  political  force  which  takes  a  decisive 
stand  in  favour  of  such  institutions,  processes,  and  values  and 
which  acts  to  strengthen  them  would  be  serving  a  useful  function. 
Even  a  party  on  the  'margin'  can  help  or  hinder  here.  How  does 
Swatantra  fare  on  this  score? 

In  some  respects,  Swatantra  fares  very  well,  indeed.  The  party 
has  certainly  made  strenuous  exertions  to  caution  India  about 
totalitarianism  of  the  left,  the  forestalling  of  which  Swatantra  has 
set  as  its  main  task.  But  to  be  opposed  to  totalitarianism  of  the  left 
is  not  necessarily  to  be  constitutional-democratic,  let  alone  liberal. 
Does  the  party  have  anything  else  to  offer? 

At  its  best,  Swatantra  has  a  good  deal  more  to  offer,  with  respect 
to  constitutionalism.  In  striving  to  develop  a  strong  alternative  to 
the  Congress,  Swatantra  has  set  before  the  Indian  public  the 
familiar  rationale  for  a  competitive  two-party  system.10  In  its 
effort  to  instutionalize  the  opposition  of  the  aristocrats,  as  part  of 
this  party-building  process,  it  has  tried  to  reconcile  this  important 
social  group  to  the  institutions  and  processes  of  constitutional- 
democratic  politics.  The  fact  that  the  party  strives  for  a  national 
opposition  which  transcends  the  parochial  pulls  of  Indian  society 
is  also  important,  if  the  maintenance  of  a  national  system  of  politics 
is  a  desideratum. 

Also  on  the  credit  side  of  the  ledger  is  Swatantra's  attitude  to- 
ward constitutional-democratic  procedures.  By  and  large,  the  party 
has  eschewed  walk-outs  and  disruptive  tactics  in  legislatures, 
threats  of  satyagraha  and  of  fasting  unto  death,  and  of  chauvinistic 
demagoguery  as  legitimate  political  techniques.  It  has,  for  the  most 

249 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

part,  stressed  the  parliamentary  arena  and  strictly  constitutionalist 
procedures;  and  even  where  its  leadership  has  been  inept  (as 
in  the  Rajasthan  assembly),  its  legislative  behaviour  has  been  digni- 
fied. In  terms  of  its  manifest  political  behaviour,  Swatantra  is  not 
a  party  of  constitution  wreckers,  and  we  may  hope  that  Swatantrites 
will  heed  Rajaji's  injunction  that  no  matter  how  dim  the  party's 
prospects  may  be,  it  would  not  be  desirable  to  'turn  our  thoughts 
from  peace  and  democracy  to  force  and  revolution'.11 

Still  further  evidence  is  available  on  the  question  of  Swatantra 
and  constitutionalism.  The  party's  'public  advice  committee',  its 
Punjab  inquiry  commission,  and  its  detailed  attention  to  many 
constitutional  questions,12  have  all  underscored  precise  political 
and  constitutional  issues  in  a  significant  fashion.  Needless  to  say, 
the  relationship  between  the  Planning  Commission  and  the  Cabinet 
and  Parliament  has  also  received  sustained  attention.  The  party's 
outspoken  criticism  of  the  economic  and  foreign  policies  of  the 
government  has  certainly  contributed  to  the  sometimes  halting 
and  one-sided  political  dialogue  in  India.  On  many  of  these 
questions,  the  party  has  published  useful  analyses,  however  limited 
the  audience  for  these  might  be.13  Given  the  assumption  that  con- 
stitutional-democratic procedures  and  values  are  important  and 
that  sound  policy  will  emerge  from  a  confrontation  of  alternatives, 
Swatantra  deserves  ample  credit  in  these  respects. 

It  is  necessary,  however,  to  take  note  of  some  lapses  from  grace. 
There  is  within  the  party  leadership  a  strong  strain  of  anti- 
democratic elitism  (aristocratic,  administrative  and  professional) 
and  frequent  criticism  of  universal  suffrage.  There  have  been 
some  threats  of  satyagraha,  there  have  been  some  walk-outs, 
etc.  There  are  certainly  some  Swatantrites,  including  some 
who  are  highly  placed,  who  would  not  mourn  the  passing 
of  constitutional  democracy,  provided  the  'right'  people  assumed 
control. 

Thus  far,  these  summary  remarks  have  been  confined  to  issues 
of  constitutional-democratic  politics  and  of  alternative  policies 
within  that  framework,  where,  generally,  Swatantra  fares  well.  In 
confronting  its  substantitive  policy  recommendations  and  Swatan- 
tra's  place  in  the  political  spectrum  from  that  vantage  point,  we 
face  certain  difficulties.  For  one  thing,  one's  judgment  here 
depends  in  large  measure  on  the  perception  of  the  dialectical 
nature  of  competitive  party  politics.  If  we  concede  the  Swatantra 

250 


Swatantra:  Achievements,  Problems,  Prospects 

contention  that  the  Congress  and  other  major  parties  have  swung 
far  to  the  left  (or  else  do  not  appreciate  the  threat  from  the  left), 
then  we  will  be  less  critical  if  we  find  that  Swatantra  lies  much  to 
the  right,  because  a  balance  may  be  struck  in  the  interaction  of  the 
contending  forces.  Similarly,  if  we  concede  the  argument  that 
statism  is  the  greatest  enemy  to  personal  freedom  and  that  its 
triumph  is  approaching  in  India,  then  we  will  be  less  critical  if  we 
find  that  Swatantra  tends  toward  a  victory-at-any-cost  approach 
towards  the  Congress. 

A  second  major  difficulty  relates  to  the  divergent  perspectives 
within  Swatantra  itself,  the  balance  among  which  is  by  no  means 
firmly  settled.14  There  is  the  related  problem  of  ideological  shifts 
on  the  part  of  individuals  and  groups,  as  they  participate  in  the 
political  process.  An  accurate  assessment  of  Swatantra' s  qualitative 
performance  depends  on  a  reasonably  precise  understanding  of 
these  ambiguities. 

The  simplest  matters  to  dispose  of  concern  formal  party  doctrine 
and  the  question  of  secularism.  For  all  its  lacunae  and  ambiguities, 
formal  party  doctrine  is  predominantly  liberal  in  tone;  and  even 
after  due  allowances  are  made  for  non-believers,  for  lapses  from 
grace,  and  for  the  consequences  of  Morris-Jones'  diverse 
*  idioms',15  this,  too,  ought  not  be  lightly  dismissed.  A  major 
Indian  political  party  is  publicly  committed  to  such  a  doctrine, 
which  is  poles  apart  from  the  views  of  the  RRP,  Hindu  Mahasabha, 
and  the  Jan  Sangh.  Related  to  this  is  the  fact  that  at  the  highest 
levels,  at  least,  Swatantra  has  set  forth  a  moderate,  secular, 
nationalist  approach  to  public  life,  to  which  people  of  diverse 
religions  have  been  willing  to  subscribe  and  with  which  most  feel 
comfortable.  It  is  incontestable  that  of  all  political  parties  which 
may  with  any  justice  be  placed  to  the  right  of  the  political  spectrum, 
Swatantra  is  the  most  secular,  and  this,  too,  ought  not  be  lightly 
dismissed.16 

Other  factors  are  relevant,  however,  in  defining  the  position  of 
the  party,  and  among  these  are  the  social  backgrounds  and  the 
perspectives  of  those  who  comprise  the  party.  Rajaji,  by  all  odds 
Swatantra's  stellar  attraction,  looks  upon  the  party  as  a  conserva- 
tive one  and  he  has  explicitly  referred  to  it  as  a  party  of  the  right. 
So  did  Menon,  and  most  of  the  aristocrats  would  concur.  Some 
have  been  quite  outspoken  in  their  view  that  Swatantra  should 
appeal  to  aristocrats,  non-aristocratic  landed  classes,  businessmen, 

251 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

and  other  groups  of  'haves',  because  the  party  will  protect  these 
vested  interests.  To  this  extent,  the  problem  of  denning  what 
Swatantra  stands  for  is  answered  by  some  Swatantra  leaders  in 
emphatic  language:  for  privilege  and  for  conservatism  in  one  or 
another  entirely  recognizable  form.  Rajaji  was  even  willing  to  call 
his  party  the  'Conservative  Party5,  but  he  was  apparently  con- 
vinced that  this  would  be  a  distinct  political  liability.17 

We  have  also  seen  that  within  Swatantra  there  are  people  of  a 
more  liberal  temper  and  that  both  explicitly  and  implicitly  they 
pose  a  challenge  to  the  more  conservative  elements  in  the  party. 
Certainly  a  liberal  party  in  the  classical  European  sense  would  also 
generate  '  dislocation,  disturbance,  and  distress '  of  the  type  that 
Rajaji  opposes.  This  is  obvious  from  Rajaji's  assessment  of  western 
individualism,  social  reform  movements  based  thereon,  and 
industrialization;  and  Rajaji  is,  in  this  sense,  conservative  not  only 
towards  the  statists  but  also  to  the  liberals.  In  short,  Swatantra 
contains  both  conservative  and  liberal  elements,  albeit  in  unequal 
measure;  and  in  many  respects  it  contains  in  microcosm  the  classic 
battle  between  these  two  perspectives. 

A  central  problem,  therefore,  is  the  way  in  which  the  balance  has 
been  struck  between  these  points  of  view,  and  we  must  see  this 
without  being  seduced  by  those  who  insist  that  such  distinctions 
as  we  have  been  making  are  utterly  meaningless.  That  the  analytical 
waters  have  been  amply  muddied  is  immediately  obvious.  At  one 
point  prior  to  the  creation  of  Swatantra,  it  was  argued  that '  every 
day  that  passes  makes  the  need  for  a  conservative  party  in  this 
country  to  check  the  tide  of  statism  increasingly  urgent'.  The 
argument  continued  by  saying  that  'a  conservative  party  in  the 
context  of  Indian  politics  is  not  a  party  of  reaction' — which  may 
be  accepted  without  qualm— but  to  say,  then,  that  'it  will  be  a 
progressive  liberal  party,  which  will  have  its  roots  in  basic  demo- 
cratic principles  and  in  the  cherished  traditions  of  the  country' 
simply  does  not  follow.18  Admitting  that  it  is  difficult  to  use  parts 
of  the  political  vocabulary  with  precision,  we  still  cannot  permit  this 
statement  to  pass  unchallenged.  It  is  one  thing  to  say  that 
conservatives  and  liberals  can  join  hands  in  opposing  statism,  but 
it  is  quite  another  thing — and  quite  incorrect — to  argue  that  they 
are  identical. 

Masani  has  done  little  to  clarify  the  picture.  On  one  occasion  he 
said: 

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Swatantra:  Achievements,  Problems,  Prospects 

I  do  not  much  care  what  label  such  a  party  adopts.  Rajaji  would  like  to 
call  it  a  conservative  party.  Being  myself  a  liberal  and  one  of  the  Patrons 
of  the  Liberal  International,  I  would  prefer  another  title.  But  whether 
it  is  called  a  Democratic  Party,  People's  Party,  or  Centre  Party,  it  is  not 
important.  What  is  important  is  that  it  should  present  a  clear  demo- 
cratic alternative  to  the  policies  of  the  ruling  party,  so  that  the  people 
of  India  may  be  given  an  opportunity  to  exercise  an  effective  choice.  In 
my  view,  the  new  party  should  be  what  may  be  broadly  called  a  middle- 
of-the-road  party  or  centre  party  which  would  eschew  dogma  and 
extreme  of  any  kind.19 

This  characterization  would  obviously  permit  both  liberals  and 
conservatives  to  join  hands  against  the  statists,  but  it  still  does  not 
settle  the  question  of  the  interaction  between  them. 

Elsewhere,  too,  Masani  has  been  of  little  help,  as  he  has  sought 
to  free  Swatantra  from  the  label  of  *  rightist',  even  though  Rajaji 
does  not  seem  to  mind  this  characterization: 

While  large  sections  of  the  press  both  in  India  and  abroad  have  de- 
scribed the  Swatantra  Party  as  a  'Rightist'  party,  coupling  it  in  this 
respect  with  the  Jan  Sangh,  every  serious  student  of  political  science 
knows  that  the  terms  'Left'  and  'Right'  have  lost  all  meaning  in  recent 
decades.  There  can  be  nothing  more  reactionary  than  the  Communist 
ideology,  with  its  belief  in  totalitarian  control . . .  and  yet  it  is  labelled 
'Leftist'  along  with  the  democratic  socialist  elements.  There  can  be 
nothing  more  progressive  and  radical  than  the  philosophy  of  the  Swa- 
tantra Party  with  its  stress  on  individual  liberty,  the  dignity  of  the 
human  personality  and  the  assertion  of  the  Fundamental  Rights  in  the 
Constitution,  and  yet  it  is  often  described  as  'Rightist!'20 

This  is  a  variant  on  the  theme  of  who  is  a  true  socialist,  as  is  evident 
from  the  remark  that  Nehru  was  'a  pre-Revolution  Marxist;  we 
are  post-Revolution  Marxists  \21  In  the  second  extended  quotation, 
Masani  stresses  the  individualistic,  progressive  aspects  of  Swatan- 
tra, but  by  contrast  to  the  statists,  not  to  the  conservatives. 

The  problem  is  not  only  one  of  contending  groups  within  Swa- 
tantra, but  it  is  also  one  which  is  visible  within  a  single  individual, 
as  we  have  seen  in  the  case  of  Rajaji  himself.  He  is  fundamentally 
a  Burkean  conservative,  of  that  there  can  be  no  doubt.  Yet  recently, 
Rajaji  has  come  to  talk  more  in  terms  of  liberal  individualism  than 
in  terms  of  conservatism,  without  clearly  facing  the  implicit  con- 
tradictions himself;  and  he  has  explicitly  rejected  any  *  back-to-the- 

253 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

village'  programme.  Some  Swatantrites,  confronted  by  the 
massive  challenge  of  socialism  and  by  the  massive  verbal  challenge 
to  the  old  order,  have,  indeed,  shifted  toward  more  liberal  posi- 
tions, as  Rajaji  has  done.22  Over  wide  areas,  however,  no  real 
fusion  of  the  two  perspectives  is  evident,  and  the  conflict  between 
conservative  and  liberal  elements  remains,  even  though  it  is 
often  suppressed.  There  are  some  indications,  however,  that  the 
pressure  of  the  competitive  situation  is,  in  fact,  moving  Swatantra 
generally  away  from  conservative  positions. 

If  we  approach  this  problem  in  terms  of  the  party  which  has  been 
built  so  far — its  elites,  composition,  formal  doctrine,  the  pattern  of 
electoral  support  and  of  electoral  understandings — the  prospects 
of  a  well-rounded  liberal  position,  as  distinct  from  a  constitution- 
alist or  technologically  progressive  role,  are  not  good.  The  liberal 
element  is,  in  the  first  place,  numerically  small,  even  within  the 
elites,  and  there  is  an  obvious  weakening  of  liberal  commitment  as 
one  moves  down  the  party  hierarchy.  This  is  to  be  expected  in 
terms  of  Morris- Jones'  arguments  about  India's  political  idioms. 
Secondly,  there  is  the  problem  of  reaching  the  electorate  in  terms 
of  broadly  based,  liberal  programmes.  Thirdly,  there  is  the 
related  problem  of  the  extreme  dependence  on  aristocrats  who 
are  (i)  not  fully  reconciled  in  many  cases  to  modern,  demo- 
cratic politics,  (2)  quite  conservative  on  the  whole,  and  (3)  not 
disposed  to  put  their  residual,  traditional  appeal  at  the  disposal  of 
the  more  liberal  elements  in  the  party.  Even  when  aristocratic 
commitment  to  modern  industry  is  taken  into  account,  when 
occasional  cases  of  Tory  democracy  are  acknowledged,  and  when 
Masani's  efforts  to  assert  the  position  of  the  more  modern, 
liberal  elements  are  noted,  the  general  situation  is  still  quite 
depressing  from  the  standpoint  of  Swatantra's  modern  men — not 
all  of  whom  are,  in  any  event,  liberals.  Moreover,  the  Masani- 
led  effort  runs  afoul  of  much  non-aristocratic  conservatism  and 
parochialism  as  well.  It  will  be  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty 
that  Swatantra's  more  modern  and  liberal  men  will  make 
appreciable  headway. 

The  obstacles  confronting  Swatantra  in  this  respect  are  clear 
enough.  With  limited  time  and  resources,  coupled  with  a  feeling 
among  many  that  it  is  'now  or  never',  Swatantra  sought  aid  and 
comfort  wherever  it  could  be  found.  Many  less  than  edifying  local 
notables  were  welcomed  into  the  fold  and  these  proved  to  be 

254 


Swatantra:  Achievements,  Problems,  Prospects 

largely  responsible  for  the  party's  electoral  successes.  Given 
Swatantra's  estimate  of  the  present  political  scene,  it  is  inconceiv- 
able that  the  party  would  consider  a  major  '  purge '  in  order  to  put 
its  organization  on  a  more  modern  and  liberal  footing.  Local 
notables  have  the  appeal,  and  Swatantra,  by  and  large,  had  to  take 
whatever  it  got,  and  it  is  likely  to  continue  to  do  so. 

Masani,  as  usual,  has  been  able  to  specify  the  central  issues, 
even  if  he  has  not  been  able  to  implement  pertinent  policies.  At  one 
juncture  he  told  his  party  that  'we  should  be  careful  not  to  depend 
on  dubious  elements.  Our  enthusiasm  and  eagerness  to  see  the 
Party  grow  should  not  lead  us  to  welcome  people  into  our  fold 
without  due  discrimination'.23  In  addition,  in  surveying  the 
'lessons'  of  the  general  elections  of  1962,  Masani  insisted  that  £the 
moral  is  simple ' : 

The  Swatantra  Party  has  to  build  its  own  structure  on  a  sound  and  more 
broad-based  social  basis.  It  has,  in  particular,  to  devote  specific  attention 
to  massive  sections  of  the  people,  like  Harijans,  Adivasis,  small  farmers, 
industrial  and  agricultural  labour,  shopkeepers,  youth  and  women. 
Specific  attention  to  the  needs  of  these  classes  of  our  people,  many  of 
whom  are  under-privileged  in  social  and  economic  terms,  is  called  for. 
For  a  Party  which  has  put  the  needs  of  the  Common  Man  in  the  fore- 
front of  its  programme  and  Manifesto,  such  a  task  is  a  moral  and 
political  imperative.24 

These  are  unexceptionable  positions,  action  upon  which  seems 
unlikely,  if,  by  it,  Masani  means  to  circumvent  the  local  notables 
upon  whom  Swatantra  has  been  so  dependent.  In  the  absence  of  a 
conversion  of  the  aristocracy,  such  circumvention  is  essential  if 
Swatantra  is  to  become  the  spokesman  for  the  middle  class,  let 
alone  for  the  'common  man'.  This,  however,  would  involve 
virtually  the  total  reconstruction  of  the  party  precisely  in  those 
areas  where  it  has  made  some  of  its  most  impressive  showings. 
Even  such  verbally  gifted  people  as  Masani  or  Rajaji  could  not 
convince  a  sensible  person  that  the  party  in  Bihar  or  Rajasthan  was 
a  party  of  the  common  man,  and  Rajaji  admitted  as  much  in  the 
case  of  Ramgarh.  Masani  may  have  soothed  some  personal  guilt 
feelings  but  should  have  confused  no  one  when  he  said  that '  our 
inability  to  reach  large  sections  of  the  electorate  also  meant  that  the 
Big  Lie  about  the  Swatantra  Party  being  a  party  of  maharajas  and 
capitalists  remained  unanswered  in  so  far  as  large  numbers  of 

255 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

voters  were  concerned'.25  Until  the  pattern  of  electoral  support 
and  the  composition,  or  at  least  the  outlook  of  most  of  the  northern 
cadres,  change  rather  markedly,  the  question  will  remain  largely 
unanswered — and,  in  so  far  as  it  is  answered  partially,  it  will  not  be 
to  Swatantra's  advantage. 

If  Swatantra's  reliance  on  the  aristocracy  raises  some  doubts 
about  the  party's  liberal  future,  its  relations  with  other  opposition 
groups  raise  still  more.  Masani  again  provided  a  useful  approach 
to  the  problem  when  he  said  that  while  Swatantra  £is  a  National 
Democratic  Party  of  all  elements  and  communities  in  India'  which 
*  could  not  agree'  with  the  Jan  Sangh,  Hindu  Mahasabha,  DMK, 
and  AkaliDal  /insofar  as  they  are  sectarian  parties ',  most,  if  not  all 
non-Communist  opposition  parties  were,  in  his  view,  acceptable 
electoral  allies :  *  That  is  the  choice  of  evils  we  have  to  make.  The 
total  evil  is  the  communist  evil,  whether  it  is  in  the  Communist 
Party  or  whether  it  has  infiltrated  the  Congress.'26  Thus,  the 
Swatantra  perception  of  the  Indian  situation  as  well  as  objective 
aspects  of  that  situation  (such  as  the  multiplicity  of  parties, 
Swatantra's  poor  finances,  etc.)  leads  it  toward  positions,  both  in 
terms  of  its  own  membership  and  organization  and  in  terms  of  its 
electoral  and  legislative  understandings  and  alliances,  which 
seriously  prejudice  its  chances  for  liberal  respectability.  Swatantra 
will  have  a  most  difficult  time,  in  the  prevailing  Indian  context, 
without  considerable  reliance  on  *  dubious  elements'  both  inside 
and  outside  the  party  ranks.  The  fault  is  not  entirely  due  to  a  uni- 
form lack  of  will  in  Swatantra;  but  wherever  the  fault  lies,  the 
party  faces  a  steep  ascent,  if  it  is  to  establish  itself  not  only  as  a 
constitutional-democratic  party  but  as  a  modernizing,  liberal  one 
as  well.27 

At  this  point  in  time,  then,  it  would  seem  fair  to  characterize 
Swatantra  as  a  predominantly  conservative  party  which  embraces, 
in  particular,  aristocratic  conservatism,  non-aristocratic  landed 
conservatism,  and  the  conservatism  of  the  idealized  village.  Its 
modernizing  potential  would  seem  to  be  greatest  in  the  political 
realm,  i.e.  through  its  willingness  to  function  through  contemporary 
national  political  institutions  and  organized  parties,  with  the 
economic  sector  ranking  next  in  this  respect,  as  a  result  of  the 
presence  of  some  urban,  industrial  interests,  plus  some  techno- 
logically progressive  aristocrats.  Weakest  of  all  thus  far  is  an  open, 
aggressive  commitment  to  social  modernization,  which  is,  of 

256 


Swatantra:  Achievements,  Problems,  Prospects 

course,  intimately  related  to  the  question  of  liberalism.  A  more 
modern  and  in  some  cases  more  liberal  element  is  certainly 
present,  and  it  has  tried  to  assert  its  position  through  its  involve- 
ment in  formal  doctrinal  matters  and  through  judicious  use  of  the 
rupee;  but  thus  far  it  has  tended  to  exist  toward  the  'margin5  of  a 
party  itself  at  the  'margin'  of  the  Congress  system. 

These  considerations  are,  of  course,  related  to  certain  of  our 
introductory  remarks  about  conservatism.  Huntington  and  others 
have  noted  the  two-directional  battle  of  the  French  middle  classes, 
and  many  have  noted  the  retreat  of  the  liberals  in  nineteenth- 
century  Germany,  in  the  face  of  a  rising  socialist  challenge.  The 
problems  inherent  in  this  'middling'  position  are  abundantly 
evident  in  the  Swatantra  case.28  To  a  modest  degree,  liberal  ideas 
are  being  articulated  against  the  ancien  regime  elements  in  Swa- 
tantra, but  for  the  most  part,  as  we  have  seen  over  and  over  again, 
the  threat  from  the  left  is  considered  to  be  so  serious  that  this 
critique  is  muted  to  the  point  of  inaudibility.  It  is  for  such  reasons 
that  analysts  who  easily  characterize  Swatantra  as  a  nineteenth- 
century  liberal  party  (largely  due  to  misplaced  emphasis  on  formal 
ideology)  miss  a  key  point.  The  fact  is  that  twentieth-century  India 
is  not  eighteenth-  or  nineteenth-century  Europe,  and  even  the 
liberals  in  Swatantra  are  not  liberals  in  the  classical  European 
sense.  The  Swatantra  liberals  have  consistently  emphasized  the 
statist  threat  and  have  understated  or  completely  ignored  the 
weight  of  tradition  and  the  dangers  which  lie  to  the  right;  and, 
in  so  far  as  they  continue  to  do  so,  they  will  represent  at  best  a 
very  truncated  form  of  liberalism.  Masani  would  do  well  to  consider 
the  nineteenth-century  German  case,  as  part  of  his  world-historical 
analyses. 

THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  INDIAN  RIGHT 

The  future  of  Swatantra  as  the  principal  vehicle  for  either  Indian 
conservatism  or  for  Indian  liberalism  (or  some  combination  of  the 
two)  would  not  seem  promising.  This  does  not  mean  that  the 
Indian  right  is  in  eclipse  or  that  it  is  inconsequential  in  the  Indian 
political  system.  The  bases  of  Indian  rightism  are  ample,  but  the 
major  components  have  been  disorganized  and  somewhat  beneath 
the  surface  of  overtly  conservative  party  political  life. 

The  poor  electoral  performance  of  the  explicitly  rightist  parties 
prior  to  Swatantra' s  arrival  justifies  only  modest  conclusions.  It 

17  257  ESP 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

indicates  only  that  the  most  venturesome  exponents  of  various 
right-wing  positions  have  thus  far  been  devoid  of  substantial  mass 
appeal  as  independent  forces.  It  says  little  about  the  (latent) 
strength  of  such  views  within  the  Congress  itself,  particularly 
about  moderate  conservatism,  as  opposed  to  the  views  of  the  RRP, 
Hindu  Mahasabha,  or  the  Jan  Sangh.  Swatantra,  for  reasons 
suggested  by  Kothari's  analysis,  as  we  have  amended  it  here,  may 
well  suffer  serious  setbacks  and  recede  in  importance,  particularly 
if  Congress  hegemony  is  sustained  and  if  the  ruling  party  responds 
to  pressure  at  the  'margin'. 

A  most  obvious  fact  is  that  there  is  more  to  Indian  rightism  than 
meets  the  eye — at  least  the  eye  which  scans  only  electoral  data  and 
official  party  propaganda.  In  the  future,  there  should  be  ample 
scope  for  both  moderate  and  militant  rightism  (if  not  for  aristo- 
cratic conservatism  or  for  RRP-style  obscurantism),  although  it  is 
impossible  to  specify  what  the  balance  will  be.29  What  may  safely 
be  said  is  that  the  social  forces  which  have  supported  various 
rightist  positions  will  continue  to  work  through  diverse  channels, 
some  of  which  will  surely  be  more  explicitly  rightist  now  that 
Nehru  has  passed  from  the  scene.  Whether  Swatantra  and  the 
Jan  Sangh  merge,  or  whether  Swatantra  and  the  Congress  right 
merge,  or  whether  some  other  pattern  evolves  (e.g.  one  based  on  a 
drastic  disintegration  of  national  politics),  the  underlying  social 
forces,  and  their  interaction,  must  receive  greater  attention  than 
has  thus  far  been  the  case,  if  Indian  political  development  is  to  be 
properly  understood. 

It  is  most  likely  that  India's  rightist  forces  will  remain  reason- 
ably disorganized  and  will  seem  somewhat  less  strong  and  less 
explicitly  rightist  than  they  in  fact  are.  These  are  virtually  inescap- 
able aspects  of  rightist  activity  in  India  today  and  are  likely  to 
remain  so  for  some  time.  The  prevailing  disorder  may  seem  to  be  a 
luxury  that  the  right  can  ill-afford,  but  we  must  remember  that  there 
are  substantial  conflicts  within  the  rightist  camp  on  major  issues. 
There  is  certainly  no  compelling  reason  for  all  rightist  forces  to 
unite,  and  there  is  certainly  little  likelihood  that  they  will  do  so  in 
the  absence  of  a  sustained  and  serious  attack  from  the  left.  In  this 
writer's  view,  the  latter  has  thus  far  not  been  forthcoming  and  is 
not  likely  in  the  near  future,  Swatantra  charges  of  statism  and 
incipient  totalitarianism  notwithstanding.  There  is  also  consider- 
able historical  evidence  to  suggest  that  even  in  the  face  of  a 

258 


Swatantra:  Achievements,  Problems,  Prospects 

serious  challenge  the  rightist  groups  would  not  heed  the  maxim, 
*  we  had  best  hang  together,  else  we  shall  hang  separately',  but,  in 
so  far  as  this  situation  persists  today,  Swatantra  cannot  be  blamed 
for  it. 

The  pattern  of  Indian  public  life  in  the  mid-1960s  suggests  that 
Congress  reformism  is  unlikely  to  'get  that  huge  country  moving' 
widely  and  swiftly.  Persistent  problems,  domestic  and  foreign, 
could  generate  a  sense  of  frustration  and  already  seem  to  have 
generated  a  more  cautious  approach  on  the  part  of  the  Congress, 
as  the  suggestions  for  a  plan '  holiday '  and/or  more  modest  develop- 
ment programmes  testify.  If  this  should  be  the  case,  and  if  the 
failures  of  earlier  policy  be  traced  to  Nehru  and  his  'western' 
ideas,  then  a  renaissance  of  more  'Indian'  ideas  could  come 
increasingly  to  permeate  public  life.  Such  a  renaissance  along 
militant  Hindu  lines  would  probably  be  disastrous  in  terms  of 
communal  relations  (i.e.  Hindu  v.  Muslim),  although  it  would 
hold  out  the  hope  for  industrial  and  some  social  advance, 
within  the  framework  of  a  strong,  more  centralized  nation- 
state.  A  re-emphasis  along  the  lines  of  the  idealized  village  would 
doubtless  be  disastrous  on  almost  all  counts,  although  many 
Indians  could  announce  their  revolutionary  intent  and  could 
console  themselves  with  the  thought  that  they  were  being  true 
to  Gandhi. 

In  this  context,  a  Swatantra  Party  which  aggressively  propagated 
a  liberal  and  moderate  nationalist  line,  maintaining  a  firm  com- 
mitment to  industrialization  and  to  national  political  institutions, 
could  perform  a  valuable  function  in  Indian  public  life.  And  there 
are  some  modestly  hopeful  signs.  The  present  evidence  suggests, 
however,  that  Swatantra  will  not  be  equal  to  the  task  of  a  two-front 
war,  critical  of  rightist  dangers  to  freedom  as  well  as  of  the  leftist 
threat.  Again,  we  must  emphasize  that  this  is  not  due  entirely  to  a 
uniform  lack  of  will.  Broadly  liberal  classes  simply  do  not  exist  in 
India,  and  the  impact  of  colonialism  and  of  world-wide  Marxism 
have  probably  thrown  India  into  a  situation  in  which  classical 
liberalism  is  not  likely  to  flourish.  Even  if  we  agree  with  Swatantra 
that  the  principal  threat  flows  from  totalitarianism  of  the  left,  we 
must  yet  insist  (with  Brecher,  for  one)30  that  the  Indian  right  poses 
serious  problems  as  well.  Here  many  western  observers  join  hands 
in  irresponsibility  with  all  too  many  Swatantrites :  by  steadfastly 
ignoring  the  substantial,  if  often  latent  or  untapped  or  disorganized 

259  17-2 


The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism 

reservoirs  of  right-wing  strength  in  India,  or  by  blithely  assuring 
us  that  anti-statism  is  equivalent  to  liberalism  or  that  a  conservative 
party  in  India  is  not  really  conservative,  but  liberal,  they  avoid 
coming  to  grips  with  one  of  the  fundamental  problems  of  Indian 
public  life.  But  neither  in  intellectual  nor  in  practical  terms  will 
the  many  problems  posed  by  the  Indian  right  be  solved  by  denying 
that  they  exist. 


1 

I 

I 

1 


260 


APPENDIX  I 

A  NOTE  ON  THE  1967  ELECTIONS 

The  months  prior  to  the  1967  elections  were  ones  of  intense  excite- 
ment and  interest.  The  new  and  improved  ministry  of  Indira 
Gandhi  was  increasingly  viewed  as  representing  a  deterioration  of 
national  political  power  (both  in  governmental  and  party  terms)  in 
India.  Famine  conditions,  inflation,  a  host  of  strikes,  riots,  and 
fasts,  seemed  to  many  to  symbolize  not  only  the  deterioration  of 
incumbent  political  leadership  but  also  of  the  Indian  nation  and 
its  democratic  system.  Stern  warnings  from  home  and  abroad 
were  heard  that  Indian  democracy  was  in  danger.1 

Opposition  parties,  looking  to  the  first  election  in  which  Nehru 
was  not  at  the  helm  of  the  Congress,  sensed  the  opportunity  for 
marked  gains;  many  of  them,  after  carefully  stocking  the  pond, 
proceeded  to  fish  in  the  inviting  waters.  Of  the  rightist  parties, 
Swatantra  and  Jan  Sangh  talked  enthusiastically  of  controlling 
some  states  (individually  or  in  coalition)  and  of  substantially  re- 
ducing the  Congress  majority  at  the  Centre.  The  right-wing  ele- 
ments within  the  Congress  itself  also  felt  that  the  tide  was  running 
in  their  favour. 

There  was  some  basis  for  right-wing  optimism.  All  the  mis- 
fortunes which  had  befallen  India  could  be  laid  at  the  door  of  the 
ruling  party  in  one  way  or  another;  and,  where  they  were  well 
organized,  the  right-wing  elements  could  hope  to  capitalize  on  the 
discontent.  The  Jan  Sangh  in  particular  responded  eagerly  to  the 
bifurcation  of  the  Punjab  and  to  the  demand — accompanied  by 
assorted  fasts  of  dubious  integrity — for  a  ban  on  cow-slaughter.  A 
host  of  essentially  local  issues  were  also  assiduously  exploited  by  the 
opposition  parties.2 

Especially  important  in  the  context  of  this  book  was  the  upsurge 
in  overt,  anti-Congress  activity  on  the  part  of  the  aristocracy  and 
the  business  communities.  Much  of  the  previously  latent  right- 
wing  sentiment  was  swiftly  and  energetically  coming  to  the  surface.3 
With  the  prospect  of  more  potent  candidates  (i.e.  aristocrats)  and 
better  finance,  the  right-wing  opposition  saw  better  days  ahead. 

Related  to  this,  but  complicating  the  political  picture  for  the 
right-wing  opposition  was  the  emergence  of  a  spate  of  rump  Con- 

261 


Appendix  I 

gresses,  under  assorted  designations.4  On  the  one  hand,  the  emer- 
gence of  such  groups,  some  of  which  were  rightist,  suggested 
further  fragmentation  of  the  anti-Congress  vote.  Hence,  there  was 
much  wailing  in  many  opposition  quarters.  On  the  other  hand, 
certain  elements  had  come  out  of  the  Congress,5  and  if  electoral 
adjustments  and  agreements  on  the  formation  of  coalition  mini- 
stries could  be  worked  out  with  them,  this  development  could 
work  to  the  advantage  of  the  opposition  collectively,  although  it 
might  frustrate  the  ambitions  and  aspirations  of  an  individual 
party.  The  opportunities  and  problems  here  led  to  strenuous  efforts 
by  opposition  parties  to  minimize  undesirable  fragmentation  of 
the  vote,  by  achieving  at  least  state- wide  electoral  agreements.6 

More  specifically,  the  Swatantra  Party  confronted  the  elections 
with  a  combination  of  anxiety  and  hope,  in  varying  proportions 
over  time  and  space.  Deprived  of  the  large  group  of  Bihar  legis- 
lators who  followed  Ramgarh  on  his  seemingly  endless  political 
meanderings,  Swatantra's  numerical  strength  and  territorial  im- 
pact were  reduced.7  Although  there  were  some  important  entrants 
into  the  party  (mostly  outside  of  the  legislative  arenas),  notably  in 
Gujarat,  these  did  not  compensate  for  the  quantitative  loss  in 
Bihar. 

Organizationally,  too,  Swatantra  had  cause  for  concern.  Masani 
detailed  numerous  deficiencies  in  his  report  to  the  1966  convention 
in  Delhi,  and  they  boiled  down  to  the  fact  that,  in  too  many  cases, 
Swatantra  had  no  organization  and  no  cadres  worthy  of  the  name, 
even  in  states  where  it  had  considerable  legislative  strength.  In 
Gujarat,  already  organizationally  better  than  most  states  in  which 
Swatantra  had  some  strength,  the  situation  was  encouraging. 
There,  H.  M.  Patel,  a  retired  ICS  officer,  sought  to  develop  and 
to  regularize  the  party's  organization;  and  in  this  effort  he  was 
aided  by  some  prominent  ex-Congressmen  who  brought  with  them 
an  appreciation  of  good  grass-roots  organization  and  of  sustained 
contact  with  the  electorate.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  little 
sign  of  progress  in  Rajasthan,  where  an  ex-IAS  officer  took  the  post 
of  state  General- Secretary;  and  in  Orissa,  Swatantra  influence 
continued  to  be  confined  almost  entirely  to  the  princely  influenced 
highlands,  where  the  erstwhile  Ganatantra  Parishad  had  held  sway. 

Illustrative  of  one  of  the  central  problems  discussed  in  this  book 
was  the  charge  made  by  Swatantrites  in  coastal  Orissa  that  the 
aristocratic  leadership  was  intentionally  neglecting  organizational 

262 


Appendix  I 

matters,  so  that  power  would  remain  firmly  in  aristocratic  hands. 
Even  Gujarat  was  not  immune  to  this  problem.  In  fact,  it  became 
worse  as  the  election  approached,  because  a  number  of  aristocrats 
came  into  the  party  (or  stood  as  S watantra-supported  independents) 
and  started  to  assert  themselves  in  a  more  vigorous  fashion  than 
was  true  of  earlier  years  in  Gujarat.  Even  with  K.  M.  Patel's 
efforts,  the  Gujarat  unit  came  to  display  some  of  the  character- 
istics of  aristocrat-influenced  units  in  other  northern  states.  (Also 
notable  on  the  Gujarat  scene  was  the  not-unrelated  struggle  be- 
tween kshatryas  and  Patidars.8)  In  both  Orissa  and  Gujarat, 
there  were  open  rebellions  against  local  aristocratic  leadership ;  and  in 
some  cases  these  dissident  Swatantrites  openly  fought  the  official 
nominees  of  the  party.9  But  here,  as  elsewhere,  the  party's  depen- 
dence on  aristocratic  support  made  it  most  difficult  to  achieve  a 
modus  vivendi.10 

Swatantra  had  some  basis  for  hope,  too.  Many  of  the  business- 
men and  aristocrats  who  came  out  openly  against  the  Congress 
turned  to  the  Swatantra  party.  Swatantra  benefited  primarily  in 
Gujarat  and  Rajasthan,  and,  to  a  far  lesser  extent,  in  UP.  For 
example,  the  Saurashtra  region  of  Gujarat,  which  gave  negligible 
support  to  Swatantra  in  1962,  looked  quite  promising  as  the  1967 
elections  approached,  in  large  part  because  of  aristocratic  support; 
and  the  entry  of  a  number  of  prominent  Birla  men  bolstered  Swa- 
tantra hopes  in  Rajasthan.  In  terms  of  finance,  Swatantra  was 
certainly  in  a  much  better  position  than  in  1962,  although,  as  ex- 
pected, its  aspirations  outran  its  resources  and  there  was  great 
reliance  on  self-financing  candidates  again.11 

Relations  with  other  opposition  parties  also  produced  mixed  re- 
actions. The  emergence  of  the  rump  Congresses  was  bemoaned  by 
Masani,  among  others,  who  were  upset  over  the  entry  of  yet  more 
aspirants  in  the  political  arena.  Yet  in  Orissa,  after  much  pulling 
and  hauling,  Swatantra  and  the  Mahtab-led  Jana  Congress  worked 
out  an  agreement  quite  favourable  to  Swatantra;  and  there  was 
some  co-operation  between  the  Congress  dissidents  in  Rajasthan 
and  the  Swatantra  unit  in  that  state.12  In  both  of  these  cases,  there 
was  considerable  optimism  that  Swatantra-led  governments  might 
be  formed  with  the  help  of  such  dissident  elements. 

On  the  whole,  relations  with  other  opposition  parties  were  more 
orderly  prior  to  the  1967  elections  than  they  were  in  1962.  Swa- 
antra  and  the  Jan  Sangh  reached  a  reasonably  firm  accord  in  Raja- 

263 


Appendix  I 

sthan,  where  Swatantra's  superior  position  was  recognized.  In 
return  for  Jan  Sangh  support  for  Masani  in  Rajkot,  the  Gujarat 
unit  was  obliged  to  concede  far  more  to  the  Sangh  than  the 
latter 's  strength  would  have  warranted;  and  while  it  required 
persistent  effort,  relations  remained  tolerably  good.13  In  Madras, 
Swatantra  acknowledged  its  weakness  and  joined  as  a  minor,  but 
effective  partner  in  a  broad,  anti-Congress  front  dominated  by  the 
DMK.  Elsewhere,  informal  or  formal  understandings  were  reached 
with  a  wide  range  of  parties,  including,  in  some  cases,  the  two 
wings  of  the  Communist  Party.14  In  some  cases  (as  in  Madras), 
this  resulted  in  a  quantitatively  reduced  but  qualitatively  better 
effort  on  the  part  of  the  Swatantra  Party. 

In  the  matter  of  electoral  understandings  and,  more  broadly,  in 
confronting  the  electorate,  Swatantra  leaders  frankly  admit  that 
they  often  yielded  to  the  pressure  of  necessity,  defined  in  terms  of 
how  best  to  defeat  the  Congress.  As  before,  the  propaganda  which 
emanated  from  the  central  office  remained  overwhelmingly  orien- 
ted toward  economic  problems  and  was  scrupulously  secular;  and 
party  leaders  tried  to  project  Swatantra's  image  as  a  responsible, 
constitutional-democratic  party.  Still,  it  was  only  after  a  frequently 
bitter  debate  that  the  national  party  refrained  from  including  a 
demand  for  a  ban  on  cow-slaughter  in  its  election  manifesto;  and 
many  state  units  and  individual  candidates  were  side  by  side  with 
the  Jan  Sangh  in  exploiting  the  cow-slaughter  issue.15  Masani  and 
other  secular  leaders  were  dismayed  at  this,  and  even  Rajaji  decried 
the  fact  that  cow-slaughter  seemed  to  dominate  the  political  scene 
for  so  long,  but  they  all  admitted  that  necessity  led  down  other 
paths.  The  boycott  of  the  Andhra  legislature  over  a  steel-plant 
location  issue,  the  electoral  understandings  with  the  Communists, 
and  other  actions  were  similarly  tolerated.16 

In  the  immediate  pre-election  period,  the  scoring  of  electoral 
successes  was  obviously  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  the  party 
leaders;  but  many  of  the  underlying  problems  analysed  in  the  main 
part  of  this  book  were  obviously  not  far  below  the  surface.  Organiza- 
tional and  ideological  deficiencies  were  clearly  recognized  in  many 
quarters,  and,  for  example,  many  national  and  state  leaders  were 
frankly  apprehensive  at  the  prospect  of  Swatantra(-led)  mini- 
stries in  Gujarat  and  Rajasthan.17  The  highly  educated  and  ex- 
tremely able  group  of  candidates  put  up  for  the  Lok  Sabha  pro- 
vided some  consolation  at  that  level  of  politics,  but  the  situation 

264 


Appendix  I 

at  the  state  level  left  many  Swatantra  leaders  very  much  depressed. 
It  was  still  not  clear  that  the  more  modern  elements  (in  both 
organizational  and  ideological  terms)  could  satisfactorily  assert 
themselves,  either  within  the  Swatantra  Party  itself  or  within  the 
broader  political  context. 

In  this  connection,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  central  office 
of  the  party  again  made  its  primary  effort  in  elections  to  the  Lok 
Sabha.18  Here,  the  most  notable  development  was  the  support 
rendered  to  more  modern  Swatantrites  by  the  aristocrats,  particu- 
larly in  Gujarat  and  Rajasthan.19  Whether  this  support  stemmed 
more  from  indifference  to  sitting  in  the  Lok  Sabha  (as  opposed  to 
the  state  assemblies)  or  other  factors  is  not  yet  clear.  It  is  even  less 
clear  that  such  support  will  be  forthcoming  in  the  future.  But 
whatever  the  cause  and  whatever  the  future  of  such  co-operation 
between  aristocratic  and  industrial  elements,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  Swatantra' s  modern  men  benefited  greatly  in  the  1967  elec- 
tions for  the  Lok  Sabha.20 

In  general,  the  results  of  the  1967  elections  represent  a  sub- 
stantial, although  not  irreversible  step  forward  for  the  Swatantra 
Party.  As  against  eighteen  Lok  Sabha  members  elected  on  the 
Party  symbol  in  1962  (or  twenty- two,  if  the  Ganatantra  Parishad 
be  added),  Swatantra  secured  forty-four  seats  in  1967  (and  it  must 
be  remembered  that  of  the  eighteen  seats  in  1962,  seven  were  lost 
in  Bihar  upon  Ramgarh's  defection).  There  was  a  marked  improve- 
ment in  its  more  established  strongholds— Gujarat,  Orissa  and 
Rajasthan — and  there  were  gains  also  in  Mysore,  Madras,  and 
Andhra.21  In  Gujarat,  Orissa,  and  Madras,  Swatantra  gained  more 
Lok  Sabha  seats  than  the  Congress,  while  in  Rajasthan,  Mysore 
and  Andhra  it  occupied  second  place  (although  in  Andhra  it  was 
a  very,  very  poor  second).  Only  in  Bihar  and  UP  did  it  lose 
strength  in  the  Lok  Sabha.22 

In  the  state  legislatures,  Swatantra  also  improved  its  position 
(although  here,  by  contrast  with  the  Lok  Sabha,  it  lost  second 
place  to  the  Jan  Sangh  in  terms  of  total  seats).  It  was  the  largest 
single  party  in  Orissa,  and  it  appeared  destined  to  form  a  reason- 
ably stable  coalition  ministry  with  the  Jana  Congress.  It  moved 
into  a  very  strong  opposition  position  in  Gujarat,  and  it  improved 
its  position  in  Rajasthan  as  well;  and  in  the  latter,  there  was  a 
possibility  of  a  broad  coalition  ministry,  including  Swatantra,  Jan 
Sangh,  SSP,  and  independents.  Its  strength  increased  in  Madras, 

265 


Appendix  I 

Andhra,  and  Mysore,  while  Bihar  and  UP  recorded  losses  of  seats 
(although  Swatantra's  performance  in  the  latter  was  not  much 
inferior  to  its  1962  performance).23 

What  does  the  pattern  of  support  suggest  about  Swatantra's 
viability  and  future  prospects?  First,  in  some  important  cases, 
Swatantra's  Lok  Sabha  performance  was  relatively  better  than  its 
Vidhan  Sabha  performance.  This  would  seem  to  be  due  partly  to 
the  centre's  emphasis  on  Lok  Sabha  seats  and  to  the  extremely 
well-financed  campaigns  mounted  in  key  Lok  Sabha  constituen- 
cies. In  addition,  this  pattern  of  support  suggests  that  Swatantra's 
local  roots  and  organization  in  many  areas  still  leave  much  to  be 
desired.  Secondly,  taking  1962  and  1967  results  together,  Swa- 
tantra  has  established  itself  quite  firmly  in  Gujarat,  on  a  reasonably 
broad  and  stable  social  basis.  Its  strength  in  Rajasthan  and  Orissa — 
which,  in  1967,  fell  below  expectations — still  owes  too  much  to 
the  influence  of  a  few  key  aristocrats  and  remains  vulnerable  to 
defections.24  Of  the  remaining  states,  Mysore  is  the  most  promising 
from  the  Swatantra  standpoint,  as  neither  prestigious  local  notables, 
nor  lavishly  financed  campaigns,  nor  firm  electoral  alliances  played 
a  significant  part  in  Swatantra  successes.25  By  contrast,  the  sub- 
stantial gains  in  Madras  are  due  much  more  to  the  carefully 
engineered,  DMK-led  united  front  (in  the  building  of  which 
Rajaji  played  a  major  part,  however)  than  to  any  great  strength  of 
Swatantra  per  se.2G 

The  1967  elections  thus  broaden  Swatantra's  areas  of  significant 
representation  to  include  the  southern  states.  A  combination  of 
south  Indian  MPs  and  the  large  number  of  industrialist  MPs  from 
the  north  substantially  modify  the  social  composition  of  the  Lok 
Sabha  group,  which  had  been  heavily  Rajput  after  the  1962  elec- 
tions. (The  debts  owed  by  some  industrialists  to  Rajput  aristo- 
crats must  not  be  forgotten,  however.)  The  Swatantra  Party  in  the 
Lok  Sabha  will  be  a  formidable  group,  and  the  dominance  of  that 
group  by  industrial  and  professional  elements  will  lead  to  a  more 
well-defined  modern  image  and  to  a  great  emphasis  on  economic 
matters,  where  Swatantra's  principal  spokesmen  may  be  counted 
upon  for  a  superlative  performance.  This  means,  however,  that  the 
Lok  Sabha  group  (deprived,  at  least  for  the  moment,  of  Ranga's 
presence)27  lacks  a  strong,  middle- class,  rural  component;  and  the 
party  will  have  to  struggle  even  harder  than  before  to  persuade 
people  that  it  is  primarily  a  rural  peoples'  party.  (The  peasant  com- 

266 


Appendix  I 

ponent  is  more  in  evidence  at  the  state  level,  particularly  in  Gujarat, 
and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  in  the  south.) 

On  balance,  the  1967  elections  indicate  somewhat  greater  vi- 
ability for  Swatantra  and  an  improvement  in  the  position  of  the 
more  modern  component  of  the  party,  particularly  in  the  Lok 
Sabha.  The  failure  of  certain  aristocrats  to  retain  their  own  seats, 
and  the  poorer-than-expected  performance  in  Rajasthan,  Orissa, 
and  UP,  may  also  persuade  party  leaders  that  this  source  of  support 
has  reached  its  maximum  and  that  future  improvements  will  re- 
quire conscious  effort  to  overcome  the  organizational  and  social 
limitations  of  the  aristocracy.28 

It  would  still  be  premature  to  predict  a  healthy  future  for 
Swatantra,  but  its  future  looks  brighter  than  it  did  in  1962.  Much 
still  depends  on  relations  with  the  Congress  right  and  with  other 
opposition  parties,  particularly  the  Jan  Sangh,  which  made  striking 
gains  in  the  north  and  which  has  intensified  its  efforts  (largely 
unrewarded  in  1967)  in  non-Hindi  speaking  areas.29  The  role  of 
the  rump  Congresses  will  also  be  important  here.  It  is  also  pre- 
mature to  announce  the  ascendancy  of  the  modernists  in  the 
Swatantra  Party,  although  here,  too,  the  prospects  seem  to  have 
improved  somewhat. 

Given  a  relatively  stable  political  environment,  Swatantra  may 
be  expected  to  perform  responsibly  and  well  at  the  national  level 
and  in  most  states.  But  it  will  face  some  stern  tests,  with  respect  to 
its  secular,  constitutional-democratic  commitments.  The  Rajasthan 
unit  behaved  very  poorly  during  the  post-election,  ministry- 
forming  crisis  in  that  state;  and  the  argument  that  Swatantra 
irresponsibility  was  forced  upon  the  party  to  avoid  being  out- 
flanked by  the  Jan  Sangh  is  scarcely  an  encouraging  sign.30  Rather 
it  raises  the  question :  what  else  will  Swatantra  be  willing  to  do  to 
avoid  being  surpassed  by  the  Sangh? 

There  are  other  major  questions  as  well.  How  will  Swatantra  re- 
spond to  the  leftist(-dominated)  ministries  which  have  been,  or  are 
likely  to  be  formed  in  some  states?  How  will  Swatantra  respond  to 
delicate  law-and-order  situations,  particularly  where  demonstra- 
tions, etc.,  may  be  organized  by  leftist  elements?  Will  its  Lok 
Sabha  spokesmen  (and  its  assembly  spokesmen,  too)  support  those 
measures  which  not  only  protect  the  rich,  the  wise,  and  the  well- 
born, but  which  strengthen,  educate,  and  lift  up  those  who  are  not? 
More  broadly,  will  Swatantra  be  able  to  curb  the  elitist,  anti- 

267 


Appendix  I 

democratic  elements  in  its  ranks,  in  the  event  of  signs  of  political 
instability? 

The  next  few  years  are  likely  to  be  decisive  in  terms  of  the 
course  which  India  will  take.  As  before,  a  technologically  pro- 
gressive, secular,  and  constitutionalist  party  has  much  to  recom- 
mend it;  and  Swatantra  has  made  some  significant  strides  along 
these  lines.  It  will  face  the  stern  tests  of  the  next  years  as  a  stronger, 
more  broadly  based  party  than  it  was  after  the  1962  elections.  We 
have  raised  some  of  the  major  questions,  for  which  time  alone  can 
provide  the  answers;  but,  judging  from  the  general  conditions  pre- 
vailing in  India,  some  answers,  at  least,  should  not  be  too  long  in 
coming. 


1 


268 


APPENDIX  II 

Note.  Tables  i-iv  are  reproduced  from  Morris-Jones'  Government  and 
Politics  of  India,  pp.  163-6.  Tables  v  and  VI  are  based  on  the  official 
election  returns  of  1962  and  give  a  more  detailed,  state-by-state  picture 
of  Swatantra's  performance.  The  following  abbreviations  are  used  in 
Morris-Jones'  tables: 


Tables  1  and  11 

CPI 

PSP 

SP 

KMP 

SP 

JS 

HM 

RPI 

RRP 

Tables  111  and  iv 

DMK 

GP 

ML 

PWP 

PDF 


Communist  Party  of  India 

Praja  Socialist  Party. 

Socialist  Party  (Narayan) 

Kisan  Mazdoor  Praja  Party  (Kripalani). 

Socialist  Party  (Lohia) 

Jan  Sangh 

Hindu  Mahasabha 

Republican  Party  of  India 

Ram  Rajya  Parishad 


Dravida  Munnetra  Kazagham 
Ganatantra  Parishad 
Muslim  League 
Peasants'  and  Workers'  Party 
Peoples'  Democratic  Front 


Tables  v-vm  use  the  same  abbreviations  as  those  for  Tables  1  and  11 
with  the  addition  of: 

CON      Congress 
SWA      Swatantra  Party 


269 


Appendix  II 


Table  I.  All  India  parties — Lok  Sahlia 


Candi- 

■ Seats 

/o 

Votes 

% 

Votes  per 

Parties 

dates 

gained 

seats 

polled 

votes 

candidate 

1952 

Congress 

472 

364 

74'4 

47,665,875 

45-0 

100,987 

Swatantra 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

CPI 

49 

16 

3-3 

3,484,401 

3-3 

71,110 

PSP\KMP 

SP 

JS 

256 

12 

2'5 

11,216,779 

io-6 

43,816 

145 

9 

1-8 

6,156,558 

5-8 

42,459 

93 

3 

o-6 

3,246,288 

3-1 

34,906 

HM 

3i 

4 

o-8 

1,003,034 

0-95 

32,356 

RPI 

27 

2 

0-4 

2,501,964 

2-36 

92,665 

RRP 

55 

3 

o-6 

2,151,603 

2-03 

39,120 

Other  parties 

215 

35 

7-2 

11,739,244 

ii-i 

54,601 

Independents 

521 

41 

8-4 

16,778,749 

15-8 

32,205 

Total 

489 

1957 

105,944,495 

Congress 

490 

371 

75-1 

57,579,593 

4778 

117,509 

Swatantra 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

CPI 

108 

27 

5*4 

10,754,075 

8-92 

99,575 

psp!sp 

SP 
JS 

189 

19 

3-8 

12,542,666 

10-41 

66,363 

130 

4 

o-8 

7,149,824 

5'93 

54,999 

HM 

19 

1 

0-2 

1,032,322 

0-86 

54,333 

RPI 

19 

4 

o-8 

1,812,919 

1*5 

95,417 

RRP 

15 

— 

460,838 

0-38 

30,723 

Other  parties 

73 

29 

5'9 

5,805,873 

4-81 

79,519 

Independents 

475 

39 

7-9 

23,377,805 

19-39 

49,216 

Total 

494 

1962 

120,513,915 

Congress 

488 

361 

73-1 

51,512,243 

46-02 

105,558 

Swatantra 

172 

18 

3-6 

7,784,495 

6-8o 

45,259 

CPI 

137 

29 

5'9 

11,399,268 

9.96 

83,206 

pspIsp 

1  M  \KMP 

166 

12 

2-4 

7,829,997 

6-84 

47,169 

SP 

107 

6 

1-2 

2,812,795 

2-49 

26,288 

JS 

198 

14 

2-8 

7,363,772 

6-44 

37,i9i 

HM 

32 

1 

0-2 

502,115 

0-44 

15,691 

RPI 

69 

3 

o-6 

3,185,168 

2-78 

46,162 

RRP 

35 

2 

0-4 

629,823 

0-55 

17,995 

Other  parties 

82 

21 

43 

7,251,066 

6-33 

88,428 

Independents 

497 

27 

5-5 

14,154,805 

12-27 

28,481 

Total 

— 

494 

— 

114,425,547 

— 

— 

270 


Appendix  II 
Table  II.  All-India  parties — State  assemblies 


Candi- 

Seats 

/o 

Votes 

/o 

Votes  per 

Parties 

dates 

gained 

seats 

polled 

votes 

candidate 

1952 

Congress 

3,*53 

2,246 

68-4 

43,802,546 

42-2 

13,892 

Swatantra 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

CPI 

465 

106 

3'2 

4,552,537 

4'38 

9,790 

psp!sp 
1 M  \kmp 

SP 
JS 

1.799 

125 

3-8 

10,071,211 

9'7 

5,598 

1,005 

77 

2-3 

5,306,219 

5-n 

5,280 

717 

35 

i-i 

2,866,566 

2-76 

3,998 

HM 

194 

14 

0-4 

848,415 

0-82 

4,373 

RPI 

171 

3 

o-i 

1,751,294 

1-68 

10,241 

RRP 

314 

31 

09 

1,260,049 

I-2I 

4,oi3 

Other  parties 

— 

— 

— 

10,776,136 

10-4 

— 

Independents 

7,492 

635 

19-3 

22,566,226 

21-74 

4,405 

Total 

3,283 

1957 

103,801,199 

Congress 

3,027 

2,012 

64-9 

54,794,454 

44*97 

18,102 

Swatantra 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

CPI 

812 

176 

5'7 

11,407,192 

9-36 

14,048 

PSP\KMP 

1,154 

208 

6-7 

11,881,094 

9-75 

10,296 

SP 
JS 

584 

46 

i-5 

4,380,638 

3-60 

7,501 

HM 

87 

6 

0-2 

614,754 

o-5 

7,066 

RPI 

99 

21 

0-7 

1,603,578 

i-3i 

16,198 

RRP 

146 

22 

0-7 

842,956 

0-69 

5,774 

Other  parties 
Independents 

4,863 

611 

19-7 

36,317,487 

29-81 

7,468 

Total 

3,102 

1962 

121,842,153 

Congress 

3,062 

1,984 

60-2 

51,801,965 

43-53 

16,918 

Swatantra 

1,012 

170 

5-2 

7,721,870 

6-49 

7,630 

CPI 

975 

197 

6-0 

12,403,703 

10-42 

12,722 

psp/sp 
1 5i  Ikmp 

1,149 

179 

5'4 

9,153,193 

7-69 

7,966 

SP 

632 

64 

i-9 

2,828,409 

2-38 

4,475 

JS 

i,i35 

116 

3*5 

6,436,784 

5-40 

5,671 

HM 

75 

8 

0-2 

287,777 

o-34 

3,847 

RPI 

99 

n 

0-3 

673,680 

0-56 

6,805 

RRP 

99 

13 

0-4 

348,536 

0-29 

3,521 

Other  parties 
Independents 

5,313 

242 
313 

7'3 
9'5 

27,357,469 

23-0 

5,149 

Total 

— 

3,297 

— 

119,013,386 

— 

— 

271 


Appendix  II 


Table  III.  One-state  parties — Lok  Sabha 


Candi- 

Seats 

/o 

Votes 

/o 

Votes  per 

Parties 

dates 

gained       seats 

polled 

votes 

candidate 

1952 

DMK  (Madras) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

Akali  Dal  (Punjab) 

8 

2 

0-4 

569,973 

0'53 

71,247 

GP  (Orissa) 

12 

4 

o-8 

959/749 

0-91 

79,979 

ML  (Kerala) 

I 

i 

0-2 

79,470 

0-08 

— 

Jharkhand  (Bihar) 

6 

2 

0-4 

601,865 

o-57 

100,311 

Forward  Bloc 

8 

— 

— 

425,971 

0-40 

53,246 

(W.  Bengal) 

PWP  (Maharashtra) 

12 

— 

— 

899,489 

o-8 

74,957 

Janta  (Bihar) 

6 

I 

0-2 

236,094 

0-22 

39,349 

PDF  (Andhra) 

12 

7 

i*4 
1957 

1,367,404 

1-29 

113,950 

DMK  (Madras) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

Akali  Dal  (Punjab) 

— 

— 

— 

— 



— 

GP  (Orissa) 

15 

7 

1-4 

1,291,141 

1-07 

86,076 

ML  (Kerala) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

Jharkhand  (Bihar) 

12 

5 

i-o 

751,830 

0-62 

62,653 

Forward  Bloc 

5 

2 

0-4 

665,341 

o-55 

133,068 

(W.  Bengal) 

PWP  (Maharashtra) 

6 

4 

o-8 

868,344 

072 

144,724 

Janta  (Bihar) 

ii 

3 

o-6 

501,269 

0-42 

45,570 

PDF  (Andhra) 

8 

2 

0-4 
1962 

1,044,032 

0-87 

130,504 

DMK  (Madras) 

18 

7 

1-4 

2,315,610 

2-02 

128,645 

Akali  Dal  (Punjab) 

7 

3 

o-6 

829,129 

0-72 

118,447 

GP  (Orissa) 

10 

4 

o-8 

342,970 

0-30 

34,297 

ML  (Kerala) 

4 

— 

0-4 

419,761 

o-37 

104,940 

Jharkhand  (Bihar) 

ii 

3 

o-6 

499,950 

o-44 

45,450 

Forward  Bloc 

6 

i 

0-2 

615,395 

o-54 

102,566 

(W.  Bengal) 

PWP  (Maharashtra) 

10 

— 

— 

703,582 

o-6i 

70,358 

Janta  (Bihar) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

PDF  (Andhra) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

272 


Table  IV.  One-state  parties — state  assembly 


Candi- 

Seats 

/o 

Votes 

0/ 
/o 

Votes  per 

Parties 

dates 

gained 

seats 

polled 

votes 

candidate 

1952 

DMK  (Madras) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

Akali  Dal  (Punjab) 

88 

33 

(186) 

177 

922,268 
(6,333,058) 

14-6 

10,480 

GP  (Orissa) 

38 

3i 

(140) 

22-1 

741,887 
(3,677,046) 

20-2 

19,523 

ML  (Kerala) 

13 

(375) 

i"3 

186,546 
(19,997,256) 

1*0 

14,350 

Jharkhand  (Bihar) 

53 

33 

(330) 

io-o 

765,272 
(9,548,840) 

8-0 

14,439 

Forward  Bloc 

77 

10 

4-2 

506,274 

6-8 

6,575 

(W.  Bengal) 

(238) 

(7,444,225) 

PWP  (Maharashtra) 

87 

14 

(315) 

4-4 

717,963 
(11,123,242) 

6-5 

8,252 

Janta  (Bihar) 

38 

11 
(33o) 

3.3 

301,691 
(9,548,840) 

3-2 

7,939 

PDF  (Andhra) 

78 

42 

(175) 

23-0 
1957 

1,096,112 

(5,178,593) 

21*2 

14,053 

DMK  (Madras) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

Akali  Dal  (Punjab) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

GP  (Orissa) 

109 

5i 
(140) 

36-4 

1,221,794 
(4,255,915) 

287 

11,209 

ML  (Kerala) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

Jharkhand  (Bihar) 

70 

3i 

(3i8) 

97 

726,983 
(10,585,421) 

6-9 

10,386 

Forward  Bloc 

26 

8 

3-2 

425,318 

4-1 

16,358 

(W.  Bengal) 

(252) 

(10,469,803) 

PWP  (Maharashtra) 

60 

33 

(396) 

8-3 

1,186,169 
(16,712,160) 

7-1 

19,770 

Janta  (Bihar) 

122 

22 
(3i8) 

6-9 

831,273 
(10,585,421) 

7.9 

6,814 

PDF  (Andhra) 

63 

23 

(105) 

21-9 
1962 

914,335 
(3,603,585) 

25-4 

14,513 

DMK  (Madras) 

142 

50 
(206) 

24-3 

3,406,804 
(12,620,995) 

27-0 

23,992 

Akali  Dal  (Punjab) 

46 

19 

(154) 

12-3 

798,925 
(6,701,171) 

n-9 

17,368 

GP  (Orissa) 

121 

37 
(140) 

26-4 

655,099 
(2,932,285) 

22'3 

5,414 

ML  (Kerala) 

12 

11 
(126) 

8-7 

401,925 

(8,104,077) 

5-o 

33,494 

Jharkhand  (Bihar) 

84 

20 
(3i8) 

6-3 

458,244 
(9,848,995) 

4.7 

5,455 

Forward  Bloc 

34 

13 

5*2 

441,098 

4-6 

12,974 

(W.  Bengal) 

(252) 

(9,57i,09i) 

PWP  (Maharashtra) 

79 

15 

(264) 

5-7 

818,801 
(10,965,394) 

7-5 

10,366 

Janta  (Bihar) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

PDF  (Andhra) 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

273 


Appendix  II 


Table  V.  1962  elections,  seats  according  to  parties,  Lok  Sabha 

N.B.  The  three  figures  in  each  entry  are  in  order,  the  number  of  candidates  sponsored  by  the 
party  who  (i)  contested,  (ii)  were  elected,  and  (iii)  forfeited  their  security  deposits. 


States  and 

No.  of 

territories 

seats 

CON 

CPI 

SWA 

PSP 

JS 

RPI 

Andhra  Pradesh 

43 

43-34-o 

20-7-0 

28-1-11 

I-O-I 

8-0-8 

3-o-3 

Assam 

12 

12-9-0 

4-0-1 

Nil 

8-2-2 

Nil 

Nil 

Bihar 

53 

53-39-o 

16-1-6 

43-7-17 

32-2-15 

13-0-11 

Nil 

Gujarat 

22 

22-16-0 

Nil 

1 4-4- 1 

6-1-3 

5-o-5 

1-0-0 

Kerala 

18 

14-6-0 

14-6-0 

I-O-I 

4-0-0 

4-0-4 

Nil 

Madhya  Pradesh 

36 

35-24-1 

3-0-3 

5-0-5 

19-3-6 

28-3-13 

7-o-7 

Madras 

40 

40-30-0 

14-2-1 

16-0-2 

5-o-4 

I-O-I 

2-0-0 

Maharashtra 

44 

44-41-0 

6-0-0 

3-0-3 

I3-I-5 

17-0-13 

20-0-4 

Mysore 

26 

26-25-0 

3-0-2 

7-0-1 

12-0-2 

7-0-6 

4-0-1 

Orissa 

19 

19-13-0 

2-0-0 

1 -0-0 

5-1-0 

Nil 

Nil 

Punjab 

22 

22-14-0 

4-0-0 

6-0-4 

Nil 

17-3-10 

7-o-4 

Rajasthan 

22 

21-14-1 

5-0-3 

10-3-1 

Nil 

11-1-4 

Nil 

Uttar  Pradesh 

85 

85-61-1 

18-2-8 

33-2-26 

48-2-23 

74-7-33 

22-3-1: 

West  Bengal 

36 

36-22-0 

24-9-0 

4-0-3 

12-0-5 

4-0-4 

Nil 

Delhi 

5 

5-5-o 

I-O-I 

Nil 

I-O-I 

5-0-0 

I-O-I 

Himachal  Pradesh 

4 

4-4-0 

Nil 

2-0-0 

Nil 

2-0-2 

1 -0-0 

Manipur 

2 

2-1-0 

I-O-I 

Nil 

I-O-I 

Nil 

Nil 

Tripura 

2 

2-0-0 

2-2-0 

Nil 

I-O-I 

Nil 

Nil 

Total 

491 

485-358-3 

137-29-26 

i73-i8-75 

168-12-69 

196-14-114  68-3-35 

Other 

Un- 

States and 

No.  of 

recognized 

recognized 

Inde- 

territories 

seats 

SP 

HM 

RRP 

parties 

parties 

pendents 

Andhra  Pradesh 

43 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

44-1-28 

Assam 

12 

2-0-1 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

2-1-1 

13-0-7 

Bihar 

53 

24-1-19 

3-o-3 

3-o-3 

n-3-3a 

Nil 

35-o-3i 

Gujarat 

22 

I-O-I 

2-0-2 

Nil 

Nil 

3-i-ib 

14-0-8 

Kerala 

18 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

3-2-oc 

1-1-0 

9-3-6 

Madhya  Pradesh 

36 

14-1-10 

7-o-4 

14-1-9 

Nil 

i-o-od 

26-4-15 

Madras 

40 

2-0-2 

Nil 

Nil 

1 8-7- 1 e 

7-1-3 

46-0-42 

Maharashtra 

44 

Nil 

3-0-2 

2-0-2 

io-o-if 

Nil 

50-2-39 

Mysore 

26 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

3-i-ig 

26-0-20 

Orissa 

19 

3-1-2 

Nil 

Nil 

io-4-oh 

Nil 

8-0-8 

Punjab 

22 

1-1-0 

Nil 

3-0-3 

7-3-I1 

1-1-0 

39-0-36 

Rajasthan 

22 

6-0-4 

2-0-2 

7-1-5 

Nil 

Nil 

49-3-40 

Uttar  Pradesh 

85 

5i-i-35 

13-1-11 

12-0-12 

Nil 

Nil 

86-5-70 

West  Bengal 

36 

I-O-I 

7-0-6 

Nil 

6-1-1 

4-2-od 

14-2-10 

Delhi 

5 

Nil 

I-O-I 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

14-0-13 

Himachal  Pradesh 

4 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

2-0-1 

Manipur 

2 

2-1-0 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

5-o-5 

Tripura 

2 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

Nil 

2-0-2 

Nil 

Total 

4QI 

107-6-75 

38-1-31 

41-2-34 

65-20-7 

24-8-8 

480-20-379 

a  Jharkhand.        b  Nutan  Mahagujarat  Janata  Parishad.  °  Muslim  League.       d   Forward 

Bloc.        e  DMK.        f  PWP.        s  L0k  Sevak  Sangh.       b  Ganatantra  Parishad.  Akali  Dal. 


274 


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NOTES 


ABBREVIATIONS 

At  various  points  in  the  notes,  abbreviations  have  been  used  to  refer  to 
certain  sources.  In  every  case,  the  first  reference  is  given  in  full  and  the 
abbreviation  to  be  used  subsequently  has  been  noted.  However,  for  the 
reader's  convenience,  the  following  list  of  frequently  used  abbreviations 
is  provided. 

AS  Asian  Survey  (monthly) 

HT  Hindustan  Times  (daily) 

HWR  Hindu  Weekly  Review  (overseas  edition) 

J  AS  Journal  of  Asian  Studies  (quarterly) 

OHT  Overseas  Hindustan  Times  (weekly) 

FA  Pacific  Affairs  (quarterly) 

SN  Swatantra  Newsletter  (more  or  less  monthly) 

TI  Times  of  India  (daily) 


chapter  i,  pp.  1-9 

1  Gabriel  Almond  and  James  Coleman  (eds.),  The  Politics  of  the  Develop- 
ing Areas  (Princeton,  Princeton  University  Press,  i960),  Introduction. 

2  For  example,  K.  M.  Munshi,  a  Swatantra  leader,  suggested  that  the 
author  entitle  this  work  'The  Swatantra  Party:  India's  Search  for  a 
Constitutional  Opposition'.  Some  reasons  for  the  present  emphasis  (which 
does  not  preclude  attention  to  other  issues)  are  found  in  Howard  L. 
Erdman,  'Conservative  Politics  in  India',  Asian  Survey  (AS),  vi,  6 
(June  1966),  338-47. 

3  Samuel  P.Huntington,  'Conservatism  as  an  Ideology',  American 
Political  Science  Review  (APSR),  LI,  2  (June  1957),  459. 

4  See  Karl  Mannheim,  '  Conservative  Thought ',  in  his  Essays  on  Soci- 
ology and  Social  Psychology,  ed.  Paul  Kecskemeti  (New  York,  Oxford 
University  Press,  1953).  See  idem,  Ideology  and  Utopia,  trans,  by  Louis 
Wirth  and  Edward  Shils  (New  York,  Harvest  Books,  n.d.). 

5  Roberto  Michels,  '  Conservatism ',  Encyclopedia  of  the  Social  Sciences 
(ESS)  (New  York,  Macmillan,  1937),  iv,  230. 

6  Carl.  J.  Friedrich,  Constitutional  Government  and  Democracy  (revised 
ed.  Boston,  Ginn,  1950),  pp.  425-6. 

7  Michael  Oakeshott,  '  On  Being  Conservative ',  in  his  Rationalism  and 
Politics  (New  York,  Basic  Books,  1962),  pp.  183  and  168. 

8  ESS,  iv,  230. 

9  See  Ideology  and  Utopia. 

10  ESS,  iv,  230. 

11  Rationalism  and  Politics,  p.  168. 

12  Peter  Viereck  (ed.),  Conservatism  (Princeton,  Van  Norstrand,  1956), 
P-  15. 

278 


Notes,  pp.  1-9 

13  Ibid.  p.  17. 

14  Constitutional  Government,  p.  425. 

15  Kalman  Silvert,  'Some  Psychocultural  Factors  in  the  Politics  of 
Conflict  and  Conciliation',  mimeo,  read  before  the  American  Political 
Science  Association,  8-1 1  Sept.  1965,  p.  14. 

16  Barrington  Moore,  Jr.,  Social  Origins  of  Dictatorship  and  Democracy 
(Boston,  Beacon  Press,  1966),  and,  for  example,  Maurice  Dobb,  Studies 
in  the  Development  of  Capitalism  (New  York,  International  Publishers, 
1963). 

17  APSR,  li,  466. 

18  Constitutional  Government,  p.  426. 

19  Conservatism,  p.  15. 

20  APSR,  li,  466. 

21  Conservatism,  p.  12. 

22  ESS,  iv,  230. 

23  See  Eugen  Weber's  introduction  to  Hans  Rogger  and  Eugen  Weber 
(eds.),  The  European  Right  (Berkeley,  University  of  California  Press, 
1965). 

24  See  Max  Weber,  The  Religion  of  India,  trans,  and  ed.  Hans  Gerth 
and  Don  Martindale  (Glencoe,  Free  Press,  1958),  and  idem,  The  City, 
trans.  Don  Martindale  and  Gertrud  Neuwirth  (New  York,  Collier,  1962), 
as  well  as  Edward  Shils,  The  Intellectual  Between  Tradition  and  Modernity: 
The  Indian  Case  (The  Hague,  Mouton,  1961),  for  major  examples. 
Reinhard  Bendix,  Max  Weber:  An  Intellectual  Portrait  (Garden  City, 
N.Y.,  Doubleday,  i960),  is  also  useful  here. 

25  The  term  '  sanskritization '  refers  to  the  process  whereby  a  lower 
caste  or  segment  thereof  emulates  the  behaviour  pattern  of  a  superior 
caste,  in  order  to  improve  its  status,  usually  following  an  improvement  in 
its  economic  position.  The  process  is  group-based,  not  individualistic;  it 
often  takes  generations  to  come  to  fruition;  it  is  accompanied  by  the 
strictest  application  of  closure  towards  formerly  equal  and  subordinate 
castes ;  and  it  rarely,  if  ever,  has  been  successful  as  a  means  of  mobility 
for  untouchables.  For  these  reasons,  the  process  is  obviously  a  conserva- 
tive one.  For  a  major  statement  on  this  subject,  see  M.  N.  Srinivas,  'A 
Note  on  Sanskritization  and  Westernization',  in  his  Caste  in  Modern  India 
and  Other  Essays  (New  York,  Asia  Publishing  House,  1962),  pp.  42-62. 

26  See  Moore,  Social  Origins. 

27  The  fact  that  many  radical  Indians  look  with  favour  upon  the  pro- 
foundly conservative  rebellion  of  1857  suggests  the  problem  here.  See, 
for  example,  P.  C.  Joshi,  'A  Social  Revolution',  in  Ainslie  Embree  (ed.), 
1857  in  India  (Boston,  D.C.,  Heath,  1963),  pp.  59~6i. 


CHAPTER  2,   pp.  IO-45 

i     Lloyd  I.  Rudolph  and  Susanne  Hoeber  Rudolph,  'The  Political  Role 
of  India's  Caste  Associations',  Pacific  Affairs  (PA),  xxxm,  1  (March 
i960),  5. 
2    Hugh  Tinker,  India  and  Pakistan  (New  York,  Praeger,  1962),  p.  121. 

279 


Notes,  pp.  10-45 

3  See  Erdman,  AS,  VI,  338-47. 

4  From  an  unsigned  article  in  Economic  Weekly,  Special  Number, 
July  1959,  P-  893. 

5  The  Maharaja  of  Rewa,  Indian  Round  Table  Conference,  First  Session, 
12  Nov.  1930  to  19  Jan.  1931,  Proceedings  (London,  HMSO,  1931),  p.  57. 
Hereinafter,  RTC,  I. 

6  Nehru,  for  example,  termed  the  princely  states  '  sinks  of  reaction  and 
incompetence'  and  argued  that  the  native  rulers  *  stoutly  declare  their 
intention  of  maintaining  medieval  conditions . . .  such  as  exist  nowhere 
else  in  the  world. .  .The  Indian  States  represent  today  probably  the 
extremest  type  of  autocracy  existing  in  the  world.'  See,  respectively, 
Reginald  Coupland,  Indian  Politics,  19 36-1 942  (London,  Oxford  University 
Press,  1944)3  p.  1 74a  and  Nehru,  Towards  Freedom  (Boston,  Beacon 
Press,  1958),  p.  320.  See,  in  general,  Michael  Brecher,  Nehru:  A  Political 
Biography  (New  York,  Oxford  University  Press,  1959)3  ch.  9,  'Hero  of  the 
Left',  and  Nehru,  India's  Freedom  (London,  Allen  and  Unwin,  1962), 
passim. 

7  Quoted  in  Coupland,  Indian  Politics,  p.  93. 

8  The  preceding  summary  is  based  on  numerous  books  which  cannot 
be  cited  individually  here.  Brecher,  Nehru,  at  least  touches  on  most  of 
these  points  and  dwells  at  length  on  some  of  them.  Citations  at  certain 
junctures  below  will  indicate  some  of  the  specific  sources  used. 

9  The  preceding  summary  is  again  based  on  sources  too  numerous  to 
cite  fully  here.  For  the  princes,  see  V.  P.  Menon,  The  Story  of  the  In- 
tegration of  the  Indian  States  (Bombay,  Orient  Longmans,  1961).  For  the 
landed  aristocrats  and  land  reform,  see  Govindlal  D.  Patel,  The  Indian 
Land  Problem  and  Legislation  (Bombay,  N.  M.  Tripathi,  1954),  and 
H.  D.  Malaviya,  Land  Reforms  in  India  (New  Delhi,  All-India  Congress 
Committee,  1954).  For  village  affairs,  see  the  village  studies  cited  in  the 
general  bibliography,  especially  the  titles  by  Bailey,  Dube,  Epstein, 
Isaacs,  Retzlaff,  and  Srinivas.  For  the  business  communities,  see  Helen 
Lamb,  'The  Indian  Business  Communities  and  the  Evolution  of  an 
Industrial  Class',  PA,  xxvm,  2  (June  1955)  and  her  'Business  Organiza- 
tion and  Leadership  in  India  Today',  in  Richard  L.  Park  and  Irene 
Tinker  (eds.),  Leadership  and  Political  Institutions  in  India  (Princeton, 
Princeton  University  Press,  1959);  Gokhale  Institute  of  Politics  and 
Economics,  Notes  on  the  Rise  of  the  Business  Communities  in  India  (New 
York,  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  195 1);  and  Myron  Weiner,  Politics 
of  Scarcity  (Bombay,  Asia  Publishing  House,  1962).  Of  a  more  general 
nature  are  Brecher,  Nehru;  Vera  M.  Dean,  New  Patterns  of  Democracy  in 
India  (Cambridge,  Harvard  University  Press,  1959);  H.  Venkatasubbiah, 
The  Indian  Economy  Since  Independence  (New  York,  Asia  Publishing 
House,  1 961);  and  Taya  Zinkin,  India  Changes!  (New  York,  Oxford  Uni- 
versity Press,  1959). 

10  Quoted  in  Khushwant  Singh,  The  Fall  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Punjab 
(Bombay,  Orient  Longmans,  1961),  p.  1. 

11  A  decent  summary  of  these  points  is  found  in  Menon,  The  Story. 
For  1857,  see  Embree  (ed.),  1857  i>n  India,  and  the  bibliography  therein. 

280 


Notes,  pp.  10-45 

The  constitutional  problems  of  the  1920s  and  1930s,  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  princes,  may  be  examined  through:  K.  M.  Panikkar,  Indian  States 
and  the  Government  of  India  (London.,  Martin  Hopkinson,  1932),  and  his 
Indian  Princes  in  Council  (London,  Oxford  University  Press,  1936); 
Ranbir  Singh,  The  Indian  States  Under  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1935 
(Bombay,  Taraporevala,  n.d.);  Coupland,  Indian  Politics ;  and  RTC,  I, 
and  Indian  Round  Table  Conference,  Second  Session,  Proceedings  (London, 
HMSO,  1932).  The  last  title  will  be,  hereinafter,  RTC,  II. 

12  See  Patel,  Indian  Land  Problem',  Malaviya,  Land  Reforms',  Venkata- 
subbiah,  Indian  Economy;  Brecher,  Nehru;  Dean,  New  Patterns;  A.  R. 
Desai,  Social  Background  of  Indian  Nationalism  (3rd  edn.  Bombay, 
Popular  Book  Depot,  1959);  and  R.  Palme  Dutt,  India  Today  (London, 
Gollanz,  1940).  Restricted  in  scope  but  useful  here  is  Paul  R.  Brass, 
'Regionalism,  Nationalism,  and  Political  Conflict  in  Utter  Pradesh', 
mimeo,  read  before  the  Association  of  Asian  Studies,  2-4  April  1965. 

13  This  paragraph  is  based  on  a  mimeo  MS  on  politics  in  Rajasthan  by 
Susanne  H.  Rudolph.  Specific  citations  to  Rudolph,  MS,  refer  to  this 
mimeo  text.  Lloyd  I.  and  Susanne  H.  Rudolph,  The  Political  in  Social 
Change:  Princes  and  Politicians  in  Rajasthan  (forthcoming)  contains  all  of 
the  mimeo  material  cited  in  this  book,  although  the  pagination  naturally 
differs. 

14  See  Erdman,  AS,  vi,  338-47. 

15  For  Rajput-Jat  conflicts,  see,  for  example,  Rudolph,  MS.  For 
Kamma-Reddy  conflicts,  see  Selig  Harrison,  India:  The  Most  Dangerous 
Decades  (Princeton,  Princeton  University  Press,  i960),  and  Srinivas, 
Caste  in  Modern  India.  For  fotorya-Patidar  conflicts,  see  Myron  Wein- 
er,  chapter  on  Kaira,  in  Party  Building  in  a  New  Nation:  The  Indian  National 
Congress  (forthcoming),  and  Rajni  Kothari  and  Rushikesh  Maru,  '  Caste 
and  Secularism  in  India',  Journal  of  Asian  Studies  {J AS),  xxv,  1  (Nov. 
1965),  33-50.  The  Weiner  chapter  will  henceforth  be  referred  to  as 
Weiner,  MS. 

16  See  the  articles  by  Lamb,  cited  in  n.  9,  above;  Gokhale  Institute 
Notes;  and  Weiner,  Politics  of  Scarcity.  See  also  Weber,  The  City; 
Reinhard  Bendix,  Max  Weber;  and  the  titles  on  economic  history,  the 
structure  of  Indian  industry,  and  on  specific  topics  such  as  the  Bombay 
Plan,  in  the  general  bibliography. 

17  Briefly,  this  doctrine  held  that  the  rich,  the  wise,  and  the  well-born 
should  use  their  advantages  for  the  good  of  society  as  a  whole,  on  a 
voluntary  basis.  Other  leaders  who  could  appeal  to  the  peasantry  were 
often  vehemently  anti-capitalistic,  as  were  the  more  socialistic  elements 
in  the  Congress  coalition.  The  discussion  of  N.  G.  Ranga  in  chapter  5, 
below,  will  illustrate  this  point. 

18  Sir  Tej  Bahadur  Sapru,  a  leading  member  of  the  Liberal  Party,  the 
lineal  descendants  of  the  early  Congress  'Moderates',  was  anxious  to 
bring  the  aristocracy  into  the  developing  political  system,  to  serve  as  a 
stabilizing  element,  but  this  was  a  minor  element  in  the  Congress  itself 
in  these  years.  See  Menon,  The  Story,  pp.  27-8,  and  RTC,  I  and  II,  for 
some  of  Sapru's  views. 

281 


Notes,  pp.  10-45 

19  For  Rajasthan,  see  Rudolph,  MS,  and  for  Madras,  see  Rudolph  and 
Rudolph,  'Political  Role',  PA,  xxxiii,  and  Lloyd  I.  Rudolph,  'Urban 
Life  and  Populist  Radicalism ',  JAS3  xx,  3  (May  1961),  283-97.  Some  of 
the  disaffected  elements  entered  the  Swatantra  Party  and  will  be  dis- 
cussed further  below. 

20  See  Coupland,  Indian  Politics,  pp.  175-6  and  144. 

21  Quotations  are  from  the  White  Paper  on  Indian  States  (New  Delhi, 
Ministry  of  States,  1950),  pp.  124,  63  and  30,  respectively.  Sir  Kenneth 
Fitze,  Twilight  of  the  Maharajas  (London,  John  Murray,  1956),  p.  165, 
terms  Patel  'a  most  able  and  forceful  politician'  to  whose  'ruthless  and 
resourceful  hands '  the  integration  of  the  states  was  entrusted.  For  his 
efforts  here,  Patel  has  been  called  by  some  'the  Bismarck  of  India'.  See 
also  Menon,  The  Story. 

22  These  matters  are  all  discussed  in  the  White  Paper,  and  some  are 
covered  in  Menon,  The  Story.  The  fact  that  distinctions  between  public 
and  personal  property  were  not  clear  allowed  many  rulers  to  retain  vast 
landholdings  and  other  forms  of  wealth.  The  fact  that  princely  revenues 
were  often  not  precisely  known  also  meant  that  in  calculating  the  privy 
purses  (fixed  at  some  percentage  of  previous  revenues)  there  was  some 
latitude  for  princely  self-protection.  Gandhi,  who  favoured  voluntary 
abandonment  of  powers  by  the  princes,  in  accordance  with  the  trustee- 
ship notion,  recommended  at  one  time  a  maximum  privy  purse  of 
Rs.  300,000,  which  is  far  below  many  which  have  actually  been  paid.  See 
Gandhi,  The  Indian  States  Problem  (Ahmedabad,  Navajivan  Press,  1941), 
p.  636  and  passim,  for  his  views,  which  were  decidedly  restrained.  The 
office  of  Rajpramukh  was  equivalent  to  that  of  a  governor  in  a  former 
province  of  British  India  and  was  established  in  those  areas  where  post- 
independence  federal  units  largely  coincided  with  one  or  a  group  of 
former  princely  states.  The  office  was  subsequently  abolished,  although  it 
had  been  assured  at  least  for  the  life  of  the  incumbents.  Some  ex-rulers 
have,  however,  continued  to  serve  as  governors. 

23  Quoted  in  White  Paper,  p.  124.  Menon,  The  Story,  pp.  455  ff.,  argues 
that  the  price  was  small  when  the  value  of  the  states'  public  cash  balances 
and  public  properties,  which  accrued  to  the  Union,  is  calculated.  Need- 
less to  say,  many  people  have  cavilled  at  the  amount  paid. 

24  The  fragmentary  quote  is  from  Zinkin,  India  Changes,  p.  209.  She 
observes  that  for  many  the  purse  was  'just  sufficient  to  keep  them  from 
bankruptcy'. 

25  E.g.  even  such  wealthy  rulers  as  the  Maharaja  of  Jaipur  have  con- 
verted palaces  into  luxury  hotels,  museums,  etc. 

26  Percival  Griffiths,  Modern  India  (London,  Ernest  Benn,  1905),  p.  105, 
argues  thus,  and  some  supporting  evidence  is  found  in  Menon,  The  Story. 

27  Census  of  India,  19 51, 11, '  Uttar  Pradesh ',  Part  ia,  Report  (Allahabad, 
Government  of  Uttar  Pradesh,  1953),  p.  246.  Patel,  Indian  Land  Problem, 
p.  246,  supports  this  contention.  Naturally  the  wealthier  landed  aristocrats 
were  in  the  best  position  to  do  this. 

28  Quoted  in  Malaviya,  Land  Reforms,  pp.  20-1.  Concerning  full  com- 
pensation, Nehru  said,  ibid.  p.  20,  that  this  was '  on  the  face  of  it  impossible, 

282 


Notes,  pp.  10-45 

as  we  cannot  find  the  enormous  amount  of  money  for  it'.  The  Congress 
election  manifesto  of  1946  stressed  these  points  and  declared  for  abolition 
with  partial  compensation. 

29  See  Patel,  Indian  Land  Problem ,  p.  373,  where  he  notes  that  in  Hyder- 
abad, jagirdars  could  retain  up  to  500  acres,  acquired  via  evictions,  if 
necessary.  See  also  ibid.  p.  395,  where  he  questions  whether  such  acts 
can  be  considered  'progressive'.  Zinkin,  India  Changes,  p.  212,  claims  that 
in  Hyderabad,  '  where  the  aristocracy  is  unusually  oppressive,  more  than 
half  the  tenants  have  been  evicted.' 

30  Patel,  Indian  Land  Problem,  p.  399.  See  also  ibid.  pp.  371  ff.,  406  ff., 
434  ff.,  and  Venkatasubbiah,  Indian  Economy,  pp.  67  ff. 

31  This  is  based  on  a  wide  range  of  village  studies,  for  which  see  the 
general  bibliography.  Socio-religious  reforms  elicited  much  opposition 
at  the  time  of  introduction,  many  were  watered-down,  and  most  remained 
a  dead  letter  at  the  local  level.  None  the  less,  efforts  along  these  lines,  par- 
ricularly  efforts  to  improve  the  position  of  the  most  depressed  groups,  may 
well  be  expected  to  produce  a  stronger  middle  caste  response,  when  and  if 
they  get  off  the  ground  to  the  extent  that  a  large  number  of  aggressive, 
self-conscious,  and  economically  more  secure  untouchables  come  to 
challenge  caste  Hindu  domination.  Thus  far,  this  has  not  been  the  case, 
save  in  limited  areas ;  but  the  caste  Hindu  response  gives  a  pre-vision  of 
things  to  come :  it  seems  virtually  certain  that  middle  caste  conservatism 
will  become  more  explicit  in  the  future. 

32  For  the  'red  herring',  see  Dean,  New  Patterns,  p.  128.  This  FBI 
report  was  published  in  1956.  In  general,  see  the  titles  by  Baldwin,  Crane, 
Deshmukh,  and  Spencer  in  the  general  bibliography.  Many  of  these 
points  are  best  examined  through  the  annual  reports  of  individual 
enterprises,  many  of  which  are  available  in  the  Times  of  India  ( TI).  It  is  also 
pertinent  to  note  that  businessmen  have  played  key  roles  in  government, 
as  ministers,  governors,  members  of  development  councils,  of  public 
financial  institutions,  and  of  public  corporations.  See  Lamb,  'Business 
Organization. . . ',  in  Park  and  Tinker  (eds.),  Leadership,  pp.  264-7. 

33  Rajni  Kothari,  'The  Congress  "System"  in  India',  AS,  iv,  12 
(Dec.  1964),  1 161-73. 

34  See  Menon,  The  Story,  ch.  21,  esp.  pp.  410-15.  The  Manchester 
Guardian,  quoted  ibid.  p.  413,  observed  that  the  government  'has  struck 
back  quickly.  It  is  likely  to  have  no  more  trouble  from  the  princes. 
Nobody  will  risk  his  comfortable  income'.  As  will  be  seen,  this  was  a  bit 
premature  a  judgment  on  princely  politics. 

35  For  examples,  see  TI,  24  June  1961,  and  the  Hindu  Weekly  Review 
(HWR),  29  May  and  28  Aug.  1961.  Link  from  April  through  June 
1 96 1  contains  numerous  references  to  the  carrot-and-stick  policy  vis-a-vis 
the  princes. 

36  See  Rudolph,  MS,  p.  192,  for  the  first  quote,  and  Zinkin,  India 
Changes,  p.  210,  for  the  second. 

37  In  one  case,  a  would-be  anti-Congress  jagirdar  was  most  reluctant 
to  enter  politics  actively  because  the  government  still  owed  him  Rs.  17-5 
lakhs  (Rs.  1,750,000)  in  compensation  as  well  as  irrigated  canal  lands  for 

283 


Notes,  pp.  10-45 

personal  cultivation.  This  was  publicly  noted  by  the  Maharani  of  Jaipur 
during  the  campaign  preceding  the  1962  elections;  and  the  jagirdar,  who 
joined  Swatantra  with  the  Maharani,  expressed  serious  doubts  that  he 
would  ever  receive  further  compensation.  From  interviews  and  corres- 
pondence. 

38  That  is,  the  many  religious  and  caste  divisions;  reluctance,  if  not 
outright  refusal  to  enter  competitive  politics,  because  it  would  be  de- 
grading, etc.,  many  aspects  of  which  will  be  discussed  below. 

39  The  Maharaja  of  Bikaner,  in  the  introduction  to  Panikkar,  Princes  in 
Council,  p.  v. 

40  Quoted  in  Dutt,  India  Today,  p.  212. 

41  From  RTC,  II,  pp.  152  and  211. 

42  From  Dutt,  India  Today,  p.  212,  and  RTC,  II,  p.  152,  respectively. 

43  Quoted  in  Dutt,  India  Today,  p.  212. 

44  See  Fitze,  Twilight,  p.  163,  where  he  notes  their  'shining  record  of 
loyal  and  faithful  services. .  .to  the  Crown'  and,  in  general,  pp.  162  ff. 
See  also  Sir  William  Barton,  The  Princes  of  India  (London,  Nisbet,  1934)5 
and  Sir  George  McMunn,  The  Indian  States  and  Princes  (London, 
Jarrolds,  1936),  for  strongly  pro-princely  views.  For  British  gratitude  for 
princely  help  in  1857,  see  Menon,  The  Story,  p.  9;  White  Paper,  p.  12; 
and  Barton,  Princes  of  India,  p.  132. 

45  Ranbir  Singh,  Indian  States,  p.  19,  and  RTC,  I,  p.  59,  respectively. 

46  R  TC,  I,  p.  34  and  Ranbir  Singh,  Indian  States,  pp.  19-20,  respectively. 

47  RTC,  II,  p.  152. 

48  Ranbir  Singh,  Indian  States,  p.  21. 

49  See  RTC,  II,  p.  211,  and  RTC,  I,  p.  78,  respectively. 

50  See,  for  example,  RTC,  II,  p.  152. 

51  For  these  fragments,  see,  respectively:  RTC,  I,  p.  125;  Barton, 
Princes  of  India,  p.  47;  McMunn,  Indian  States,  p.  232;  and  Panikkar, 
Indian  States,  p.  xvii.  The  last  three  are  by  the  respective  authors  and  are 
not  quotations  from  aristocrats. 

52  RTC,  II,  p.  140. 

53  Barton,  Princes  of  India,  p.  75. 

54  McMunn,  Indian  States,  p.  238. 

55  Barton,  Princes  of  India,  p.  293.  Note  here  the  class  factors,  discussed 
in  the  preceding  section  of  this  chapter. 

56  The  Raja  of  Ramgarh,  quoted  in  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades, 
p.  312.  The  Raja  will  be  discussed  below,  in  his  capacity  as  the  founder- 
leader  of  the  Janata  Party  and  as  a  one-time  Swatantra  luminary. 

57  Quoted  in  G.  Morris  Carstairs,  The  Twice-Born  (Bloomington, 
Ind.,  University  of  Indiana  Press,  1958),  pp.  58  and  176. 

58  Ibid.  p.  58. 

59  See,  respectively,  Panikkar,  Princes  in  Council,  p.  13,  and  Menon, 
The  Story,  p.  57,  the  latter  stating  that  'an  important  ruler'  made  the 
assertion.  For  comparable  statements,  see  Panikkar,  Princes  in  Council, 
pp.  13  and  119. 

60  From  an  interview  in  India  with  a  Swatantra  Party  aristocrat. 


284 


Notes,  pp.  10-45 

61  See,  for  example,  RTC, I,  pp.  124  ff. 

62  Quoted  in  Overseas  Hindustan  Times  (OHT),  8  Feb.  1962. 

63  See  77,  8  Aug.  1961,  p.  14. 

64  Carstairs,  Twice-Born,  pp.  24-5. 

65  Quoted  in  Philip  Woodruff,  The  Men  Who  Ruled  India,  I,  The  Foun- 
ders (London,  Jonathan  Cape,  1953),  p.  343. 

66  Of  course,  in  areas  where  the  aristocratic  classes  were  dominant  at 
the  village  level,  this  is  certainly  the  case. 

67  W.  Norman  Brown,  'Class  and  Cultural  Traditions  in  India',  in 
Milton  Singer  (ed.),  Traditional  India:  Structure  and  Change  (Phila- 
delphia, American  Folklore  Society,  1959),  p.  38. 

68  See  the  village  studies  in  Park  and  Tinker  (eds.),  Leadership,  and 
Srinivas,  Caste  in  Modern  India,  passim. 

69  S.  C.  Dube,  India's  Changing  Villages  (London,  Routledge  and 
Kegan  Paul,  1958),  pp.  216  and  138-9,  respectively. 

70  Ibid.  pp.  138-9 

71  Zinkin,  India  Changes,  pp.  138-40,  for  quotations  and  further 
details. 

72  From  the  party's  paper,  The  Justice,  quoted  in  J.  H.  Hutton,  Caste  in 
India  (Bombay,  Oxford  University  Press,  1961),  p.  203. 

73  Harijans  Today  (New  Delhi,  Publications  Division,  Ministry  of 
Information  and  Broadcasting  (PDMIB),  n.d.),  pp.  45-6. 

74  Many  of  these  points  are  developed  at  length  in  Howard  L.  Erdman, 
Ph.D.  dissertation,  'The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism', 
Cambridge,  Harvard  University,  1964,  ch.  3. 

75  See,  for  example,  Adam  B.  Ulam,  The  Unfinished  Revolution  (New 
York,  Random  House,  i960),  for  a  splendid  analysis  of  the  response  to 
the  early  stages  of  industrialization. 

76  See,  in  general,  Gandhi,  Economic  and  Industrial  Life  and  Relations, 
ed.  V.  B.  Kher  (3  vols.  Ahmedabad,  Navajivan  Press,  1959);  Bharatan 
Kumarappa,  Capitalism,  Socialism  or  Villagism?  (Madras,  Shakti  Karya- 
layam,  1946);  K.  M.  Munshi,  Reconstruction  of  Society  Through  Trustee- 
ship (Bombay,  Bharatiya  Vidya  Bhavan,  i960);  Susanne  H.  Rudolph, 
'  Consensus  and  Conflict  in  Indian  Politics ',  World  Politics,  xiii,  3  (April 
1961)5  385-99;  and  the  writings  of  Vinobha  Bhave,  Jayaprakash  Narayan, 
and  Shriman  Narayan  (Agarwal).  Parallels  to  these  perspectives  are 
widely  found,  as  in  Sukarno's  rejection  of  western  'free-fight'  democracy 
and  his  defence  of  the  traditional  village  system  of  building  consensus. 
See  Paul  Sigmund  (ed.),  The  Ideologies  of  the  Developing  Nations  (New 
York,  Praeger,  1963),  pp.  57  ff. 

77  In  the  case  of  the  princes,  Gandhi  insisted  on  the  application  of  the 
trusteeship  principle,  'viz.,  the  plan  of  princes  voluntarily  parting  with 
power  and  becoming  real  trustees'.  He  acknowledged  that  'very  few 
people  have  faith  in  my  plan'  but  insisted  that  he  would  advocate  it  'as 
long  as  I  believe  in  its  practical  possibility'.  He  admitted  that  he  would 
'not  ask  for  their  coercion'  if  they  'will  not  listen'.  See  Gandhi,  Indian 
States  Problem,  pp.  344  and  636.  Nehru,  Towards  Freedom,  p.  320,  com- 
plained that  Gandhi,  following  'a  long  succession  of  religious  men',  was 

285 


Notes,  pp.  10-45 

'  always  laying  stress  on  the  idea  of  trusteeship  of  the  feudal  princes,  the 
big  landlord,  and  the  capitalist ',  and  he  made  it  abundantly  clear  that  he  was 
one  of  those  who  had  little  faith  in  Gandhi's  approach. 

78  See  the  extended  discussion  of  Rajaji  in  chapter  5,  below,  for  illus- 
trations of  this  and  other  major  points  in  this  paragraph. 

79  C.  Rajagopalachari,  paraphrasing  Gandhi,  in  '  Gandhiji's  Teachings 
and  Philosophy',  Swarajya  (Special  Number  1963),  pp.  41  and  44. 

80  The  felicitous  phrase, '  messiahs  of  backwardness ',  is  from  Panikkar, 
The  State  and  the  Citizen  (Bombay,  Asia  Publishing  House,  1956), 
pp.  25-37,  'The  Danger  of  Reaction'. 

81  See  the  conclusions  of  Srinivas,  Caste  in  Modern  India,  p.  104,  and  of 
F.  G.  Bailey,  'Oriya  Hill  Village:  II',  in  M.  N.  Srinivas  (ed.),  India's 
Villages  (2nd  edn.  Bombay,  Asia  Publishing  House,  i960),  p.  145.  Many 
other  village  studies  reach  essentially  the  same  conclusion. 

82  See  the  works  by  Bailey,  Dube,  and  Srinivas,  and  Erdman,  disserta- 
tion, ch.  3. 

83  See  Carstairs,  Twice-Born;  J.  A.  Curran,  Militant  Hinduism  in 
Indian  Politics:  A  Study  of  the  RSS  (New  York,  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations,  195 1);  Dhananjay  Keer,  Savarkar  and  His  Times  (Bombay, 
A.  V.  Keer,  1950);  Stanley  Wolpert,  Tilak  and  Gokhale  (Berkeley, 
University  of  California  Press,  1962);  Myron  Weiner,  Party  Politics  in 
India  (Princeton,  Princeton  University  Press,  1957);  and  biographies  of 
the  other  leading  figures  noted  above.  The  discussion  which  follows  is 
based  primarily  on  Curran,  Militant  Hinduism,  Weiner,  Party  Politics, 
and  Rudolph,  MS. 

84  For  the  first,  see  Theodore  L.  Shay,  The  Legacy  of  the  Lokamanya 
(London,  Oxford  University  Press,  1956),  p.  92,  and  for  the  second,  see 
Weiner,  Party  Politics,  p.  172.  The  Shay  volume,  like  the  bulk  of  the  bio- 
graphies of  Tilak,  is  rather  a  '  white-wash '  of  this  controversial  figure.  A 
more  balanced  account,  tending  to  be  quite  critical  of  Tilak,  is  found  in 
Wolpert,  Tilak  and  Gokhale. 

85  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  pp.  167-8.  Because  the  militant  Hindu  strand 
is  largely  embodied  in  the  Jan  Sangh,  much  detail  has  been  deferred  to 
the  following  section,  and  to  the  point  at  which  Swatantra-Jan  Sangh 
relations  are  examined. 

86  For  historical  materials  pertinent  here  see  Weber,  The  City  and 
Religion  of  India;  Bendix,  Max  Weber;  A.  L.  Basham,  The  Wonder  that 
was  India  (New  York,  Grove  Press,  1959);  H.  G.  Rawlinson,  India:  A 
Short  Cultural  History  (New  York,  Praeger,  1965) ;  and  Helen  Lamb, '  The 
Indian  Merchant',  in  Singer  (ed.),  Traditional  India.  In  questionnaires, 
some  Swatantra  Jains  identified  themselves  as  Hindus  by  religion,  Jain 
by  sub-caste. 

87  See  B.  B.  Misra,  The  Indian  Middle  Classes  (New  York,  Oxford 
University  Press,  196 1);  W.  H.  Moreland,  India  at  the  Death  of  Akbar 
(London,  Macmillan,  1920);  and  Susanne  H.  Rudolph,  'The  Princely 
States  of  Rajputana:  Ethic,  Authority,  and  Structure',  Indian  Journal  of 
Political  Science,  xxiv,  1  (Jan.-March  1963). 

88  For  a  critique  of  Weber's  Religion  of  India,  see  Milton  Singer, '  The 

286 


Notes,  pp.  10-45 

Religion  of  India:  The  Sociology  of  Hinduism  and  Buddhism  (Max 
Weber)',  American  Anthropologist,  lxi,  1  (Feb.  1961). 

89  See  Lamb,  'Indian  Merchant',  in  Singer  (ed.),  Traditional  India 
and  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades,  ch.  4,  under '  The  Ubiquitous  Marwari '. 

90  Based  on  the  various  articles  by  Lamb;  Gokhale  Institute  Notes; 
Misra,  Indian  Classes;  and  Joan  B.  Landy,  'Factors  in  the  Rise  of  the 
Parsi  Community  in  India ',  senior  honours'  thesis,  Radcliffe  College,  1962. 

91  Lamb,  'Indian  Business  Communities',  PA,  xxviii,  106. 

92  See  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades,  ch.  4,  under  'The  Ubiqitous 
Marwari'. 

93  From  Rudolph,  MS.  Many  of  the  leading  financial  supporters  of  the 
Congress  were  Marwaris. 

94  See  statements  by  business  representatives  in  RTC,  I,  p.  158  and  in 
RTC,  II,  pp.  141,  361  and  370. 

95  See,  for  example,  Weiner,  Politics  of  Scarcity,  pp.  123  ff. 

96  For  the  quotations  from  Birla,  see  his  In  the  Shadow  of  the  Mahatma 
(Bombay,  Orient  Longmans,  1953),  p.  xv.  Weiner,  Politics  of  Scarcity, 
p.  133,  notes  that  many  business  leaders  'frequently  criticized  Gandhi's 
"antiquarian"  anti-industrial  outlook'.  For  references  to  Gandhi's 
'saintly'  qualities,  see  Birla,  loc.  cit.,  and  Weiner,  Politics  of  Scarcity, 
p.  123.  For  recent  business  criticism  of  support  for  cottage  industries, 
see  Lamb,  '  Business  Organization  and  Leadership ',  in  Park  and  Tinker 
(eds.),  Leadership,  p.  261;  and  the  reports  of  Messrs  N.  K.  Jalan  of 
Elphinstone  Spinning  and  Weaving  Mills,  and  of  O.  S.  Gupta  of  Sajjan 
Mills,  TI,  1  June  1961  and  5  Oct.  1961,  respectively.  For  a  statement  by 
the  Tamil  Nad  Mill-Owners  Association  stating  that  increased  excises  (as 
proposed)  on  units  with  more  than  49  looms  would  force  many  shut- 
downs, see  HT,  14  Feb.  1963. 

97  For  Nehru,  see  Toward  Freedom,  p.  347,  and  for  Ranga,  see  Desai, 
Social  Background,  pp.  173  ff.  Ranga  has  been  Swatantra  President  from 
the  party's  inception  to  the  time  of  writing  (1966)  and  will  be  discussed 
further  below. 

98  See  Weiner,  Politics  of  Scarcity,  p.  123.  For  the  first  Birla  reference, 
see  RTC,  II,  pp.  361  and  370,  and,  for  the  second,  see  his  Shadow  of 
the  Mahatma,  p.  48,  from  a  letter  dated  14  March  1932,  which  was 
already  after  some  of  Nehru's  more  fiery  speeches  but  well  before 
the  Congress  Socialist  Party  emerged  as  an  articulate  left  wing  inside  the 
Congress. 

99  See  Brecher,  Nehru,  pp.  510  ff.,  for  the  'strike  of  capital'. 

100  See  Lamb,  'Business  Organization  and  Leadership',  in  Park  and 
Tinker  (eds.),  Leadership,  p.  260.  See  also  P.  A.  Wadia  and  K.  T. 
Merchant,  The  Bombay  Plan — A  Criticism  (Bombay,  Popular  Book 
Depot,  1945).  The  Bombay  Plan  argued  that  public  utilities  and  certain 
key  industries  could  be  state-run  or  state-controlled,  that  death  duties  and 
taxes  could  be  used  to  redistribute  income,  etc.,  but  the  general  conclu- 
sion about  the  thrust  of  the  proposal  is  still  valid. 

101  See  Weiner,  Politics  of  Scarcity,  pp.  124  ff.,  and  the  several  publi- 
cations of  the  FFE  listed  in  the  bibliography,  especially  those  by  A.  D. 

287 


Notes,  pp.  46-64 

Shroff  and  Murarji  Vaidya.  As  a  key  element  in  the  formation  of  the 
Swatantra  Party,  the  FFE  is  discussed  further  below. 

102  Politics  of  Scarcity,  pp.  139-40. 

103  This  conclusion  is  based  mainly  on  evidence  found  in  published 
annual  reports  of  industrial  concerns,  particularly  of  textile  companies. 
See  Erdman,  dissertation,  ch.  4,  for  a  fuller  account  of  these. 

104  Nehru,  pp.  510-11,  as  in  the  vehement  opposition  to  retention  of 
certain  price  controls  shortly  after  independence,  the  'strike  of  capital', 
among  others. 

105  See,  for  example,  Charles  A.  Myers,  Labor  Problems  in  the  Indus- 
trialization of  India  (Cambridge,  Harvard  University  Press,  1958). 
Evidence  on  this  point  will  be  presented  below,  in  discussing  the  position 
of  business  interests  in  Swatantra. 


chapter  3,  pp.  46-64 

1  Much  evidence  is  found  in  Rudolph,  MS,  and  in  S.  V.  Kogekar  and 
Richard  L.  Park  (eds.),  Reports  on  the  Indian  General  Elections  (Bombay, 
Popular  Book  Depot,  1956). 

2  See  F.  G.  Bailey,  'Politics  and  Society  in  Contemporary  Orissa',  in 
C.  H.  Philips  (ed.),  Politics  and  Society  in  India  (New  York,  Praeger, 
1962),  pp.  103-4,  and  Rudolph,  MS,  pp.  183-4.  The  other  side  of  the 
coin,  noted  in  Rudolph,  MS,  loc.  cit.,  was  revealed  by  the  Congressman 
who  said  sadly, '  the  people  couldn't  be  shaken  out  of  their  slavish  frame  of 
mind'.  See  also  the  paper  by  Brass,  for  the  Association  of  Asian  Studies 
meeting,  already  cited. 

3  See  Kogekar  and  Park,  Reports,  passim,  for  examples  of  the  transfor- 
mation of  some  ad  hoc  groups  into  local  political  parties. 

4  See  S.  R.  Maheshwari,  The  General  Election  in  India  (Allahabad, 
Chaitanya,  1963),  chs.  5  and  6. 

5  The  Jan  Sangh  has  controlled  municipalities,  but  this  lies  beyond  the 
scope  of  the  present  study.  Some  leaders  of  these  parties  have  gone  in  and 
out  of  the  Congress  and  in  a  detailed  study  one  could  examine  some 
aspects  of  this  problem  through  a  consideration  of  their  Congress  activities. 

6  To  the  extent  that  caste  leaders  have  widely  served  as  'vote  banks', 
almost  every  party  draws  on  traditional  loyalties  and  'organization'. 

7  See  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades,  p.  3 12,  and  chapter  2  above  for  some 
of  the  Raja's  views. 

8  Kogekar  and  Park,  Reports,  p.  20.  During  the  195 1-2  elections,  Ram- 
garh  contested  against  the  sponsor  of  the  legislation,  K.  B.  Sahay,  in 
three  constituencies,  winning  in  two.  Ramgarh  also  contested  in  another 
constituency  in  which  Sahay  was  not  a  candidate,  and  he  won  here  as 
well,  becoming  the  only  person  in  India  to  have  been  victorious  in  three 
assembly  districts.  See  ibid.  p.  21. 

9  Statesman,  5  Feb.  1962. 

10  Based  on  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades,  p.  312;  Kogekar  and  Park, 
Reports,  pp.  19  ff.;  Asok  Mehta,  The  Political  Mind  of  India  (Bombay, 
Praja  Socialist  Party,  1952),  p.  27;  R.  V.  Krishna  Ayyar  et  al.  (eds.),  All- 

288 


Notes,  pp.  46-64 

India  Election  Guide  (Madras,  Oriental  Publishers,  1956),  pp.  32  and  94; 
and  interviews  in  India  with  the  Raja  of  Ramgarh  and  other  party- 
leaders  in  1962-3.  In  addition,  Mr  Noorul  Arfin,  personal  assistant  to 
the  Raja,  was  interviewed  in  the  United  States  in  1964  and  has  supplied 
much  valuable  information  subsequently. 

11  F.  G.  Bailey,  'The  Ganatantra  Parishad',  Economic  Weekly,  24  Oct. 
1959,  p.  1469.  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades,  p.  312,  states  that  the  Janata 
Party  and  the  Parishad  '  can  accurately  be  described  as  feudal  elements ', 
although  he  does  little  more  than  cite  some  of  Ramgarh's  more  vitriolic 
pronouncements  in  support  of  this  contention.  Brecher,  Nehru,  p.  477, 
observed  that  in  1957  'a  group  of  dispossessed  princelings  was  able  to 
arouse  feudal  loyalties  and  almost  succeeded  in  unseating  the  Congress 
ministry'.  K.  P.  Karunakaran,  in  his  introduction  to  S.  L.  Polpai  (ed.), 
1962  General  Elections  in  India  (Bombay,  Allied  Publishers,  1962),  p.  13, 
calls  the  Parishad  'a  conservative  party'  which  included  'vestiges  of 
medievalism  and  feudalism',  and  a  report  in  Kogekar  and  Park,  Reports, 
p.  124,  insisted  that  'the  princes  were  fighting  for  the  restoration  of  their 
gaddis\  Upon  his  resignation  from  the  party,  Surendra  Mahanty  censured 
it  for  'being  increasingly  deployed  to  maintain  conservatism  and  vested 
interests'.  See  TI,  6  April  1961. 

12  Economic  Weekly,  24  Oct.  1959,  p.  1476  and  generally  pp.  1469  ff. 
For  Mehta,  see  his  Political  Mind,  pp.  26  and  67,  and  for  Sadiq  Ali, 
The  General  Elections  1957  (New  Delhi,  All-India  Congress  Committee, 

1959),  P-  54. 

13  For  middle-class  elements,  see  Bailey,  Economic  Weekly,  24  Oct. 
1959,  and  Kogekar  and  Park,  Reports,  p.  128. 

14  Kogekar  and  Park,  Reports,  p.  128. 

15  H.  H.  Patna  is  very  widely  respected,  and  on  the  basis  of  the  author's 
interviews  and  investigations,  and  on  the  basis  of  information  supplied 
by  Richard  Taub  of  the  Department  of  Sociology,  Brown  University,  a 
high  estimate  of  his  ability  and  integrity  would  be  in  order. 

16  See  Krishna  Ayyar  et  al.  (eds.),  Election  Guide,  p.  90. 

17  Ibid.  pp.  89-90. 

18  For  Ali  see  his  General  Elections,  p.  57.  For  Morris-Jones,  see  his 
Government  and  Politics  of  India  (London,  Hutchinson  University 
Library,  1964),  p.  160. 

19  See  his  Political  Mind,  pp.  26-7. 

20  In  addition  to  the  sources  cited  in  these  paragraphs,  see:  Bailey, 
'Politics  and  Society  in  Contemporary  Orissa',  in  Philips  (ed.),  Politics 
and  Society,  and  his  nine-part  series,  'Politics  in  Orissa',  Economic 
Weekly,  Aug.-Nov.  1959;  P.  K.  Deo  (H.  H.  Kalahandi),  My  Humble 
Contributions  (Cuttack,  Ganatantra  Parishad,  195 1);  Ganatantra  Parishad 
or  Democratic  Party:  Policy  Statement  (Balangir,  Ganatantra  Parishad, 
195 1);  and  the  Election  Manifesto  of  the  Ganatantra  Parishad  (Balangir, 
Ganatantra  Parishad,  1961).  Both  the  Janata  Party  and  the  Ganatantra 
Parishad  merged  with  the  Swatantra  Party  and  will  be  discussed  below. 

21  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  p.  156  and  passim.  See  also  Morris-Jones, 
Government  and  Politics,  pp.  as  cited  in  the  index. 


19 


289 


Notes,  pp.  46-64 

22  The  first  Hindu  sabha  was  formed  in  19073  but  the  All-India  Hindu 
Mahasabha  was  not  established  until  1925.  It  was  less  a  political  party 
than  a  cultural  group  and  for  a  long  time  dual  membership  in  the  Congress 
and  the  Mahasabha  was  permitted.  For  some  background  and  basic 
Mahasabha  perspectives,  see  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  pp.  166  ff.;  V.  D. 
Savarkar,  Hindu  Rashtra  Darshan  (Bombay,  L.  G.  Khare,  1949);  and 
Dhananjay  Keer,  Savarkar,  passim.  Keer,  op.  cit.  pp.  274  ff.,  contains  a 
scathing  attack  on  Rajaji  for  his  views.  The  Muslims  have  always  borne 
the  brunt  of  the  attack.  Savarkar,  for  example,  praised  the  Parsis  because 
they  had  no  extra-territorial  or  anti-national  loyalties.  Weiner,  Party 
Politics,  p.  167,  notes,  however,  that  following  independence  the  Maha- 
sabha turned  its  guns  on  'the  Westernized  Indian  community',  which 
would  certainly  include  many  Parsis. 

23  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  pp.  166  ff. 

24  See  ibid.  pp.  170  ff.  I  would  defend  this  characterization  of  the  RRP 
as  orthodox  and  conservative,  if  not  reactionary,  even  though  in  Rudolph, 
MS,  there  are  assertions  that  'right  radical'  tendencies  can  be  identified 
in  the  party,  at  least  in  Rajasthan.  The  fact  that  the  more  affluent  jagirdars 
seem  to  have  supported  the  RRP  while  the  'little'  Rajputs  supported  the 
Jan  Sangh  lends  some  credence  to  my  conclusion.  Among  the  candidates 
supported  by  the  RRP  were  Sir  Homy  Mody,  one  of  India's  most  western- 
ized and  most  influential  Parsi  businessmen-financiers,  and  Major  Thakur 
Raghubir  Singh  of  Bissau,  a  sophisticated,  Oxford-educated  jagirdar. 
Even  a  brief  encounter  with  either  of  these  men,  among  other  RRP 
candidates,  will  indicate  that  the  party  programme  does  not  receive 
universal  approbation  from  its  nominal  adherents  or  standard-bearers. 
This  is  further  reflected  in  the  fact  that  many  RRP  supporters  turned  to 
the  more  moderate  Swatantra  Party  after  the  latter's  formation  in  1959. 
This  was  particularly  true  in  Rajasthan. 

25  See  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  p.  169,  for  the  quotation  and  some 
general  observations,  and  see  as  well  Curran,  Militant  Hinduism,  for  a 
detailed  account  of  the  RSS.  The  RSS  was  founded  in  1925.  The  RSS 
and  the  Mahasabha,  which  had  been  informally  linked  for  some  time, 
were  both  implicated  in  Gandhi's  assassination  and  neither  was  per- 
mitted to  function  for  some  time.  Many  felt  that  the  Mahasabha  had  out- 
lived its  political  usefulness,  while  others  felt  that  no  new  party  (i.e.  the 
Jan  Sangh)  was  needed. 

26  Tinker,  India  and  Pakistan,  p.  120.  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  pp.  177  ff., 
presents  a  comparable  estimate.  Mookerjee  was  one  of  the  RSS  leaders 
who  'fell  under  the  influence  of  Savarkar'  of  the  Mahasabha  (p.  187)  and 
joined  the  latter  in  1939.  He  resigned  from  that  party  after  Gandhi's 
assassination,  urged  the  Mahasabha  to  admit  Muslims  and  to  confine  itself 
to  strictly  cultural  work.  Tinker,  loc.  cit.,  calls  Mookerjee  'a  conservative 
in  the  best  sense ',  which  probably  means  that  he  was  something  of  an 
Indian  'Tory',  in  his  view. 

27  India  and  Pakistan,  p.  120.  The  Sangh's  weekly,  The  Organiser, 
regularly  abuses  Muslims,  Pakistan,  and  westernized  Hindus. 

28  Jan   Sangh  General- Secretary,  Deendayal  Upadhyaya,  quoted  in 

290 


Notes,  pp.  46-64 

Poplai  (ed.),  1962  Elections,  p.  56.  A  comparable  motto  was  used  by 
Savarkar  and  the  Mahasabha. 

29  Upadhyaya,  in  Poplai  (ed.)3  1962  Elections,  pp.  58-9. 

30  From  the  1962  election  manifesto,  in  ibid.  p.  144,  It  is  also  stated  that 
*  large-scale  industries  will  be  given  full  scope  for  growth'  with  'defence 
and  basic  industries '  in  the  public  sector. 

31  Conversations  with  leading  Jan  Sanghis  did  not  clear  up  this  am- 
biguity. The  author's  impression  is  that  nationalization  of  certain  in- 
dustries is  fully  acceptable  but  that  attacks  on  smaller  property  holders 
find  no  support.  This  seems  true  of  property  in  land  as  well,  i.e.  abolition 
of  huge  estates  is  acceptable.  On  the  matter  of  socialist  rhetoric,  the 
Sangh  claims  to  have  imbibed  Marx's  moral  revulsion  vis-a-vis  the 
industrial  process  but  abjures  all  institutional  arrangements  commonly 
associated  with  Marxism.  The  Hindu  Mahasabha  emphasizes  'Hindu 
socialism'  and  'joint  co-operative  farming'  because  of  the  alleged 
existence  of  communal  ownership  of  land  in  ancient  India  and  because 
of  the  success  of  the  Israeli  kibbutz.  See  TI,  24  April  1961;  HWR,  1  May 
1 96 1 ;  and  HWR,  4  Dec.  1961,  for  the  Mahasabha.  The  Organiser  remains 
the  best  source  for  the  Sangh. 

32  For  a  brief,  comparative  analysis  of  Jan  Sangh  and  Swatantra  foreign 
policy  views,  see  Howard  L.  Erdman,  '  The  Foreign  Policy  Views  of  the 
Indian  Right',  Pacific  Affairs,  xxxix,  1-2  (spring-summer  1966),  pp.  5-18. 

33  Upadhyaya  in  Poplai  (ed.),  1962  Elections,  p.  57.  Both  the  Sangh 
and  the  Mahasabha  refuse  to  admit  that  reunification  of  India  and 
Pakistan  is  impossible  or  at  least  extremely  unlikely. 

34  In  an  interview  with  a  leading  Jan  Sanghi,  the  author  was  told  that 
the  party  invariably  received  a  'bad  press',  largely  because  of  the  RSS 
connection.  The  interviewee  claimed  that  the  RSS  had  done  much  good 
work  during  partition,  that  it  was  becoming  less  militant,  and  that  it 
would  be  better  if  the  RSS  shed  its  para-military  and  vehemently  anti- 
Muslim  posture.  He  made  it  clear,  however,  that  he  would  under  no 
circumstances  repudiate  the  support  of  the  RSS,  pending  such  develop- 
ments. For  the  most  part,  Sangh  legislators  acquit  themselves  quite  well. 

35  See  the  excellent  tables  and  discussion  in  Morris-Jones,  Government 
and  Politics,  pp.  161-6.  The  tables  are  reproduced,  by  permission,  in 
Appendix  II.  Generally  speaking,  the  RRP,  Ganatantra  Parishad  and 
the  Janata  Party  appear  to  have  drawn  primarily  on  rural  conservative 
elements  on  a  largely  derivative  basis,  i.e.  through  local  notables,  especially 
the  princely-landlord  classes.  The  Sangh  and  the  Mahasabha  seem  to 
have  had  as  their  hard  core  middle  and  lower-middle  class  urbanites,  and 
in  the  early  years  after  partition,  among  refugees.  In  Rajasthan,  as  noted 
earlier,  the  RRP  drew  upon  larger  landholders,  the  Jan  Sangh  on  smaller 
ones  and  on  displaced  retainers  in  some  urban  areas.  As  Weiner,  Party 
Politics,  p.  170,  points  out,  communal  party  strength  'has  shifted  into 
areas  where  the  Western  impact  has  been  the  weakest',  particularly  in 
former  princely  states.  He  points  out  that  in  195 1-2,  65  of  the  84  assembly 
seats  won  by  the  RRP-Mahasabha- Sangh  were  in  former  princely  areas. 
Given  the  dislocations  attendant  upon  industrialization,  Weiner  quite 

291  19-2 


Notes,  pp.  46-64 

properly  speculates  that  the  urban  areas  in  backward  states  '  may  provide 
a  new  basis  for  Hindu  communalism  in  the  years  to  come '. 

36  S.  L.  Poplai  (ed.),  National  Politics  and  the  1957  Elections  in  India 
(Delhi,  Metropolitan  Book  Company,  1957)3  pp.  32-3,  discusses  this  unity 
effort  but  mentions  only  the  RRP,  Mahasabha,  Sangh  and  Akalis.  Weiner, 
Party  Politics,  p.  199,  mentions  all  those  listed  above.  Harrison,  Dan- 
gerous Decades,  p.  291,  similarly  notes  the  inclusion  of  the  southern  parties. 
Poplai  (ed.),  19 57  Elections,  p.  32,  claims  that  the  group  totalled  30; 
Weiner,  Party  Politics,  p.  199,  puts  the  figure  at  34.  For  an  excellent 
discussion  of  the  origins  of  the  Commonweal  Party  and  Tamilnad  Toilers, 
see  Rudolph  and  Rudolph,  '  Political  Role ',  PA,  xxxiii. 

37  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades,  pp.  291-2.  W.  H.  Morris- Jones,  Parlia- 
ment in  India  (Philadelphia,  University  of  Pennsylvania  Press,  1957), 
pp.  1 13-14,  refers  to  the  situation  as  follows : '  The  communal  parties  have 
fallen  further  since  their  thorough  defeat  in  1952,  and  the  death  in  1953  of 
Dr  S.  P.  Mukherjee  [Mookerjee],  the  creator  and  leader  of  the  Jan  Sangh, 
removed  the  one  man  who  might  have  been  able  to  transform  these 
parties  into  a  coherent  nationalist  conservative  party.' 

38  Poplai  (ed.),  1957  Elections,  p.  35.  In  dealing  with  this  aspect  of 
right-wing  unity  efforts,  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  pp.  199  ff.,  does  not 
discuss  the  Ganatantra  Parishad. 

39  For  the  quotation,  see  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  p.  203.  This  entire 
discussion  is  based  on  Weiner's  book,  pp.  200  ff.  He  notes,  ibid.  p.  204, 
that  Deshpande  took  exception  to  such  charges,  insisting  that  all  would 
have  been  well  had  not  some  Jan  Sanghis  '  indulged  in  vilifying  or  mis- 
representing the  Mahasabha.  Statements  were  issued  calling  Hindu 
Mahasabha  communal  and  a  body  composed  of  capitalists ...  I  need  not 
answer  the  baseless  charge  of  Princes,  Rajas,  jagirdars,  being  in  Hindu 
Mahasabha.'  The  evidence  in  Kogekar  and  Park,  Reports,  indicates  that 
in  some  areas  the  charge  was  far  from  '  baseless '. 

40  Chatter jee  will  be  discussed  further  below,  in  connection  with  his 
short  romance  with  Swatantra.  He  has  been  somewhat  'rootless'  as  a 
politician  and  on  this  basis  it  seems  plausible  that  he  would  be  willing 
to  contemplate  the  demise  of  the  Mahasabha. 

41  See  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  pp.  210  ff.  Other  factors,  such  as  the 
Sangh's  aggressiveness  and  emphasis  on  discipline,  could  also  be  cited. 

42  As  we  shall  see,  leaders  of  the  Ganatantra  Parishad  and  the  Janata 
Party  were  willing  to  contemplate  the  formation  of  a  national  opposition 
in  which  their  separate  identities  would  be  lost.  In  interviews,  leaders  of 
these  parties  said  that  after  Mookerjee's  death,  there  was  simply  no  one 
around  with  sufficient  stature  to  induce  them  to  help  form  such  a  party 
and  they  also  disliked  the  '  images'  of  the  major  right-wing  groups.  Sangh 
discipline  was  also  a  deterrent  in  some  cases. 

43  For  the  Rajasthan  case,  see  Rudolph,  MS. 

44  Kogekar  and  Park,  Reports,  and  Maheshwari,  General  Election,  will 
indicate  satisfactorily  the  range  of  co-operation  and  conflict.  The  former, 
p.  75,  notes  that  in  Madhya  Pradesh,  the  Sangh,  Mahasabha  and  RRP 
supported  each  other;  in  the  Punjab,  the  Sangh  is  said  to  have  had  some 

292 


Notes,  pp.  46-64 

'understandings'  with  the  Zamindara  Party  and  the  Akali  Dal  (p.  138); 
in  UP,  there  were  'local  agreements'  involving  the  Praja  Party  and  the 
'big  three'  (p.  154).  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  now  defunct  state  of 
Madhya  Bharat,  the  rightists  '  fought  each  other  in  several  constituencies ', 
with  sixteen  contests  between  the  Sangh  and  the  RRP,  six  between  the 
RRP  and  the  Mahasabha,  and  three  between  the  Sangh  and  the  Mahasabha 
(p.  190).  Rudolph,  MS,  p.  204  and  passim,  also  contains  material  on  this 
general  issue.  This  MS  contains  an  excellent,  detailed  study  of  unity  efforts 
at  the  state  level.  According  to  the  MS,  pp.  329  ff.,  the  so-called '  Sanyutka 
Dal',  which  included  the  RRP,  Sangh  and  independents,  fell  apart  after 
land  reform  controversies  divided  the  Rajputs  who  dominated  the  front. 

45  India  and  Pakistan,  pp.  120-1.  See  also  Zinkin,  India  Changes,  p.  225, 
for  a  reference  to  Prasad's  reaction,  which,  according  to  this  account, 
involved  a  threat  of  resignation  if  the  bill  were  not  modified  drastically. 
For  a  detailed  study,  see  Gene  D.  Overstreet,  'The  Hindu  Code  Bill',  in 
James  B.  Christoph  (ed.),  Cases  in  Comparative  Politics  (Boston,  Little 
Brown,  1965),  pp.  413-40.  See  also  Dhananjay  Keer,  Dr  Ambedkar:  His 
Life  and  Mission  (Bombay,  A.  V.  Keer,  I954)>  PP-  396  ff.,  for  an  account 
of  this  leader's  bitter  disappointment  over  the  mutilation  of  this  bill. 

46  India  and  Pakistan,  p.  121. 

47  As  noted,  Tinker  was  generally  impressed  by  Mookerjee,  and 
Poplai  (ed.),  1957  Elections,  pp.  37-8,  stated  that  the  Sangh  was  moving 
toward  '  the  position  of  a  Conservative  Party  in  certain  respects '.  Occa- 
sionally, when  the  Sangh  elevates  a  southerner  to  a  prominent  position  and 
seems,  therefore,  to  be  moderating  its  pro-Hindi  stand,  such  speculations 
become  more  frequent.  Interviews  in  India  with  top  Sangh  leaders  left 
little  doubt  in  this  writer's  mind  that  no  such  illusion  should  be  harboured. 
It  is  likely  to  remain  adamant  on  Hindi,  alienating  at  least  the  south,  and 
its  RSS  ties  will  continue  to  give  the  party  a  communal  aspect  which  will 
not  be  easily  shed. 

48  'Congress  Ideology',  India  Quarterly,  xvi,  1  (Jan.-March  i960),  10. 

49  By  the  leftist  periodical  Link,  20  March  i960. 

50  Quoted  in  TI,  13  Oct.  1961. 

51  TI,  9  Oct.  and  28  Nov.  1961. 

52  Norman  Palmer,  '  India  Faces  a  New  Decade ',  Current  History,  XL, 
235  (March  1961),  149. 

53  William  A.  Robson, ' India  Revisited',  The  Political  Quarterly,  xxxi, 
4  (Oct.-Dec.  i960),  p.  428. 

54  From  Swarajya,  the  'unofficial'  organ  of  the  party,  18  April  1959. 

55  From  an  interview  with  a  pro-Swatantra  Indian  diplomat  posted  in 
the  United  States. 

56  The  major  Indian  newspapers  generally  followed  the  same  basic  line, 
in  assessing  Swatantra  at  the  time  of  its  birth.  See,  for  example,  TI, 
8  May  1959;  Hindu,  11  May  1959;  HT,  12  May  1959;  Delhi  Hindustan 
Standard,  13  May  1959;  HT,  17  May  1959;  HT,  18  May  1959;  TI, 
18  May  1959;  and  assessments  of  the  various  party  conventions,  mani- 
festos, and  the  like. 

57  Editorial,  'For  Nehru:  An  Opposition',  16  March  1962. 

293 


Notes,  pp.  65-81 

CHAPTER   4,  pp.  65-81 

i     K.  P.  Karunakaran,  in  Poplai  (ed.),  1962  General  Elections,  p.  2. 

2  From  his  inaugural  address  at  the  Bombay  (Preparatory)  Convention, 
August  19593  reprinted  in  Swatantra  Party  Preparatory  Convention 
(Bombay,  Swatantra  Party,  1959),  p.  18.  The  Popular  Book  Depot, 
Bombay,  is  cited  as  the  distributor. 

3  All  three  will  come  in  for  further  attention  below,  because  of  their 
connection  with  the  Swatantra  Party.  According  to  Vaidya  (in  an  inter- 
view in  Bombay,  1962),  he  gave  an  address  to  the  All-India  Manufacturers' 
Association  of  which  he  was  then  (1956)  President,  in  which  he  cautioned 
against  excessive  state  controls,  both  in  terms  of  their  effects  on  economic 
initiative  and  on  political  liberty.  Nehru,  who  had  agreed  for  the  first 
time  to  open  the  meeting,  heard  the  warning,  and,  according  to  Vaidya, 
he  agreed,  in  general  terms,  that  excessive  government  controls  were  to 
be  feared.  Shortly  thereafter,  both  Vaidya  and  Shroff  wrote  'anti-statist' 
articles  for  a  special  supplement  of  the  Times  of  India,  and  upon  reading 
these  pieces,  Masani  arranged  for  a  meeting  with  Vaidya  and  Shroff,  and 
the  idea  of  a  '  Forum  of  Free  Enterprise '  was  launched.  Vaidya  claims  to 
have  mentioned  the  projected  group  to  Nehru,  who  said  that  while  it  was 
a  hopeless  venture  in  the  Indian  context,  it  was  only  fitting  that  in  a 
democracy  such  a  group  should  form  and  propagate  its  ideas.  Vaidya 
himself  insisted  that  subsequent  attacks  on  the  group  by  Nehru  were 
inspired  more  by  his  '  lieutenants '  than  by  Nehru's  own  personal  hostility. 

4  The  FFE  publishes  a  wide  range  of  anti-statist  material,  regardless  of 
the  party  identification  of  the  author.  The  FFE  unit  in  New  Delhi  has,  at 
least  in  the  past,  been  more  sympathetic  to  the  Sangh  than  to  Swatantra. 

5  From  the  '  Manifesto '  originally  published  on  1 8  July  1 95  6,  in  a  pamph- 
let entitled  'The  Forum  of  Free  Enterprise',  Bombay,  FFE,  n.d.,  p.  4. 

6  For  the  quotation,  see  the  'Forum  of  Free  Enterprise',  p.  1.  The 
literature,  very  often,  consisted  of  reprints  of  speeches  and  articles  by 
business  leaders,  economists,  educators,  and  others  in  public  life.  For  a 
partial  list  of  Forum  publications,  see  the  bibliography. 

7  See  ibid.,  and  Shroff,  Free  Enterprise  and  Democracy  (Bombay, 
FFE,  n.d.),  p.  2. 

8  The  Road  to  Serfdom  (Chicago,  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1944)- 

9  The  Communist  Party  of  India  (New  York,  Macmillan,  I954)>  P-  240. 

10  Ibid.  p.  229. 

11  Ibid.  pp.  242  and  250-1. 

12  Ibid.  p.  230. 

13  From  an  interview  with  Ramgarh,  in  Bombay,  1963. 

14  For  Masani's  statement,  see  Modern  Review,  cv,  3  (March  1959),  182. 
In  Hindu,  15  Feb.  1959,  Rajaji  condemned  the  Nagpur  Resolution  on  the 
grounds  that  coercion  would  inevitably  be  used  to  bring  about  joint  co- 
operative farming. 

15  For  the  type  of  position  taken  by  Masani,  see  his  A  Plea  for  Realism 
(Bombay,  Popular  Book  Depot,  n.d.),  which  is  a  collection  of  some 
speeches  delivered  in  the  Lok  Sabha  between  May  and  August  1957.  For 

294 


Notes,  pp.  65-81 

the  argument  he  had  been  advancing  about  the  need  for  an  opposition 
see  his  'Need  for  a  Centre  Party \  TI,  4  June  1959. 

16  Communist  Party  of  India,  p.  242. 

17  Based  on  interviews  with  Rajaji,  Vaidya,  and  Masani,  in  1962-3. 

18  Based  on  interviews  with  several  participants  in  these  meetings. 

19  See  Weiner,  Politics  of  Scarcity,  p.  106,  and,  in  general,  pp.  105  ff., 
for  a  brief  and  superficial  account  of  the  Forum  and  Swatantra.  See  also 
Ranga,  'The  Story  of  the  Birth  of  the  Swatantra  Party',  in  Kailash  Pati 
Singh  (ed.),  Swatantra  Party  Souvenir  i960  (no  data),  pp.  3  ff. 

20  Further  evidence  on  this  will  be  presented  below,  in  discussing 
Swatantra  finances. 

21  Here,  too,  Swatantra  leaders  admit  that  when  B.  L.  Singh's  con- 
nection with  Swatantra  was  brought  to  Nehru's  attention,  Nehru  in- 
sisted that  no  action  be  taken  against  him  with  respect  to  his  official 
position  as  adviser  to  the  Planning  Commission. 

22  This  geographical  concentration  is  to  some  extent  reflected  in  the 
group's  office  bearers,  who,  with  the  exception  of  B.  L.  Singh,  were  all 
from  South  India,  as  of  1959.  Prof.  M.  Ruthnaswamy,  in  an  interview, 
supported  this  contention. 

23  Kogekar  and  Park  (eds.),  Reports,  pp.  89,  112,  refer  to  support  for 
candidates  by  a  'Madras  Agriculturalists'  Federation'  in  the  195 1-2 
elections,  which  antedates,  of  course,  the  formation  of  the  AI AF.  Accord- 
ing to  one  source,  the  Madras  group  was  a  component  of  the  AI  AF  when 
it  came  into  existence  in  1958. 

24  For  a  fragmentary  criticism,  see  Karunakaran,  in  Poplai  (ed.),  1962 
General  Elections,  p.  16,  and,  for  a  rebuttal,  see  B.  L.  Singh,  'What  All- 
India  Agriculturalists'  Federation  Stands  For',  in  Souvenir  i960,  pp.  68  ff. 

25  Masani,  'Opening  Remarks',  in  Preparatory  Convention,  p.  9. 

26  The  latter  is  noted  by  B.  L.  Singh,  in  Souvenir  i960,  p.  68.  Ranga, 
'The  Story',  in  Souvenir  i960,  p.  5,  notes  that  both  he  and  Rajaji  had 
stressed  the  kisan  component  when  Nehru  levelled  the  charge  that 
Swatantra  was  a  projection  of  the  FFE.  Throughout  his  'Story',  Ranga 
plays  down  the  role  of  the  FFE,  which  Masani,  Vaidya,  and  others  are 
happy  to  stress,  at  least  in  private. 

27  The  AIAF  and  Swatantra  have  sponsored  meetings  jointly,  and  in 
1963,  the  AIAF  office  bearers  were  Ranga  (President),  B.  L.  Singh  and 
Gayatri  Devi  (Vice-Presidents),  and  C.  L.  N.  Reddy  (Secretary).  See 
TI,  23  April  1963,  and  Express,  23  April  1963. 

28  Based  on  interviews  with  Masani  and  Ramgarh. 

29  Based  on  interviews  with  Kalahandi,  Patna,  and  Rajaji. 

30  Based  on  a  biographical  sketch  in  Souvenir  i960. 

31  As  we  shall  see,  many  retired  civil  servants,  judges,  educators,  and  the 
like  were  among  those  who  turned  to  Rajaji,  in  their  first  venture  into 
politics.  For  Kanoongo,  see  Souvenir  i960. 

32  From  Ranga,  'The  Story',  in  Souvenir  i960. 

33  TI,  23  June  1959. 

34  Ranga,  'The  Story',  in  Souvenir  i960,  notes  that  on  28  Feb.  he  and 
Masani  spoke  at  Belgaum  (Maharashtra)  and  that  on  15  May  S.  K.  D. 

295 


Notes,  pp.  65-81 

Paliwal  of  UP  invited  Ranga  and  others  to  preside  over  the  inaugural  of  a 
'rural  peoples'  publication. 

35  For  Munshi,  see  Modern  Review,  cv,  2  (Feb.  1959),  88.  For  Paliwal, 
see  Ranga,  'The  Story',  in  Souvenir  i960. 

36  See  Ranga,  'The  Story',  in  Souvenir  i960. 

37  The  INDC  was  formed  shortly  before  the  1957  elections.  The  Andhra 
Democratic  Party  was  formed  in  February  1959,  and  then  joined  with 
the  Andhra  Socialist  Party  (defectors  from  the  Lohia  group)  to  form  the 
Andhra  Socialist  Democratic  Party,  as  a  means  to  unseat  the  Communists 
as  the  legislative  opposition  party.  For  this,  see  77,  10  July  1959,  and  the 
Hindu,  1  Aug.  1959. 

38  For  some  of  these  see :  V.  V.  Prasad, ' New  Delhi  Diary',  Swatantra, 
3  Nov.  1956;  Kongot,  'Rajaji  is  Rising',  Szvatantra,  10  Nov.  1956 ',  V.  S. 
Krishnaswamy,  'Wanted:  An  Opposition  Party',  Szvatantra,  24  Nov. 
1956 ;  'C.R.:  Some  Footnotes  to  His  Future  Biography',  Szvatantra, 
15  Dec.  1956;  Sethu,  'Sidelights',  Szvatantra,  22  Dec.  1956;  and  the 
exchange  of  letters  between  A.  S.  Karanth  and  Rajaji  in  Szvatantra, 
29  Dec.  1956.  In  his  letter,  Rajaji  said  that  he  wanted  an  opposition  but 
that  he  was  too  old  to  lead  it  personally. 

39  Our  Democracy  and  Other  Essays  (Madras,  B.  G.  Paul,  1957),  p.  3- 

40  Ibid.  p.  3.  Cf.  Szvarajya,  8  Sept.  1962,  for  his  criticism  of  'left'  and 
'right'  categories. 

41  Our  Democracy,  p.  2. 

42  From  an  interview  with  Rajaji  in  1962. 

43  The  foreign  observer,  a  Harvard  professor,  has  asked  to  remain 
nameless  here.  The  interview  took  place  in  1959.  In  his  inaugural  speech 
at  the  Swatantra  national  convention  in  Bangalore,  1  Feb.  19643  Rajaji 
concluded  by  saying:  'The  Swatantra  Party's  future  is,  according  to 
intelligent  assessment,  bright.  Let  us  gather  more  and  more  strength 
quickly.  I  cannot  wait  much  longer,  friends.'  The  speech  has  been 
printed  by  the  Kalki  Press,  Madras,  publishers  of  Szvarajya. 

44  See  Kabir,  'Congress  Ideology',  Indian  Quarterly,  xvi,  9-10; 
Palmer,  'India  Faces  a  New  Decade',  Current  History,  XL,  149 ;  and 
Vincent  Sheean,  Nehru:  The  Years  of  Power  (New  York,  Random  House, 
i960),  p.  45,  respectively. 

45  Sheean,  Nehru,  pp.  45  and  56.  Palmer,  Current  History,  XL,  states  that 
Rajaji  was  'a  close  associate  of  Gandhi,  a  veteran  leader  of  the  indepen- 
dence struggle'. 

46  Brecher,  Nehru,  p.  86. 

47  Toward  Freedom,  p.  371. 

48  Rajaji  has  by  no  means  escaped  criticism.  Brecher,  Nehru,  p.  24, 
speaks  of  his  tendency  to  indulge  in  'Olympian  criticism',  and  Frank 
Moraes,  India  Today  (New  York,  Macmillan,  i960),  p.  230,  calls  Rajaji 
'  subtle  and  subterranean,  but  clear-headed '  and  notes  that  he  '  is  some- 
times referred  to  maliciously  as  the  Machiavelli  of  Madras,  or  after  his 
home  district,  Salem,  as  the  Savonorola  of  Salem'. 

49  For  the  curious,  B.  V.  Raman,  'Outlook  for  Swatantra  Party',  in 
Souvenir  i960,  pp.  79-81. 

296 


Notes,  pp.  65-81 

50  Our  Democracy,  pp.  4-5. 

51  Preparatory  Convention,  pp.  9-10. 

52  Palmer,  Current  History,  XL,  149. 

53  Kabir,  India  Quarterly,  xvi. 

54  For  a  partial  list  of  those  at  Madras,  see  Preparatory  Convention, 
p.  5.  The  major  newspapers  of  5  June  1959  report  this. 

55  From  interviews  with  people  who  naturally  want  to  remain  name- 
less. 

56  This  discussion  is  based  on  interviews.  Narayan  declined  the  offer, 
insisting  that  he  was  determined  to  pursue  the  goal  of  a  'partyless' 
democracy  and  that,  in  any  event,  he  was  not  sufficiently  conservative  to 
find  the  party  attractive.  He  did,  however,  give  Swatantra  a  modest  boost 
by  expressing  his  admiration  for  Rajaji  and  for  the  emphasis  on  'trustee- 
ship '  in  the  tentative  manifesto,  and  by  saying  that  as  long  as  India  was 
not  a  partyless  democracy,  a  strong  opposition  was  needed  to  check 
Congress  power. 

57  Statesman,  14  June  1959. 

58  Preparatory  Convention,  p.  10.  Note  that  Masani  here  and  elsewhere 
emphasizes  the  4  June  date  and  the  role  of  non-business  interests. 

59  'The  Need  for  a  Centre  Party',  TI,  4  June  1959.  Note  that  he  ex- 
plicitly referred  again  to  the  middle-class  basis  for  the  party.  My  emphasis. 

60  For  Shastri,  see  TI,  8  July  1959. 

61  The  preparatory  convention  was  originally  announced  for  Ahmeda- 
bad,  on  the  above  days,  but  the  venue  was  changed.  One  source  {TI, 
23  June  1959)  speculated  that  Ahmedabad  had  been  chosen  for  three 
reasons :  first,  that  the  party  had  elicited  considerable  enthusiasm  from 
some  key  members  of  the  Gujarat  Khedut  Sangh;  secondly,  that  the 
textile  interests  in  that  city  were  vulnerable  to  a  'middle  of  the  road' 
party  committed  to  greater  latitude  for  private  enterprise;  and  thirdly, 
that  Ahmedabad,  above  all  other  Indian  cities,  bore  the  imprint  of  the 
Gandhian  notion  of  'trusteeship'  in  its  labour-management  relations. 
See  also  Ranga,  'The  Story',  Souvenir  i960. 

62  TI,  12  June  1959,  and  see  also  TI,  30  July  1959.  Ranga  had  partici- 
pated in  a  number  of  Punjab  peasant  meetings  with  Nagoke,  the  leader  of 
the  Dehati  Janata  Party,  and  at  a  meeting  of  the  party  itself,  shortly  after 
Swatantra  was  born,  Ranga  induced  Nagoke  and  his  colleagues  to  amend 
the  Dehati  Janata  constitution,  which  had  originally  stated  that  the  group 
would  be  non-partisan.  See  HT,  16  June  1959. 

63  For  Paliwal,  see  HT,  28  June  1959. 

64  Particularly  vehement  were  some  remarks  made  by  Nehru  at  a  press 
conference  on  7  July,  reported  in  all  of  the  major  papers  on  8  July.  He 
accused  the  party  of  being  the  political  'projection'  of  the  FFE  and  said 
it  completely  distorted  the  intent  of  the  Nagpur  proposals.  In  speaking  to 
A.  D.  Shroff's  remark  that  Nehru  had  been  put  in  office  by  an  illiterate 
electorate,  Nehru  said  that  such  attitudes  smacked  of  fascism.  He  was 
reasonably  generous  and/or  restrained  in  many  of  his  remarks,  but  the 
press  emphasized  the  charges  relating  to  the  FFE  and  fascism. 

65  TI,  11  July  1959. 

297 


Notes,  pp.  82-108 

66  There  had  been  a  number  of  local  meetings  prior  to  the  preparatory 
convention,  and  one  state  meeting,  in  Mysore,  on  22  July,  for  a  report  of 
which  see  the  Hindu,  23  July.  A  Hindu  report  (7  July)  of  a  meeting  in 
Bombay  noted  that  two  men  who  became  Swatantra  stalwarts — K.  M. 
Munshi  and  Sir  Homy  P.  Mody — were  present  and  that  the  latter  had  al- 
ready been  designated  as  'honorary  treasurer'.  These  figures  will  be  dis- 
cussed further  in  the  next  chapter,  while  the  various  local  parties  which 
merged  with  Swatantra  will  be  considered  in  chapter  6.  Press  comment 
on  Swatantra's  birth  was,  in  broad  terms,  cautiously  optimistic.  Most 
assessments  conceded  that  a  liberal/moderate  opposition  was  useful  or 
necessary  but  warned  against  excessive  negativism,  willingness  to  admit 
any  and  all  anti- Communist  and  anti-Congress  elements. 

chapter  5,  pp.  82-108 

1  Weiner,  Politics  of  Scarcity,  p.  105.  Biographical  data  may  be  found  in 
Souvenir  1960,  pp.  87  ff.,  or  in  almost  any  Times  of  India  Directory  and 
Yearbook,  in  'Who's  Who'.  A  close  examination  of  their  careers  leaves 
little  doubt  that  the  leaders  are  'distinguished'  rather  than  'popular',  as 
we  saw  in  the  case  of  Rajaji,  in  the  preceding  chapter. 

2  Kabir,  India  Quarterly,  xvi,  9,  footnote,  emphasizes  their  age.  Rajaji 
was  born  in  1879;  Mody  in  1881;  Munshi  in  1887;  Ranga  in  1900;  and 
Masani  in  1905.  Many  of  the  others  to  be  discussed  below  would  also 
qualify  as  'comparatively  older  men',  to  say  the  least. 

3  In  the  early  days  of  Swatantra,  this  was  one  of  the  favourite  terms  of 
abuse.  Nehru  himself  often  joined  in  the  chorus,  for  which  see  Swarajya, 
10  Oct.  1959.  Nehru  is  reported  to  have  said  that  the  'medley'  which  was 
the  Swatantra  leadership  made  it  difficult  to  know  what  the  party  stood 
for  or  how  to  characterize  it.  Rajaji,  however,  commented  (Joe.  cit.)  that 
'if  I  have  a  "medley  of  companions". .  .it  is  not  only  natural  but  fair. 
Our  nation  is  a  medley ...  It  is  not  a  good  thing  that  this  big  country  and 
this  large  nation  should  be  governed  by  anything  that  approaches  the 
homogeneity  of  a  clique.  I  take  the  reproach  of  the  new  Party  being  a 
medley  as  a  compliment.' 

4  See  Hari  Kishore  Singh,  History  of  the  Praja  Socialist  Party  (Lucknow, 
Narendra  Prakashan,  1959),  p.  21,  where  he  notes  that  Masani  'studied 
at  the  London  School  of  Economics  and  was  influenced  by  Fabian 
thought.  Like  [Asoka]  Mehta  he  is  a  good  example  of  the  social  demo- 
cratic strand  in  Indian  socialism.' 

5  Quoted  ibid.  pp.  29  and  47,  respectively. 

6  Ibid.  p.  21.  Morris-Jones,  Government  and  Politics,  p.  212,  argues  that 
Masani  was  not  a  Gandhian;  but  he  certainly  came  to  admire  Gandhi 
very  much,  and  was  accused  of  'selling  out'  to  Gandhism  by  the  more 
orthodox  Marxists. 

7  See  Morris-Jones,  Government  and  Politics,  p.  156. 

8  Revolutionary  Peasants  (Delhi,  Amrit  Book  Co.,  1949)?  P-  64. 

9  Ibid.  pp.  54-5> 

10  Quoted  in  Desai,  Social  Background,  p.  173. 

298 


Notes,  pp.  82-108 

11  From  a  biographical  sketch  in  1952  by  the  late  Khasa  Subba  Rao,  in 
Swatantra,  quoted  in  N.  G.  Ranga,  Freedom  in  Peril  (Hyderabad,  The 
Indian  Peasants  Institute,  1961),  p.  3.  In  ibid.  p.  9,  there  is  a  statement  by 
Prof.  Hiren  Mukherjee,  a  leading  Bengali  Communist,  which  praises 
Ranga's  '  spirit  of  protestantism,  a  spirit  of  non-conformisrn,  a  spirit  of 
defiance  which  seem  to  run  in  his  blood';  and  while  noting '  serious  funda- 
mental differences'  with  Ranga,  Mukherjee  added:  'but  that  does  not 
prevent  me  from  expressing  my  admiration,  or  even  my  appreciation,  of 
the  talent  which  he  has  brought  to  bear  in  the  services  to  the  country. . . '. 

12  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades,  p.  218. 

13  It  is  worth  noting  here  that  Ranga,  Revolutionary  Peasants,  p.  69,  cites 
the  existence  of  considerable  friction  between  the  peasant  leaders  and  the 
CSP,  at  the  time  the  former  were  trying  to  develop  the  All-India  Kisan 
Sabha.  Ranga's  outlook  was,  and  remains,  decidedly  pro-peasant  and  he 
certainly  distrusted  that  strand  of  socialism  which  wanted  to  remake  India 
in  the  image  of  the  great  industrial  west,  at  the  expense  of  the  peasantry. 

14  Munshi,  for  example,  was  a  close  friend  of  the  Brahmin  Darbhanga 
Raj  and  other  ruling  families,  while  Rajaji  was  quite  content  to  apply 
Madras  anti-sedition  laws  to  many  anti-prince  agitators.  For  the  latter, 
see  Coupland,  Indian  Politics,  p.  133,  where  it  is  also  noted  that  Gandhi 
supported  Rajaji  here,  against  violent  criticism  from  radical  Congressmen. 

15  V.  Subramanian,  'Bismarck  of  India',  Swatantra,  6  March  1948. 

16  These  fragments  are  culled  from  Rajaji's  Speeches  (Bombay, 
Bharatiya  Vidya  Bhavan,  1958),  1,  159-61. 

17  Ibid.  p.  161. 

18  Loc.  cit.  All  of  these  remarks  appear  to  have  been  taken  from  an 
address  to  the  princes  themselves,  although  the  precise  situation  is  not 
clear  from  the  text. 

19  Quoted  in  Malaviya,  Land  Reforms  in  India,  pp.  52-3. 

20  For  his  support  for  the  Karachi  Resolution,  see  Hindu,  8  Feb.  1962. 
Coupland,  Indian  Politics,  p.  137,  calls  the  projected  land  reforms  in 
Madras,  1937-9,  'radical',  although  no  action  had  been  taken  on  key 
measures  when  the  ministry  was  called  upon  to  resign.  In  commenting 
on  the  proposed  legislation,  Coupland  indicates  that  there  was  a  good 
deal  of  opposition  within  the  Congress  itself,  but  Rajaji  was  apparently 
willing  to  countenance  some  fairly  drastic  (from  the  landlords'  standpoint) 
reform  proposals.  Referring  to  both  of  his  Madras  ministries,  Rajaji 
stated  that  '  I  am  reminded . . .  that  I  got  an  Act  passed  to  wipe  out  pea- 
sants' debts  where  they  had  paid  by  way  of  interest  double  the  principal 
borrowed,  that  I  got  tenancy  laws  passed  by  which  farm  tenants  and 
labourers  got  a  much  larger  share  of  the  produce  than  ever  before  in  the 
Tanjore  area . . .  that  these  were  revolutionary  Socialist  measures . . . ' 
(from  Swarajya,  31  Oct.  1959).  The  Tanjore  area  was  one  of  the  very  worst 
in  Madras  State  and  was  the  scene  of  considerable,  and  widely  successful, 
Communist  agitation — which  may  have  had  more  to  do  with  Rajaji's 
reforms  than  is  suggested  by  his  remarks.  For  Munshi,  see  J.  H.  Dave 
et  al.  (eds.),  Munshi:  His  Art  and  Work  (4  vols.  Bombay,  Munshi  70th 
Birthday  Citizens'  Celebration  Committee,  n.d.),  11,  249-51. 

299 


Notes,  pp.  82-108 

21  rtc,i,p.  158. 

22  It  might  be  noted  that  Mody  resigned  from  the  Viceroy's  Council  in 
1943  in  protest  against  the  government's  treatment  of  Gandhi.  It  is  also 
useful  to  remember  that  V.  P.  Menon,  who  was  one  of  the  Madras 
founding  fathers,  was  Patel's  assistant  in  the  integration  of  the  princely 
states.  The  story  that  one  maharaja  drew  a  pistol  on  Menon  when  he 
broached  the  subject  of  absorption  reminds  us  that  moderate  nationalism 
is  not  equivalent  to  extreme  reaction  along  aristocratic  lines. 

23  See  Howard  L.  Erdman,  'Chakravarty  Rajagopalachari  and  Indian 
Conservatism ',  Journal  of  Developing  Areas,  1,  1  (Oct.  1966),  7-2 1,  for  a 
somewhat  different  statement  of  the  main  arguments  presented  here. 

24  Nehru,  p.  56. 

25  'Gandhiji's  Teachings',  Swarajya  (Special  Number,  1963),  pp.  41 
and  44. 

26  Ibid.  p.  44. 

27  RajajTs  Speeches,  I,  108.  Here  of  course,  he  joins  Gandhi  and  many 
others,  both  Indian  and  non-Indian,  in  reacting  to  the  problem  of  aliena- 
tion and  related  issues.  For  those  who  sympathize  with  this  concern,  the 
question  still  remains :  will  any  action,  predicated  on  such  feelings,  in  a 
pre-industrial  society  generate  any  significant  economic  and  social  move- 
ment? There  are  costs — terrible  human  costs — involved  in  stagnation, 
just  as  there  are  costs  involved  in  dislocation  and  alienation. 

28  From  Sheean,  Nehru,  pp.  50  ff. 

29  Rajaji' s  Speeches,  II,  172. 

30  See  Rajaji's  Speeches,  11,  161,  and  Sheean,  Nehru,  pp.  45-56,  for  the 
first  point.  I  am  indebted  to  material  supplied  by  Prof.  Susanne  Hoeber 
Rudolph  for  the  second  point. 

31  'To  Preserve  Family  Economy',  in  Why  Swatantra?  (Bombay, 
Swatantra  Party,  n.d.),  pp.  11-12.  Here  it  should  be  noted  that  a  resolu- 
tion to  nationalize  the  rice  trade,  presented  at  the  1964  Congress  session 
at  Bhubaneshwar,  Orissa,  was  defeated.  State-trading  in  food  grains  was 
also  included  in  the  Nagpur  Resolution.  Recall,  for  example,  the  1962 
Jan  Sangh  programme  which  insisted  that  a  time  limit  be  set,  within 
which  the  khadi  industry  'will  be  required  to  become  self-sufficient ' 
because  'in  spite  of  heavy  subventions'  it  'has  not  yet  become  economic'. 
Rajaji  made  his  plea  at  a  time  when  khadi  was  suffering  grievously, 
in  the  late  1940s. 

32  See  the  anti-power  loom  article  in  Swarajya,  30  Jan.  1965.  Students 
of  American  history  may  want  to  compare  this  with  Jefferson's  view  that 
his  country's  workshops  should  remain  forever  in  Europe. 

33  Rajaji' s  Speeches,  1,  198.  Significantly,  in  his  '  Gandhiji's  Teachings ', 
Swarajya  (Special  Number,  1963),  p.  35,  Rajaji  drew  on  this  earlier 
speech  but  amended  the  last  sentence  to  read  'coercion,  fraud  and 
corruption'  rather  than  simply  'fraud  and  corruption',  which  reflects  his 
growing  concern  for  state  control  of  the  economy. 

34  Rajaji's  Speeches,  11,  131.  My  emphasis. 

35  See  Swarajya,  19  Dec.  1964. 

36  Munshi,  Warnings  of  History  (Bombay,  Bharatiya  Vidya  Bhavan, 

300 


Notes,  pp.  82-108 

1959)3  PP-  12-13.  He  was  referring  specifically  to  the  Marxists  in  the 
latter  remark. 

37  Munshi,  Reconstruction  of  Society,  passim.  The  place  of  the  notion  of 
trusteeship  in  formal  Swatantra  doctrine  will  be  discussed  in  chapter  8, 
below. 

38  Rajaji's  Speeches,  11,  177.  See  also  Rajaji,  Our  Culture  (Bombay, 
Bharatiya  Vidya  Bhavan,  1963),  passim. 

39  Our  Culture,  p.  26. 

40  Ibid.  p.  39.  See  Rajaji,  'The  Value  of  Traditional  Values',  Swarajya, 
26  Dec.  1964. 

41  Our  Democracy,  p.  29.  See  ibid.  pp.  47-8. 

42  Our  Culture,  pp.  27  and  29,  for  the  two  quotes. 

43  Ibid.  p.  27. 

44  Ibid.  p.  33.  My  emphasis. 

45  Ibid.  pp.  31  and  33. 

46  Rajaji,  Social  and  Religious  Decay  (Bombay,  Swatantra  Party,  n.d.), 
p.  6. 

47  Rajaji  considers  the  former  the  Russian  approach,  the  latter  the 
American  approach. 

48  See  Swarajya,  21  Feb.  1959,  and  Our  Culture,  p.  50,  for  the  quotations. 

49  Rajaji  has  also  taken  a  strong  stand  in  defence  of  slums,  against  the 
'  city  planners ',  along  familiar  lines.  He  has  said  that  slums  are  a  useful 
form  of  'self-help'  which,  if  anything,  'should  be  preserved'.  See  Link, 
14  Feb.  i960,  and  Swatantra,  29  Nov.  1952. 

50  For  the  harijan  issue,  see  Coupland,  pp.  144  ff.,  and  Swarajya, 
31  Oct.  1959.  A  permissive  bill  was  substituted  for  one  which  would 
have  made  temple  entry  mandatory.  The  former  would  be  akin  to  a  bill 
which  would  permit  Mississippi  racists  to  use  the  principal  of  local  option 
to  admit  Negroes  to  public  facilities.  Rajaji's  daughter  married  Gandhi's 
son:  not  a  typical  inter-caste  marriage  by  any  means.  For  the  argument 
about  traditional  medicine,  see  Rajaji's  Speeches,  I,  50,  and  for  the  business 
communities,  see  ibid.  pp.  178-81.  For  his  statement  about  the  impossi- 
bility of  a  return  to  the  village  economy,  see  Swarajya,  29  Feb.  1963.  The 
author  discussed  the  question  of  social  reform  with  Rajaji  on  two  separate 
occasions,  and  Rajaji's  main  points  were  these:  (1)  no  party  could  turn 
its  back  on  the  processes  set  in  motion  by  the  British  and  the  Congress; 
and  (2)  Swatantra  would  pay  primary  heed  to  defence  needs,  after  which 
rural  welfare  in  general  would  receive  the  highest  priority. 

51  Rajaji's  Speeches,  I,  196. 

52  'Gandhiji's  Teachings',  Swarajya  (Special  Number,  1963),  p.  35. 

53  Quoted  in  Swarajya,  10  Oct.  1959. 

54  Our  Culture,  p.  37. 

55  For  these  two  points  see,  respectively,  HT,  4  Sept.  1959  and  Swarajya, 
29  Feb.  1964. 

56  Rajaji's  Speeches,  II,  180. 

57  Swarajya,  14  March  1959. 

58  Swarajya,  21  Dec.  1963.  My  emphasis. 

59  In  terms  of  the  earlier  argument,  that  statement  that  '  to  let  every 

301 


Notes,  pp.  82-108 

person  act  creatively  as  he  chooses ...  is  the  best  means  of  making  people 
work'  would  encourage  the  son  of  the  village  potter  to  take  up  another 
occupation  if  he  found  it  more  attractive,  whereas  Rajaji  would  normally 
want  him  to  be  disciplined  by  'culture'  and  remain  on  the  job.  The 
tension  between  the  two  has  not  yet  been  resolved,  but  it  would  appear 
that  under  the  pressure  of  the  doctrinal '  dialectic ',  Rajaji  has  been  obliged 
to  shift  somewhat  toward  more  liberal  formulations.  I  think  it  is  fair  to 
say,  however,  that  in  a  contest  between  liberalism  and  conservatism, 
Rajaji  would  be  very  much  on  the  side  of  the  latter. 

60  Morris- Jones,  Government  and  Politics,  p.  156. 

61  From  the  Constituent  Assembly  Debates  (CAD),  iv,  544,  quoted  in 
Morris-Jones,  Parliament  in  India,  p.  82,  n.  3. 

62  Dave,  Munshi,  11,  258-9  and  passim,  ch.  8.  See  ibid,  for  a  discussion 
of  Munshi's  admittedly  ruthless  suppression  of  communal  disturbances 
during  his  term  as  home  minister  of  Bombay,  1937-9. 

63  Quoted  in  HT,  23  April  1961. 

64  Cf.  the  dispute  between  the  Congress  and  the  Muslim  League  prior 
to  independence. 

65  Interviews,  with  Munshi  and  Swatantra  members  drawn  from  these 
minorities,  amply  bear  out  this  point. 

66  Quoted  in  HT3  5  April  1961. 

67  HT,  22  July  1 96 1. 

68  Quoted  in  the  Hindu,  9  Jan.  1961. 

69  For  Munshi  on  zones,  see  the  Hindu,  9  Jan.  1961 ;  for  Rajaji,  see  HT, 
11  March  1961.  For  a  relatively  recent  defence  of  English  by  Munshi, 
see  Swarajya,  1  Sept.  1962,  and  in  general  see  Dave,  Munshi,  II, 
263-5. 

70  Hindu,  22  July  1961,  and  31  Aug.  1962. 

71  See  Donald  Eugene  Smith,  India  as  a  Secular  State  (Princeton, 
Princeton  University  Press,  1963),  p.  241. 

72  For  the  quotation,  see  Dave,  Munshi,  11,  136-7.  See  ibid.  pp.  9-10, 
for  a  statement  along  Arya  Samajist  lines. 

73  Smith,  Secular  State,  p.  485,  during  a  debate  on  the  'Useful  Cattle 
Preservation  Bill,  195 1'.  Nehru  was  adamantly  opposed  to  a  national 
cow-slaughter  prevention  bill,  an  issue  which  has  animated  Hindu 
revivalists  from  the  days  of  Dayanand  Saraswati,  founder  of  the  Arya 
Samaj,  through  Tilak,  Gandhi,  and  others. 

74  Headquarters  in  Bombay,  with  branches  elsewhere.  'Bharat'  is  a 
more  secular  word  for  'India'  than  is  'Hindustan'.  It  is  pertinent  to 
note  here  that  the  full  title  of  the  Jan  Sangh  is  'Bharatiya  Jan  Sangh'. 
Also,  vis-a-vis  Pakistan,  the  Sangh  stands  for  'Akhand  (united)  Bharat', 
while  the  Mahasabha  stands  for  'Akhand  Hindustan'. 

75  From  'What  Bharatiya  Vidya  Bhavan  Stands  For'.  The  complete 
statement  is  available  in  the  fly-leaf  of  many  Bhavan  publications,  in- 
cluding Rajaji's  retellings  of  the  Ramayana  and  the  Mahabharata  for 
modern  audiences.  These  are  almost  perfect  examples  of  what  Munshi 
means  by  the  need  to  relate  old  truths  to  new  circumstances.  In  addition 
to  many  works  by  Rajaji  and  Munshi,  the  Bhavan  has  a  lengthy  list  which 

302 


Notes,  pp.  82-108 

is  not  narrowly  parochial,  i.e.  it  has  published  some  of  Asok  Mehta's 
writings  on  socialism. 

76  Loc.  cit.  Cf.  Rajaji's  statements  about  the  relevance  of  the  Vedas, 
the  Gita,  etc.,  for  modern  times,  in  light  of  modern  science,  notions  of 
citizenship,  and  the  like.  See  also  Bhavan' s  Journal ',  a  periodical  published 
by  the  Bhavan,  and  Hindu,  10,  11  Jan.  and  13  Dec.  1963,  for  other  refer- 
ences to  Munshi  and  the  Bhavan. 

77  Dangerous  Decades,  p.  313.  Raj aji,  in  his  own  way,  would  rank  very 
high  here,  but  Harrison  is  evidently  thinking  of  the  more  militant 
revivalists.  He  should  not  overlook  the  other  main  group,  ably  represented 
by  Rajaji. 

78  According  to  some  of  Munshi's  closest  associates,  he  was  on  more 
than  one  occasion  offered  the  presidency  of  the  Jan  Sangh,  and  according 
to  one  of  these  the  Sangh  considers  him  'as  one  of  their  own*.  From 
interviews  in  Bombay,  1962.  It  is,  of  course,  important  to  note  that 
Munshi  never  joined  the  Sangh.  It  is  also  pertinent  to  note  here  that 
Rajaji  has  been  a  frequent  contributor  to  the  Sangh's  Organiser,  even 
though  he  and  the  Sangh  are  sharply  at  odds  on  Pakistan  and  the  language 
question. 

79  From  a  questionnaire  completed  by  Munshi.  The  same  view  is  pre- 
sented in  Dave,  Munshi,  II. 

80  Ibid.  pp.  263-5. 

81  'Tradition  and  Experiment  in  Forms  of  Government',  in  Philips 
(ed.),  Politics  and  Society,  pp.  158-9. 

82  Sampurnanand  was  at  that  time  Premier  of  UP  and  was  not  in  the 
constituent  assembly.  He  is  now  (1966)  Governor  of  Rajasthan.  His 
statement  was  made  at  a  convocation  address  at  Agra  in  1949,  quoted  by 
Tinker,  in  Philips  (ed.),  Politics  and  Society,  p.  159. 

83  All  from  Constituent  Assembly  debates,  quoted  in  Morris- Jones, 
Parliament  in  India,  p.  88.  For  Munshi's  role,  see  ibid.  pp.  73"89j  and 
Dave,  Munshi,  II,  ch.  8.  For  an  excellent  discussion  of  political  'styles' 
which  bears  on  this  issue,  see  Morris-Jones, '  India's  Political  Idioms ',  in 
Philips  (ed.),  Politics  and  Society,  pp.  i33-54s  or  ch.  2  of  his  Government 
and  Politics. 

84  From  Tinker,  in  Philips  (ed.),  Politics  and  Society,  pp.  159,  157,  and 
160,  respectively. 

85  Dave,  Munshi,  II,  251. 

86  See  ibid.  p.  248  and  ch.  8,  passim. 

87  Concerning  the  President,  see  Munshi,  'Is  the  President  Mere 
Figurehead',  Tide,  30  Jan.  1963  and  'The  President  of  India',  the 
Hindu,  26  Jan.  1963.  Munshi  touches  on  the  role  of  the  attorney-general 
here  as  well,  in  arguing  that  the  President  needs  such  a  legal  adviser,  who 
is  not  removable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  Cabinet  or  Prime  Minister,  as 
would  have  been  the  case  under  the  proposed  law  minister-attorney- 
general  fusion.  In  general,  Munshi  argues  for  autonomous  powers  for  the 
President,  the  supreme  court,  the  attorney-general,  and  kindred  agencies  to 
check  the  power  of  the  Cabinet.  For  a  roughly  comparable  argument,  but 
with  less  attention  to  the  intent  of  the  framers  or  to  general  constitutional 

303 


Notes,  pp.  82-108 

experience,  by  Rajaji,  see  the  Hindu,  9  Dec.  1962.  For  general  background 
on  the  attorney-general-law  minister  issue,  see  the  Hindu,  5  Jan.  1963  and 
HT,  16  Feb.  1963,  the  latter  reporting  that  the  Government  had  decided 
to  abandon  the  proposal.  This  is  one  specific  case  in  which  Swatantra's 
energetic  opposition  helped  to  modify  government  policy.  For  a  more 
detailed  and  semi-official  Swatantra  statement,  see  A.  P.  Jain,  *  The  Case 
of  the  Attorney-General',  mimeo  (no.  6  of  a  series  of  'position'  papers 
prepared  by  the  Swatantra  Parliamentary  Office,  New  Delhi).  This 
document  examined  precedent  in  England  and  in  India  under  the  1935 
Act,  the  'intent  of  the  framers',  and  the  contemporary  issues.  The  con- 
clusion stresses  the  need  for  'independent  legal  counsel'  to  help  check 
abuses  of  power.  The  Swatantra  Parliamentary  Board,  on  13  Jan.  1963, 
passed  a  resolution  condemning  the  proposal,  which  would  have  required 
an  amendment  of  Article  76  of  the  constitution. 

88  The  committee  consisted  of  Munshi,  as  chairman,  and  a  number  of 
other  distinguished  former  judges  and  advocates.  For  a  list  of  the  members 
and  the  terms  of  its  commission,  see  the  General- Secretary's  Report  to 
the  first  national  convention  (Patna),  i960,  pp.  10-11. 

89  That  is,  the  demand  for  a  separate  Punjabi-speaking  state,  which 
would  also  be  a  Sikh-majority  state.  The  criticism  of  Munshi  by  Sikhs  was 
widespread.  See  the  Report  of  the  Punjab  Enquiry  Committee  (Bombay, 
Swatantra  Party,  i960),  and  the  General-Secretary's  Report  to  the  second 
national  convention  (Agra),  1961,  p.  18.  For  press  comments  on  the 
Punjab  report,  see  Swatantra  Newsletter  (SN),  no.  11,  Nov.  i960. 

90  For  some  other  works  by  Munshi,  see  the  bibliography. 

91  Hindu,  21  May  1961. 

92  Communist  Party  of  India,  p.  15. 

93  Based  on  interviews,  Bombay  and  Delhi,  1962-3. 

94  HWR,  28  Aug.  1961. 

95  Government  and  Politics,  p.  156. 

96  Notwithstanding  Savarkar's  effusive  praise  for  the  Parsis  {Hindu 
Rashtra  Darshan,  p.  69),  the  latter  have  nothing  to  gain  and  a  good  deal 
to  lose  from  a  marked  resurgence  of  militant  Hinduism.  In  some  respects, 
the  contrast  between  Rajaji  and  Munshi  has  been  overdrawn,  to  emphasize 
the  difference  in  style.  In  this  connection,  it  is  worth  noting  some  aspects 
of  Rajaji's  relations  with  Christians.  At  one  point,  Rajaji  sent  a  letter  of 
congratulations  to  a  group  of  re-converts  to  Hinduism,  which  in  many 
eyes — Christian  and  non-Christian — was  tantamount  to  Hindu  com- 
munalism.  However,  two  leading  Madras  Swatantrites,  Dr  M.  Santosham 
and  Prof.  M.  Ruthnaswamy,  both  Christians,  regard  Rajaji  very  highly  and 
do  not  feel  that  the  aforementioned  action  makes  him  a  communalist,  and 
their  conclusion  seems  well  taken.  Rajaji  certainly  has  a  tremendous  pride 
in  the  Hindu  tradition  as  he  understands  it,  and  he  is  confident  that  it  can 
be  purged  of  some  of  its  worst  defects,  without  rejecting  it  completely. 
In  this  light,  he  was  naturally  gratified  when  some  '  defectors '  returned 
to  their  spiritual  'home'.  This  is  akin  to  Gandhi's  view  of  swadeshi  as 
applied  to  religion,  viz.  that  one  should  remain  with  one's  ancestral  reli- 
gion and  reform  it  where  it  is  deficient.  Such  a  view  is  not,  however, 

304 


Notes,  pp.  82-108 

equivalent  to  the  militant  demand  for  aggressive  efforts  at  reconversion, 
which  is  a  high-priority  item.  On  this  score,  Rajaji  would  seem  to  escape 
censure,  as  his  Christian  colleagues  argue. 

97  It  is  worth  restating  that  Savarkar,  Hindu  Rashtra,  p.  122,  said  that 
many  non-Hindu  minorities,  but  especially  the  Parsis,  are  '  too  allied  to  us 
in  culture  and  too  patriotic'  to  be  anti-national  or  out  of  the  national 
mainstream.  Still,  the  westernized  Bombay  Parsi  is  quite  isolated  from  the 
dominant '  political  culture '  of  India. 

98  Brecher,  Nehru,  p.  86. 

99  For  the  Swaraj  Party,  see  H.  K.  Singh,  Praja  Socialist  Party,  pp. 
1-4. 

100  See  the  introduction  to  vol.  I  of  Dave,  Munshi,  and  vol.  11,  passim, 
for  these  points.  Both  Munshi  and  Rajaji  were  further  isolated  after  the 
death  of  Sardar  Patel. 

101  See  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades,  pp.  207  ff.  He  notes  (p.  207)  that 
'at  the  end  of  the  war'  Ranga  'was  on  the  far  fringes  of  the  Andhra 
Congress  power  structure ',  in  large  measure  because  he  was  a  Kamma  in 
the  Reddy-dominated  Congress.  In  1945-6  (p.  218),  Ranga  tried  to  organ- 
ize 'a  compact  political  striking  force,  bent  upon  increasing  Kamma  in- 
fluence in  the  Congress  while  at  the  same  time  fighting  the  Communists 
by  reciting  the  story  of  Stalin  and  the  peasant'.  His  fortunes  from  1945  to 
195 1  '  went  first  upward  and  then  to  rock  bottom '  and  he  formed  the  KLP, 
which,  with  the  CPI,  was  one  of  the  '  champions  of  the  delta '  in  Andhra 
(then  still  part  of  Madras).  See  ibid.  pp.  226-8.  For  the  electoral  perform- 
ance of  the  KLP  see  Poplai  (ed.),  1957  Elections',  Mehta,  Political  Mind, 
pp.  10-12,  23  and  27;  and  Kogekar  and  Park,  Reports,  chapter  on  Madras. 
The  KLP  had  some  strength  among  the  Jats  of  Rajasthan,  particularly  in 
Bharatpur  district,  in  Gujarat,  and  elsewhere.  For  the  association  with  the 
Congress,  see  77,  23  Aug.  1957,  where  it  is  noted  that  there  were  31 
members  of  the  APCC  executive, '  but  no  room  has  been  found  in  such  a 
large  body  for  Mr  N.  G.  Ranga'.  See  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades, 
pp.  283  ff.,  and  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  p.  260,  for  somewhat  conflicting 
statements  on  the  precise  relationship  between  the  KLP  and  the  Congress. 
Upon  his  resignation  from  the  Congress  in  1959,  Ranga  was  confronted 
with  a  demand  that  he  resign  from  the  Lok  Sabha  as  well,  at  which  point 
Ranga  insisted  that  he  was  not  formally  a  Congressman  when  he  was 
elected,  even  though  in  1959  he  was  Secretary  of  the  Congress  parlia- 
mentary party. 

102  For  his  letter  of  resignation  and  other  pertinent  material  see  Ranga, 
Freedom  in  Peril,  pp.  148-59  and  passim.  The  long  and  turbulent  career 
of  this  man  provides  an  excellent  case  study  in  the  role  of  caste,  ideology, 
and  power  factors,  and  their  interaction,  in  Indian  politics,  although  this 
cannot  be  gone  into  here. 

103  This  is  irrelevant  in  the  sense  that  it  does  not  tell  us  very  much  about 
critical  aspects  of  Swatantra's  contribution  to  Indian  political  life.  It  is 
not  irrelevant  to  the  extent  that  the  quest  for  power  is  held  in  very  low 
esteem  in  India.  Such  charges  against  Swatantra  could  remotely  affect 
its  political  fortunes. 

20  3°5  esp 


Notes,  pp.  109-146 

104  Recall  here  the  appeal  to  Narayan  to  assume  the  leadership  of  the 
party.  Even  the  more  moderate  Swatantra  leaders  did  not  drag  their  heels 
as  much  as  did  the  aristocrats,  who  were  not  prominent  in  the  early  days 
of  the  party.  As  we  shall  see,  however,  the  aristocrats  are  of  crucial 
importance  to  Swatantra.  An  important  aspect  of  this  important  issue  is 
the  fact  that  the  princes  in  particular  have  considerable  residual  appeal 
but  are  often  not  attuned  to  competitive  party  politics.  The  following 
chapters  develop  this  point  at  great  length. 

105  Based  on  interviews  in  Bombay,  1962. 

chapter  6,  pp.  109-146 

1  The  last  of  the  party's  twenty-one  'fundamental  principles'  gives 
members  complete  freedom  on  all  issues  not  covered  in  the  preceding 
twenty  principles.  See  chapter  8. 

2  E.  P.  W.  daCosta,  '  Indian  Politics  Today  and  Tomorrow — Assess- 
ment and  Prophecy',  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  xxvn,  5  (4  Feb.  i960), 
161. 

3  The  Tamilnad  Democratic  Party  to  which  daCosta  referred  is  pre- 
sumably the  INDC,  previously  known  as  the  Congress  Reform  Com- 
mittee (CRC). 

4  Preparatory  Convention,  p.  27. 

5  77,  28  July  1959,  reported  that  the  INDC  had  voted  unanimously  to 
merge. 

6  As  late  as  HWR,  17  April  1 961,  it  was  reported  only  that  the  INDC 
'has  practically  identified  itself  with. .  .Swatantra'.  By  this  time,  many 
INDC  men  had  already  dissociated  themselves  from  Swatantra,  citing  the 
reactionary  views  of  Rajaji  and  the  party  generally.  See  Link,  24  April  i960. 
Biographical  sketches  of  some  leading  INDC- Swatantra  men  are  found  in 
Souvenir  i960,  pp.  100  and  107. 

7  George  Rosen,  Democracy  and  Economic  Change  in  India  (Berkeley, 
University  of  California  Press,  1965)  and  Andre  Beteille,  Caste,  Class,  and 
Power  (Berkeley,  University  of  California  Press,  1965)^  both  refer  to 
Rajaji's  appeal  to  and  support  for  Swatantra  from  Brahmins. 

8  Link,  30  Dec.  1962.  For  the  discussion  of  the  INDC,  I  am  indebted  to 
L.  I.  Rudolph,  who  has  provided  me  with  much  information,  much  of 
which  appears  in  his  'Urban  Life',  J  AS,  xx. 

9  For  the  quotation,  see  Link,  31  Jan.  i960.  This  account  notes  that  the 
Toilers  Party  is  based  largely  on  'the  backward  Vanniya  community'. 

10  See  L.I.  Rudolph,  'Urban  Life',  J  AS,  xx,  and  Rudolph  and 
Rudolph,  'Political  Role',  PA,  xxxm.  According  to  the  former,  p.  294, 
both  parties  had  merged  with  the  Congress  after  Rajaji's  departure  and 
the  subsequent  'democratization'  of  the  Congress  under  Kamaraj. 
According  to  information  supplied  by  L.  I.  Rudolph,  the  Toilers  split, 
with  part  going  to  Swatantra,  part  to  the  Congress,  and  part  to  the  CPI. 
This  is  a  most  important  development,  because  only  very  shortly  before, 
both  Toilers  and  Commonweal  were  fairly  compact  action  arms  of  the 
Vanniyars.  For  Padayachi,  see  also  SN,  no.  6,  April-May  i960. 

306 


Notes,  pp.  109-146 

11  Rajaji  mentioned  the  possibility  of  a  merger  at  one  point  but  it  never 
came  about.  After  Thevar's  death,  Swatantra  and  the  Forward  Bloc 
combined  against  the  Congress  in  the  by-election  but  were  defeated. 

12  Statesman,  5  Feb.  1962. 

13  Preparatory  Convention,  p.  28. 

14  According  to  Hindu,  21  Sept.  1959,  Janata  formally  voted  to  merge 
on  20  September. 

15  Darbhanga  was  also  a  leader  of  the  effort  to  have  zamindari  abolition 
legislation  invalidated  in  the  courts,  and  he  opposed  the  Hindu  Code 
reforms.  He  himself  did  not  join  Swatantra  or  openly  support  it,  about 
which  more  will  be  said  below.  For  the  Jan  Congress,  see  Souvenir 
i960,  p.  112,  and  SN,  no.  3,  Jan.  i960. 

16  From  an  interview  with  Paliwal  in  Agra,  1962.  This  discussion  is 
based  almost  entirely  on  that  interview. 

17  Ibid. 

18  As  early  as  HT,  28  June  1959,  Paliwal  was  reported  to  have  been 
co-opted  to  the  Swatantra  executive  bodies.  For  the  Gram  Raj  merger, 
see  SN,  no.  1,  Oct.  1959.  According  to  SN,  no.  6,  April-May  i960, 
Paliwal  led  a  group  of  twenty-three  MLAs  in  the  UP  legislature. 

19  For  Nagoke's  letter  of  resignation  see  SN,  no.  1,  Oct.  1959. 

20  See  Ranga,  'The  Story',  Souvenir  i960. 

21  Delhi  Hindustan  Standard,  15  July  1959. 

22  77,  25  Feb.  1962. 

23  Nagoke  served  with  Munshi,  Prof.  M.  Ruthnaswamy,  and  Maharani 
Gayatri  Devi  of  Jaipur  as  Vice-Presidents. 

24  HWR,  20  Nov.  1961. 

25  See  above,  chapter  4. 

26  See  Link,  7  Feb.  i960,  where  it  was  stated  that  Ramgarh  was 
negotiating  with  Orissa  princes;  Link,  18  April  1 961,  for  a  report  of  later 
talks;  and  HWR,  25  Jan.  i960,  where  Kalahandi  is  quoted  as  saying  that 
talk  of  merger  was  '  baseless '  and  that  there  were  no  discussions  whatever 
concerning  a  merger. 

27  For  a  discussion  of  the  advantages  of  coalition  from  the  Parishad- 
Swatantra  standpoint  see  TI,  19  May  i960.  The  writer  of  the  account 
suggested  that  the  coalition  would  be  maintained  (as  far  as  the  Parishad 
and  Swatantra  were  concerned)  until  the  eve  of  the  1962  general  elections, 
at  which  time  the  Parishad  might  be  more  willing  to  consider  a  merger 
with  Swatantra. 

28  For  the  quotation,  see  TI,  3  April  1961.  See  also  Link,  16  April 
1961. 

29  This  was  Harihar  Das,  son  of  a  former  Congress  Chief  Minister. 

30  See  TI,  18  April  1 961,  for  a  condemnation  of  the  proposed  accord  by 
Sanjiva  Ready,  who  said  that  this  proved  that  the  Parishad  was  truly 
reactionary;  TI,  19  April  1961,  noted  that  no  accord  was  reached  and  that 
Ramgarh  was  engaged  in  further  talks;  TI,  26  April  1 961,  for  a  report  that 
the  state  Swatantra  unit  wanted  to  contest  the  elections  but  would  under 
no  circumstances  fight  the  Parishad.  For  another  statement  on  co- 
operation in  the  mid-term  elections,  see  HT,  6  April  1961. 

307  20-2 


Notes,  pp.  109-146 

31  Based  on  interviews  with  Kalahandi,  Patna,  and  Lokanath  Misra 
(MP,  Rajya  Sabha),  New  Delhi,  1963. 

32  For  a  preliminary  report  on  the  talks  see  77,  12  Oct.  1961.  For  the 
latter,  see  HWR,  20  Nov.  1961.  The  discussions  dwelt  on  many  organi- 
zational and  policy  matters,  such  as  the  relationship  between  the  infant 
Swatantra  organization  in  Orissa  and  that  of  the  Parishad  and  the  extent 
to  which  the  Parishad  could  continue  to  emphasize  local  issues. 

33  HWR,  20  Nov.  1 96 1.  The  statement  announced  that  details  would 
be  discussed  by  Masani  and  Ranga  for  Swatantra  and  by  Dr  Ram  Prasad 
Misra  (President),  Kalahandi  and  Patna,  for  the  Parishad.  The  actual 
merger  was  postponed  until  after  the  1962  elections,  because  of  the 
problem  with  respect  to  the  electoral  symbol.  Had  the  merger  taken  place 
in  1961,  the  Parishad- Swatantra  candidates  would  have  been  obliged  to 
use  the  Swatantra  star  symbol,  rather  than  the  familiar  Parishad  bow-and- 
arrow.  The  Election  Commission  could  have  made  an  exception  but  it 
refused,  in  part  because  it  had  already  made  an  exception  for  Ramgarh 
who  asked  to  use  the  Janata  bicycle  symbol  instead  of  the  star. 

34  From  an  interview  with  a  Parishad  leader  who  has  asked  to  remain 
nameless  here. 

35  From  Swatantra  Party  files. 

36  From  an  interview  with  Kalahandi,  New  Delhi,  1963. 

37  Ibid.  The  reference  to  the  umbrella  was  prompted  by  talks,  after  the 
Chinese  invasion  in  1962,  of  a  US-UK  'air  umbrella'  to  protect  India 
against  air  attack.  With  respect  to  funds,  the  Parishad  received  at  least 
Rs.  250,000  from  Swatantra  for  the  1962  elections. 

38  See  HWR,  7  March  i960,  and  SN,  no.  6,  April-May  i960. 

39  See  Morris-Jones,  Government  and  Politics,  p.  160,  and  chapters  4 
and  5  above  for  some  points  on  Ranga,  the  KLP,  and  the  Democratic 
Party.  See  also  SN,  no.  2,  Nov.  1959;  HT3  13  Feb.  1962;  and  Hindu, 
14  Feb.  1962. 

40  For  Gujarat,  see  Kirtidev  Desai, '  Emergence  of  the  Swatantra  Party 
in  Gujarat',  Journal  of  the  Gujarat  Research  Society  (JGRS),  xxv,  2 
(April  1963),  143-51,  and  Devavrat  Pathak,  M.  G.  Parekh  and  Kirtidev 
Desai,  Three  General  Elections  in  Gujarat  (Ahmedabad,  Gujarat  Univer- 
sity, 1966),  passim. 

41  There  were  also  some  defections  from  some  of  these  parties,  about 
which  more  will  be  said  below. 

42  See  Link,  14  Feb.  i960;  and  SN,  no.  8,  July  i960,  no.  11,  Oct.  i960, 
no.  21,  Aug.  1 96 1,  and  no.  17,  April  1961.  These  groups  were  not  of 
uniformly  high  status. 

43  See  SN,  no.  7,  June  i960,  and  Link,  14  Feb.  i960. 

44  For  Gujarat  kshatryas  see  Kothari  and  Maru, '  Caste  and  Secular- 
ism', J  AS,  xxv,  35-50;  Weiner,  MS;  Desai,  JGRS,  xxv,  143-51;  and 
Pathak  et  al.  Three  General  Elections,  passim. 

45  Ibid. 

46  Certain  Gujarat  Rajputs,  in  particular,  cited  'external'  influence. 

47  E.g.  Kamma  and  Reddy  landed  interests. 

48  Based  in  part  on  biographical  data  in  Souvenir  i960  and  on  informa- 

308 


Notes,  pp.  109-146 

tion  supplied  by  Miss  Carolyn  Elliot,  who  did  field  work  in  Andhra  for 
two  years  (1962-4)  as  a  Fulbright  grantee. 

49  See  the  list  in  Preparatory  Convention,  pp.  36-40. 

50  Paul  Brass,  Factional  Politics  in  an  Indian  State  (Berkeley,  University 
of  California  Press  1965),  ch.  4,  'Gonda'. 

51  See  SN,  no.  3,  Jan.  i960,  for  the  Punjab  and  Bhinai;  and  no.  7, 
June  i960,  for  Dungarpur.  For  Bhalindra  Singh  see  HT,  16  Sept.  1959, 
and  for  the  later  entry  of  Banswara  see  SN,  no.  21,  Aug.  1961,  and  TI, 
25  Oct.  1961. 

52  For  Bhadawar,  Statesman,  14  Feb.  1962.  He  had  joined  the  party 
much  earlier  than  the  date  of  this  report,  however.  For  further  material  on 
Mankapur,  Statesman,  29  Jan.  1962. 

53  For  Kaluhera,  SN,  no.  6,  April-May  i960.  The  statement  by  Zamin- 
dar  is  from  party  files. 

54  See  HT,  29  Jan.  1961,  for  her  entry.  One  such  reluctant  jagirdar  was 
Major  Thakur  Raghubir  Singh  of  Bissau,  to  whom  the  government  still 
owed  substantial  compensation  payments.  A  successful  RRP  candidate 
for  the  assembly  in  1952,  Bissau  joined  Congress  prior  to  the  1957  elec- 
tions (though  he  was  not  given  a  Congress  ticket),  and  then  lost  interest  in 
active  politics  until  the  Maharani  brought  her  pressure  to  bear  on  him  and 
other  jagirdar s. 

55  See  Statesman,  7  May  1 961,  for  a  statement  by  Gayatri  Devi  about 
her  husband's  political  career. 

56  See  HT,  29  Jan.  1961,  and  Link,  12  March  1961,  for  some  remarks 
about  the  durbar  and  for  Ranga's  remark  that  it  was  'silly'.  For  Lok 
Sabha  comment,  Link,  5  March  1961. 

57  Jodhpur's  death  in  an  airplane  crash  immediately  after  the  elections 
contributed  to  the  collapse  of  the  front,  which  was  precarious,  in  any 
event,  due  to  the  split  between  'big'  and  'little'  Rajputs. 

58  Link,  5  Feb.  1961.  See  also  Statesman,  22  Oct.  1961. 

59  For  Congress  consideration  of  this  question,  see  HWR,  29  May  and 
28  Aug.  1 96 1,  and  Link,  21  May  1961. 

60  Statesman,  22  Oct.  1961. 

61  See  Link,  21  Feb.  i960,  and  HT,  12  May  i960.  The  early  date  sug- 
gests a  healthy  respect  for  the  possibility  of  an  anti-Congress  Rajput 
resurgence,  before  the  Maharani's  entry.  According  to  the  former  report, 
Sukhadia, '  in  his  anxiety  to  gain  supporters,  seems  to  have  overlooked  the 
fact  that  most  of  the  new  entrants  to  his  cabinet  are  not  ideologically  at 
one  with  him.  Ex-ruler  Harishchandra  often  sounds  like  a  Swatantri.' 
The  former  Chief  Minister,  Jai  Narain  Vyas,  had  built  up  his  power  in 
part  by  cultivating  Rajput  support. 

62  Statesman,  22  Oct.  1 961.  In  a  wise  move,  Vyas  did  not  in  fact  contest 
against  the  Maharani,  whose  majority  was  so  great  that  all  other  candidates 
forfeited  their  security  deposits.  Vyas  would  have  been  wiser  still  had  he 
not  stood  against  Maharajkumar  Jai  Singh  of  Jaipur,  one  of  the  Maha- 
raja's sons  by  a  previous  marriage — as  he  lost  this  contest  for  an  assembly 
seat. 

63  Based  on  party  files. 

309 


Notes,  pp.  109-146 

64  Devgadh-Baria  had  married  a  daughter  of  the  Jaipur  family,  but  he 
and  his  wife  had  separated. 

65  Based  on  party  files. 

66  See  Link,  13  and  20  March  and  17  April  1960,  for  these  points. 

67  E.g.  M.  A.  Sreenivasan,  to  be  discussed  below,  and  B.  V.  Narayana 
Reddy,  once  a  joint  treasurer  with  Mody.  Reddy  had  been  with  the  State 
Bank  of  Mysore. 

68  See,  for  example,  Link,  31  July  i960. 

69  Link,  15  Jan.  1961.  Bastar  was  finally  deposed. 

70  Based  on  interviews.  In  a  major  party  split,  some  state  leaders  of 
Swatantra  supported  an  independent  candidate  against  the  Maharaja, 
over  the  decision  of  the  local  unit.  Baroda's  brother  was  scheduled  to 
contest  an  assembly  seat  for  Swatantra  in  the  1967  elections. 

71  Link,  5  Feb.  1961,  reported  that  Bikaner  had  'apparently'  joined 
Swatantra  and  other  sources  reported  the  same  news. 

72  See  TI,  25  Oct.  1961,  where  it  is  noted  that  she  would  campaign 
with  Gayatri  Devi  and  the  two  Maharanis  of  Banswara.  See  Statesman, 
22  Nov.  1961,  for  a  statement  by  Rajaji  to  the  effect  that  she  would  only 
endorse  a  slate  of  candidates  but  would  neither  contest  herself  nor 
campaign  for  her  endorsed  slate. 

73  Link,  28  May  1961. 

74  The  Maharani  of  Jaipur,  Himmatsinhji  of  Kutch,  Dungarpur,  and 
Devgadh-Baria  also  campaigned  for  Masani.  At  least  the  Yuvarajes  of 
Wankaner  and  Jasdan  have  since  openly  joined  Swatantra,  along  with  a 
number  of  other  Saurashtra  aristocrats. 

75  See  Statesman,  13  Feb.  1962,  and  TI,  16  Feb.  1962.  In  late  1966  it 
was  announced  that  Bharatpur  would  stand  as  an  independent  against 
Congress. 

76  HT,  14  and  22  Jan.  1962,  and  Statesman,  30  Jan.  1962. 

77  From  an  interview  in  1962. 

78  For  Sukhadia's  remark,  Link,  25  Jan.  1961. 

79  Swatantra  was  most  worried  about  the  Maharani's  ability  to  fight  an 
energetic  campaign,  but  she  has  declared  her  intention  to  do  so.  There 
have  also  been  reports  that  Jaipur  would  resign  his  ambassadorial  post 
prior  to  the  1967  elections. 

80  TI,  15  and  16  Jan.  1961,  for  the  quotations. 

81  Link  delights  in  pointing  out  'feudal'  elements  in  Swatantra  (as  does 
SN,  but  without  the  same  flourish,  or  bias).  See  Link,  13  and  20  March, 
10  and  17  April,  25  Sept.,  10  Oct.  and  18  Dec.  i960;  15  Jan.,  5, 12  and  26 
Feb.,  9  April,  28  May  and  22  Aug.  1961,  for  some  salient  examples. 

82  From  an  interview,  Delhi,  1962. 

83  From  an  interview,  Delhi,  1963. 

84  From  an  interview,  Delhi,  1963. 

85  From  a  questionnaire. 

86  From  an  interview,  Jaipur,  1962.  In  interviews,  virtually  every 
Swatantra  aristocrat  made  substantially  the  same  comment. 

87  This  was  quoted  in  chapter  2. 

88  From  a  report  on  the  1962  elections  in  Bihar,  submitted  to  the 

310 


Notes,  pp.  109-146 

central  office  by  Ramgarh.  These  words  were  widely  quoted  in  the  press 
and  SN. 

89  My  Humble  Contributions,  p.  148.  For  other  statements  by  Kalahandi 
which  suggest  his  'resilient'  outlook,  see  ibid.  pp.  39-4*3  61-2,  74-5,  103, 
107,  146-8  and  264. 

90  Lloyd  I.  and  Susanne  H.  Rudolph,  mimeo  on  political  development 
in  Rajasthan.  (This  is  not  the  same  as  Susanne  Rudolph,  MS,  from  which 
we  have  quoted  above.)  This  material  will  appear  in  their  The  Modernity 
of  Tradition:  Political  Development  in  India  (Chicago,  University  of 
Chicago  Press,  1967). 

91  They  make  the  argument  particularly  with  respect  to  the  Jaipur 
family. 

92  The  questionnaire  asked  which  Congressmen  at  the  national  or  state 
level  were  sympathetic  to  the  Swatantra  point  of  view. 

93  Based  on  an  interview,  Bombay,  1962. 

94  Quoted  in  Modern  Review,  cv,  6  (June  1959),  438.  See  also  Hindu, 
15  Sept.  1959,  for  a  comparable  statement. 

95  From  an  interview,  Bombay,  1962. 

96  E.g.  Vasantrao  Oak  and  Mrs  Manmohini  Sehgal  in  the  Delhi  unit 
were  political  itinerants  who  inspired  little  confidence. 

97  HT,  26  June  1961.  Mahtab  was  Chief  Minister  in  the  Congress- 
Parishad  coalition  ministry. 

98  During  1962-3  there  were  frequent  press  reports  of  statements  by 
Mahtab  and  Hanumanthaya,  along  these  lines. 

99  From  an  interview,  Delhi,  1962.  See  his  privately  printed  volume 
The  Second  Phase,  a  collection  of  speeches  made  in  the  Rajya  Sabha. 
Much  of  Dahyabhai's  distress  flows  from  the  fact  that  the  Congress  failed 
to  honour  his  father's  memory  properly.  This  bitterness  notwithstanding, 
his  Rajya  Sabha  performance  has  been  quite  good. 

100  Based  on  a  questionnaire.  See  also  TI,  16  July  1959,  for  Patel  and 
Joshi. 

101  See  Pathak  et  al.  Three  General  Elections;  Desai,  JGRS,  xxv;  Dr 
Bhailalbhai  Patel  75th  Birthday  Souvenir  (Vallabh  Vidyanagar,  Charutar 
Vidyamandal,  1963),  and  Shri  Bhailalbhai  Patel  70th  Birthday  Souvenir 
(Vallabh  Vidyanagar,  Charutar  Vidyamandal,  1958).  The  last  two  volumes 
contain  material  in  both  English  and  Gujarati. 

102  Link,  6  March  i960.  E.  M.  S.  Nambudiripad,  CPI  leader  in  Kerala, 
asked  Chatter jee  to  conduct  an  inquiry  into  conditions  in  that  state. 
See  also  chapter  3,  above,  and  TI,  11  July  1959  (for  the  Sangh's  interest 
in  Chatterjee). 

103  Based  on  an  interview,  Madras,  1962. 

104  Based  on  a  questionnaire,  to  which  he  appended  a  lengthy,  un- 
solicited statement  about  the  Indian  party  system. 

105  The  Lok  Sabha  Who's  Who  (New  Delhi,  Lok  Sabha  Secretariat, 
1962),  will  provide  pertinent  biographical  data.  For  Aney,  see  Sunday 
Standard,  28  April  1963.  The  above  account  is  based  on  interviews  and 
party  files. 

106  Based  on  interviews  and  party  files. 

311 


Notes,  pp.  109-146 

107  Based  on  an  interview,  Bombay,  1963.  Lobo  Prabhu  held  high  posts 
in  Madras  and  at  the  centre.  See  his  weekly  publication  Insight  (Manga- 
lore)  and  his  frequent  contributions  to  Swarajya.  See  also  his  New 
Thinking  (Bombay,  India  Book  House,  1959),  which  is  an  analysis  of  the 
second  five-year  plan;  his  Third-Plan  X-Rayed  (n.d.),  reprinted  from 
Commerce,  24  Sept.  and  1,  8,  15  and  29  Oct.  i960;  and  his  Industrial 
Policy  (Calcutta,  Society  for  the  Propagation  of  Democratic  Truth,  1963), 
for  more  elaborate  statements  on  economic  affairs. 

108  Based  on  questionnaires.  Sreenivasan  is  associated  with  a  number 
of  the  premier  textile  and  plantation  industries  in  South  India. 

109  For  V.  N.  Rao,  see  Swarajya,  29  Aug.  1959,  and  for  a  later  discus- 
sion of  the  function  of  his  office,  see  V.  T.  Sreenivasan, '  Can  the  Comptrol- 
ler and  Auditor-General  Make  Himself  Felt?',  Swarajya  (Special 
Number,  1963).  pp.  117-20.  For  Pasricha,  see  'Our  Stuporous  Society', 
Quest  (April-June  1962),  pp.  32-3,  and  'Free  Economy  and  the  Wealth 
of  Nations'  (Delhi,  Swatantra  Party,  1963),  the  latter  being  adapted  from 
Swarajya  (Special  Number,  1963).  Menon's  'Planning  Commission  and 
State  Autonomy',  Swarajya  (Special  Number,  1962),  pp.  98-9,  is  also 
useful  here. 

no  See  Shri  H.  M.  Patel  60th  Birthday  Commemoration  Volume 
(Vallabh  Vidyanagar,  Charutar  Vidyamandal,  1964),  with  material  in  both 
English  and  Gujarati.  Patel  was  secretary  in  the  finance  ministry  during 
the  Mundhra  scandal  but  was  cleared  after  an  inquiry.  He  resigned,  how- 
ever, and  soon  took  up  work  with  Bhailalbhai  Patel,  whom  he  eventually 
replaced  as  head  of  some  Vallabh  Vidyanagar  activities.  There  was  also 
some  pressure  in  1966  to  have  H.  M.  Patel  replace  Bhaikaka  as  leader  of 
Swatantra  in  Gujarat,  but  thus  far,  H.  M.  Patel  has  contented  himself 
with  a  major  re-organization  of  the  state  party  apparatus,  which  has  placed 
the  Gujarat  unit  on  much  sounder  footing. 
in     The  business  recruits  will  be  discussed  separately  below. 

112  For  mention  of  ICS  distress  see  S.  H.  Rudolph,  'Consensus  and 
Conflict',  World  Politics,  xm;  Zinkin,  India  Changes,  where  the  ICS 
men  are  listed  with  the  princes,  landlords,  and  some  businessmen  as  the 
'dispossessed'  of  post-independence  India;  and  Nehru,  The  Discovery  of 
India,  ed.  and  abridged  by  R.  Crane  (Garden  City,  Anchor  Books,  i959)> 
pp.  297  ff.,  for  the  ICS  between  1937  and  1939. 

113  See,  for  example,  A.  D.  Gorwala,  'The  Administration  Today', 
Swarajya  (Special  Number,  1962),  pp.  51-2. 

114  Patel  was  quite  popular  among  ICS  men  because  they  felt  that  he 
tried  to  protect  the  services  against  erosion,  demoralization,  meddling, 
etc. 

115  Quoted  in  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades,  pp.  3  and  91. 

116  From  a  questionnaire,  where  this  opinion  was  volunteered,  i.e.  no 
question  raised  this  issue  or  anything  close  to  it. 

117  From  an  interview  in  Bombay,  1963. 

118  Swarajya,  4  Sept.  and  24  July  1965,  respectively. 

119  Swarajya,  24  July  1965. 

120  From  an  interview,  Jaipur,  1963. 

312 


Notes,  pp.  109-146 

121  See  77,  8  July  1959,  and  Delhi  Hindustan  Standard,  9  July  1959. 

122  See  Swarajya,  8  and  25  May  1965. 

123  Aristocrats,  administrators,  and  other  professionals  joined  in  this 
view,  but  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  aristocrats  are  very  likely  to 
succeed  in  the  battle  for  votes  (even  where  they  find  the  competitive  party 
system  distasteful),  whereas  administrators  are  not. 

124  Quoted  SN3  no.  18,  May  1961. 

125  Swarajya,  9  Jan.  1965. 

126  'Where  Ministers  Accumulate  and  Administration  Decays', 
Swarajya  (Special  Number,  1962),  p.  57. 

127  'Swatantra  Party's  Contribution  to  Democracy',  Souvenir  1961, 
p.  36,  and,  in  general,  pp.  36-8. 

128  See  the  discussion  of  business  ideology,  chapter  2,  above. 

129  The  suffering  may  be  more  psychological  than  material,  although 
prohibition  in  Bombay  hurt  Parsis  economically.  A  number  of  Parsi  and 
Christian  leaders  interviewed  in  India  emphasized  the  fact  that  they  felt 
'at  sea'  since  the  British  left  and  that  they  had  turned  to  Swatantra 
because  of  the  latter's  more  moderate,  tolerant  perspectives. 

130  See  the  discussion  of  Rajaji  in  chapter  5  above. 

131  See  the  discussion  of  Masani  in  chapter  5  above. 

132  An  intentionally  vague  question  was  asked  about  the  respondent's 
feelings  about  the  Hindu  Code.  This  does  not  mean  that  all  supporters 
of  the  Code  are  ipso  facto  liberal  or  modern  or  that  all  opponents  are 
ipso  facto  conservative  or  reactionary;  but  in  the  context  of  social  back- 
ground, etc.,  of  the  respondents,  the  responses  become  very  significant. 

133  See  the  titles  cited  in  the  discussion  of  Lobo  Prabhu,  in  the  pre- 
ceding section  of  this  chapter. 

134  'Fifteen  Years  of  Democracy',  Swarajya  (Special  Number,  1962), 
p.  36.  Cf.  Rajaji's  'Gandhiji's  Teachings',  Swarajya  (Special  Number, 
1963). 

135  'Our  Stuporous  Society',  Quest  (April-June  1962),  pp.  23-38,  is 
the  source  for  all  of  these  remarks  by  Pasricha. 

136  Some  of  these  limitations  are  discussed  below;  others  will  be 
evident  from  an  examination  of  the  electoral  data  in  the  tables  in 
Appendix  II. 

137  Latchanna,  state  President  in  Andhra,  is  the  most  notable  harijan 
office  bearer. 

138  This  will  be  discussed  further  in  the  next  chapter.  At  the  national 
level,  we  have  already  noted  the  presence  of  two  Parsis  in  the  inner  circle. 
For  a  time,  two  Hindus  (Munshi  and  Gayatri  Devi)  served  with  a 
Christian  (Ruthnaswamy)  and  a  Sikh  (Nagoke)  as  Vice-Presidents.  In 
Madras,  Ruthnaswamy  and  Dr  M.  Santosham,  a  Christian  doctor,  are 
prominent,  although  most  leaders  are  high  caste  Hindus.  In  Mysore,  we 
find  a  Jain  (Hegde),  a  Lingayat  (Rao  Bahadur  B.  L.  Patil),  a  Christian 
(Lobo  Prabhu)  and  a  Muslim  (Imam),  among  the  top  leaders. 

139  See  the  tables  in  Appendix  II. 

140  Ibid. 

141  The  state  of  Rajasthan  was  divided  into  zones,  for  electoral  and 

313 


Notes,  pp.  147-187 

organizational  purposes,  and  all  three  Swatantra  MPs  came  from  the 
Maharani's  zone.  This  zonal  division  will  be  discussed  further  in  the  next 
chapter. 

142  See  Hindu,  14  May  1960,  for  Reddiar's  defection  and  HWR, 
7  March  1960,  for  the  return  to  Congress  of  ten  ML  As  who  had  followed 
Ranga. 

143  R.  P.  Misra,  once  Parishad  President,  entered  the  Congress,  as  did 
Rani  Nabakumari  Devi,  also  of  the  Parishad.  S.  Supakar,  another  former 
President,  responded  to  the  merger  by  declaring  that  he  would  not  him- 
self stand  as  a  candidate  and  that  he  would  not  support  the  party's 
candidates  actively.  See  HT,  12  Feb.  and  22  April  1962,  for  Supakar, 
Misra,  and  the  Rani.  Swatantra  leaders  were  adamant  after  Misra  entered 
the  Congress,  claiming  that  Patnaik  had  engaged  in  unethical  practices  to 
weaken  opposition  parties. 

chapter  7,  pp.  147-187 

1  See  chapter  8  for  Swatantra's  formal  doctrine. 

2  Not  all  *  modern'  men  are  liberal,  but  the  emphasis  here  will  be  on 
those  in  Swatantra  who  are  inclined  to  be  both. 

3  See  above,  chapter  5,  for  details  of  Rajaji's  views. 

4  Based  on  interviews,  Delhi,  1962  and  1963. 

5  Based  on  party  files. 

6  Based  on  interviews  and  on  Link,  31  July  i960  and  12  Nov.  1961. 
Morris- Jones,  Government  and  Politics,  p.  156,  also  refers  to  the  use  of 
religious  appeals  by  Swatantra.  See  also  chapter  8,  below,  for  this  point. 

7  For  a  discussion  of  this  general  issue,  see  77,  24  Oct.  1966. 

8  Based  on  questionnaire  data. 

9  Communist  Party  of  India,  p.  231. 

10  See  the  statement  by  B.  Madhok,  OHT,  13  May  1965.  SN,  no.  4, 
Feb.  i960,  refers  to  the  inclusion  of  Hindu,  Muslim,  Parsi,  and  Christian 
prayers,  hymns,  etc.,  at  Bombay  City  meetings. 

11  Based  on  interviews,  party  files,  and  correspondence. 

12  Based  on  extended  interviews  with  all  major  Swatantra  leaders  in 
Rajasthan,  Jaipur,  1962  and  1963.  The  Gujarat  case  was  discussed  in 
chapter  6,  above. 

13  Based  on  interviews  and  correspondence. 

14  Based  on  interviews,  Jaipur,  1962  and  1963. 

15  Based  on  interviews  and  party  files.  Man  Singh  has  since  resigned. 

16  Based  on  interviews,  Jaipur,  1962  and  1963. 

17  Based  on  correspondence.  Padayachi  has  founded  a  new,  strictly  local 
party  once  again. 

18  Based  on  party  files  and  correspondence. 

19  Bhailalbhai  Patel's  death  would  also  encourage  aristocrats  in  Gujarat 
to  assert  their  position. 

20  Government  and  Politics,  p.  160. 

21  From  a  questionnaire.  Other  Orissa  respondents  made  much  the 
same  comment. 

314 


Notes,  pp.  147-187 

22  Statesman,  7  May  1961.  Dungarpur  is  reported  to  have  admitted  the 
existence  of  considerable  bitterness  between  Rajputs  and  Jats,  but  he  did 
not  elaborate  on  what  he  meant  by  'unusual'  concessions.  Little  has  been 
done,  to  this  date,  to  gain  the  confidence  of  the  Jats. 

23  Based  on  party  files  and  interviews. 

24  Based  on  party  files. 

25  From  a  questionnaire. 

26  Translated  for  the  author  from  the  Hindi  weekly  Chetana,  17  April 
1962,  from  a  copy  in  Swatantra  files. 

27  Translated  from  Chetana,  15  May  1962.  In  this  article,  many  leading 
Swatantrites  (in  UP  and  elsewhere)  were  mentioned  by  name. 

28  See  OHT,  12  Sept.  1963. 

29  Hindu,  14  Sept.  1959. 

30  'The  National  Appeal  of  the  Swatantra  Party',  Souvenir  1961,  p.  40. 

31  Ibid. 

32  Ibid.  For  an  important  study  which  bears  upon  the  matter  of  the 
respectability  of  party,  see  Harvey  Mansfield,  Jr.,  Statesmanship  and 
Party  Government  (Chicago,  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1965). 

33  'National  Appeal',  Souvenir  1961,  p.  40. 

34  Ibid.  pp.  40-1. 

35  Based  on  interviews,  Bombay,  1962. 

36  From  an  interview.  In  a  lighter  vein,  another  Swatantra  leader  said, 
'  Ramgarh  has  an  inferiority  complex ...  he  thinks  he's  Napoleon ! ' 

37  From  an  interview,  Agra,  1962. 

38  Based  on  interviews,  1962  and  1963. 

39  Based  on  interviews. 

40  Swarajya,  19  Sept.  1964. 

41  This  will  be  discussed  in  detail  shortly. 

42  This  will  be  discussed  in  detail  shortly. 

43  E.g.  opposition  to  major  public  sector  'display'  projects,  acceptance 
of  a  'Gandhian'  approach  to  India's  problems,  etc.  Some  of  these  points 
are  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 

44  The  General  Council  was  originally  an  appointed  body,  whose  maxi- 
mum size  was  250.  It  was  intended  to  embrace  a  cross-section  of  the 
national  and  state  leadership.  The  COC  was  a  smaller  body  which  included 
the  pivotal  national  and  state  figures.  Under  the  revised  party  constitution 
of  1964,  the  COC  became  the '  national  executive '  and  was  to  be  elected  by 
the  General  Council,  with  some  provision  for  co-operation. 

45  Only  one  party  election  has  thus  far  been  held,  well  after  the  1962 
elections.  The  Chinese  invasion  in  1962  in  part  frustrated  plans  for  party 
elections.  Internal  difficulties  also  played  a  part  here. 

46  Based  on  interviews  and  party  files. 

47  The  absence  of  a  cohesive  aristocracy  bears  on  this  problem  and  can 
cut  both  ways  in  organizational  terms.  On  the  one  hand,  it  means  that  the 
defection  of  even  a  major  aristocrat  will  not  necessarily  lead  all  others  out 
of  the  party.  On  the  other  hand,  it  means  that  Swatantra  cannot  even 
count  on  aristocratic  solidarity  as  a  substitute  for  a  more  formal  party 
organization. 

315 


Notes,  pp.  147-187 

48  Based  on  interviews,  Baroda  and  Ahmedabad,  1966. 

49  Based  on  interviews  and  personal  observation  at  party  meetings.  Devi 
Singh  has  since  been  replaced  as  state  General- Secretary  by  a  retired  IAS 
officer,  Mandhata  Singh.  Devi  Singh  is  now  an  MP  (Rajya  Sabha). 

50  Based  on  interviews,  Jaipur,  1963. 

51  Ibid. 

52  The  author  was  present  at  at  least  two  meetings  at  which  Dungarpur 
made  such  a  statement. 

53  Based  on  interviews,  1962  and  1963. 

54  Based  on  interviews,  party  files,  and  personal  observation  at  party 
meetings,  1962  and  1963. 

55  Based  on  interviews  and  party  files. 

56  Based  on  an  appeal  from  the  Bihar  unit  to  the  General  Council  and 
on  rejoinders  submitted  by  the  central  office,  made  available  to  the  author 
by  the  central  office. 

57  The  author  was  in  Bombay  when  the  General  Council  considered 
the  Bihar  appeal  and  all  major  figures  were  interviewed. 

58  Based  on  correspondence  with  close  associates  of  the  Raja.  The  loan 
is  discussed  by  Rajaji,  Swarajya,  19  Sept.  1964. 

59  Based  on  OH T,  6  and  27  Aug.  1964,  and  on  correspondence. 

60  Based  on  OHT3  27  Aug.  1964,  and  on  correspondence. 

61  OHT,  24  Sept.  1964.  The  decision  was  announced  on  12  Sept.  at  which 
time  it  was  said  that '  only  details  of  the  merger  remain  to  be  worked  out . . . '. 

62  Based  on  Swarajya,  19  Sept.  1964,  a  news  statement  issued  by  the 
central  office  (dated  1  Oct.),  and  correspondence. 

63  E.g.  after  the  1963  appeal  from  Bihar  was  withdrawn  and  Ramgarh 
was  instructed  to  reconstitute  the  state  executive  along  lines  defined  by 
the  central  office,  a  number  of  papers  expressed  satisfaction  that  Swatantra 
rejected  Ramgarh's  demand  for  unfettered  powers.  For  further  details  on 
Ramgarh,  Swatantra,  and  Congress,  see:  77,  9  and  10  Sept  1964,  and 
HT,  10  and  11  Sept.  1964;  Statesman,  17  and  25  May  1965,  and  Indian 
Nation  (Bihar),  24  May  1965.  After  remaining  in  limbo  for  an  extended 
period,  Ramgarh  contemplated  the  restoration  of  Janata  and  a  merger  with 
Jharkand,  which  had  latterly  left  the  Congress.  However,  Ramgarh  and 
almost  all  of  his  followers  finally  entered  the  Congress. 

64  OHT,  24  Sept.  1964. 

65  See  Maurice  Duverger,  Political  Parties,  trans.  Barbara  and  Robert 
North  (London,  Methuen,  1954),  p.  359,  notes  that  *  cadre  parties, 
which  have  no  strong  financial  backing  and  live  in  perpetual  money 
difficulties,  are  always  soft-hearted  towards  candidates  willing  to  cover 
the  costs  of  the  campaign  and  in  practice  investiture  is  obtained  without 
any  difficulty'.  On  the  other  hand,  he  points  out,  p.  59,  that  if  the  central 
office  receives  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  funds  available  to  fight 
elections,  this  can  be  used  to  discipline  local  units,  candidates,  etc.,  which 
is  precisely  what  Masani  has  tried  to  do. 

66  There  have  been  efforts  to  deny  tickets  to  Congress  'rejects',  as  well 
as  those  from  other  parties ;  but  while  most  parties  agree  to  this  in  principle, 
they  depart  from  it  by  a  wide  margin  in  practice. 

316 


Notes,  pp.  147-187 

67  For  Rajaji,  Swarajya,  19  Sept.  1959,  and  for  Mody,  SN,  no.  1, 
Oct.  1959.  See  also  'Which  is  the  Rich  Man's  Party? \  Swarajya,  4  Sept. 
1959.  SN,  no.  5,  March  i960,  quotes  Rajaji  as  saying  that  'the  heart  of  the 
rich  is  with  us  but  their  money  is  with  the  Congress  because  of  compulsion '. 

68  For  Birla,  Link,  31  Jan.  i960.  For  the  second  remark,  by  Karuna- 
karan,  see  his  introduction  to  Poplai  (ed.),  1962  Elections,  p.  18. 

69  For  the  proposed  ban,  HWR,  15  Aug.  i960,  Link,  21  Aug.  1960,  and 
HWR,  7  Aug.  1961.  For  Masani's  statement,  see  HWR,  7  Aug.  1961,  or 
TI,  2  Aug.  1 96 1.  Under  the  then  existing  company  law,  a  joint  stock 
company  could  contribute  Rs.  25,000  or  5  per  cent  of  its  net  profits, 
whichever  was  higher. 

70  Tata  was  head  of  the  great  Tata  empire.  Khatau  was  head  of 
Associated  Cement  Companies  and  was  also  on  the  board  of  the  Central 
Bank  of  India  (the  'Tata  bank'),  of  which  Mody  was  then  chairman. 
Dandekar  was  once  a  director  of  Associated  Cement.  For  one  reference 
to  the  appeal,  Hindu,  2  Aug.  1961.  This  entire  discussion  is,  however, 
based  on  party  files  and  on  interviews. 

71  Based  on  party  files,  interviews,  and  a  limited  amount  of  public  in- 
formation. For  some  financial  data  see  the  General  Secretary's  Report  to  the 
second  national  convention  (Agra),  pp.  6-7.  See  also  Swarajya,  20  April 
1963,  for  a  discussion  of  the  Tata-Khatau  contributions  to  Swatantra  and 
to  the  Congress.  Link,  17  Sept.  1961,  refers  to  a  'great  capitalist  house' 
which  had  decided  to  give  a  substantial  sum  to  Swatantra  but  more  to  the 
Congress.  Link,  6  Aug.  1961,  notes  that  a  Madras  textile  man  had  given 
both  Swatantra  and  the  Congress  Rs.  16,000.  TI,  6  Sept.  1961,  noted  that 
Sir  Biren  Mookerjee,  chairman  of  the  board  of  Indian  Iron  and  Steel  had 
announced  prospective  contributions  to  Congress  and  to  an  opposition 
party — the  latter  in  the  interests  of  strengthening  democracy  in  India. 
The  anonymous  gifts  were  discussed  with  Swatantra  leaders  who  insisted 
that  the  same  people  had  given  more  to  the  Congress,  openly.  The 
Ahmedabad  case  was  discussed  with  Patel,  Bombay,  1962.  Also,  Rajaji 
received  many  large  gifts,  as  personal  tributes,  and  these  were  presumably 
turned  over  to  the  party.  See,  for  example,  TI,  7  April  i960,  for  a  report 
of  a  purse  of  Rs.  100,000  from  textile  men  in  Kanpur.  State  units  also 
received  contributions,  too,  but  no  records  of  these  were  made  available 
to  the  author.  However,  in  1966,  Masani  was  most  upset  that  leaders  in 
Gujarat  had  solicited  funds  for  the  state  unit  from  people  whom  he  had 
planned  to  approach  for  central  office  funds.  Masani  accused  these 
Gujarat  leaders  of  ignoring  the  needs  of  the  national  party  in  financing 
campaigns  in  poor  states  (such  as  Orissa),  but  it  is  clear,  too,  that  he 
wanted  to  have  these  funds  to  use  as  a  lever  in  controlling  state  units  and 
individual  candidates.  See  below  for  a  full  discussion  of  this  point. 

72  The  official  minutes  of  the  COC  note  a  shortfall  of  Rs.  1,000,000  with 
respect  to  the  goal  set  for  the  national  fund. 

73  Based  in  part  on  party  files.  One  source  stated  that  certain  Akali  Dal 
candidates  for  the  Lok  Sabha  each  received  Rs.  30,000  from  Swatantra, 
which  suggests  that  this  amount  was  generally  provided  to  aspiring  MPs 
who  were  endorsed  by  the  national  party. 

317 


Notes,  pp.  I47~i8y 

74  Based  on  interviews,  Jaipur,  1963. 

75  From  the  General  Secretary's  Report,  to  the  third  national  convention 
(Bangalore),  1  and  2  Feb.  1964,  p.  14. 

76  Based  on  interviews,  1963  and  1966,  and  on  correspondence.  The 
financial  picture  of  the  Gujarat  unit  had  brightened  considerably  by  1966, 
and  many  major  industrialists  were  themselves  planning  to  contest  for  the 
Lok  Sabha  from  Gujarat,  on  Swatantra  tickets. 

77  E.g.  in  1964,  at  the  Bhubaneshwar  session  of  the  Congress,  a  resolu- 
tion urging  nationalization  of  all  banking  and  of  food  grain  trade  was 
turned  down. 

78  Based  on  party  files. 

79  Based  on  party  files  and  on  interviews.  Most  Swatantra  leaders  in 
Gujarat  felt  that  they  had  contested  too  many  seats  in  that  state,  for  the 
assembly  at  least. 

80  Based  on  party  files. 

81  Political  Parties,  p.  359. 

82  Based  on  party  files.  See  Hindu,  2  Nov.  1961,  for  a  report  of  the 
resignation. 

83  Based  on  party  files. 

84  Based  on  interviews  with  Masani  and  Rajasthan  leaders,  1963. 

85  Based  on  the  Bihar  unit's  appeal  and  the  rejoinder  thereto.  Masani 
would  have  insisted  on  using  the  Swatantra  star  symbol  and  on  otherwise 
identifying  himself  as  a  Swatantrite. 

86  From  the  central  office  rejoinder  to  the  Bihar  appeal. 

87  See  HT,  6  Jan.  1962,  for  a  statement  by  Masani  to  the  effect  that  he 
would  not  contest  a  Lok  Sabha  seat  in  1962. 

88  Based  on  interviews,  correspondence,  and  party  files.  The  record  of 
Swatantra  MPs  from  Bihar  was,  to  say  the  most,  dismal. 

89  See  Statesman,  24  May  and  1  June  1963;  Patriot,  29  May  1963;  and 
Amrit  Bazar  Patrika,  3  June  1963. 

90  To  some  extent,  the  problem  is  a  personal  one,  because  Masani  is 
often  brusque,  impatient,  etc.,  but  much  resentment  among  state  and 
local  leaders  is  due  to  the  pressure  that  Masani  applies  to  further  the 
cause  of  the  modern  wing  of  the  party. 

91  See,  for  example,  Statesman,  29  Jan.  1962. 

92  Based  on  interviews,  Bombay  and  Baroda,  1966. 

93  E.g.  Lobo  Prabhu  might  have  been  returned  in  this  fashion,  although 
there  is  no  indication  that  he  wanted  to  sit  in  the  Rajya  Sabha,  let  alone 
from  Rajasthan. 

94  Based  on  party  files  and  on  correspondence. 

95  From  questionnaires  and  follow-up  interviews. 

96  This  is  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 

97  See  the  party  constitution,  as  revised  2  Feb.  1964,  at  the  third 
national  convention  (Bangalore),  clauses  4,  5,  and  5<z.  The  party  is 
divided  into  life  workers,  who  must  pay  a  minimum  of  Rs.  100  for  life 
membership ;  workers,  who  must  pay  Rs.  3  per  annum,  and  members,  who 
pay  nothing  but  must  sign  a  statement  supporting  the  fundamental 
principles  of  the  party.  Only  the  first  two  groups  are  eligible  to  vote  in 

318 


Notes,  pp.  188-21 1 

party  elections.  Enrolment  of  workers  does  not  technically  require  the 
approval  of  the  national  organization,  although  its  advice,  where  sought, 
is  binding.  On  the  other  hand,  the  national  executive  may  expel  a  worker 
entirely  on  its  own  authority. 

98  Based  on  correspondence  and  on  interviews  in  India,  1966. 

99  Based  on  interviews,  correspondence,  and  party  files. 

100  Based  on  interviews  and  party  files. 

101  Based  on  interviews  and  party  files.  A  number  of  other  businessmen, 
including  some  quite  young  ones,  also  joined  Swatantra  in  Gujarat  and 
were  planning  to  contest  for  public  office  in  1967. 

102  Based  on  interviews.  See  C.  Rai, '  Why  I  Took  to  Politics ',  a  Rotary 
Club  speech  reprinted  by  the  Swatantra  party. 

103  Based  on  correspondence  with  Swatantra  leaders  in  Rajasthan. 

104  Most  businessmen,  that  is,  are  more  concerned  with  protecting  free 
enterprise  from  state  controls  rather  than  with  pushing  broadly  liberal 
programmes.  However,  as  questionnaire  data  on  the  Hindu  Code  measures 
suggest,  there  is  a  more  broadly  liberal  dimension  present  as  well.  How 
aggressively  it  is,  or  can  be  propagated  is  another  matter. 

chapter  8,  pp.  188-211 

1  Towards  Doom?  (Bombay,  Swatantra  Party,  n.d.),  pp.  7-8. 

2  The  emphasis  on  political  affiliation  is  based  on  the  party's  contention 
that  preferential  treatment  in  all  sectors  is  accorded  to  those  who  either 
belong  to  the  Congress  or  help  it  financially. 

3  These  fragments  are  from  the  twenty-one  points  (fundamental 
principles).  The  last  fragment,  among  others,  suggests  the  'constitu- 
tionalist '  background  of  many  leaders. 

4  See  Rajaji, '  To  Save  Freedom ',  in  Why  Swatantra?  (Bombay,  Swatan- 
tra Party,  n.d.),  p.  3.  This  publication  contains  short  statements  by 
Rajaji,  Ranga,  Munshi,  and  Masani  on  the  general  topic  of  'why 
Swatantra?'  See  the  manifesto  'To  Prosperity  Through  Freedom',  para. 
7  of  part  iv. 

5  HT,  27  Oct.  I959- 

6  For  the  proposal  that  the  Congress  resign  from  office  six  months  prior 
to  a  general  election,  see  HT,  16  March  1962.  For  the  permit-licence 
board  recommendation,  advanced  strongly  at  the  1964  Bangalore  con- 
vention, see  HWR,  17  Feb.  1964;  HWR,  10  Feb.  1964;  and  Swarajya, 
15  Feb.  1964.  See  also  A.  P.  Jain  (ed.),  Lawless  Legislation  (New  Delhi, 
Swatantra  Party  Parliamentary  Office,  1963),  which  is  an  attack  on  the 
17th  Amendment  (prior  to  its  passage);  M.  R.  Masani,  The  Fraud  of  Gold 
Control  (Bombay,  Swatantra  Party,  1964);  M.  R.  Masani  et  al.}  The  Budget 
versus  The  People  (Bombay,  Swatantra  Party,  n.d.);  N.  Dandekar  and 
Kapur  Singh,  A  Fair  Deal  for  Public  Servants  (Bombay,  Swatantra  Party, 
n.d.);  M.  R.  Masani  and  N.  Dandekar,  Judgment  Reserved  (Bombay, 
Swatantra  Party,  n.d.),  concerning  a  proposed  motion  of  no-confidence. 
In  1966,  an  administrative  reforms  committee  under  Morarji  Desai 
recommended  the  creation  of  an  office  like  that  of  the  Ombudsman;  the 

319 


Notes,  pp.  188-21 1 

gold  control  order  was  relaxed ;  abolition  of  land  revenue  was  recommended 
by  the  Madras  Congress  and  the  cry  was  taken  up  elsewhere;  licensing 
laws  were  eased;  there  was  talk  of '  plan  holidays '  and  more  modest  plans; 
and  the  like,  suggesting  that  the  S  watantra  critique  was  having  some  impact. 

7  Rajaji,  Towards  Doom?,  p.  9.  See  also  the  discussion  of  Rajaji, 
chapter  5. 

8  From  a  questionnaire  submitted  by  a  Brahmin  legislator. 

9  See  chapter  6. 

10  'To  Preserve  Freedom',  Why  Swatantra?  p.  5.  Many  Swatantrites 
do  not,  of  course,  reject  legislative  'compulsion'  and  Rajaji  himself,  as 
noted  in  the  preceding  chapter,  was  associated  with  remedial  legislation  in 
the  area  of  rents  and  interest  on  debts.  Many  of  those  who  would  be 
willing  in  some  cases  to  countenance  legislative  'coercion'  are  of  the 
opinion  that  no  such  measures  are  required  in  the  present  context.  Thus, 
anti-control  positions  are  advanced  for  both  'moral'  and  'practical' 
reasons. 

11  See,  for  example,  Munshi,  Reconstruction  of  Society.  Jayaprakash 
Narayan,  former  Communist  and  Socialist  and  now  a  Bhoodan  leader, 
noted  ('On  Rajaji',  in  Swarajya,  Special  Number,  1962,  p.  114)  that 
trusteeship  was  a  key  notion  for  Rajaji '  which  I  am  afraid  is  not  shared  by 
his  colleagues'.  He  adds  (loc.  cit.)  that  'the  Swatantra  Party  has  reconciled 
itself  to  that  idea  only  as  a  token  of  regard  for  its  great  leader'.  Narayan 
feels  that  trusteeship  alone  raises  Swatantra  conservatism  to  a  respectable 
level. 

12  For  an  18-point  manifesto,  see  77,  28  June  1959,  and  for  a  19-point 
manifesto,  see  Statesman,  16  June  1959.  Masani,  Munshi,  Ranga,  and 
Ruthnaswamy,  in  addition  to  Rajaji,  are  those  most  deeply  involved  in 
doctrinal  matters.  Drafts  of  various  resolutions,  etc.,  are  also  presented  to 
various  party  organs,  such  as  the  Central  Organizing  Committee,  the 
General  Council,  and  to  state  leaders,  about  which  something  further  will 
be  said  subsequently. 

13  See  chapter  5,  above. 

14  For  a  discussion  which  includes  material  on  many  industries,  see 
Vithaldas  Kothari  (ed.),  Why  Khadi  and  Village  Industries?  (Ahmedabad, 
Navajivan  Press,  1957). 

15  Except  as  otherwise  noted,  all  of  the  fragments  quoted  above  come 
from  the  fundamental  principles  of  21  points. 

16  See  Statesman,  6  June  i960,  for  one  of  the  numerous  statements 
against  the  Planning  Commission,  as  a  'super-cabinet',  by  Masani.  He  is 
reported  here  to  have  said, '  if  the  Swatantra  Party  had  a  chance,  its  first 
act  would  be  to  liquidate  the  Planning  Commission'.  See  also  Delhi 
Hindustan  Standard,  19  May  i960,  for  the  same  argument. 

17  See  HWR,  28  Aug.  1961,  and  chapter  5,  above.  The  anti-plan  votes 
were  recorded  by  those  sitting  MPs  who  joined  Swatantra  after  its 
creation,  and  the  battle  has  been  carried  on  by  its  contingent  in  the  present 
Lok  Sabha. 

18  From  party  files.  Among  those  who  asked  to  contest  as  independents 
was  the  head  of  the  Madras  FFE  who  had  been  a  member  of  the  Jan 

320 


Notes,  pp.  188-21 1 

Sangh  until  Swatantra  was  founded;  a  number  of  prospective  Lok 
Sabha  candidates  from  Mysore;  J.  Mohammed  Imam,  also  from  Mysore, 
who  wanted  to  contest  either  as  a  PSP  man  or  as  an  independent;  Yashpal 
Singh  of  UP,  who  did  contest  as  an  independent,  was  opposed  by  a 
Swatantra  candidate,  won,  and  then  joined  the  party!  These  are  only  a 
few  of  the  many  cases.  Some  did  not  mind  the  'rich  man'  image,  but  were 
deterred  by  other  factors,  e.g.  Rajaji's  defence  of  English  was  held  to  be  a 
liability  in  UP,  as  will  be  discussed  below. 

19  OHT,  5  Jan.  1961. 

20  HWR,  30  May  i960,  77,  24  May  i960,  and  HT,  28  May  i960,  for 
the  statement  by  Hutheesing.  The  latter  two  also  contain  rejoinders  by 
Vaidya.  In  words  almost  identical  to  those  used  by  Paliwal  much  later, 
Hutheesing  said  that  his  '  instinct'  made  him  apprehensive  from  the  outset 
but  that  he  wanted  to  make  sure  Swatantra  was  as  bad  as  it  seemed  before 
resigning. 

21  From  party  files.  The  author  was  permitted  to  examine  all  of  the 
drafts  of  the  party  manifesto,  with  comments  thereon  from  national  and 
state  leaders. 

22  To  some  extent,  all  situations  require  a  balance  of  the  external  and 
internal  restraints,  but  the  rejection  of  legislation  as  an  instrument  of 
policy  goes  a  bit  far  in  the  voluntary  direction ! 

23  From  an  editorial  in  the  PSP  weekly  Janata,  9  Aug.  1959. 

24  For  the  source,  and  the  full  quotation,  see  chapter  2,  under  the  dis- 
cussion of  business  ideology.  Cf.  Shroff's  comment  that  the  Congress  had 
been  put  in  office  by  an  illiterate  electorate  with  these  remarks  about '  the 
dynamic  urge  of  democratic  ideals '. 

25  See,  for  example,  Ranga's  presidential  address  at  the  Patna  Conven- 
tion; his  Freedom  in  Peril,  pp.  115-47  ('Planning  in  India');  and  his 
'  Swatantra  and  the  Plan',  Swarajya  (Special  Number,  1962),  pp.  169-72. 
Also  relevant  is  the  Swatantra  Manifesto,  'To  Prosperity  Through 
Freedom'.  Munshi  on  one  occasion  asserted  that  'Parliament,  in  fact 
does  not  govern  the  country. .  .The  nominated  super-cabinet,  the  Plan- 
ning Commission,  does  the  supervision,  control  and  direction  of  the 
Government  of  India,  and  owes  no  responsibility  to  Parliament'  (quoted 
in  Norman  D.  Palmer,  The  Indian  Political  System  [Boston,  Houghton 
Mifflin,  1 96 1,  p.  172]).  Munshi  advanced  the  same  argument  in  'To 
Restore  Fundamental  Rights',  Why  Swatantra?,  p.  14:  'The  Parliament 
is  dominated  by  the  Congress,  the  Party  by  its  leader . . .  And  the  super- 
Cabinet  of  the  country — the  nominated  Planning  Commission — is 
always  there  to  bring  errant  ministers  to  heel.  The  National  Development 
Council  of  ministers . . .  has  also  arrogated  to  itself  equal  powers  of  a 
super-Cabinet. ' 

26  From  a  Lok  Sabha  address  by  Ranga,  reprinted  under  the  title 
'No  Truck  with  the  Plan',  in  What's  Wrong  with  the  Third  Plan  (Bombay, 
Swatantra  Party,  n.d.),  p.  27. 

27  See,  for  example,  the  articles  by  Ruthnaswamy  in  Swarajya,  24  Aug. 
and  9  Nov.  1963. 

28  Indian  Finance,  8  Sept.  1962,  p.  429.  Those  engaged  in  drafting  the 

21  321  ESp 


Notes,  pp.  188-21 1 

alternative  plan  are  economics  Professor  B.  R.  Shenoy,  J.  M.  Lobo 
Prabhu,  Dandekar,  Masani  and  a  few  others.  Lobo  Prabhu  has  prepared 
a  variety  of  drafts,  ranging  in  length  from  a  dozen  or  so  pages  to  close  to 
one  hundred,  indicating  some  of  the  major  contours  of  a  possible 
Swatantra  plan.  To  this  writer's  knowledge,  none  of  these  have  been 
published  in  any  form,  but  some  of  Lobo  Prabhu's  personal  views  may  be 
found  in  the  English-language  weekly,  Insight,  which  he  has  founded,  and 
in  Swarajya. 

29  Swarajya,  4  July  1959,  where  Rajaji  quotes  Lenin  to  the  effect  that 
socialist  agriculture  would  require  decades  to  bring  about  and  that  the 
kulak  must  be  relied  upon. 

30  HT,  12  April  i960,  for  Masani,  and  Swarajya,  17  Oct.  1959,  for  Rajaji. 

31  See  ibid,  for  many  of  these  specifics.  See  HWR,  18  March  i960,  for 
Ceylon,  and  13  June  i960  for  Great  Britain. 

32  See  'Who  is  Outdated?  German  Social  Democrats  Echo  Swatantra' 
(Bombay,  Swatantra  Party,  n.d.),  and '  Socialism :  an  Ism  that  has  become 
a  Wasm'  (Bombay,  Swatantra  Party,  n.d.). 

33  'To  Provide  a  Democratic  Alternative',  in  Why  Swatantra?,  p.  29. 

34  See  77,  6  Jan.  1962 ;  HWR,  13  June  i960;  and  Preparatory  Convention, 
p.  8,  for  references  to  this.  In  the  latter,  Masani  argues  that  Congress 
socialism  'is  more  accurately  described  as  State  Capitalism'. 

35  This  range  of  discourse  reflects  Masani's  involvement  in  the  Liberal 
International,  the  Congress  for  Cultural  Freedom,  and  associated  causes. 
Needless  to  say,  this  argument  is  addressed  to  the  tiny  intellectual 
stratum,  while  more  accessible  fare  is  served  to  the  'common  man'. 

36  The  author  was  permitted  to  examine  various  drafts  of  the  programme. 
Masani  and  Munshi  worked  on  one  draft,  while  other  drafts  were  pre- 
pared by  Rajaji  and  Ruthnaswamy.  The  final  manifesto  followed  closely 
the  Masani-Munshi  version. 

37  From  the  General- Secretary's  Report  to  the  Swatantra  party  candi- 
dates' convention,  Bombay,  7  and  8  April  1962,  p.  6. 

38  From  a  party  resolution  on  'national  integration',  excerpted  in 
HWR,  7  Aug.  1961. 

39  Quoted  in  Frank  Moraes,  Jawarharlal  Nehru  (Bombay,  Jaico,  1959), 
p.  417. 

40  Based  on  questionnaires. 

41  Here,  too,  men  of  different  perspectives  are  brought  together.  Rajaji 
clearly  does  not  believe  that  the  '  old  order '  involves  many  oppressions,  as 
he  suggested  when  he  argued  that  'feudal'  oppression  had  largely  been 
overcome  and  that  statism  was  now  the  principal — if  not  the  only — 
source  of  mass  distress.  Men  like  Masani,  Pasricha,  et  ah,  are  prepared  to 
concede  that  the  old  order  has  abundant  evils  but  that  these  are  clearly 
secondary  to  those  flowing  from  '  statist '  politics.  For  Rajaji,  see  Towards 
Doom?,  pp.  10-11.  For  Masani  see,  for  example,  'The  Congress  Path  to 
Communism',  speech  in  Bombay,  2  Aug.  1961,  reprinted  by  the  Swatantra 
Party,  pp.  10-11. 

42  Cf .  the  history  of  the  German  liberals  in  the  nineteenth  century. 

43  Swarajya,  8  May  1965. 

322 


Notes,  pp.  188-21 1 

44  'To  Save  Freedom ',  in  Why  Swatantra?,  p.  4.  This,  of  course,  is  in 
keeping  with  the  broader  Swatantra  attack  against  the  Congress,  which  is 
accused  of  unwarranted  imposition  of  the  legislative  whip,  as  part  of  its 
prevailing  'authoritarian'  tendencies. 

45  Rajaji  once  supported  compulsory  study  of  Hindi  in  the  south  but  is 
now  a  vehement  defender  of  English.  Much  of  the  party's  support  for 
English  is  due  to  the  intensity  of  Rajaji's  feelings  on  this  issue.  See 
Rajaji's  pamphlet,  'My  Inconsistencies',  and  'English  for  Unity', 
Swarajya,  20  Feb.  1965. 

46  See  HWR,  7  Aug.  1961,  for  these  quotations  from  the  statement  on 
'national  integration'.  See  also  Pasricha's  'Our  Stuporous  Society', 
Quest  (April-June  1962),  for  a  comparable  view;  and  Munshi's  '  Language 
and  Literature  as  Integrating  Forces',  Illustrated  Weekly  of  India,  12  Aug. 
1962,  pp.  54-5.  Recall,  however,  Munshi's  views,  quoted  above  (chapter  5), 
which  criticize  leadership  which  is  'remote'  from  the  masses.  For  a 
representative  statement  by  Rajaji,  see  HWR,  9  May  1961.  Naturally  the 
southerners,  and  the  many  Parsis  for  whom  English  is  the  '  native '  tongue, 
would  be  expected  to  take  this  position. 

47  E.g.  during  the  Lok  Sabha  debate  on  the  language  bill  in  the  spring 
of  1963  feelings  ran  very  high  and  two  Swatantra  MPs — Yashpal  Singh  of 
UP  and  C.  L.  N.  Reddy  of  Andhra — found  themselves  heatedly  on 
different  sides  of  the  fence.  Elsewhere  tension  is  evident.  As  far  as  the 
author  could  ascertain,  Yashpal  Singh  refused  to  speak  in  English  to  his 
southern  colleagues  (e.g.  C.  L.  N.  Reddy)  even  though  he  knew  English 
well  while  the  latter  did  not  know  Hindi  at  all.  This  pro-English  view  is 
naturally  not  well  received  in  the  great  Hindi  heartland,  and  Swatantra 
leaders  in  UP  and  elsewhere  reported  to  the  author  their  belief  that  the 
language  position,  although  'unofficial',  hurt  the  party's  efforts  in  the 
1962  elections. 

48  For  the  Macaulay  reference,  see  above,  ch.  3. 

49  For  Raghuvira,  see  77,  22  April  1963.  For  one  report  of  such 
heckling,  see  Delhi  Hindustan  Standard,  15  April  i960.  The  Jan  Sangh/RSS 
and  Lohia  Socialist  elements  are  most  frequently  charged  with  such 
behaviour. 

50  Also  widely  supported  in  the  national  elite  was  a  '  zonal '  rather  than 
a  'linguistic'  division  of  India.  A  large  majority  of  respondents  to 
questionnaires  opposed  the  principle  of  linguistic  states,  although 
obviously  not  always  for  the  same  reasons.  Many  of  these  admitted  that 
they  originally  had  supported  the  linguistic  principle. 

51  That  is,  the  DMK  set  aside  its  demand  for  secession  during  the 
invasion,  and  when  confronted  with  a  constitutional  amendment  pro- 
hibiting demands  for  secession,  C.  N.  Annadurai,  the  leader  of  the  DMK, 
publicly  abjured  this  goal  for  his  party. 

52  OHT,  n  Aug.  i960. 

53  See  77,  19  Oct.  i960,  and  HWR,  26  June  1961. 

54  HWR,  6  June  i960. 

55  See  HWR,  14  Aug.  1961;  HWR,  11  Sept.  1961;  and  TI,  2  Oct.  1961. 
For  a  time  it  was  suggested  that  Rajaji  investigate  the  case  and  present 

323  21-2 


Notes,  pp.  188-21 1 

his  findings  before  a  commission  of  enquiry  (77,  4  Oct.  1961;  HWR, 
2  Oct.  1961),  but  Rajaji  repeatedly  insisted  (e.g.  HWR,  6  June  i960)  that 
he  could  not  do  so,  because  of  'acute  arthritis'.  For  other  references,  see 
HWR,  4  April  i960,  and  HWR,  2  Jan.  1 961— both  of  which  contain 
'unofficial'  endorsements  of  the  Punjabi  suba  demand  by  Rajaji. 

56  See  Swarajya,  31  March  1962  and  13  Jan.  1962,  respectively.  See 
also  Swarajya,  29  April  1961,  and,  for  some  of  Masani's  views,  77, 10  and 
19  Aug.  1961. 

57  See  the  next  chapter  for  a  discussion  of  electoral  alliances. 

58  Swarajya,  22  March  1961. 

59  Editorial,  17  May  1961. 

60  See,  for  example,  The  Hindu,  1  Sept.  1962.  Munshi  favoured  the 
constitutional  amendment  to  ban  secessionist  agitation  and  in  the  report 
on  the  situation  in  the  Punjab  he  was,  as  noted  earlier,  quite  critical  of 
both  the  Government  and  the  Akalis. 

61  E.g.  Nagoke,  one-time  leader  of  the  Akali  Dal  and  Swatantra  leader 
in  the  Punjab,  was  reportedly  upset  at  the  reluctance  of  the  national 
leaders  to  take  a  'positive'  stand  for  Punjabi  suba  and  at  excessive  atten- 
tion to  Hindu  Swatantrites.  See  Link,  22  Jan.  and  23  July  1961.  The  latter 
reports  that  Masani  was  obliged  to  visit  the  Punjab  to  pacify  Nagoke,  but 
that  he  emphasized  that  the  fundamental  principles  did  not  cover  this 
issue  and  that  the  party  would  not  take  a  binding  stand. 

62  Mahabir  Singh  Kalra,  secretary  of  a  local  unit  of  the  party,  quoted  in 
77,  14  Sept.  1961.  For  reported  defections  as  a  result  of  Rajaji's  stand  on 
Punjabi  suba,  see  HT,  1  Jan.  1961.  As  will  be  discussed  in  the  next 
chapter,  there  was  a  good  deal  of  difficulty  keeping  both  sides  happy  in 
this  respect.  For  one  strong  statement  by  a  Sikh  Swatantrite  who  resigned 
from  the  party  (after  being  expelled,  then  reinstated)  to  press  for  Punjabi 
suba,  see  Sardar  Gurnam  Singh,  A  Unilingual  Punjabi  State  and  the 
Sikh  Unrest  (Dehli,  the  author,  n.d.),  It  is  not  absolutely  certain  that 
Gurnam  Singh  is  the  author  of  this,  but  a  reliable  source  has  reported  that 
if  it  is  not  Gurnam  Singh,  then  it  is  another  Sikh  Swatantrite. 

63  See  Erdman,  PA,  xxxix,  5-18. 

64  E.g.  Nehru's  invitation  to  Chou  En-Lai  to  discuss  problems,  for 
which  see  HWR,  22  Feb.  i960. 

65  See  77,  2  Nov.  1961. 

66  See  loc.  cit.  The  last  view  is  not  even  'unofficial'  party  policy.  For 
further  references  to  joint  defence  proposals  and  views  on  Pakistan,  see : 
the  Manifesto,  'To  Prosperity  Through  Freedom';  Ranga's  Presidential 
Address  at  the  Patna  Convention  (where  he  noted  that  he  and  many  others 
had  originally  favoured  non-alinement  in  order  to  allow  the  country  to 
concentrate  on  domestic  problems);  OHT,  22  Sept.  i960  (where  Masani 
urged  disengagement  in  Kashmir  to  free  Indian  troops  for  the  China 
frontier)  and  29  Sept.  i960  (where  Rajaji  urged  a  Nehru-Ayub  Khan 
gentlemen's  agreement  on  a  Kashmir  truce  line);  and  HWR,  25  Jan. 
i960,  14  and  28  March  i960,  18  April  i960  (where  Rajaji  urged  a  suspen- 
sion of  non-alinement  and  expressed  his  desire  that  the  Kashmir  issue 
be  put  in  the  'freezer');  8  Aug.  i960,  2  Jan.,  13  March,  6  Nov.  1 961.  At 

324 


Notes,  pp.  188-211 

the  Patna  Convention  some  spokesmen  expressed  the  view  that '  we  should 
accept  military  aid  from  friendly  countries  on  honourable  terms  befitting 
the  dignity  of  our  Nation'  (see  Patna  Report,  p.  82,  and  also  pp.  62-3). 
In  a  post-invasion  address  in  Jaipur,  Masani  said  that  India  should  take 
western  military  aid,  because  there  was  no  prospect  that  India  could,  by 
herself,  build  up  adequate  defence  against  China  and  that  all  such  efforts 
would  lead  to  intolerable  taxation.  After  some  western  aid  was  accepted, 
Swatantra  insisted  that  the  Government  of  India  had  not  shown  proper 
appreciation,  had  not  publicized  it  sufficiently  within  India  and  had  been 
grudging  in  its  thanks.  For  further  views  of  Rajaji,  Ranga,  Munshi, 
Masani,  Mody,  and  Dandekar,  on  a  wide  range  of  matters,  see  Swatantra 
Answer  to  the  Chinese  Communist  Challenge  (Bombay,  Swatantra  Party, 
1963).  Masani,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Ranga,  are  the  exponents  of  the 
'tough'  line,  while  Rajaji  originally  was  much  'softer'  on  Communism 
generally,  especially  with  respect  to  the  USSR.  (It  is  widely  agreed  in 
Swatantra  circles  that  Masani  has  succeeded  in  convincing  Rajaji  that  a 
harder  line  against  Communism  generally  is  necessary.)  In  the  columns 
of  Swarajya  and  elsewhere,  Rajaji  has  frequently  inveighed  against  the 
attitudes  of  both  the  US  and  the  USSR  in  the  cold  war,  has  occasionally 
spoken  against  excessive  preoccupation  with  defence  and  military  affairs 
in  India,  and  has  been  vehement  in  his  denunciation  of  all  nuclear  testing 
and  weaponry.  See,  for  example,  HWR,  6  Nov.  1 961,  for  a  reference  to 
Soviet  testing  as  a  'wicked  act'  and  a  'colossal  crime'.  He  wanted  India 
and  other  nations  to  take  (unspecified)  steps  to  show  the  USSR  that  it  had 
placed  itself  '  outside '  the  pale  of  humanity  by  continuation  of  nuclear 
testing.  For  a  statement  on  the  atomic  bomb,  which  argues  that  India 
should  aline  with  the  west  to  secure  its  nuclear  deterrent  against  China, 
see  Masani,  India's  Answer  to  the  Chinese  Bomb  (Bombay,  Swatantra 
Party,  n.d.). 

67  See  OHT3  30  Nov.  1961. 

68  For  many  years  prior  to  the  seizure  of  Goa  and  the  other  Portuguese 
enclaves,  both  the  extreme  left  and  extreme  right  had  been  recommending 
a  take-over,  for  'anti-imperialist'  and  'nationalist'  reasons  respectively. 
Nehru  and  others  had  evidently  hoped  that  a  peaceful  resolution  (such  as 
that  which  obtained  in  the  case  of  the  French  enclaves)  would  be  possible, 
but  when  the  Congress  finally  yielded  to  a  variety  of  pressures,  articulate 
Indian  opinion  was  almost  unanimous.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  Swatantra 
demonstrated  its  willingness  to  stand '  above  the  struggle '  and  the  passions 
which  animate  many  other  Indian  parties. 

69  I.e.  in  connection  with  electoral  alliances,  which  will  be  discussed  in 
the  following  chapter. 

70  Almost  all  Swatantra  leaders  who  were  interviewed  or  who  returned 
questionnaires  were  opposed  to  linguistic  states  now,  although  many  had 
favoured  their  creation  earlier. 

71  There  are  many  Swatantrites  for  whom  Masani,  Rajaji  and  others 
go  much  too  far  in  the  direction  of  'sweet  reasonableness'  toward 
Pakistan. 

72  For  the  latter,  see,  for  example,    V.  N.  Naik,  Indian    Liberalism 

325  21-3 


Notes,  pp.  212-244 

(Bombay,  Padma,  1945),  passim.  The  author  notes  (p.  3)  that  the  Moderate 
leaders  displayed '  animated  moderation '  and  (p.  4)  a  'fine  blend  of  historic 
sense,  culture  and  courage'.  He  quotes  (p.  16)  a  speech  by  Gokhale,  in 
which  the  latter  said  *  I  want  our  men  and  women,  without  distinction  of 
caste  and  creed,  to  have  opportunities  to  grow  to  the  full  height  of  their 
stature,  unhampered  by  cramping  and  unnatural  distinctions.'  These  and 
similar  thoughts  abound  in  the  speeches  of  Naoroji,  Mehta,  Gokhale, 
Ranade,  et  al. 

73  See  Kabir,  India  Quarterly,  xvi,  for  some  discussion  of  the  place  of 
Swatantra  ideology  in  the  Indian  political  tradition. 

74  Based  on  interviews.  Most  of  the  UP  and  Rajasthan  leaders  adverted 
to  this  issue,  when  asked  about  the  prospects  for  Swatantra  and  the  Sangh, 
as  well  as  relations  between  the  two. 

75  Swarajya,  16  Sept.  1961. 

76  Swarajya,  8  May  1965. 

77  Naik,  Indian  Liberalism,  p.  63. 

78  Ibid.  pp.  260  and  267. 

79  From  an  interview  with  a  Bombay  professional  man. 
8c     From  an  interview  in  New  Delhi,  1962. 

81  As  noted  at  various  points  above,  the  author  had  access  to  all  party 
files. 

82  Based  on  interviews. 

83  Based  on  interviews  and  on  personal  observation  at  election  tribunal 
proceedings  in  Baroda. 

84  See,  for  example,  HT,  26  Oct.  1959,  Statesman,  28  May  and  1  June 
i960. 

85  HT,  18  July  i960. 

86  It  should  be  quite  clear,  even  from  this  brief  survey,  that  a  consider- 
able gap  separates  Swatantra  doctrine  from  that  of  the  Jan  Sangh  and  the 
RRP,  discussed  in  chapter  3.  This  is  not  to  say  that  some  of  Rajaji's 
formulations  would  not  elicit  the  approval  of  either  (or  both),  or  that  they 
have  no  common  points,  in  both  domestic  and  foreign  policy.  The  overall 
'tone'  and  most  important  specifics  are  different,  however.  This  will 
become  somewhat  clearer  in  the  subsequent  discussion. 


chapter  9,  pp.  212-244 

1  Masani  in  particular  was  adamant  on  this  point.  See  HWR,  22  May 
1961. 

2  See  Link,  9  July  1961.  However,  in  TI,  10  Oct.  i960,  Rajaji  listed 
acceptable  allies— including  the  Sangh,  RRP,  DMK,  and  Akali  Dal — but 
did  not  mention  the  CPI.  Recall  also  that  while  Rajaji  termed  the  CPI  his 
'enemy  number  one',  he  also  said  he  would  not  favour  a  ban  on  it,  as 
long  as  it  refrained  from  insurrectionary  activity. 

3  For  Andhra,  see  Hindu,  14  Feb.  1962.  Party  files  record  this  as  one  of 
the  serious  breaches  of  discipline  in  the  1962  elections.  The  indirect 
relations  with  the  CPI  occurred  primarily  in  Madras,  via  the  DMK,  and 
in  the  Punjab,  via  the  Akalis,  and  these  will  be  discussed  below. 


326 


Notes,  pp.  212-244 

4  TI,  29  July  1961.  Masani  included  the  PSP  and  the  Socialist  Party 
among  those  with  whom  adjustments  would  be  sought. 

5  HWR,  22  May  1961. 

6  For  a  lengthy  statement  concerning  understandings,  see  Hindu, 
13  Jan.  1961,  and  HT,  23  Jan.  1961. 

7  Dungarpur,  in  dealing  with  the  Jan  Sangh  in  Rajasthan,  initially  held 
back,  pending  advice  from  the  national  leaders,  who  had  been  talking 
with  Sangh  leaders  (Statesman,  14  April  1961). 

8  There  were  others,  of  course:  the  Jharkand  Party  (Bihar);  the 
Forward  Bloc  (Madras);  the  Hindu  Mahasabha  (UP  and  Madhya 
Pradesh),  as  well  as  the  socialist  parties.  In  terms  of  rightist  politics 
specifically,  however,  talks  with  the  Sangh,  RRP,  and  Mahasabha  were 
the  most  important,  while  in  terms  of  serious  contenders  for  power,  the 
Sangh,  DMK,  and  the  Akali  Dal  bulked  largest.  At  some  junctures, 
leading  independents  were  also  approached. 

9  HT,  23  Nov.  1961. 

10  See,  for  example,  HT,  3 1  Jan.  1962,  for  the  DMK,  and  the  Statesman, 

10  May  i960,  for  the  Jan  Sangh  in  UP. 

11  HT,  23  Nov.  1961. 

12  See,  for  example,  the  statement  by  T.  G.  Gehani  of  the  Jan  Sangh, 
TI,  3  Aug.  1 96 1,  in  which  he  claims  that  Sangh  strength  is  often  under- 
estimated by  others. 

13  This,  of  course,  was  a  point  which  Swatantra  never  failed  to  empha- 
size. With  respect  to  Swatantra's  entry  as  one  among  many  opposition 
groups,  one  Swatantra  leader  compared  the  party's  position  to  that  of  a 
merchant  who  seeks  to  set  up  a  new  shop  in  an  old  bazaar  district.  Other 
merchants  view  the  newcomer  with  suspicion,  if  not  hostility,  as  a 
competitor;  they  wait  to  see  how  well  business  will  go;  and  they  will  seek 
some  agreements  with  respect  to  trade,  if  circumstances  seem  to  require  it, 
i.e.  if  the  new  party  establishes  itself  as  a  worthy  competitor.  The  analogy, 
while  far  from  perfect,  is  none  the  less  useful. 

14  Questionnaires  returned  by  Brahmins  from  Madras,  Andhra,  and 
Mysore  generally  opposed  electoral  understandings  with  the  DMK  and 
some  of  them  explicitly  mentioned  anti-Brahmin  '  communalism '  as  the 
reason  for  the  position  taken. 

15  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades. 

16  The  Rajaji-Annadorai  link  is  claimed  by  Economic  Weekly,  8  Sept. 
1962,  p.  1439.  See  also  the  Hindu,  18  Feb.  1962. 

17  See  TI,  2  Jan.  1962,  Hindu,  16  Feb.  1962,  and  'The  Meaning 
of  Chittoor',  Economic  Weekly,  8  Sept.  1962,  p.  1439.  Harrison, 
Dangerous  Decades,  speculated  that  the  DMK  might  exploit  strained 
international  relations  to  further  its  secessionist  cause,  which  proved  to 
be  wrong. 

18  For  details  on  the  negotiations,  see  HT,  26  June  1961;  TI,  5  Aug. 
1 96 1 ;  HWR,  6  Nov.  1961 ;  as  well  as  TI,  19  April  and  13  June  1961.  In  an 
interview  in  Madras,  Aug.  1962,  Mr  V.  K.  Narasimhan,  associate  editor 
of  the  Hindu,  stressed  Swatantra's  image  in  explaining  the  breakdown  of 
negotiations,  while  most  Swatantra  and  DMK  leaders  interviewed  in 

327 


Notes,  pp.  212-244 

Madras  stressed  Swatantra's  demands  for  some  prestige  seats,  as  well  as 
for  a  relatively  large  number  of  seats,  as  the  principal  factor.  For  the 
question  of  the  lists,  see  Statesman,  4  and  9  Jan.  1962. 

19  Statesman,  4  Jan.  1961. 

20  Loc.  cit. 

21  See,  respectively,  Statesman,  9  Jan.  1962,  TI,  3 1  Jan.  1962,  and  States- 
man, 4  Jan.  1962,  for  these  fragments. 

22  Hindu,  9  Feb.  1962. 

23  One  DMK  leader  interviewed  said  that  his  party  would  certainly 
contest  almost  every  seat,  avoiding  only  a  few  where  some  well-established 
figure  was  virtually  unbeatable.  Swatantra  did  not  come  out  of  Madras 
completely  empty-handed :  the  late  U.  M.  Thevar,  popular  leader  of  the 
Thevar-based  Madras  Forward  Bloc,  received  Swatantra  support  and 
became  an  associate  member  of  the  Swatantra  parliamentary  party, 
although  to  the  knowledge  of  Swatantra  leaders  in  the  Lok  Sabha  he 
never  once  appeared  at  a  group  meeting  and,  as  far  as  they  knew,  he  never 
appeared  in  New  Delhi.  Thevar  died  in  1964,  and  in  the  by-election  to 
fill  this  seat,  the  Swatantra-Forward  Bloc  forces  were  defeated  by  the 
Congress  candidate. 

24  There  were  a  number  of  contests  for  both  the  Lok  Sabha  and 
assembly  where  Swatantra  candidates  were  narrowly  defeated. 

25  At  Tiruchengode,  in  August  1962,  where  the  DMK  won  a  seat 
vacated  by  a  Congressman.  The  Chittoor  by-election  was  held  in  late 
August  1962,  shortly  after  that  in  Tiruchengode.  Chittoor  is  in  Andhra 
but  is  close  to  the  Madras-Andhra  line,  and  the  DMK  has  some  influence 
in  the  district.  In  pre-election  activity,  the  DMK  and  Swatantra  shared 
the  same  platform  quite  frequently,  while  the  Congress  and  CPI  held 
separate  meetings  in  support  of  the  Congress  candidate.  The  DMK 
brought  in  many  people  from  Madras  City  where  there  had  recently  been 
very  serious  disturbances  involving  the  DMK  and  a  frequently  heard 
electoral  message  was  that  concerning  Congress  brutality  in  suppressing 
DMK  activities.  As  expected,  the  DMK  claimed  credit  for  Ranga's 
margin  of  victory,  which  was  very  slight.  The  Hindu  and  the  Express 
(Chittoor  edition)  for  August  1962  provide  detailed  coverage  of  this 
important  by-election. 

26  The  latter  point  will  be  considered  more  fully  below.  Munshi,  and 
some  other  Swatantrites  (particularly  in  UP,  but  generally  in  the  north), 
are  still  extremely  hostile  to  the  DMK  and  to  Rajaji  for  courting  it.  For 
other  criticism  of  Swatantra  on  this  score,  see  TI,  10,  18  and  19  Aug. 
1961. 

27  See  TI,  11  July  1959. 

28  See  Weiner,  MS,  for  the  Gujarat  case. 

29  Quoted  in  Link,  31  Jan.  i960.  According  to  a  letter  in  Link,  3  Dec. 
1961,  Rajaji  at  one  point  explicitly  denied  that  the  Sangh  can  be  called 
communal. 

30  From  a  statement  by  a  Sangh  leader  in  Andhra,  cited  TI,  16  May  1961 . 
Recall  also  that  Murarji  Vaidya,  now  a  Swatantra  leader  in  Bombay, 
helped  to  draft  the  1957  Jan  Sangh  economic  programme. 

328 


Notes,  pp.  212-244 

31  See,  for  example.  Link,  24  Jan.  1960,  for  reference  to  concerted 
opposition  efforts  among  the  'tax-burdened  peasantry'  of  the  Punjab. 

32  Most  Jan  Sangh  leaders  who  were  interviewed  felt  that  differences  on 
economic  issues  were  more  apparent  than  real.  The  Sangh's  defence  of 
land  ceilings  was  lightly  dismissed  by  one  leader  who  said  it  was  simply  a 
matter  of  accepting  a  fait  accompli  and  of  associating  with  a  measure 
widely  considered  'progressive'.  He  argued  that  Swatantra's  opposition 
would  do  absolutely  no  good,  and  that  in  the  last  analysis,  both  parties 
would  have  to  learn  to  live  with  land  ceilings.  He  denied,  however,  that 
the  Sangh  was  at  all  enthused  about  such  'attacks'  on  property,  and  in 
passing  he  condemned  the  Lohia  Socialists  because  they  were  'real 
Socialists'.  Many  Swatantra  party  men  feel,  however,  that  many  Jan 
Sanguis  are  also  '  real  Socialists ' — a  view  which  is  also  held  widely  about 
the  DMK. 

33  77,  29  July  1 96 1. 

34  For  the  Sangh  positions,  see  77, 1 5  Sept.  1 96 1,  and  OUT,  2 1  Sept.  1961. 

35  Significantly,  the  late  Jan  Sangh  President,  Dr  Raghuvira,  was 
reportedly  'gagged'  because  too  many  of  his  public  pronouncements  were 
conciliatory  towards  Pakistan.  See  Erdman,  PA,  xxxix,  5-1 8,  for  a  compari- 
son of  Swatantra  and  Jan  Sangh  foreign  policy  views. 

36  See  chapter  3,  above,  for  Upadhyaya's  statement  about  education  in 
'Macaulay's  mould'. 

37  For  the  first  point,  see  HWR,  11  April  i960.  For  the  second,  see  77, 
16  May  and  15  Sept.  1961.  On  all  counts,  the  Sangh's  criticism  finds  some 
resonance  in  Swatantra  itself,  particularly  in  Munshi,  of  the  national 
leaders,  and  in  UP.  In  terms  of  culture  and  tradition  more  broadly  con- 
ceived, the  Sangh  finds  little  fault  with  Rajaji.  M.  R.  Malkani,  editor  of 
The  Organiser,  emphasized  the  language  division.  In  an  interview  in 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  Dec.  1961. 

38  From  a  report  on  the  1962  elections  in  Rajasthan,  sent  by  the  state 
unit  to  the  central  office.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  the  author  is  grateful  to 
Swatantra  authorities  for  having  made  the  party's  files  available  to  him. 

39  77,  3  Aug.  1961. 

40  Statesman,  4  Jan.  1962. 

41  E.g.  Masani  held  a  number  of  meetings  with  the  late  Dr  Raghuvira, 
Jan  Sangh  President  at  one  stage,  concerning  both  nationwide  and  state- 
by-state  adjustments. 

42  Statesman,  7  May  1961.  Dungarpur  is  reported  to  have  criticized  the 
Sangh  aim  of '  Akhand  Hindustan '  and  to  have  favoured  the  canal  water 
treaty  with  Pakistan  which  the  Sangh  had  condemned.  Dungarpur  insisted 
that  harmonious  relations  with  Pakistan  had  to  be  cultivated  and  that 
Sangh  positions  worked  counter  to  this  goal. 

43  77,  20  Nov.  1 96 1.  The  report  notes  that  the  Maharaja  met  twice  with 
Bhairon  Singh,  leader  of  the  Jan  Sangh  group  in  the  state  assembly;  they 
had  arrived  '  at  some  sort  of  a  working  arrangement  on  the  distribution  of 
assembly  constituencies  to  avert  a  direct  clash  between  the  two  parties'; 
and  that  final  arrangements  would  be  made  in  discussion  between  Masani 
and  Bhairon  Singh. 

329 


Notes,  pp.  212-244 

44  Statesman,  22  Nov.  1961.  TI,  24  Nov.  1961,  reports  a  tour  of  some 
districts  by  both  the  Maharaja  and  Maharani  of  Jaipur  in  the  course  of 
which  the  latter  was  supposed  to  meet  with  opposition  leaders. 

45  See  HT,  12  Dec.  1961,  and  Statesman,  13  Dec.  1961,  for  some 
accounts  of  these  developments. 

46  From  interviews  in  Rajasthan,  1962  and  1963. 

47  Statesman,  13  Dec.  1961.  See  also  Statesman,  4  Jan.  1962,  for  a 
further  reference,  to  the  effect  that '  the  breakdown  of  talks . . .  has  destroyed 
the  image,  sought  to  be  built  up,  of  these  Opposition  parties  as  an 
alternative  to  the  Congress.  Local  adjustments  are  still  contemplated. . .  \ 

48  HT,  19  Feb.  1962. 

49  TI,  4  March  1962. 

50  HT,  23  Oct.  1962. 

51  During  one  time  of  troubles  for  the  Congress  in  Rajasthan,  Dungrapur 
intimated  that  he  would  be  willing  to  enter  a  coalition  with  a  wing  of  the 
Congress  and  support  Sukhadia  as  the  Chief  Minister.  See  HT,  8  Aug. 
1962. 

52  See  OHT,  14  May  1964,  for  a  report  of  the  rumoured  merger  and  a 
denial  by  the  Swatantra  state  unit. 

53  HT,  24  April  1962,  refers  to  Bhairon  Singh  as  the  Sangh's  '  astute  and 
alert  leader '  who  *  has  not  allowed  the  spotlight  to  wander  far  away  from 
him,  or  for  too  long.  He  is  the  sleuth  of  the  opposition,  and  knows  the 
location  of  every  grievance  in  the  administration,  or  outside  \  For  press 
charges  about  Swatantra's  poor  performance  in  Rajasthan,  see:  Express, 
12  April  1962;  New  Age,  15  April  1962;  HT,  24  April  1962;  and  States- 
man, 30  April  1962.  Dungarpur  submitted  a  rebuttal  to  these  charges  and 
this  document  is  in  Swatantra  Party  files,  Bombay. 

54  See  OHT,  14  May  1964;  TI,  19  July  1965;  and  TI,  20  July  1965, 
respectively. 

55  SN,  no.  41,  Jan.-Feb.  1964. 

56  Statesman,  8  June  1965,  reproduced  in  the  Organiser,  14  June  1965, 
and  discussed  in  Swarajya,  3  July  1965. 

57  From  an  interview. 

58  In  mid- 1 965,  there  were  numerous  reports  that  Sangh  units  in 
Gujarat,  Mysore,  and  other  non-Hindi-speaking  states  insisted  on  a 
more  restrained  language  policy  and  that  the  leadership  did  yield  some 
ground. 

59  The  death  of  Raghuvira  seems  to  have  hurt  relations  between  the 
two  parties.  Masani  and  other  Swatantra  leaders  got  on  well  with  Rag- 
huvira, who,  among  other  things,  was  reportedly  '  muzzled '  by  the  Sangh 
because  of  a  relatively  moderate  stance  towards  Pakistan. 

60  See  TI,  15  March  i960,  for  an  announcement  that  the  Akali  Dal  had 
decided  to  abrogate  its  alliance  with  the  Congress,  coupled  with  a  request 
that  all  MPs  and  ML  As  elected  on  the  joint  Congress- Akali  ticket  move 
from  the  government  benches  to  the  opposition  benches.  The  decision 
was  taken  because  of  the  failure  of  the  Congress  to  respond  to  Akali 
demands  concerning  the  linguistic  issue  and  related  matters. 

61  TI,  26  Sept.  1959,  reports  that  the  Punjab  unit  of  the  Jan  Sangh  (like 

330 


Notes,  pp.  212-244 

the  national  organization)  demanded  that  Nehru  unequivocally  reiterate 
his  stand  that  there  would  be  no  division  of  the  Punjab. 

62  Statesman,  16  July  i960.  The  resolution,  passed  by  general  meeting 
of  the  Chandigarh  unit  against  Gurnam  Singh,  who  was  its  chairman, 
specifically  referred  to  his  close  association  with  the  Akali  Dal.  Gurnam 
Singh  and  Harbans  Singh  Gujral  had  been  serving  as  counsel  to  Master 
Tara  Singh  of  the  Akali  Dal. 

63  From  party  files. 

64  See  the  discussion  of  Munshi  in  chapter  5  and  of  Swatantra  doctrine 
in  chapter  8. 

65  TI,  24  June  1961. 

66  Statesman,  2  Jan.  1962. 

67  See  ibid.,  where  it  is  noted  that  Nagoke  was  supposed  to  contest 
against  a  Communist  candidate  who  would  under  no  circumstances  be 
withdrawn.  Thus  Akali  support  for  Nagoke  would  have  obliged  them  to 
oppose  the  CPI,  prejudicing  chances  for  broader  Akali-CPI  co-oper- 
ation. HT,  1  Jan.  1962,  notes  that  representatives  of  the  Akalis,  CPI, 
Swatantra,  PSP  and  the  Republican  Party  met  together  to  consider 
electoral  adjustments  but  had  been  successful  in  only  a  very  few  cases. 
The  Statesman,  20  Jan.  1962,  reports  Nagoke's  withdrawal. 

68  HT,  28  April  1961,  reports  a  Swatantra  announcement  that  it  hoped 
to  contest  about  100  out  of  154  assembly  seats.  In  HT,  1  Jan.  1962,  and 
Statesman,  2  Jan.  1962.  There  are  reports  of  Swatantra  displeasure  over 
the  small  number  of  seats  which  they  were  'conceded'  by  the  other 
opposition  parties.  TI,  3  Jan.  1962,  reported  that  Swatantra  finally 
announced  a  list  of  39  assembly  and  7  Lok  Sabha  candidates  but  many  of 
these  were  withdrawn,  too,  at  the  last  minute.  Nagoke  was  among  the 
latter,  as  was  Raja  Bhalindra  Singh,  who  refused  to  contest  for  the 
Patiala  Lok  Sabha  seat  after  his  brother,  the  Maharaja,  had  declined  to 
support  him. 

69  Statesman,  20  Jan.  1962.  Basant  Singh,  the  state  General- Secretary, 
was  reported  to  be  among  those  who  would  use  the  Akali  symbol  alone. 
In  a  report  to  the  Central  Organizing  Committee  of  the  Swatantra  Party, 
Masani  listed  the  use  of  the  Akali  symbol  as  one  of  the  serious  breaches  of 
discipline  evident  in  the  1962  elections. 

70  See  Statesman,  20  Jan.  1962,  and,  for  further  information  on  Akali- 
CPI  negotiations,  TI,  3  and  5  Jan.  1962. 

71  According  to  very  reliable  sources,  Swatantra  provided  Rs.  30,000 
to  each  Akali  candidate  for  the  Lok  Sabha,  and  the  three  victorious  Akalis 
became,  in  fact,  associate  members  of  the  Swatantra  group  in  Parliament. 
One  of  these,  Sardar  Kapur  Singh,  has  been  an  office-holder  in  the 
Swatantra  parliamentary  organization,  which  suggests  rather  complete 
amalgamation  at  the  Lok  Sabha  level.  None  the  less  the  two  remain 
organizationally  distinct  outside  of  Parliament  and  Akalis  are  far  from 
convinced  that  Swatantra  is  a  satisfactory  vehicle  through  which  they 
can  advance  their  interests.  The  question  of  Akali- Swatantra  candidacies 
remains  a  bit  obscure  because  some  Swatantra  candidates  did  use  the 
Akali  symbol. 

331 


Notes,  pp.  212-244 

72  Statesman,  7  Feb.  1963.  Rajaji  said  much  the  same  thing,  HWR, 
4  April  i960. 

73  For  the  statement  by  the  MP  (Buta  Singh),  see  77,  13  Feb.  1963. 
For  the  entry  of  one  high-ranking  Akali,  see  either  HT  or  77,  20  Sept. 
1962.  Also  see  Statesman,  7  Feb.  1963,  and  77, 14  Feb.  1963,  for  reports  of 
possible  merger. 

74  OHT,  7  April  i960. 

75  HT,  3  Jan.  1961,  argues  that  Nagoke  had  played  a  key  role  in  efforts 
to  have  the  Akali  Dal  reject  in  toto  an  appeal  from  Nehru  to  reduce 
tension  over  the  Punjabi  suba  issue.  According  to  this  report,  Nagoke 
took  part  in  the  formal  Akali  discussions,  by  special  invitation. 

76  See  77,  14  Feb.  1963,  for  Fateh  Singh's  statement. 

77  HT,  28  April  1965. 

78  Based  on  correspondence  and  on  the  following  newspaper  accounts : 
HT,  28  April  1965  (Kapur  Singh);  Patriot,  8  July  1965  (Akali  meeting  to 
decide  future);  HT  Weekly,  11  July  1965,  and  Patriot,  11  July  1965 
(Gurnam  Singh  and  the  opposition  of  Patiala  and  Fateh  Singh);  TI, 
21  July  1965  (S ant-Master  reconciliation  effort);  Pioneer,  25  July  1965 
(Tara  Singh-Rajaji);  Express,  29  July  1965  (split  among  Akali  legislators 
in  Punjab  assembly  and  Gurnam  Singh's  role);  ibid.  (Rajaji-Ranga-Tara 
Singh  talks);  Organiser,  1  Aug.  1965  (Sikh  state  demand);  Express,  4  Aug. 
1965  (Tara  Singh  decline,  relations  with  Swatantra);  TI,  11  Aug.  1965 
(Rajaji  quote). 

79  A  resolution  of  the  Punjabi  suba  issue  might  conceivably  allow  the 
Akalis  to  turn  their  attention  to  the  type  of  issue  which  Swatantra  prefers 
to  emphasize;  but  at  least  at  the  present  time,  it  would  appear  that  under 
such  conditions  an  Akali-Congress  entente  would  be  more  likely. 

80  To  be  sure,  the  Sangh  does  admit  non-Hindus  and  is  therefore 
officially  non-communal,  which  may  make  it  sufficiently  respectable  as  a 
close  ally  or  even  for  purposes  of  merger.  The  fusion  of  the  ranks  of  the 
two  parties  would  be  very  difficult  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  among  them 
Swatantra's  non-Hindu  appeal  in  some  states. 

81  P.  S.  Krishnaswamy,  a  founder  of  Swatantra  in  Coimbatore  district, 
resigned,  complaining  about  a  policy  of  indiscriminate  alliances  under- 
taken by  Swatantra.  Munshi's  distress  is  evident  in  Swarajya,  25  Sept. 
1962. 

82  Based  on  interviews. 

83  Based  on  correspondence  and  newspaper  accounts  cited  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  Ramgarh  in  chapter  7. 

84  Based  on  interviews. 

85  Based  on  interviews  and  on  the  following  accounts:  Indian  Affairs 
Record,  Jan.  i960  (Swatantra-RRP  merger  talks);  Link,  14  Feb.  i960 
(merger  talks);  Link,  25  Sept.  i960  (merger  effort  by  the  late  Bhinai,  then 
a  Swantantrite,  formerly  a  member  of  the  RRP  and  Sangh,  at  a  Rajasthan 
Rajput  meeting);  TI,  3  Aug.  1961  (unity  conference,  including  RRP, 
Swatantra,  Jan  Sangh,  Hindu  Mahasabha,  and  the  Ganatantra  Parishad, 
called  by  Karapatri  of  RRP). 

86  Based  on  TI,  8  Aug.  1965,  and  correspondence. 

332 


Notes,  pp.  212-244 

87  Link,  4  Sept.  i960;  8  May  1961;  5  June  i960;  and  27  March  1960, 
respectively,  for  these  fragments. 

88  Link,  22  May  i960. 

89  Link,  17  Jan.  i960. 

90  Based  on  a  wide  variety  of  interviews  with  interested  parties  and  on 
personal  observation  at  meetings  where  the  matter  was  discussed.  The 
attention  to  Vyas  as  a  possible  Chief  Minister  stemmed  in  part  from 
Dungarpur's  insistence  that  he  had '  had  his  innings '  as  a  serious  politician 
and  that  under  no  circumstances  would  he  assume  the  chief  minister- 
ship. 

91  Based  on  interviews. 

92  See  Link,  3  April  i960,  for  the  first  two  cases,  and  Link,  3  July  i960, 
for  the  last. 

93  Based  on  correspondence  with  Swatantra  leaders  in  Madras.  This  is 
not  a  one-way  street,  as  we  have  seen.  In  Bihar,  in  1964,  the  first  Swatantra 
nominee  for  the  Rajya  Sabha  did  not  get  elected,  even  though  the  party 
had  ample  strength  in  the  assembly. 

94  This  discussion  is  based  on  interviews  and  on  discussions  at 
Swatantra  Party  meetings  which  the  author  was  permitted  to  attend. 
Masani  was  at  his  most  persuasive  best  in  trying  to  get  Dungarpur  to  visit 
Sampurnanand,  and  Dungarpur  finally  acquiesced,  reluctantly.  I  have  not 
yet  received  a  report  that  Dungarpur  has  actually  paid  such  a  visit.  We 
have  already  seen  that  in  the  south,  the  Brahmin/non-Brahmin  split  is 
involved  in  Swatantra  relations  with  the  DMK;  but  it  should  also  be 
noted  that  many  historic  cleavages  have  been  overcome,  e.g.  as  between 
some  of  the  Justiceites  and  the  Brahmins.  Even  in  Rajasthan,  the  situation 
was  not  completely  hopeless.  Swatantra  did  work  with  Vyas  and  Shastri  to 
a  limited  extent,  and  Dungarpur  has  said  upon  occasion  that  he  would  not 
be  averse  to  supporting  Sukhadia  in  some  sort  of  coalition  ministry. 

95  Questionnaires  were  returned  by  almost  all  leading  Swatantrites, 
both  national  and  state.  In  some  cases  where  they  were  not  returned, 
interviews  elicited  much  the  same  information;  and  in  some  cases, 
follow-up  interviews  were  used  to  explore  certain  points.  Not  very  sur- 
prisingly, when  asked  in  the  questionnaire  which  leading  Congressmen 
were  closest  to  Swatantra  in  outlook,  S.  K.  Patil  was  named  most  often, 
with  Hanumanthaya  and  Mahtab  next.  These  three  were  mentioned  very 
frequently,  with  little  variations  in  terms  of  the  state  from  which  the 
respondent  came.  The  others  mentioned  were  generally  lesser  Congress- 
men and  were  very  heavily  weighted  in  terms  of  the  state  from  which  the 
respondent  came.  In  very  few  cases  was  anyone  at  a  loss  to  name  at  least 
two  or  three  state  ministers  among  the  'fellow-travelling'  Swatantrites. 
Patil  is  very  much  pro-private  enterprise,  Hanumanthaya  and  Mahtab 
more  'old  warriors'  who  look  upon  themselves  as  Gandhians. 

96  Based  on  interviews  on  1962. 

97  Based  on  correspondence  and  in  interviews,  1966. 

98  Kothari,  AS,  iv,  1 161-73. 

99  A  number  of  examples  of  such  efforts  have  been  noted  already,  and  in 
the  pre- 1 967  election  period  there  was  strenuous  activity  along  these  lines. 

333 


Notes,  pp.  245-260 

100  Based  on  party  files,  interviews,  and  correspondence. 

101  Based  on  interviews  and  correspondence. 

102  Based  on  interviews  and  correspondence. 

103  Based  on  interviews  and  correspondence. 

104  Where  these  parties  have  any  support,  Swatantra  has  negotiated 
with  them,  as  with  the  RRP  in  Rajasthan.  One  MP  and  some  ML  As  from 
the  RRP  in  Rajasthan  have  joined  Swatantra. 

105  SN,  no.  20, 9  July  1961 .  This  was,  of  course,  prior  to  the  first  general 
elections  in  which  Swatantra  contested. 

106  See  Link,  6  March  i960.  As  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  ascertain, 
Swatantra  gave  no  help  to  Jan  Sangh  General-Secretary  Upadhyaya  in  the 
Jaunpur  by-election  in  1963.  There  was,  in  any  event,  serious  opposition 
among  top  Swatantra  leaders  to  the  giving  of  such  help. 

107  From  an  interview. 

108  Based  on  interviews  and  on  observation  of  assembly  and  Swatantra 
Party  meetings  in  Rajasthan. 

109  Rajaji  made  his  suggestion  at  the  Bangalore  convention  of  Swatan- 
tra in  1964.  For  Kripalani,  see  Swarajya,  6,  13  and  20  July  1963,  and  for  a 
comparable  effort  by  Munshi,  see  HT,  3  June  1963. 

CHAPTER    10,  pp.  245-260 

1  Kalman  Silvert  (ed.),  Expectant  Peoples  (New  York,  Random  House, 
1963),  introduction. 

2  Rupert  Emerson,  From  Empire  to  Nation  (Cambridge,  Harvard  Uni- 
versity Press,  i960). 

3  Government  and  Politics,  ch.  2. 

4  AS,  iv,  1 1 16-73. 

5  Harrison,  Dangerous  Decades,  and  Shils,  The  Intellectual  Between 
Tradition  and  Modernity. 

6  As  in  the  work  of  the  Rudolphs,  Morris- Jones,  Weiner,  and  Kothari 
and  Maru,  among  others. 

7  AS,  iv,  1 161-73. 

8  Government  and  Politics,  p.  160.  See  also  Weiner,  MS. 

9  For  Harrison,  see  Dangerous  Decades. 

10  Implicity  rejecting  Kothari's  contention  that  the  Congress  'system' 
is  satisfactorily  democratic. 

11  Swarajya,  22  May  1965. 

12  These  include  the  position  of  the  president  vis-a-vis  Cabinet  and 
Parliament,  the  proposed  amalgamation  of  the  offices  of  law  minister  and 
attorney-general,  the  use  of  preventive  detention,  the  continuation  of  the 
state  of  emergency  after  the  Chinese  invasion  in  1962,  the  possible  role 
of  an  Ombudsman,  and  the  utilization  of  a  non-partisan  board  to  assign 
permits  and  licence  to  private  enterprise. 

13  These  were  published  by  both  the  central  office  and  the  parlia- 
mentary office,  almost  exclusively  in  English. 

14  The  question  of  balance  is  inherent  in  Morris-Jones'  approach, 
Government  and  Politics,  ch.  2. 

334 


Notes,  pp.  245-260 

15  Ibid. 

16  See  Silvert  (ed.)  Expectant  Peoples,  introduction. 

17  Modern  Review,  cv,  6  (June  I959)>  434>  and  OHT,  11  June  1959, 
both  claim  that  Rajaji  wanted  to  call  the  party  'conservative'.  The  PSP 
periodical  Janata,  17  Jan.  1960,  refers  to  the  formation  of  a  'Conservative 
Party'  under  Rajaji's  leadership,  although  by  that  time,  of  course,  the 
name  Swatantra  had  been  firmly  fixed.  Kabir,  India  Quarterly,  xvi,  8, 
argues  that  'conservative'  would  have  been  disastrous.  We  have  already 
quoted  Rajaji's  view  that  a  'party  on  the  right'  is  necessary  to  give 
expression  to  'the  pain  involved'  in  the  'dislocation,  disturbance,  and 
distress'  which  every  change  'necessarily'  produces. 

18  Swarajya,  18  April  1959. 

19  TI,  4  June  1959.  See  also  Modern  Review,  cv,  6  (June  1959),  434. 

20  From  the  General  Secretary's  Report,  Swatantra  Party  candidate's 
convention,  Bombay,  7  and  8  April  1962,  p.  5.  My  emphasis. 

21  Modern  Review,  cv,  6  (June  1959),  435. 

22  See  above,  chapter  5. 

23  Party  Politics  in  India  (Ahmedabad,  Harold  Laski  Institute,  1962), 
p.  19.  The  statement  was  originally  made  at  a  party  convention  and  was 
repeated  in  an  address  at  the  Harold  Laski  Institute,  which  published  the 
address  under  the  above  title. 

24  From  his  Report,  candidates'  convention,  1962,  p.  6. 

25  Ibid.  p.  5. 

26  The  Congress  Path  to  Communism,  pp.  10-11. 

27  For  some  fairly  typical  partisan  views,  see  H.  D.  Malaviya,  The 
Swatantra  Party:  Its  Real  Character  and  Designs  (New  Delhi,  Socialist 
Congressman,  n.d.),  and  N.  C.  Zamindar,  Congress  Refuted  (Indore, 
Sahityalaya,  1962).  Zamindar  is  not  the  most  able  spokesman,  but  he  is 
earnest.  For  more  sober  fare,  see  Why  Swatantra? 

28  Vincent  Starzinger,  Middlingness  (Charlottesville,  Va.,  University  of 
Virginia  Press,  1966),  provides  an  analysis  of  nineteenth-century  French 
and  British  developments. 

29  Weiner,  Party  Politics,  argues,  for  example,  that  the  radical  right  has  a 
future,  based  largely  on  uprooted  rural  people,  displaced  artisans,  and 
others  adversely  affected  by  the  process  of  social  change.  The  Rudolphs, 
'  Political  Role ',  PA,  xxxni,  5,  argue  that  conflict  in  India  '  has  generally 
been  dealt  with  less  by  confrontation  of  adversaries,  struggle  and  decision, 
than  by  compartmentalization,  absorption,  and  synthesis'.  The  con- 
figuration of  right-wing  forces  depends  very  much  on  arguments  such  as 
these,  on  international  developments,  and  on  so  many  imponderables  that 
speculation  on  the  subject  would  be  little  more  than  a  very  lengthy 
catalogue  of  'if. .  .then'  propositions. 

30  Nehru,  conclusion. 


335 


Notes,  pp.  261-268 

APPENDIX  I,  pp.  261-268 

i  President  Radhakrishnan's  1967  Republic  Day  address  is  a  good  case 
in  point. 

2  E.g.  the  language  issue  in  Madras,  ground-nut  policy  in  Gujarat. 

3  In  addition  to  those  who  entered  active  politics  for  the  first  time, 
there  were  others  who  abandoned  the  Congress.  The  once-faithful  Birla 
family  allegedly  divided  its  politicial  contributions  equally  among  the 
Congress,  Swatantra  and  the  Jan  Sangh.  Among  the  aristocrats,  the 
Rajmata  of  Gwalior  (Madhya  Pradesh)  left  the  Congress  and  spearheaded 
the  complete  rout  of  the  Congress  in  the  former  Gwalior  region  of 
Madhya  Pradesh;  and  the  Maharaja  of  Bharatpur,  whose  ambitions  were 
similarly  frustrated  by  the  state  (Rajasthan)  Congress  unit,  contested  for 
the  Lok  Sabha  as  an  independent  and  won  an  overwhelming  victory. 
Other  examples  could  easily  be  cited. 

4  E.g.  the  Jana  Congress  (Orissa),  the  Bangla  Congress  (Bengal),  the 
Kerala  Congress  (Kerala),  among  others. 

5  There  was,  as  usual,  the  possibility  that  some  would  rejoin  the  parent 
body. 

6  Swatantra,  although  a  leader  in  this  effort,  was  by  no  means  alone. 
There  were  very  broad  and  stable  anti-Congress  fronts  in  Kerala,  Bengal, 
and  Madras,  in  particular. 

7  Ramgarh,  having  been  admitted  into  the  Congress,  was  dissatisfied 
with  the  treatment  he  and  his  followers  received  in  candidate  selection  and 
defected.  With  some  dissident  Congressmen,  he  helped  to  form  the  Jan 
Kranti  Dal  (Peoples'  Revolutionary  Party),  which  is  now  a  partner  in  the 
coalition  ministry  in  Bihar.  Swatantra  tried  to  carry  on  in  Bihar  but  was 
completely  routed. 

8  This  was  evident  both  in  candidate  selection  and  in  the  premature 
consideration  of  the  constitution  of  the  Gujarat  ministry. 

9  Some  Orissa  dissidents  formed  a  rump  Swatantra  party,  while  in 
Gujarat,  dissidents  generally  fought  as  independents.  The  Gujarat  dis- 
sidents came  primarily  from  aristocratic-dominated  areas  of  Kutch, 
Saurashtra,  and  Panchmahals. 

10  E.g.  Piloo  Mody's  candidacy  from  Panchmahals  in  Gujarat  was 
largely  in  the  hands  of  H.  H.  Devgadh-Baria;  Dandekar's  campaign  in 
Jamnagar  owed  much  to  the  support  of  the  Thakur  of  Dhrol;  etc.  In  the 
first  case,  most  observers  and  party  leaders  agreed  that  the  dissidents  did  not 
demand  much — only  considerate  treatment  and  some  consultation  before 
major  decisions  were  taken;  but  even  this  was  not  readily  forthcoming. 

11  In  terms  of  the  problems  of  finance,  as  discussed  in  the  main  part  of 
the  book,  there  were  other  important  issues.  The  Birla  money  was  speci- 
fically earmarked  for  Birla  candidates  in  Rajasthan,  and  much  money  was 
given  directly  to  the  state  units,  rather  than  being  funnelled  through  the 
central  office.  This  made  it  more  difficult  to  finance  resource-poor  state  units 
and  it  weakened  Masani's  position  somewhat  as  he  confronted  state  units. 

12  There  was  a  more  restricted  and  informal  understanding  with  the 
Janata  Paksha  in  Mysore. 

336 


Notes,  pp.  261-268 

13  There  was  persistent  fear  that  the  Jan  Sangh  would  work  sub  rosa  to 
subvert  Masani's  position  and  to  keep  him  out  of  the  Lok  Sabha.  During 
the  campaign,  the  charge  was  also  made  that  Masani  was  a  beef-eater  and 
many  Swatantra  leaders  felt  that  this  was  raised  primarily  by  the  RSS 
men  in  Rajkot,  who  were  allegedly  working  on  Masani's  behalf.  Elsewhere 
in  Gujarat,  the  feeling  was  that  the  understanding  with  the  Jan  Sangh  did 
Swatantra  more  harm  than  good. 

14  The  Andhra  unit  was  particularly  active  in  reaching  understandings 
with  the  Communists. 

15  Kalahandi  was  the  leader  of  the  group  in  favour  of  the  demand  for  a 
ban  on  cow-slaughter.  The  opposition  was  led  by  the  Bombay  City 
representatives  but  they  had  much  support  from  other  regions.  The 
Gujarat  and  Madras  units  were  foremost  in  their  advocacy  of  a  ban  on 
cow- slaughter,  and  even  many  people  who  had  no  sympathy  for  such  a 
move  felt  that  it  was  an  exploitable  issue.  Hence,  there  was  great  dis- 
appointment in  many  quarters  when  the  cow-slaughter  fasts-unto-death 
were  terminated. 

16  Representatives  of  the  central  office  uniformly  deplored  these  actions 
but  felt  they  were  absolutely  indispensable  for  electoral  success. 

17  Many  national  leaders  quietly  expressed  the  hope  that  Swatantra 
would  not  form  ministries  in  these  states,  and,  for  example,  most  pro- 
Swatantra  businessmen  in  Baroda  hoped  for  a  Congress  ministry  in  that 
state. 

18  Candidates  were  generally  very  closely  screened;  central  office  con- 
tributions were  made  contingent  upon  the  submission  of  periodic  reports 
of  work  and  adequate  accounting  of  expenditures;  and  the  Lok  Sabha 
candidates  were  authorized  to  arrange  disbursement  of  funds  to  their 
assembly  candidates  as  they  saw  fit. 

19  The  Gujarat  case  is  notable  in  that  many  of  the  businessmen  were 
outsiders. 

20  As  noted,  Mody  in  Panchmahals  and  Dandekar  in  Jamnagar  re- 
ceived much  help,  as  did  Masani  in  Rajkot  and  most  of  the  Lok  Sabha 
candidates  in  Rajasthan. 

21  This  is  in  terms  of  seats  gained.  In  terms  of  percentage  of  total  vote 
for  Lok  Sabha  candidates  by  state,  Swatantra  recorded  losses  in  Bihar, 
UP,  Andhra  and  Madras,  although  in  the  last  two  states  the  number  of 
seats  increased  (which  discrepancy  is  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  more 
limited  efforts).  In  terms  of  votes  per  contested  seat,  Swatantra  recorded 
a  significant  improvement  in  aggregate  terms.  In  terms  of  its  major  states, 
its  votes  per  contested  seat  dropped  only  in  Bihar  and  remained  constant 
in  UP.  By  this  last  index,  notable  gains  were  recorded  in  Gujarat,  Rajas- 
than, Orissa,  Andhra,  Madras,  and  Mysore. 

22  The  losses  in  Bihar  were  expected — no  Lok  Sabha  seats  and  only 
four  assembly  seats — although  with  greater  concentration  of  effort,  one  or 
two  Lok  Sabha  seats  might  have  been  gained.  UP,  where  a  major  effort 
was  made,  was  the  biggest  disappointment,  as  one  sitting  MP  declined  to 
stand  and  another  lost  his  deposit,  as  part  of  a  general  rout. 

23  This  again  is  in  terms  of  seats  gained.  As  before,  there  is  considerable 

337 


Notes,  pp.  261-268 

variation  in  terms  of  percentage  of  vote  and  votes  per  contested  seat. 
Thus,  in  Gujarat  and  Rajasthan,  Swatantra  showed  increases  in  number  of 
seats,  percentage  of  votes,  and  votes  per  contested  seat;  while  in  Madras 
and  Mysore,  its  percentage  of  the  vote  declined  but  there  were  marked 
gains  in  the  other  two  respects.  According  to  available  figures,  its  poll 
percentage  in  Andhra  remained  nearly  constant,  but  it  gained  more  seats 
and  nearly  doubled  its  votes  per  contested  seat.  Only  a  detailed  analysis 
using  all  of  these  indices,  together  with  factors  such  as  regional  concen- 
tration of  seats,  votes,  etc.,  would  provide  an  accurate  measure  of  Swa- 
tantra's  quantitative  and  qualitative  performance. 

24  E.g.  approximately  half  of  Swatantra's  MLAs  in  Rajasthan  come 
from  Jaipur  division. 

25  As  noted,  there  was  a  limited  and  informal  understanding  with  the 
Janata  Paksha,  which,  according  to  Swatantra  national  leaders,  played 
some  role  in  Swatantra's  victories. 

26  Relations  between  Rajaji  and  Annadorai,  the  DMK  leader,  have  been 
quite  cordial;  and,  according  to  one  report,  Rajaji  said  'leave  Madras  to 
me;  the  last  act  of  my  life  will  be  to  convert  the  DMK  into  the  Madras 
unit  of  the  Swatantra  Party'.  A  proposed  Swatantra-DMK  bloc  in  the 
Lok  Sabha  nearly  came  to  fruition;  but  difficulties  at  the  state  level  have, 
for  the  moment,  laid  this  to  rest. 

27  Ranga  was  defeated  in  the  general  election  but  is  standing  in  a  by- 
election. 

28  E.g.  the  Maharani  of  Jaipur  was  defeated  in  her  assembly  contest, 
although  she  won  her  Lok  Sabha  seat  comfortably;  and  Himmatsinhji  of 
Kutch  lost  his  Lok  Sabha  seat.  In  the  weeks  following  the  1967  elections 
there  has  already  been  much  talk  of  developing  a  Swatantra  counterpart 
to  the  RSS  cadres,  which  sounds  a  bit  far-fetched.  However  there  is 
widespread  realization  that  if  Swatantra  is  to  hold  its  own,  it  must  develop 
some  cadres.  But  as  one  Swatantra  leader  put  it,  in  discussing  this  need: 
'What  do  we  substitute  for  the  emotional  issues  which  give  strength  to 
the  RSS  and  the  Jan  Sangh?'  Others  feel  that  the  party  does  not  require 
a  band  of  zealous  workers,  such  as  the  RSS,  but  needs  only  to  put  its  con- 
ventional party  apparatus  on  a  sounder  footing.  Even  this  will  be  difficult 
to  achieve  in  many  areas,  but  it  will  be  easier  to  accomplish  than  to  build 
an  RSS  counterpart. 

29  In  addition  to  huge  gains  in  UP  and  Madhya  Pradesh,  the  Jan  Sangh 
improved  its  position  in  Rajasthan  and  made  a  good  start  in  Bihar.  It  also 
did  extremely  well  in  Delhi.  Most  Jan  Sangh  leaders  obviously  want  the 
party  to  develop  on  its  own  and  to  make  an  even  stronger  effort  in  1972, 
without  undue  attention  to  the  Swatantra  Party.  However,  talks  of  a 
united  front  in  Parliament  and  of  complete  merger  have  taken  place,  and 
Balraj  Madhok  seems  quite  responsive  to  the  idea  of  a  merger.  The  united 
front  in  the  Lok  Sabha  was  discussed  immediately  after  the  elections,  but 
Swatantra's  terms  were  unacceptable  to  the  Jan  Sangh.  Swatantra  in- 
sisted, for  example,  that  the  leader  and  chief  whip  of  the  group  be  from 
the  largest  party  in  any  front,  and  that  on  all  issues  on  which  the  members 
of  the  front  could  not  agree,  everyone  should  have  a  free  vote  (i.e.  indi- 

338 


Notes,  pp.  261-268 

vidual  parties  could  not  issue  whips  to  their  own  members).  In  the  nego- 
tiations, the  DMK  was  also  involved,  and  together  the  three  parties  would 
have  formed  a  group  of  approximately  one  hundred  members. 
30  In  Rajasthan,  the  Congress  was  by  far  the  largest  single  party  but  it 
still  fell  a  few  seats  short  of  an  absolute  majority.  Both  the  Congress  and 
the  united  opposition  claimed  a  majority,  including  independents,  defec- 
tors from  the  others'  ranks,  etc.  When,  after  some  rather  inept  efforts  to 
ascertain  who  should  be  invited  to  form  the  ministry,  Governor  Sampur- 
nanand  turned  to  the  Congress,  there  were  serious  public  disturbances  in 
Jaipur,  including  several  deaths  and  much  destruction  of  property  Swa- 
tantra  leaders  in  Rajasthan  claim  that  they  did  not  want  to  get  involved  in 
the  public  demonstrations  but  that  they  had  to,  to  avoid  leaving  the  field 
to  the  Jan  Sangh  and  the  SSP,  both  of  which  were  very  happy  to  take  to 
the  streets.  Anticipating  new  elections  in  Rajasthan  within  a  short  time, 
Swatantra  leaders  felt  that  they  had  to  involve  themselves  in  the  '  demo- 
cratic protest '  against  Sampurnanand's  decision.  Finally,  President's  Rule 
was  declared,  although  the  assembly  was  only  suspended,  not  dissolved. 


339 


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This  bibliography  is  primarily  a  list  of  materials  used  in  the  preparation 
of  the  book,  with  several  additions  to  provide  further  background  on  some 
points,  etc.  The  listing  is  divided  into  six  parts :  (i)  general  background — 
works  used  in  connection  with  discussions  of  conservatism  and  political 
development;  (2)  Indian  background;  (3)  post-independence  politics, 
with  the  emphasis  on  parties  and  elections;  (4)  Swatantra  bibliography, 
mainly  works  by  or  about  Swatantra  leaders;  (5)  publications  of  the 
Swatantra  Party;  and  (6)  publications  of  the  Forum  of  Free  Enter- 
prise. A  note  on  interviews  and  questionnaire  respondents  appears  at  the 
end. 

Three  points  should  be  noted.  First,  books  and  articles  have  been 
listed  together.  Secondly,  the  inclusion  of  an  item  in  one  section  rather 
than  another  has  in  some  cases  been  quite  arbitrary;  and,  for  example, 
pieces  authored  by  Masani  appear  in  parts  4,  5,  and  6,  due  to  circum- 
stances of  publication.  Thirdly,  Indian  editions  of  some  works  have  been 
used,  and,  as  in  the  case  of  Weiner's  Politics  of  Scarcity,  pagination 
differs  from  English  and  American  editions. 

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Moore,  Barrington,  Jr.   Social  Origins  of  Dictatorship  and  Democracy. 

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Starzinger,  Vincent.  Middlingness.  Charlottesville,  University  of  Virginia 
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Nanda,  B.  R.  Mahatma  Gandhi.  London,  George  Allen  and  Unwin, 

1959. 
Narain,  Brij.  Charkha  Marxism:  Indian  Socialism.  Lahore,  Rama  Krishna, 

1941. 
Nehru,  Jawaharlal.  Towards  Freedom.  Boston,  Beacon  Press,  1958. 
O'Malley,  L.  S.  S.  India's  Social  Heritage.  London,  Oxford  University 

Press,  1934. 
Popular  Hinduism:  The  Religion  of  the  Masses.  New  York,  Macmillan, 

I935- 
Panikkar,  K.  M.  Common  Sense  About  India.  London,  Gollancz,  i960. 

Indian  Princes  in  Council.  London,  Oxford  University  Press,  1936. 

Indian  States  and  the  Government  of  India.  London,  Martin  Hopkin- 

son,  1932. 

The  State  and  the  Citizen.  Bombay,  Asia  Publishing  House,  1956. 

Panjabi,  Kewal  L.   The  Indomitable  Sardar.  Bombay,  Bharatiya  Vidya 

Bhavan,  1964. 
Parikh,  Narhari  D.  Sardar  Vallabhbhai  Patel.  2  vols.  Trans,  not  named. 

Ahmedabad,  Navajivan  Press,  1953  and  1956. 
Patel,  Govindlal  D.  The  Indian  Land  Problem  and  Legislation.  Bombay, 

N.  M.  Tripathi,  1954. 

343  22"2 


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Patel,  Surendra  J.  Agricultural  Labourers  in  Modern  India  and  Pakistan. 

Bombay,  Current  Book  House,  1952. 
Rao,  Baditha  Srinivasa.  Surveys  of  Indian  Industries.  2  vols.  London, 

Oxford  University  Press,  1957. 
Retzlaff,  Ralph.  Village  Government  in  India.  New  York,  Asia  Publishing 

House,  1962. 
Savarkar,  V.  D.  Hindu  Rashtra  Darshan.  Bombay,  L.  G.  Khare,  1949. 
Schuster,    George,   and    Guy   Wint.    India   and  Democracy.    London, 

Macmillan,  1951. 
Sen,  Surendra  Nath.  Eighteen-Fifty- Seven.  Delhi,  Publications  Division, 

Ministry  of  Information  and  Broadcasting,  1957. 
Shils,  Edward.  The  Intellectual  Between  Tradition  and  Modernity:  The 

Indian  Case.  The  Hague,  Mouton,  1961. 
Singer,  Milton, '  The  Religion  of  India :  The  Sociology  of  Hinduism  and 

Buddhism  (Max  Weber)',  American  Anthropologist ,  lxi,  1  (Feb.  1961). 
— —  (ed.).    Traditional    India:    Structure    and    Change.    Philadelphia, 

American  Folklore  Society,  1959. 
Singh,  Ranbir.  The  Indian  States  Under  the  Government  of  India  Act,  193 5- 

Bombay,  Taraporevala,  n.d. 
Sitaramayya,  B.  Pattabhi.   The  History  of  the  Indian  National  Congress. 

Ahmedabad,  Congress  Working  Committee,  1935. 
Spencer,  Daniel.  India:  Mixed  Enterprise  and  Western  Business.  The 

Hague,  Martinus  Nijhoff,  1959. 
Srinivas,  M.  N.  Caste  in  Modern  India  and  Other  Essays.  New  York,  Asia 

Publishing  House,  1962. 
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i960. 
Stokes,  Eric.  The  English  Utilitarians  in  India.  London,  Oxford  University 

Press,  1959. 
Thorner,  Daniel.  The  Agrarian  Prospect  in  India.  Delhi,  Delhi  University, 

1956. 
Tod,  James.  Annals  and  Antiquities  of  Rajasthan.  2  vols.  London,  Rout- 
ledge  and  Kegan  Paul,  1957. 
Venkatasubbiah,  H.  Indian  Economy  Since  Independence.  New  York,  Asia 

Publishing  House,  1961. 
Wadia,  P.  A.,  and  K.  T.   Merchant.    The  Bombay  Plan — A   Criticism. 

Bombay,  Popular  Book  Depot,  1945. 
Weber,  Max.  The  City.  Trans.  Don  Martindale  and  Gertrud  Neuwirth. 

New  York,  Collier,  1962. 
The  Religion  of  India:  The  Sociology  of  Hinduism  and  Buddhism. 

Trans,  and  ed.  Hans  Gerth  and  Don  Martindale.  Glencoe,  111.,  Free 

Press,  1958. 
Wiser,  William  E.    The  Hindu  Jajmani  System.    Lucknow,  Lucknow 

Publishing  House,  1936. 
Woodruff,  Philip.  The  Men  Who  Ruled  India.  2  vols.  London,  Jonathan 

Cape,  1953  and  1954. 
Zinkin,  Taya.  Caste  Today.  New  York,  Oxford  University  Press,  1958. 
India  Changes!  New  York,  Oxford  University  Press,  1958. 

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3.   POST-INDEPENDENCE    PARTY   POLITICS 

Ali,  Sadiq.  The  General  Elections  1957.  New  Delhi,  All-India  Congress 
Committee,  1959. 

Ayyar,  R.  V.  Krishna,  et  al.  (eds.).  All-India  Election  Guide.  Madras, 
Oriental  Publishers,  1956. 

Bailey,  F.  G.  Politics  and  Social  Change:  Orissa  1959.  London,  Oxford 
University  Press,  1963. 

'Politics  in  Orissa. '  Nine  parts.  Economic  Weekly  (Aug.-Nov.  1959). 

Beteille,  Andre.  Caste,  Class,  and  Power.  Berkeley,  University  of  Cali- 
fornia Press,  1965. 

Brass,  Paul.  Factional  Politics  in  an  Indian  State.  Berkeley,  University  of 
California  Press,  1965. 

Brecher,  Michael.  Nehru:  A  Political  Biography.  New  York,  Oxford  Uni- 
versity Press,  1959. 

Succession  in  India.  London,  Oxford  University  Press,  1966. 

daCosta,  E.  P.  W.  '  Indian  Politics  Today  and  Tomorrow — Assessment 
and  Prophecy',  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  xxvn,  5  (4  Feb.  i960). 

Dean,  Vera  M.  New  Patterns  of  Democracy  in  India.  Cambridge,  Harvard 
University  Press,  1959. 

Election  Commission  (India).  Report  on  the  First  General  Elections  in  India 
1951-1952.  2  vols.  Delhi,  Manager  of  Publications,  Government  of 
India,  1955. 

Report  on  the  Second  General  Elections  in  India  1957.  2  vols.  Delhi, 

Manager  of  Publications,  Government  of  India,  1959. 

Report  on  the  Third  General  Elections  in  India  1962.  2  vols.  Delhi, 


Manager  of  Publications,  Government  of  India,  1963. 
Harrison,  Selig.  India:  The  Most  Dangerous  Decades.  Princeton,  Princeton 

University  Press,  i960. 
Kabir,  Humayun.  'Congress  Ideology',  India  Quarterly,  xvi,  1  (Jan.- 

March  i960). 
Karaka,  D.  F.  Morarji.  Bombay,  Times  of  India  Press,  1965. 
Kogekar,  S.  V.,  and  Richard  Park  (eds.).  Reports  on  the  Indian  General 

Elections  1951-52.  Bombay,  Popular  Book  Depot,  1956. 
Kothari,  Rajni.  'The  Congress  "System"  in  India',  Asian  Survey,  iv,  12 

(Dec.  1964). 
and  Rushikesh  Maru.  'Caste  and  Secularism  in  India',  Journal  of 

Asian  Studies,  xxv,  1  (Nov.  1965). 
Maheshwari,  Shri  Ram.  The  General  Election  in  India.  Allahabad,  Chai- 

tanya,  1963. 
Mehta,  Asok.  The  Political  Mind  of  India.  Bombay,  Praja  Socialist  Party, 

1952. 
Menon,  V.  P.  The  Story  of  the  Integration  of  the  Indian  States.  Bombay, 

Orient  Longmans,  1961. 
Ministry  of  States  (India).  White  Paper  on  Indian  States.  Delhi,  Govern- 
ment of  India,  1950. 
Mookerjee,  H.  C.  Congress  and  the  Masses.  Calcutta,  Book  House,  n.d. 
Moraes,  Frank.  India  Today.  New  York,  Macmillan,  i960. 

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Moraes,  Frank.  Jawarharlal  Nehru.  Bombay,  Jaico,  1959. 

Morris-Jones,  W.  H.  Government  and  Politics  of  India.  London,  Hutchin- 
son University  Library,  1964. 

Parliament   in    India.    Philadelphia,    University    of   Pennsylvania 

Press,  1957. 

Overstreet,  Gene  D.  'The  Hindu  Code  Bill',  Cases  in  Comparative 
Politics,  ed.  James  B.  Christoph.  Boston,  Little,  Brown,  1965. 

Palmer,  Norman.  'India  Faces  a  New  Decade',  Current  History,  XL,  235 
(March  1961). 

The  Indian  Political  System.  Boston,  Houghton  Mifflin,  1961. 

Park,  Richard  L.,  and  Irene  Tinker  (eds.).  Leadership  and  Political  Institu- 
tions in  India.  Princeton,  Princeton  University  Press,  1959. 

Pathak,  Devavrat,  M.  G.  Parekh  and  Kirtidev  Desai.  Three  General 
Elections  in  Gujarat.  Ahmedabad,  Gujarat  University,  1966. 

Philips,  C.  H.  (ed.).  Politics  and  Society  in  India.  New  York,  Praeger, 
1962. 

Poplai,  S.  L.  (ed.).  National  Politics  and  the  1957  Elections  in  India. 
Delhi,  Metropolitan  Book  Co.,  1957. 

(ed.).  1962  General  Elections  in  India.  Bombay,  Allied  Publishers,  1962. 

Robson,  William  A.  'India  Revisited',  The  Political  Quarterly,  xxxi,  4 
(Oct.-Dec.  i960). 

Rosen,  George.  Democracy  and  Economic  Change  in  India.  Berkeley, 
University  of  California  Press,  1965. 

Rudolph,  Lloyd  I. '  Urban  Life  and  Populist  Radicalism ',  Journal  of  Asian 
Studies,  xx,  3  (May  1961). 

Rudolph,  Susanne  H.  '  Consensus  and  Conflict  in  Indian  Politics ',  World 
Politics,  xiii,  3  (April  1961). 

—  'The  Princely  States  of  Rajputana:  Ethic,  Authority  and  Structure', 
Indian  Journal  of  Political  Science,  xxiv,  1  (Jan.-March  1963). 

Some  Aspects  of  Congress  Land  Reform  Policy.  Cambridge,  Massa- 
chusetts Institute  of  Technology,  Center  for  International  Studies,  1957. 
Mimeo. 

MS  on  Rajasthan.  Mimeo.  Revised  and  forthcoming  as  in  second 


entry  following. 
Rudolph,  Lloyd  I.  and  Susanne  H.  The  Modernity  of  Tradition:  Political 

Development  in  India.  Chicago,  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1967. 
— —  The  Political  in  Social  Change:  Princes  and  Politicians  in  Rajasthan. 

Forthcoming. 
'  The  Political  Role  of  India's  Caste  Associations ',  Pacific  Affairs, 


xxxiii,  1  (March  i960). 

Toward  Political   Stability  in  Underdeveloped   Countries:   The 


Case  of  India',  Public  Policy,  no.  9,  ed.  Carl  J.  Friedrich  and  Seymour 

Harris.  Cambridge,  Harvard  University  Graduate  School  of  Public 

Administration,  1959. 
Sheean,  Vincent.  Nehru:  The  Years  of  Power.  New  York,  Random  House, 

i960. 
Singh,  Hari  Kishore.  A  History  of  the  Praja  Socialist  Party.  Lucknow, 

Narendra  Prakashan,  1959. 

346 


Bibliography 

'Third  General  Elections',  Asian  Recorder  (30  April-6  May  1962). 

Tinker,  Hugh.  India  and  Pakistan.  New  York,  Praeger,  1962. 

Weiner,  Myron.  'India's  Third  General  Elections',  Asian  Survey ,  11, 

5  (May  1962). 
Party  Building  in  a  New  Nation:  The  Indian  National  Congress. 

Forthcoming. 

Party  Politics  in  India.  Princeton,  Princeton  University  Press,  1957. 

Politics  of  Scarcity.  Bombay,  Asia  Publishing  House,  1962. 

'  Traditional  Role  Performance  and  the  Development  of  Modern 

Political  Parties :  The  Indian  Case ',  Journal  of  Politics,  xxvi,  4  (Nov. 

1964). 


4.   SWATANTRA   BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Bhailalbhai  Patel  joth  Birthday  Souvenir.  Vallabh  Vidyanagar,  Charutar 
Vidyamandal,  1958. 

Bhailalbhai  Patel  75th  Birthday  Souvenir.  Vallabh  Vidyanagar,  Charutar 
Vidyamandal,  1963. 

Dave,  J.  H.  et  al.  (eds.).  Munshi:  His  Art  and  Work.  4  vols.  Bombay, 
Munshi  70th  Birthday  Citizens'  Celebration  Committee,  n.d. 

Deo,  P.  K.  (Maharaja  of  Kalahandi).  My  Humble  Contributions.  Cuttack, 
Ganatantra  Parishad,  1961. 

Desai,  Kirtidev.  'Emergence  of  the  Swatantra  Party  in  Gujarat',  Journal 
of  the  Gujarat  Research  Society,  xxv,  3  (April  1963). 

Erdman,  Howard  L.  'Chakravarty  Rajagopalachari  and  Indian  Con- 
servatism ',  Journal  of  Developing  Areas,  I,  1  (Oct.  1966). 

'Conservative  Politics  in  India',  Asian  Survey,  vi,  6  (June  1966). 

'The  Foreign  Policy  Views  of  the  Indian  "Right",'  Pacific  Affairs, 

xxxix,  1-2  (Spring-Summer  1966). 
-  'India's  Swatantra  Party',  Pacific  Affairs,  xxxvi,  4  (winter  1963-4). 
The  Swatantra  Party  and  Indian  Conservatism',  Ph.D.  disserta- 


tion. Cambridge,  Harvard  University,  1964. 

Felton,  Monica.  /  Meet  Rajaji.  London,  Macmillan,  1962. 

H.  M.  Patel  60th  Birthday  Commemoration  Volume.  Vallabh  Vidyanagar, 
Charutar  Vidyamandal,  1964. 

Lobo  Prabhu,  J.  M.  Draft  Third  Plan  X-Rayed.  n.d. 

Industrial  Policy.  Calcutta,  Society  for  the  Propagation  of  Demo- 
cratic Truth,  1963. 

New  Thinking.  Bombay,  India  Book  House,  1959. 


Malaviya,  H.  D.  The  Swatantra  Party:  Its  Real  Character  and  Designs. 

New  Delhi,  Socialist  Congressman,  n.d. 
Masani,  M.  R.  The  Communist  Party  of  India.  New  York,  Macmillan, 

I954- 

Party  Politics  in  India.  Ahmedabad,  Harold  Laski  Institute,  1962. 

A  Plea  for  Realism.  Bombay,  Popular  Book  Depot,  1957. 

Workers'  Participation  in  Management.  Bombay,  n.p.,  1955. 

Munshi,  K.  M.  Foundations  of  Indian  Culture.  Bombay,  Bharatiya  Vidya 

Bhavan,  1965. 

347 


Bibliography 

Munshi,  K.  M.  New  Outlook.  Lahore,  Indian  Book  Co.,  1947. 

Reconstruction  of  Society  Through  Trusteeship.  Bombay,  Bharatiya 

Vidya  Bhavan,  i960. 
— —  The  Ruin  that  Britain  Wrought.  Bombay,  Padma,  1946. 

Warnings  of  History.  Bombay,  Bharatiya  Vidya  Bhavan,  1959. 

Zonal  Divisions  of  India.  Bombay,  Vora,  1945. 


Pasricha,  Col.  H.  R.  'Our  Stuporous  Society',  Quest  (April- June  1962). 
Patel,  Dahyabhai  V.  The  Second  Phase.  Bombay,  author,  n.d. 
Rajagopalachari,  C.  Ambedkar  Refuted.  Bombay,  Hind  Kitabs,  1946. 

The  Defense  of  India.  Madras,  Rochouse,  n.d. 

Hinduism:  Doctrine  and  Way  of  Life.  Bombay,  Bharatiya  Vidya 

Bhavan,  1964. 
— —  Our  Culture.  Bombay,  Bharatiya  Vidya  Bhavan,  1963. 

Our  Democracy  and  Other  Essays.  Madras,  B.  G.  Paul,  1957. 

— —  Plighted  Word.  Delhi,  Servants  of  Untouchables  Society,  n.d. 
Prohibition.  Madras,  Kamala  Prachuralayam,  1943. 


RajajTs  Speeches.  2  vols.  Bombay,  Bharatiya  Vidya  Bhavan,  i960. 
Ranga,  N.  G.  Freedom  in  Peril.  Hyderabad,  Indian  Peasants'  Institute, 

1961. 

Kisan  Speaks.  Madras,  Kisan  Publications,  n.d. 

— —  Outlines  of  National  Revolutionary  Path.  Bombay,  Hind  Kitabs,  1945. 

Revolutionary  Peasants.  New  Delhi,  Amrit  Book  Co.,  1949. 

Ruthnaswamy,  M.  Vote  for  Swatantra:  Why?  Palamcottah,  Madras,  n.d. 
Singh,  Gurnam.  A  Unilingual  Punjabi  State  and  the  Sikh  Unrest.  New 

Delhi,  author,  i960. 
Srinivasan,  C.  M.  Nehru  Discovered.  Madras,  Aiyar,  1961. 
Zamindar,  N.  C.  Congress  Refuted.  Indore,  Sahityalaya,  1962. 
(See  also  parts  5  and  6) 

5.  SWATANTRA    PARTY   PUBLICATIONS 
REPORTS    AND    OFFICIAL   DOCUMENTS 

Swatantra  Party  Preparatory  Convention.  Bombay,  Swatantra  Party- 
Popular  Book  Depot,  1959. 

First  National  Convention  (Patna).  i960. 

Second  National  Convention  (Agra).  1962. 

Third  National  Convention  (Bangalore).  1964. 

General- Secretary's  Report  to  the  Candidates'  Convention.  Bombay, 
Swatantra  Party,  1962. 

General- Secretary's  Report  on  Organisation  (for  internal  circulation  only). 
Bombay,  Swatantra  Party,  1966. 

Swatantra  Party  Constitution,  as  revised  1964. 

Swatantra  Party  Souvenir  i960,  n.d. 

Swatantra  Party  Souvenir  1961.  Bombay,  Swatantra  Party,  1961. 

Munshi,  K.  M.  et  al.  Report  of  the  Swatantra  Party  Punjab  Enquiry  Com- 
mittee. Bombay,  Swatantra  Party,  i960. 

Swatantra  Newsletter  (more  or  less  monthly,  for  internal  circulation  only). 
Bombay,  Swatantra  Party. 

348 


Bibliography 

Swatantra  in  Parliament  (erratic,  for  internal  circulation  only).  Bombay, 
Swatantra  Party. 

ELECTION   AND   GENERAL   PROPAGANDA  (roughly  chronological) 

To  Prosperity  Through  Freedom  (1962  election  manifesto). 

Towards  Doom?  (Rajaji). 

Why  Swatantra?  (Rajaji,  Ranga,  Munshi,  Masani). 

Labour's  Friend — Congress  or  Swatantra? 

What's  Wrong  With  the  Third  Plan? 

Co-operation  or  Coercion? 

Social  and  Religious  Decay  (Rajaji). 

Who  is  Outdated?  German  Social  Democrats  Echo  Swatantra. 

Inflation:  Your  Personal  Enemy. 

The  Fight  Against  Inflation. 

Inflation — Your  Hidden  Enemy. 

Socialism — An  Ism  That  is  Now  a  Wasm. 

Congress  Path  to  Communism. 

Swatantra  Answer  to  the  Chinese  Communist  Challenge. 

The  Fraud  of  Gold  Control. 

Swatantra  Alternative  to  the  Third  Plan  (Ranga,  Masani). 

India's  Answer  to  the  Chinese  Bomb  (Masani). 

Swatantra  Demands  Fair  Deal  for  Public  Servants  (Dandekar,  Kapur  Singh). 

Lawless  Legislation  (ed.  A.  P.  Jain). 

17th  Amendment  vs.  Farm,  Family,  Freedom. 

Judgment  Reserved  (Masani,  Dandekar). 

The  Voice  of  the  People  (Masani,  Dandekar). 

First  Swatantra  Budget  (Masani).  Calcutta,  Swatantra  Forum,  1965. 

Can  India  Escape  Bankruptcy?  (Masani). 

We  Accuse!  (Deo,  Dandekar). 

The  Congress  Path  to  National  Disaster  (Ranga,  Gayatri  Devi). 

Why  I  Took  To  Politics  (C.  Rai). 

Yet  Another  Bad  Budget  (Ranga,  Masani,  Patel). 

Foreign  Capital?  Yes!  Govt.-to-Govt.  Loans?  No!  (Masani). 

Devaluation — What  Next?  (Masani). 

Devaluation — The  Guilty  Men  (Masani,  Dandekar). 

Why  Swatantra  Supports  Tashkent  Agreement?  (Patel,  Deo). 

MIMEO    DOCUMENTS    BY   A.P.JAIN,    SWANTATRA   PARLIAMENTARY 
OFFICE 

'Prohibition:  Should  It  Be  Put  Into  Reverse  Gear?' 
'  Sino- Indian  Relations :  A  Resume  of  Latest  Developments. ' 
'  Colombo  Peace-Makers. ' 
'  Gold  Control. ' 

'  The  Case  of  the  Attorney- General. ' 
'  The  Railway  Budget. ' 
'  Emergency  Outstretched. ' 

'Swatantra  Party  in  Parliament:  Report  of  Speeches.'  (Now  superseded 
by  formal  publication  noted  above.) 

349 


Bibliography 

GANATANTRA    PARISHAD    PUBLICATIONS 

Policy  Statement,  parts  I  and  II.  Cuttack,  Ganatantra  Parishad,  1951. 
Election  Manifesto  1961.  Bolangir,  Ganatantra  Parishad, 1961. 

6.    FORUM   OF   FREE   ENTERPRISE   PUBLICATIONS 

(all  Bombay,  n.d.) 
Antia,  J.  M.  Sales  Tax. 

Bhaba,  C.  H.  The  Cult  of  State  Capitalism  in  India. 
Fazalbhoy,  Y.  A.  The  Case  for  Sponsored  Radio. 
Hayek,  F.  A.  Two  Essays  on  Free  Enterprise. 
Lobo  Prabhu,  J.  M.  Democracy  in  India. 
Masani,  M.  R.  Economics  of  Freedom. 
Mathew,  T.  A  Socialist  Society  Cannot  be  Democratic. 
Matthai,  J.  Limits  of  Nationalisation. 
'An  Observer.'  Problems  of  Free  Enterprise  in  India. 
Palkhivala,  N.  A.  A  Review  of  the  Finance  (No.  2)  Bill,  1962. 
Panandikar,  S.  G.  et  al.  State  Trading  in  a  Democracy. 
Rao,  B.  G.  Community  Development. 

Ruthnaswamy,  M.  Towards  an  Economical  Administration  in  India. 
Shenoy,  B.  R.  Indian  Planning  and  the  Common  Man. 

The  Food  Situation  and  the  Common  Man. 

Prune  the  Plan. 

Shroff,  A.  D.  Desperate  Proposals. 

An  Economic  Review — 1957. 

Free  Enterprise  and  Democracy. 

Free  Enterprise  in  India. 

Free  Enterprise  in  India— A  Call  for  Leadership. 

Planning  in  India. 

The  Transport  Bottleneck. 

et  al.  Private  Enterprise  and  Politics. 

Taraporevala,  R.  J.  Wealth  and  Expenditure  Taxes. 
Vaidya,  J.  Free  Enterprise  and  Freedom. 

PERIODICALS 

The  Hindu  (Madras),  daily. 

The  Hindu  Weekly  Review  (Madras). 

The  Hindustan  Times  (Delhi),  daily. 

The  Overseas  Hindustan  Times  (Delhi),  weekly. 

The  Indian  Express,  daily. 

The  Times  of  India  (Bombay  and  New  Delhi),  daily. 

Blitz  (Bombay),  weekly. 

The  Current  (Bombay),  weekly. 

Economic  Weekly  (Bombay). 

Link  (Delhi),  weekly. 

Insight  (Mangalore),  weekly. 

Swarajya  (Madras),  weekly  and  annual  numbers. 

Swatantra  (Madras),  weekly,  predecessor  of  Swarajya. 

350 


Bibliography 

7.  INTERVIEWS  AND   QUESTIONNAIRES 

Except  where  stated  to  the  contrary,  all  of  the  interviews  listed  below  took 
place  in  India  between  August  1962  to  May  1963.  Where  the  person  in 
question  was  interviewed  more  than  once,  the  number  of  more  or  less 
formal  interviews  is  noted;  and  those  with  whom  the  author  spent  much 
time,  over  extended  periods,  have  their  names  in  CAPITALS.  As  it 
would  be  too  cumbersome  to  indicate  in  each  case  the  various  national  and 
state  offices  held,  it  will  suffice  here  to  note  that  virtually  every  major 
national  and  state  office-bearer  was  interviewed  or  responded  to  very 
detailed  questionnaires.  (By '  national  office-bearer '  I  do  not  mean  members 
of  the  Central  Organizing  Committee/National  Executive  or  the  General 
Council,  but  President,  Vice-President,  etc.) 

NATIONAL   OFFICE-BEARERS 

C.  Rajagopalachari  (3);  N.  G.  Ranga  (3);  M.  R.  MASANI  (7,  includ- 
ing 1966);  K.  M.  Munshi;  S.  K.  D.  Paliwal;  Raja  Kamakhya  Narain 
Singh  of  Ramgarh;  Maharani  Gayatri  Devi  of  Jaipur  (2);  Professor  M. 
Ruthnaswamy  (2);  Jathedar  Udham  Singh  Nagoke  (through  an  inter- 
preter); Sir  Homy  Mody  (3,  including  1966). 

state  office-bearers,  et  al.  (by  state) 

Andhra.  T.  Krishnamma  Choudhuri  (2);  C.  L.  N.  Reddy  (2);  N. 
Ranga  Reddy;  N.  Sankara  Reddy;  S.  N.  Reddy. 

Assam.  John  Deng  (2);  Professor  Martin  Narayan  (2). 

Bihar.  Raja  J.  K.  P.  N.  Singh  of  Maksoodpur;  N.  Bakshi;  P.  K. 
Ghosh  (2);  S.  A.  Matin. 

Bombay  City.  Piloo  Mody  (2);  R.  V.  Murthy  (2);  Murarji  Vaidya; 
Madhu  Mehta  (4). 

Delhi  Pradesh:  Col.  H.  R.  PASRICHA  (4);  A.  C.  Basiaria. 

Gujarat:  Bhailalbhai  Patel;  Maharaja  Jaideepsinhji  of  Devgadh-Baria 
(3);  Maharajkumar  Himmatsinhji  of  Kutch  (4);  Dahyabhai  Patel  (2); 
H.  M.  Patel  (1966);  Pravinsinh  Solanki  (4);  Narendrasingh  Mahida  (3); 
NANU  B.  AMIN  (7,  including  1966);  P.  C.  Hathi. 

Madhya  Pradesh :  R.  Agnibhoj ;  N.  C.  Zamindar. 

Madras:  Saw  Ganesan;  S.  S.  MARISWAMY  (5):  M.  SANTOSHAM 
(over  6);  T.  Sadasivam. 

Mysore:  J.  M.  Lobo  Prabhu;  V.  T.  Srinivasan;  M.  A.  Sreenivasan. 

Orissa:  Maharaja  R.  N.  Singh  Deo  of  Patna;  Maharaja  P.  K.  DEO  OF 
KALAHANDI  (7,  including  1965);  Lokanath  Misra;  Raghunath  Misra; 
Harihar  Patel;  Ghasiram  Majhi;  G.  C.  Roy. 

Punjab:  Sardar  Basant  Singh;  Sardar  Kapur  Singh  (3);  Buta  Singh. 

Rajasthan:  Maharawal  Laxman  Singh  of  Dungarpur  (4) ;  Maharajkumar 
Jai  Singh  of  Jaipur  (2);  Raja  Man  Singh  of  Bharatpur  (3);  Devi  Singh  of 
Mandawa  (3,  including  1966);  Major  Thakur  RAGHUBIR  SINGH  OF 
BISSAU  (many  times,  including  1966);  Kesri  Singh  of  Pali  (3);  Ayuwan 
Singh;  Lt.  Gen.  Thakur  Nathu  Singh  of  Gumanpura  (5,  including  1966). 

Uttar  Pradesh :  Thakur  Yashpal  Singh. 

351 


Bibliography 

NON-PARTY    INTERVIEWEES 

Professor  R.  Bhaskaran  (University  of  Madras);  Dr  S.  P.  Aiyar 
(University  of  Bombay);  V.  K.  Narasimhan  (The  Hindu)',  M.  R.  Malkani 
(The  Organiser,  1961);  A.  B.  Vajpayee  (MP,  Jan  Sangh);  Hem  Barua  and 
S.  N.  Dwivedy  (MPs,  PSP);  K.  Manoharan  (MP,  DMK);  Harekrushna 
Mahtab  (MP,  Congress);  Maharaja  P.  K.  Deo  Bhanj  of  Daspalla  (MP, 
Congress,  2,  including  1965);  C.  M.  Srinivasan  (Madras  Forum  of  Free 
Enterprise) ;  among  other  MPs,  journalists,  etc. 

QUESTIONNAIRE  RESPONDENTS 

Andhra.  B.  Ramachandra  Reddy;  C.  L.  N.  Reddy;  N.  Sankara 
Reddy;  P.  V.  K.  Reddy;  K.  M.  Reddy;  K.  Narasimha  Reddy;  Y.  C. 
Veerabhadra  Goud;  D.  Ramachandra  Rao;  Lakkaraju  Subba  Rao. 

Assam.  John  Deng. 

Bihar.  Jaleshwar  Prasad;  T.  P.  Bakshi;  K.  J.  N.  S.  Deo;  U.  S.  Prasad; 
J.  Chowdhary;  Michael  Kujim;  Chhatu  Turi;  P.  C.  Mahato. 

Bombay  City.  M.  R.  Masani;  K.  M.  Munshi;  R.  V.  Murthy;  Murarji 
Vaidya. 

Gujarat.  Maharajkumar  Himmatsinhji  of  Kutch;  Narendrasingh 
Mahida;  Hamirsinhji  Jaysinhji  Solanki;  Lalitmohan  Chunilal  Gandhi; 
Maganlal  B.  Joshi. 

Himachal  Pradesh.  Bishan  Singh,  Bhagmall  Sauhta. 

Kerala.  S.  S.  Koder. 

Madhya  Pradesh.  H.  S.  Dwivedy,  N.  C.  Zamindar. 

Madras.  M.Ruthnaswamy;  K.  Sundaram;  M.  Santosham;  S.  Narayana- 
swamy. 

Maharashtra.  B.  B.  Walvekar;  K.  R.  Koshti;  R.  D.  Kulkarni. 

Mysore.  K.  B.  Jinraja  Hegde;  J.  M.  Lobo  Prabhu;  J.  Mohammed 
Imam;  M.  A.  Sreenivasan;  G.  D.  Patil;  B.  L.  Patil. 

Orissa.  Raghunath  Misra;  Harihar  Patel;  B.  K.  Deo;  K.  Panigrahy; 
P.  Bhagat;  A.  Sahoo;  Anchal  Majhi;  Ghasiram  Majhi;  C.  S.  S.  Bhoi. 

Punjab.  Jathedar  Udham  Singh  Nagoke;  Sardar  Basant  Singh;  Col. 
Rajadhiraj  Maheshindra  Singh  of  Patiala;  Karan  Singh  Malik;  Ram 
Singh;  Dhanna  Singh  Ghulshan. 

Rajasthan.  Maharani  Gayatri  Devi  of  Jaipur;  Professor  Madan  Singh. 

Uttar  Pradesh.  Raja  Raghavendra  Singh  of  Mankapur;  Raja  Ram 
Singh  of  Gangawal;  Raja  Mahendra  Singh  of  Bhadawar;  Wahidur 
Rahman;  Sant  Saran  Shukla;  N.  R.  Sharma;  Munnu  Singh. 

West  Bengal.  R.  P.  Patodia. 


352 


INDEX 


Akali  Dal,  56-7,  59,  113,  115;  relations 
with  Swatantra,  213, 225-9,  233 ;  see  also 
Punjabi  suba 

All-India  Agriculturalists'  Federation,  13, 
65-6,  69-72,  77,  118,  120,  135,  143 

All-India  Landholders'  Conference,  15 

All-India  Manufacturers'  Association,  75 

Ambedkar,  Dr  B.,  33,  231 

Arnin,  Nanu,  140,  186 

Andhra,  16,  73,  80,  1 17-18, 120,  144, 199- 
200,  236,  265,  266,  305,  326-7,  328, 
337,  338 

Aney,  M.  S.,  133-4,  239-40 

Anglo-Indians,  140 

Annadorai,  C.  N.,  215-17;  see  also  Dravida 
Munnetra  Kazhagam 

aristocrats,  disunity  and  unity  among,  6-8, 
13,  14-16,  28,  35,  59,  151 ;  support  for 
British,  7,  14,  24-5;  outlook  of,  24-9, 
44,  127-9;  and  Congress  policy,  18-23, 
24-9>  35,  39-40,  77,  84-7,  126-7,  237, 
261;  reluctance  to  join  parties,  46, 
155  ff. ;  support  for  Swatantra,  62, 68, 71, 
72,  112-29,  145,  15 1,  262-3;  Swatantra 
reliance  on,  144,  246  ff.,  256,  267; 
organizational  limitations  of,  160  ff., 
256;  262-3,  and  Swatantra  business- 
professional  groups,  159,  165  ff.,  178, 
180  ff.,  254-6,  265,  336,  337;  see  also 
Ganatantra  Parishad,  Janata  Party,  and 
individual  aristocrats 

Arya  Samaj,  36,  131,  133 

Associated  Cement  Companies,  173;  see 
also  Khatau 

Bailey,  F.  G.,  46,  50 

Banswara,  House  of,  122,  125,  310 

Baria,  see  Devgadh-Baria 

Baroda,  House  of,  23,  125 

Bastar,  Maharaja  of,  28,  125,  127 

Bharatiya  Vidya  Bhavan,  99 

Bharatpur,  Maharaja  of,  126,  336 

Bharatpur,  Raja  of,  15,  118,  122,  126, 
151-2,  161,  163 

Bhinai,  Raja  of,  122 

bhooswami  sangh  (Madhya  Pradesh),  119 

Bihar,  47-50,  63,  72,  1 12-13,  121,  124, 
144,  145,  151,  153,  158,  161,  165-71, 
181,  230,  262,  265,  266;  see  also  Janata 
Party,  Jharkand  Party;  Jan  Congress, 
Ramgarh,  and  Singh  (Jankinandan) 

Bikaner,  Maharaja  of,  28, 46, 121, 125, 151 

Bilaspur,  Raja  of,  117, 124, 145, 169, 181-2, 
183,  229 

Birla,  G.  D.,  40,  41,  172,  186 

Birla,  R.  K.,  186 

Bombay  Plan,  16,  41-2 

Brahmins,  10,  16,  18,  35,  72,  77,  in,  113, 
215 

Brecher,  M.,  43,  60,  259 


business  classes,  outlook  of,  16,  36-43, 
141;  and  Congress  policy,  12,  13,  17, 
21-2,  27,  33,  39-43,  176;  support  for 
Swatantra,  65-9,  78,  140-1,  168,  171  ff., 
180,  182,  185-7,  224,  263  ff.,  336;  see 
also  Forum  of  Free  Enterprise 

Cariappa,  General  K.  M.,  72 

Chamber  of  Princes,  14,  24,  28 

Chatterjee,  N.  C,  57-8,  103,  132-3,  145, 
147,  179 

Chettiars,  16,  in 

China,  Jan  Sangh  policy  towards,  55, 
219-20;  Swatantra  policy  towards,  206, 
220,  243;  invasion  by,  190-1,  206 

Christians,  96,  132-3,  135,  140,  304-5 

Commonweal  Party,  56,  112 

Communist  Party  of  India  (CPI),  63, 67-8, 
73,  80,  113,  129,  132,  205;  and  DMK, 
216;  and  Swatantra,  212-13,  264,  337; 
and  Swatantra-AkaliDal  alliance,  226-7, 
228 

communalism,  97,  103,  210;  in  right 
radical  parties,  52  ff.,  218-19,  226,  229 

Congress  Party,  11,  46-7,  109-11,  1 13-14, 
115-17,  118,  119,  120,  123,  124,  125, 
126,  129,  130,  158,  169-70,  173-4,  179, 
212,  222,  230,  238,  246-9,  259,  261-3, 
267;  post-independence  policies  of, 
12-14,  21,  42,  53,  66,  68-79  passim,  92, 
147-8,  190;  social  bases  of,  17-19,  22, 
58,  59-61,  62,  146,  246,  247-8;  and 
aristocrats,  26-8,  121-9,  261;  right 
wing  of,  53,  59-61,  171-2,  235-8,  258, 
261,  267,  333 

Congress  Socialist  Party  (CSP),  41,  82,  84 

constitutionalism,  Munshi's  commitment 
to,  101-3 ;  Swatantra's  commitment  to, 
249-50,  267-8 

cow  slaughter,  ban  on,  98-9,  264,  267,  337 

da  Costa,  E.  P.  W.,  no,  117 

Dandekar,  N.,  135-6,  140,  144,  180,  186; 
and  Gonda  constituency,  182-3;  elec- 
toral difficulties  of,  247,  336;  in  Lok 
Sabha,  240-1 

Darbhanga,  Maharajadhiraj  of,  72,  113, 
121,124-5,151,160,183 

Dehati  Janata  Party,  80,  1 14-15;  see  also 
Nagoke 

Democratic  Party  (Andhra),  73,  80,  117 

Democratic  Research  Service,  67 

Desai,  C.  C,  136,  186 

Desai,  Morarji,  123 

Devgadh-Baria,  Maharaja  of,  124,  144, 
162,  182,  230-1,  247,  336 

Dhrol,  Thakur  of,  183,  336 

Dravida  Kazhagam,  215-16 

Dravida  Munnetra  Kazhagam  (DMK),  53, 
98,  203;  demand  for  secession  by,  203, 


353 


Index 


204-5,  207>  and  electoral  understand- 
ings, 213,  214-18;  and  CPI,  215-16; 
and  Swatantra,  229,  236,  264,  266,  338, 

339 

Dungarpur,  Maharawal  of,  119,  122,  124, 
125,  129,  137,  151;  as  Swatantra  leader 
in  Rajasthan,  163-5,  242;  and  seat  for 
Masani,  181;  and  Jan  Sanghis,  221-2, 
229-30;  and  relations  with  Congress 
conservatives,  237 

Duverger,  M.,  178,  245,  316 

economic  policy,  of  post-independence 
Congress,  12-16  passim,  20-2;  of 
Gandhians,  30-3;  of  militant  Hindus, 
35>  54-5s  2I9>  229j  °f  Indian  business, 
16,  40  ff.,  66-7,  78;  of  the  Ganatantra 
Parishad,  50;  of  the  RRP,  52;  of  the 
Agriculturalists'  Federation,  70 ;  of  the 
Swatantra  Party,  87  ff.,  103  ff.,  119, 
140-2,  188-201,  219,  256 

Eighteen-Fifty-Seven,  rebellion  of,  14,  28, 
38-9,  83 

elections,  1951-2,  212-14;  I957>  212-14; 
1962,  217-18,  221-3,  227,  232-3,  239, 
255;  1967,  228,  261-8 

electoral  symbols,  80,  166-7,  l685  233_4> 
308 

Federation  of  Indian  Chambers  of  Com- 
merce and  Industry,  16 

finance,  17 1-9,  263,  336 

foreign  policy,  of  militant  Hindus,  55, 207; 
of  Swatantra,  189,  205,  207;  in  Swa- 
tantra-Jan    Sangh    relations,    219-20, 

243 
Forum  of  Free  Enterprise,  13,  42,  65-71, 
72,  75,  76,  78-80  passim,  143,  193;  see 
also  Shroff 

Ganatantra  Parishad,  47,  48-50,  56,  57, 
59,  72,  no,  128,  144,  153,  I79>  216, 
218,  233,  262,  265,  267;  merger  with 
Swatantra,  1 15-17,  118;  see  also  Kala- 
handi  and  Patna 

Gandhi,  M.  K.,  12/17,  30-2, 34~5)  5i>  62, 
74,  77,  85,  99,  100,  107-8 

Gandhism,  54,  71,  83,  101,  104,  131,  141, 
259;  in  Swatantra  Party,  87-9,  100, 
1 13-14,  191-3,  196-7 

Ganesan,  S.,  in,  210 

Goa,  Swatantra  view  on  seizure  of,  207 

Gram  Raj  Party,  80,  114,  see  also  Paliwal 

Gujarat,  16,  38,  63,  72,  118-26  passim; 
131,  136,  140,  144-5.  I5i,  i52-3>  162, 
176,  182-3,  186,  210-11,  236,  247, 
262-6  passim,  297,  311,  312,  336,  337, 
338 

Gujarat  Khedut  Sangh,  72 

Gumanpura,  Lt.  Gen.  Thakur  of,  136 

Gupta,  R.  G.,  140,  236 

Gwalior,  House  of,  125,  336 

Hanumanthaya,  K.,  100,  131,  333 
harijans,  see  scheduled  castes 
Harrison,  S.,  38,  99,  245,  248 
Hegde,  J.,  77,  108,  135*  138 
Himachal  Pradesh,   117,   18 1-2;  see  also 
Bilaspur 


Hindu  Code,  60,  141,  150,  191,  210 
Hindu  Mahasabha,  47,  50-2,  53,  55,  56-8, 
101,  105;  and  Swatantra,  242,  244 

Imam,  J.  M.,  133,  233 

Independent      Progressive      Legislature 

Party,  114;  see  also  Paliwal 
Indian  Civil  Service,  role  in  Swatantra  of 

former  members  of,  77,   134  ff.,   186, 

187,  209,  262 
Indian  Committee  for  Cultural  Freedom, 

67 
Indian  Iron  and  Steel  Company,  173 
Indian    National    Democratic    Congress, 

73,  110-12,  130,  145,  215,  248 
industrialization,  see  economic  policy 

Jains,  16,  37 

Jaipur,  Maharaja  of,  122-5,  I27>  i8is  1833 

222 
Jaipur,  Maharaniof,  122-6,  127,  129,  144, 

152,  155,  161,  164-5,  i74-5j  182,  221, 

230,  237,  247,  338 
Jaisalmer,  Maharajkumar  of,  122, 126, 145 
Jan  Congress  (Bihar),  72, 113,  248;  see  also 

Jankinandan  Singh 
Jana  Congress  (Orissa),  238,  265 
Janata  Party,  47-8, 59,  68, 80, 1 12-13, 118, 

121,  166-8,  169,  233;  see  also  Ramgarh 
Jan  Sangh,  36,  47,  50-8,  61,  62,  80-1,  83, 

101,  104-5,  no,  132,  203,  208,  242-3, 

258;  language  policy  of,  97,  203,  330; 

finances  of,   176-7,  336;  merger  talks 

with  Swatantra,  80-1, 213, 214-15, 218- 

25,  229,  240,  242,  244,  267,  338-9;  m 

1967  elections,  261,  263-4 
Jasdan,  Yuvraj  of,  126 
Jats,  15-16,  18;  see  also  Bharatpur 
Jhalawar,  Maharaja  of,  124 
Jharkand  Party,  106,  no,  230 
Jodhpur,  House  of,  23,  59, 121, 123, 125-6 
Joshi,  Maganlal,  131 
Justice  Party,  29,  39,  1 17-18,  I32~3 

Kalahandi,  Maharaja  of,  49,  72,  1 15-17, 
128-9,  180;  as  Lok  Sabha  leader,  239- 
40,  242;  see  also  Ganatantra  Parishad 

Kaluhera,  Rajkumar  of,  122,  124,  125 

Kamaraj,  K.,  in,  170 

Kamath,  H.  V.,  231 

Karapatri,  Swami,  52,  57;  see  also  Ram 
Rajya  Parishad 

Kejriwal,  P.,  125,  169,  183 

Khatau,  D.,  140 

Kisan  Mazdoor  Praja  Party,  133 

Kisan  sabha,  70;  see  also  Ranga 

Kothari,  R.,  238,  245,  246,  258 

Kripalani,  J.  B.,  133,  182,  243 

Krishikar  Lok  Paksh,  73,  80,  107,  117, 
118;  see  also  Ranga 

Krishnamma,  T.,  135 

kshatrya  mahasabha,  1 18-19,  124,  218;  see 
also  Mahida 

Kutch,  Maharajkumar  of,  121,  126,  144, 
182,  338 

Kutch  Rajput  Sabha,  119 

laissez  faire,  31,  42,  66-7,  69,  193,  194, 
196-7 


354 


Index 


land  reform,  21,  30-1,  46,  69-71,  85 ;  see 

also  Nagpur  Resolution 
language  policy,   36,   97-8,    189,   202-5, 

207,  220,  330 
Latchanna,  G.,  120,  199-200 
liberalism,  in  Swatantra  Party,  38,  103-4, 

140-2,  148,  187,  189-92,  201,  207-11, 

243,  249-60  passim 
Lobo  Prabhu,  J.  M.,  135,  137,  138,  208 

Madhok,  B.,  338 

Madras,  18-19,  53,  65,  68,  69,  73,  77-8, 
98,  1 10-12,  118,  130,  144,  145,  203-10 
passim,  216,  236-7,  248,  264,  265,  299, 
30i3  313,  336,  337,  338 

Madhya  Pradesh,  52,  119,  121,  122,  124, 
125,  179,  292-3,  336 

Maharashtra,  121,  125,  140 

Mahida,  N.,  119,  145,  152,  240-1 

Mankapur,  Raja  of,  12 1-2,  145,  154, 
160-2,  183,  223 

Mariswamy,  S.  S.,  110-11,  218,  236-7 

Marwaris,  16,  37,  39 

Marxism,  impact  on  rightist  doctrine,  54, 
194,  197-9,  253 

Masani,  M.  R.,  66,  67-71,  73,  76-9,  82-3, 
101,  104-7,  iJ3,  133;  and  aristocrats, 
84-7,  127,  153,  155,  157,  159-60, 
163-71 ;  and  middle-class  liberalism, 
76,  103-4,  140,  142*  I47>  148,  149-50, 
252-3;  and  Swatantra  doctrine,  192-3, 
I97-9,  205-6;  and  party  organization, 
160-1,  185,  187,  233-4,  262,  336;  and 
party  finance,  75,  78,  172,  175,  177-8, 
180;  in  elections,  106,  126,  180-2, 
223-4,  247,  255;  in  Lok  Sabha,  239-41; 
on  alliances,  212-13,  219,  222-4,  230-2, 
242-4,  263 

Mehta,  Asok,  49,  50,  298 

Mehta,  Vadilal,  140,  186 

Menon,  V.  K.  K.,  60,  206,  243 

Menon,  V.  P.,  77,  108,  124,  125,  127, 
134-5,  138,  145,  157,  251 

militant  hinduism,  34-6,  39,  44-5,  51,  83, 
240;  see  also  Hindu  Mahasabha,  Jan 
Sangh,  Munshi 

Moderates  (Congress),  100,  140,  208-9 

Mody,  Sir  H.  P.,  82-3,  87,  105,  106,  140, 
147,  149,  168,  172,  180,  193 

Mody,  P.,  186,  336 

Mookerjee,  S.  P.,  52-3,  56,  58,  59-60, 241, 
246 

Morris-Jones,  W.  H.,  50,  104,  153,  245, 
246,  251,  254 

Munshi,  K.  M.,  36,  73,  82-3,  86,  90-1, 
95-103,  104-5,  113,  114,  129,  137,  158, 
166,  169,  191;  and  the  Indian  tradition 
and  militant  nationalism,  36,  86,  90-1, 
95-103,  104-5,  147,  149,  191,  229;  and 
Ramgarh,  158,  166,  169;  and  aristo- 
crats, 85,  124,  166;  and  foreign  policy, 
205 

Murthy,  R.  V.,  136,  140,  157,  180 

Muslims,  51,  53,  96-7,  114,  133,  230,  313 

Mysore,  69,  70,  77,  120,  133,  134-5,  138, 

144,  265,  266,  313,  336 

Nagoke,  Sardar  U.  S.,  72,  73,  80,  1 13-15, 

145,  225,  226-7,  236 


Nagpur  Resolution,  21,  62,  65,  67,  68-70, 

72-5,  79,  80,  107,  113,  114 
Narayan,  J.,  78 

'National  Democratic  Party',  56 
nationalization,  see  economic  policy 
Nehru,  J.,  10,  68,  75,  174;  and  reform/ 
radicalism,  12,  20,  21,  24,  29,  51,  60,  61, 
63,  80,  83,  94,  102,  137,  235,  246; 
moderation  of,  19  S.,  60-1,  79;  and 
businessmen,  41,  42,  174,  294 

Orissa,  22,  47,  48,  49,  50,  56,  63,  1 15-17, 
123,  128,  131,  144,  153,  162,  179-80, 
262-3,  265,  266,  288 

Padayachi,  S.  S.  R.,  111-12,  145,  152 
Pakistan,  views  toward,  51,  55,  96,  107, 

206,  207,  219-20 
Paliwal,  S.  K.  D.,  73,  1 13-14,  130,  147, 

160,  162;  and  aristocrats,  154,  157,  159; 

resigns  from  Swatantra,  145,  223;  and 

Swatantra  organization,  80,  233-4;  and 

Jan  Sangh,  230 
Parsis,  16,  38-40,  71,  140;  see  also  Masani, 

Mody,  Shroff,  Tatas 
Pasricha,  Col.  H.  R.,  135, 141-3,  191,  229, 

230 
Patel,  Bhailalbhai,  124,  13 1-2,  136,  145, 

174 
Patel,  Dahyabhai,  131,  133,  170 
Patel,  Pashabhai,  186 
Patel,  Sardar  V.,  19-20,  23,  53,  77,  86, 

102,  106,  108,  113,  127,  131,  137,  155 
Patiala,  Maharaja  of,  72,  114,  121,  122, 

126,  127,  225,  228 
Patiala,  Rajas  of,  122,  126 
Patidars,  16,  140,  263 
Patil,  S.  K.,  113,  333 
Patna,  Maharaja  of,  49,  128-9,  180;  see 

also  Ganatantra  Parishad 
Patnaik,  B.,  116,  117,  179 
Peasants'  and  Workers'  Party,  80,  230 
planning,  see  economic  policy 
Praja  Socialist  Party,  74,  no,  113;  and 

Swatantra,  230-1 
Prasad,  R.,  13,  60,  85,  150 
Punjab,  53,  72,  73,  80,  102,  103,  1 13-15, 

119,  121-2,  126,  144,  145,  203-5,  210, 

225-9,  233,  236,  292-3 
Punjab     Inquiry     Commission,      102-3, 

250 
Punjabi  suba,  103,  203-5,  207,  225-6,  227, 

228 

Raghuvira,  Dr,  203,  223 

Rajagopalachari,  C,  19,  66,  67,  73,  82-3, 
97,  104-6,  1 10-17  passim,  129-31,  135, 
!37, 149, 208 ;  and  aristocrats,  86-7, 155, 
158-9,  181;  and  conservative-Gandhian 
positions,  32-4,  73-4,  76,  87-95,  101, 
138-9,  147,  192,  199,  251-4  passim;  and 
Swatantra' s  formal  doctrine,  14 1-3, 
188,  190,  191,  194,  199,  201-2;  on 
Pakistan,  51,  96;  and  communal  group- 
ings, 97,  103,  149;  language  policy  of, 
98, 203, 204-5;  and  pacifism,  87,  205-6; 
and  mergers  and  adjustments,  212,  213, 
214,  227,  228,  243;  and  DMK,  215-17, 
338;  on  Jan  Sangh,  219-20,  221 


355 


Index 


Rajasthan,  15-16,  18,  21,  22,  28,  37,  39, 
46,  52,  56,  59,  63,  118,  119,  121-6,  129, 
131,  137,  144,  151-4  passim,  161,  162-5, 
180-2,  168,  219-31  passim,  236-42 
passim,  262-7  passim,  283-4,  290,  33^, 
338,  339 

Ramgarh,  Raja  of,  47-8, 68, 72, 73, 1 12-13, 
114,  115,  117,  118,  121,  124,  127,  128, 
144,  145,  151,  152,  155,  157,  158,  161, 
165-71,  224,  262;  and  seat  for  Masani, 
181;  and  Jharkand  merger,  230;  leaves 
Swatantra,  229,  265;  and  Congress, 
237,  336;  see  also  Janata  Party 

Ram  Rajya  Parishad,  47,  50-1,  52,  53, 
56-8,  62,  83,  93,  101,  104,  105,  no, 
118;  and  Swatantra  Party,  231,  242 

Ranga,  N.  G.,  69-70, 72-3,77,78, 80,  82-3, 
101,  104-5,  106,  113,  114,  1 17-18,  120, 
127,  133, 147,  193,  196,  266;  and  aristo- 
crats, 84-6,  158;  and  peasant  populism, 
41,  89-90;  in  Congress  Party,  106-7; 
on  mergers  and  alliances,  80,  230;  on 
Jan  Sangh,  219;  in  Lok  Sabha,  239-41; 
in  Chittoor  by-election,  204,  218 

Rashtriya  Swayamsevak  Sangh,  47,  55, 
229 

Reddys,  16,  107 

religion,  Nehru's  outlook  on,  13,  29,  60; 
right  radicals'  outlook  on,  34-6,  50  ff.; 
and  India's  business  communities, 
38-9,  140-3;  and  the  Swatantra  Party, 
82-108  passim;  149-50,  191-2,  210-n, 
218  ff.,  243,  251,  264 

Republican  Party  of  India,  231-2 

Round  Table  Conferences,  28,  41,  82 

'Rulers'  Union',  13,  23 

Ruthnaswamy,  Prof.  M.,  132-3,  179,  230; 
social  outlook  of,  141-2,  191;  on  aristo- 
crats, 155-6,  157;  DMK  assistance  to, 
218 

Sahay,  K.  B.,  48,  112,  169 

Sampurnanand,  86,  100,  165,  237,  339 

Sanatan  Dharma  Sabha,  36 

satyagraha,  48,  249 

Saurashtra  Girasdars'  Association,  119 

Saurashtra  Khedut  Sangh,  72,  118 

Savarkar,  V.  D.,  35,  51,  57 

scheduled  castes,  31  ff.,  120, 125, 199-200, 

231-2 
secularism,  105,  149-50,  251,  256,  264 
Shastri,  P.  V.,  133-4,  239-4° 
Shenoy,  B.  R.,  136 


Shroff,  A.  D.,  66,  75,  137,  140,  145,  180 

Sikhs,  96,  97,  149;  in  Swatantra  and  Akali 
Dal,  1 14-15,  225-8;  see  also  Nagoke, 
Punjabi  suba 

Singh,  Ayuwan,  164,  165 

Singh,  B.  L.,  70,  135,  145 

Singh,  Basant,  115,  199-200,  225,  226 

Singh,  Bhairon,  221-2,  223,  242 

Singh,  Devi,  163,  164 

Singh,  Fateh,  228 

Singh,  Gurnam,  226,  228 

Singh,  Jaipal,  106,  230;  see  also  Jharkand 
Party 

Singh,  Jankinandan,  72, 113, 124, 161, 166, 
167,  168;  see  also  Jan  Congress 

Singh,  Kapur,  228 

Singh,  Tara,  204,  228 

social  policy,  n,  39;  of  the  Congress,  n, 
12,  13,  19,  29-30,  60-1;  of  Gandhians, 
39  ff.;  of  militant  Hindus,  35-6,  54,  57; 
of  RRP,  52,  57;  of  Swatantra  Party,  85, 
88-95,  96-9,  103-4,  105,  I4I-3,  150, 
189,  191-3,  199-200,  252,  255 

Sreenivasan,  M.  A.,  125,  135,  138-9 

Sukhadia,  M.,  123-4,  126 

Tamilnad  Toilers'  Party,  56,  111-12 
Tata,  J.  R.  D.,  173 
Tata,  House  of,  66,  75,  224 
Thevar,  U.  M.,  112,  328 
Tilak,  B.  G.,  35-6,  108 
Tinker,  H.,  53,  60,  100 
trusteeship,  17,  31-3,  41,  90,  91,  84,  156, 
192,  193,  195,  199,  320 

Udaipur,  House  of,  121,  126 
universal  suffrage,  137-8,  298-9 
Uttar  Pradesh,  1 13-14,  121, 122,  144,  154, 
161,  223,  263,  265,  266,  323 

Vaidya,  M.,  66,  68,  72,  75,  140,  157,  193 
Vajpayee,  A.  B.,  182,  223,  224 
Vanniyars,    111-12,    118,    119;    see   also 

Commonweal  Party,  Tamilnad  Toilers' 

Party,  Padayachi 
Vyas,  J.  N.,  131,  222-3,  236 

Wankaner,  Yuvraj  of,  126 

Weber,  M.,  16,  37-8,  41,  245,  246 

Weiner,  M.,  43,  58,  139 

West  Bengal,  39,  48,  132,  140,  173,  178-9 

Zamindara  League  (Punjab),  119 


356 


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